A  Short  History  of  the 
Great  War 


Dealing  particularly  with  its 

Military  and  Diplomatic  Aspects 

and  the  part  played  in  it  by 

The  United  States 


By 

William  L.  McPherson 

Military    Critic   of    the   New    York   Tribune, 
Author  of  "  The  Strategy  of  the  Great  War" 


? 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  and  London 

tTbe    fmtckerbocfcer    press 

1920 


Copyright  1920 

BY 
WILLIAM  L.   McPHERSON 


M 


PREFACE 

The  purpose  of  this  volume  is  to  offer  the  general 
reader  an  outline  story  of  the  War.  In  another  book, 
The  Strategy  of  the  Great  War,  I  have  endeavoured  to 
interpret  the  struggle  in  the  broader  sense — as  a  singular 
and  enormously  interesting  departure  from  previous  mili- 
tary experience, — due  to  the  revolutionary  conditions 
introduced  by  a  sudden  reversion  to  rigid  positional,  or 
trench  warfare.  The  strategy  of  the  war,  determined 
in  part  by  the  military  policies  of  the  belligerents,  but 
in  still  larger  part  by  conditions  over  which  the  general 
staffs  had  little  control,  is  a  study  in  itself. 

In  this  book  the  purely  strategical  aspects  of  the 
war  are  discussed  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to 
establish  the  true  relation  of  battles  and  campaigns  to 
one  another  and  to  the  ultimate  result.  The  main  idea 
is  to  give  a  clear  and  accurate  running  account  of  the 
war's  origin  and  progress. 

Full  military  details  are  still  lacking  and  many  early 
impressions  will  undoubtedly  be  corrected  after  the 
war  archives  of  the  belligerent  nations  begin  to  be  pub- 
lished. Critical  studies  of  the  battles  and  campaigns 
are  exceedingly  few.  I  will  cite  here  again,  as  an  ad- 
mirable example  of  work  of  this  sort,  General  Palat's 
(Pierre  Lehautcourt's)  uncompleted  series  of  volumes, 
entitled  La  Grande  Guerre  sur  le  Front  Occidental,  dealing 
with  the  1 914  campaign  in  France  and  Belgium.  Few 
German  war  records  are  as  yet  available.     The  General 

iii 


441071 


iv  Preface 

Staff's  series  of  pamphlets — about  thirty  in  number — 
entitled  Kriegsberichte  aus  dem  Grossen  Hauptquartier, 
is  highly  coloured  and  misleading.  It  is  also  lamentably 
short  on  routine  military  information. 

In  My  Thoughts  and  Actions,  which  appeared  in  the 
summer  of  19 19,  General  Ludendorfl  has  presented  an 
elaborate  defence  of  his  conduct  of  the  war.  It  con- 
tains much  interesting  information  as  to  the  tactics  of 
LudendorfFs  various  campaigns  and  as  to  his  relations 
with  Hindenburg.  But  since  its  main  purpose  is  to 
shift  responsibility  for  Germany's  defeat  to  other 
shoulders  than  his  own — particularly  to  those  of  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  and  the  civil  bureaucracy — its  extreme 
bias  must  be  discounted.  Even  on  his  own  showing 
Ludendorfl  was  accountable  for  the  fatal  blunder  of  the 
renewal  of  indiscriminate  U-boat  warfare  in  February, 
1917. 

Grand  Admiral  Tirpitz  has  written  a  volume  of 
memoirs  (suppressed  in  Germany,  but  published  in 
the  United  States),  in  which  he,  too,  exculpates  himself 
and  accuses  practically  all  the  other  German  leaders — 
military,  naval,  and  civil — of  gross  incompetency.  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg  is  bringing  out  a  work,  Betrachtungen 
zum  Welt-Kriege,  in  which  he  attempts  a  similar  exon- 
eration. These  writers  all  disagree  as  to  facts.  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg,  for  instance,  minimizes  the  importance 
of  the  famous  consultation  on  July  5,  19 14,  at  Potsdam, 
at  which  Germany's  Serbian  policy  was  shaped.  He 
says  that  on  that  day,  after  the  receipt  through  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  of  an  autograph  letter 
from  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  the  Kaiser  summoned 
him  and  Zimmermann  to  Potsdam,  and  that  no  others 
were  present  at  the  conference  which  followed.  Tirpitz 
says  that  General  Falkenhayn,  the  Prussian  Secretary  of 


Preface  v 

War,  and  General  Lyncker,  the  chief  of  the  military 
cabinet,  were  also  present.  Most  of  the  current  Ger- 
man contributors  to  the  literature  of  the  war  are  mani- 
festly more  interested  in  domestic  polemics  than  in  the 
establishment  of  the  truth. 

Authorities  consulted  on  the  Western  Front  cam- 
paigns include  Volumes  II  and  III  of  General  Palat's 
series  —  Liege-Mulhouse-Sarrebourg-Morhange  and  Ba- 
tailles  des  Ardennes  et  de  la  Sambre;  Louis  Madelin's 
The  Victory  of  the  Marne  (of  which  there  is  an  English 
translation);  Field  Marshal  Viscount  French's  1914; 
General  Sir  Frederick  Maurice's  Forty  Days  in  1914; 
Sefior  E.  Diaz-Retg's  The  Attack  on  Verdun  (of  which 
there  is  a  French  translation  from  the  Spanish) ;  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Paul  Azan's  The  Warfare  of  To-day; 
General  Zurlinden's  La  Guerre  de  Liberation;  General 
Malleterre's  valuable  work,  Les  Campagnes  de  1915; 
Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle's  The  British  Campaign  in 
France  and  Flanders,  1917;  Field  Marshal  Haig's  ex- 
ceptionally clear  and  dispassionate  reports  on  the  Battle 
of  the  Somme  and  on  the  succeeding  British  cam- 
paigns; General  Pershing's  report  on  the  operations  of 
the  American  Expeditionary  Army. 

For  the  Dardanelles- Gallipoli  operation,  Mr.  Henry 
W.  Nevinson's  volume,  The  Dardanelles  Campaign,  is  a 
model  of  its  kind.  Important  facts  bearing  on  the 
situation  on  the  Turkish  side  are  contained  in  Ambassa- 
dor Morgenthau's  Story  and  in  Mr.  George  F.  Schreiner's 
From  Berlin  to  Bagdad. 

The  best  first-hand  authority  on  conditions  on  the 
Russian  front  is  General  Basil  Gourko's  War  and 
Revolution  in  Russia,  1914-1917.  Mr.  Robert  Crozier 
Long's  Russian  Revolution  Aspects  is  also  of  value. 

Among  the  authoritative  books  on  the  naval  opera- 


vi  Preface 

tions  of  the  war  are  Admiral  Viscount  Jellicoe's  The 
Grand  Fleet,  1914-IQ16;  Mr.  Arthur  H.  Pollen's  The 
British  Navy  in  Battle,  and  Naval  Power  in  the  War,  by 
Lieutenant-Commander  Charles  Clifford  Gill,  U.  S.  N. 

Other  sources  made  use  of  were  the  Italian  General 
Staff's  reports  on  the  campaigns  of  191 8 ;  General  Allen- 
by's  report  on  the  Palestine  campaign;  General  Milne's 
report  on  the  final  Macedonian  campaign;  Mr.  Oman's 
The  Outbreak  of  the  War  of  1914-1918;  Prince  Karl 
Lichnowsky's  Memorandum;  Dr.  Wilhelm  Muhlon's 
diary;  Lieutenant-General  Baron  Freytag-Loring- 
hoven's  Deductions  from  the  World  War  and  A  Nation 
Trained  in  Arms  or  a  Militia? ;  Professor  Douglas  W. 
Johnson's  Topography  and  Strategy  in  the  War;  Professor 
John  Bach  McMaster's  The  United  States  in  the  World 
War  and  the  International  Cyclopedia  annuals  for  19 14, 
1915,  1916,  and  1917. 

The  facts  about  the  military  participation  of  the 
United  States  contained  in  Chapter  XLII,  were  drawn 
largely  from  The  War  with  Germany,  a  statistical  sum- 
mary made  by  Colonel  Leonard  P.  Ayres,  U.  S.  A.,  and 
published  by  the  Statistics  Branch  of  the  General  Staff 
of  the  Army. 


William  L.  McPherson. 


New  York, 

September  i,  1919. 


CONTENTS 


I. — The  Beginnings  of  the  War.    June 

28,  1914-AuGUST  5,  1914         .         .         1 

II. — Numbers  and  Strategy  .         .         .13 

III. — Belgium  and  the  Marne.     Aug.   3, 

1914-SEPT.  9,  1914         ...       19 

IV. — "The  Race  for  the  Sea" — Septem- 
ber 15,  1914-DECEMBER  1,  1914    .       38 

V. — Operations  on  the  Russian  Front. 

August  i,  1914-DECEMBER  31, 1 914     50 

VI. — Austria's  Failures  in  Serbia. 
August  12,  1914 — December  14, 
1914 60 

VII. — Turkey  Enters  the  War.    October 

29,  1914-DECEMBER  31,  1914  .         .       63 

VIII. — Germany  Loses  her  Colonies. 
August  25,  1914-DECEMBER  31, 
1914 68 

IX. — Naval  Operations  in  1914.    August 

5,  1914-DECEMBER  31,  1914     .         .       72 

X. — The     Russian     Winter     Campaign. 

January  i,  1915-MAY  i,  1915  .         .       80 

XI. — The  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  Cam- 
paign. February  19,  1915-DECEM- 
ber  31,  1915  ....       87 


viii  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGB 

XII. — The  Russian  Retreat.    May  i,  1915- 

October  1,  1915    .         .         .         .103 

XIII. — Italy  Enters  the  War.      May   24, 

1915-DECEMBER,  31,  1915  .112 

XIV. — The  Conquest  of  Serbia.    October  4, 

1915-DECEMBER  25,  1915  .     121 

XV. — "Nibbling"  on  the  Western  Front. 
January      i,    1915-DECEMBER   31, 

1915  .        ...;..        .        .  133 

XVI. — Asiatic    and    Colonial    Campaigns. 

January  i,  1915-DECEMBER  31,  191 5     145 

XVII. — Naval  Operations,  191 5  .  152 

XVIII. — Neutral  Rights  at  Sea.  The  "  Lusi- 
tania.  "  August  3,  1914-DECEMBER 
31,  1915 156 

XIX. — Verdun.  February  21,   1916-DECEM- 

ber  16,  1916  ....     168 

XX. — Russia's      Last      Real      Offensive. 

January  i,  I9i6-September  1,1916     181 

XXI. — The  Somme.       July  i,  1916-NovEM- 

ber  18,  1916  .         .         .         .191 

XXII. — The  Trentino  and  Gorizia.    May  14, 

1916-NovEMBER  5,  1916         .         .     201 

XXIII. — The  Sacrifice  of  Rumania.    August 

28, 1916-DECEMBER31, 1916    .         .     207 

XXIV. — Asiatic  and  Colonial  Campaigns. 
January    ii,    I9i6-December    31, 

1916  ......     220 

XXV. — The     Battle     of     Jutland — Other 

Naval  Operations  of  1 916    .         .  226 


Contents  ix 

CHAPTER  PAC« 

XXVI. — America  Drifts  Toward  War.    Janu- 
ary i,  1916-DECEMBER31, 1916  237 

XXVII. — Germany  Defies  America.    January 

31,  1917-JuNE  30,  1917  .  .245 

XXVIII. — Russia  in  Revolution.     March  ii, 

1917-December  31,  1917        .         .     253 

XXIX. — West  Front  Operations,  1917.   Janu- 
ary 5,  1917-DECEMBER  5,  191 7  262 

XXX. — The    Isonzo-Caporetto.      May     12, 

1917-DECEMBER  31,  1917        .         .     282 

XXXI. — Balkan  and  Asiatic  Campaigns  of 

191 7.  January  i,  1917-DECEMBER 

io,  1917 290 

XXXII. — Submarine  and  Naval  Operations, 

1917 295 

XXXIII. — The    Dismemberment       of    Russia. 

January  i,  1918-DECEMBER31, 191 8    299 

XXXIV. — Ludendorff's  Channel  Port  Offen- 
sives— St.  Quentin,  March  21, 1918; 
Lys  Valley,  April  9,  191 8   .         .     309 

XXXV. — LudendOrff's  Paris  Offensives. 
Aisne-Marne,  May  27,  1918.  Las- 
signy,  June  9,  1918       .  .     327 

XXXVI.— The  Turn  of  the  Tide.  Luden- 
dorff's Fifth  Offensive,  July  15, 

191 8.  Foch's  Counter-Offensive, 
July  18,  1918  -334 

XXXVII. — The  Decision  in  the  West.    August 

8,  1918-NovEMBER  11,  1918  .     342 


Contents 


CHAPTER 


XXXVIII. — Italy's  Inspiring  Recovery,  June  15, 

1918-NovEMBER  5,  1918         .         .     359 

XXXIX. — The  End  in  the  Balkans.     July  7, 

I9i8-September  30,  1 91 8       .         .     367 

XL. — Turkey  Goes  to  the  Wall.    Febru- 
ary 28,  1918-OcTOBER  31,  1918     .     372 

XLI. — Naval   Operations,    191 8.      German 


XLIL 


Naval  Losses 

•     378 

-America's  Part  in  the  War 

.     382 

Appendix  I      .         . 

•     393 

Appendix  II     . 

•     396 

Appendix  III   . 

•     399 

Index      

•     403 

A  Short  History  of  the  Great  War 


A   Short   History    of 
The   Great  War 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  WAR.      JUNE  28,    I914- 
AUGUST   5,    I914 

The  Serajevo  assassinations  on  June  28,  1914, 
ushered  in  the  World  War.  They  were  in  no  sense  its 
cause.  They  merely  offered  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  a  pretext  for  satisfying  a  long-standing 
grudge  against  Serbia. 

The  statesmen  who  ruled  at  Vienna  in  the  name  of 
the  senile  Francis  Joseph  had  no  particular  desire  to 
avenge  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand 
and  his  morganatic  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg. 
The  heir  apparent  was  cordially  disliked  by  the  aged 
Emperor  and  in  Austrian  court  and  military  circles. 
The  Hungarians  hated  and  feared  him.  He  was  de- 
voted to  his  wife,  who  was  a  commoner  and  a  Czech, 
and  his  fixed  idea  was  to  create  a  Hapsburg  Slav  state, 
to  be  admitted  into  the  Empire  on  equal  terms  with 
Austria  and  Hungary.  His  scheme  was  known  as 
"trialism."  It  enraged  the  Magyars,  who  saw  that 
under  it  Hungary  would  be  stripped  of  territory  and 


2  "<  •;';•      *; .. : ;  The  Great  War  [iqhi 

j5res&ge':  kridj  wpUt&  Jose  the  commanding  position 
which  she  had  long  held  in  the  councils  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  Austrian  power,  as  well  as  Hungarian,  was 
based  on  the  exploitation  of  suppressed  races.  But 
Hungary  was  the  harsher  and  more  exacting  master. 

The  ruling  classes  at  Vienna  and  Budapest  welcomed 
Francis  Ferdinand's  taking  off.  It  has  been  charged 
since  the  war  that  the  Serajevo  assassinations  were 
accelerated  by  Austrian  and  Hungarian  politicians, 
interested  in  getting  rid  of  the  heir  apparent.  The 
circumstances  of  the  trial  of  the  assassins  and  their 
alleged  accomplices  created  much  suspicion.  The 
principals  were  let  off  with  light  sentences.  The  pro- 
ceedings were  in  camera.  The  testimony  adduced  by 
the  Austro-Hungarian  secret  service  to  connect  Serbian 
officials  or  patriotic  societies  with  the  crime  was  practi- 
cally worthless. 

But  Vienna  and  Budapest  jumped  at  the  chance  to 
lay  the  murder  at  the  door  of  the  Serbian  Government 
and  to  frame  demands  on  Serbia  which  were  as  in- 
sincere as  they  were  provocative.  Austria-Hungary 
needed  a  plausible  pretext  for  attacking  her  tiny  neigh- 
bour.    At  last  she  had  found  one. 

Serbia  was  a  hindrance  to  the  realization  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  ambitions  in  the  Balkans.  She  blocked  the 
way  to  Salonica.  In  1908,  when  Count  Aerenthal 
nullified  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  by  annexing  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  Serbia  had  made  a  violent  protest.  She 
would  have  drawn  the  sword,  if  Russia  had  been  ready 
to  support  her.  But  Russia  was  still  recovering  from 
the  effects  of  her  defeat  by  Japan  in  1904-05  and  would 
not  give  the  signal. 

The  incorporation  of  1,250,000  more  Southern  Slavs 
into  the  Hapsburg  Empire  gave  new  life  to  the  agi- 


[i9i4i       The  Beginnings  of  the  War  3 

tation  for  Southern  Slav  unity  and  independence. 
Austria-Hungary  had  to  contend  with  this  agitation 
in  the  South,  the  Czech  agitation  in  Bohemia  and 
Moravia,  and  Polish  unrest  in  Galicia.  The  suppressed 
Slavic  elements  constituted  an  obstructive  bloc  in  the 
Austrian  Reichstag  and  made  life  miserable  for  the 
government,  which  was  forced  to  rule  for  the  greater 
part  of  the  time  without  parliamentary  sanction. 

The  outcome  of  the  Balkan  wars  increased  the  irri- 
tation of  the  ruling  classes  in  the  Dual  Monarchy. 
Serbia  emerged  from  those  wars  triumphant  over  both 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  and  greatly  extended  her  borders. 
Austria-Hungary  was  enraged  at  the  partition  made  in 
the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  and  wanted  to  intervene  by 
force  to  prevent  Serbia's  expansion.  She  confided  to 
Italy  in  191 3  her  wish  to  attack  Serbia.  But  Italy 
declined  to  sanction  the  undertaking.  This  refusal 
ended  the  matter,  for  under  the  terms  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  neither  Austria-Hungary  nor  Italy  could 
take  aggressive  measures  against  any  of  the  Balkan 
States  without  first  consulting  the  other  and  giving 
guarantees  of  compensation  in  case  the  territorial 
status  quo  in  the  Balkans  should  be  altered.  Germany 
was  also  probably  reluctant  to  start  a  European  war 
in  19 1 3.  That  was  the  year  of  her  special  levy  on 
capital  for  war  purposes.  She  was  just  taking  the 
final  step  in  military  preparedness. 

But  Germany,  as  well  as  Austria-Hungary,  was 
headed  toward  war.  For  the  latter  war  was  a  necessity 
growing  out  of  domestic  politics.  The  Dual  Monarchy 
could  not  hope  to  recover  stability  and  tranquillity 
until  the  Slav  agitation  was  crushed.  For  Germany 
war  was  a  means  of  restoring  her  shrunken  international 
prestige.     Since  the  Agadir  venture  and  the  Algeciras 


4  The  Great  War  fcwl 

settlement,  Germany's  position  in  Europe  had  steadily 
grown  more  and  more  uncomfortable.  Her  blustering 
diplomacy  had  driven  Great  Britain  into  the  Triple 
Entente.  Italy  strayed  away  from  the  Triple  Alliance 
when  she  made  war  on  Turkey  in  191 1.  She  was  no 
longer  a  dependable  ally,  but  a  neutral,  drifting  back 
into  friendly  relations  with  Russia  and  France.  Ger- 
many was  distrusted  on  all  sides.  Her  ambitions  for 
world  power  were  being  inflamed  by  a  sedulous  Pan- 
German  propaganda.  Her  leaders  felt  that  it  was 
almost  time  to  get  results  out  of  her  superior  military 
resources  and  organization. 

To  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  the  Serajevo 
assassinations  were  therefore  a  godsend.  The  mur- 
derers and  their  alleged  associates  were  all  subjects  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  the  crime  was  committed  on 
its  soil.  But  it  was  possible  to  charge  the  conspiracy 
to  the  activities  of  the  Serbian  patriotic  society,  the 
Narodna  Odbrana,  which  for  some  years  had  been  en- 
gaged in  Pan-Serb  propaganda.  Using  this  accusa- 
tion as  a  pretext  for  excessive  demands  for  reparation, 
Serbia  could  be  forced  either  to  humiliate  herself  in 
the  eyes  of  the  subject  Slav  peoples  or  to  accept  a 
quarrel  of  Austria's  making. 

An  indispensable  preliminary,  from  the  Austrian 
point  of  view,  was  to  secure  a  positive  understanding 
with  Germany.  There  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that 
that  was  achieved  as  early  as  July  5th.  Vienna  carried 
her  case  to  Berlin  and  was  told  there  to  go  as  far  as  she 
liked.  Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador  to 
London,  says  in  his  famous  Memorandum: 

Subsequently  [that  is,  after  his  visit  in  Berlin  early 
in  July]  I  learned  that  at  the  decisive  conversation 


[19X41        The  Beginnings  of  the  War  5 

at  Potsdam  on  July  5th  the  inquiry  addressed  to 
us  by  Vienna  found  absolute  assent  among  all  per- 
sonages in  authority.  Indeed,  they  added  that  there 
would  be  no  harm  if  a  war  with  Russia  would  result. 

Dr.  Wilhelm  Muhlon  testifies  in  his  Diary: 

Immediately  before  the  Kaiser  started  on  his  trip 
to  Norway  there  was  a  conference  in  Berlin  with  the 
Austrians.  The  Kaiser  had  declared  to  the  Austrians 
that  this  time  he  would  go  with  them  through  thick 
and  thin. 

Count  Lerchenfeld,  the  Bavarian  Minister  to  Prussia, 
wrote  on  July  18,  19 14,  to  Count  Hertling,  the  Bavarian 
Minister  of  State : 

The  opinion  here  is  general  that  this  is  Austria's 
hour  of  fate.  For  this  reason,  in  reply  to  the  inquiry 
from  Vienna,  the  declaration  was  immediately  made 
here  than  any  line  of  action  upon  which  Austria  may 
resolve  will  be  agreed  to,  even  at  the  risk  of  war  with 
Russia.  The  free  hand  which  was  given  to  Count 
Berchtold's  chef  de  cabinet,  Count  Hoyos,  who  arrived 
in  Berlin  to  deliver  the  detailed  memorandum,  was 
so  extensive  that  the  Austrian  Government  was 
authorized  to  negotiate  with  Bulgaria  regarding 
her  joining  the  Triple  Alliance. 

Corroborating  all  these  is  Ambassador  Morgenthau's 
report  of  a  conversation  he  had  with  Baron  Wangen- 
heim  in  Constantinople,  in  August,  1914.  Wangen- 
heim  said  that  he  had  himself  been  present  at  the 
conference  on  July  5th.  It  was  attended  by  several 
other  ambassadors,  by  the  heads  of  the  General  Staff 


6  The  Great  War  [&$ 

of  the  Army  and  the  General  Staff  of  the  Navy,  by 
bankers  and  industrial  chiefs.  The  Kaiser  asked  them 
all  if  they  were  ready  for  war  and  all  said  "yes," 
except  the  bankers,  who  asked  for  two  weeks'  time  in 
which  to  adjust  their  foreign  accounts. 

The  Austro-Hungarian-German  understanding  was 
clear-cut  and  precise.  Vienna  was  to  issue  an  ultima- 
tum to  Serbia  containing  demands  so  exorbitant  that 
Serbia  could  hardly  accept  them.  In  case  of  non- 
acceptance  or  qualified  acceptance,  war  was  to  be  de- 
clared. If  any  Entente  Power  objected  and  proposed 
mediation  by  the  European  concert,  Austria-Hungary 
was  to  contend  that  the  affair  was  one  concerning  only 
herself  and  Serbia.  She  was  to  promise  not  to  annex 
any  Serbian  territory,  as,  indeed,  she  was  practically 
compelled  to  do  by  her  obligations  to  Italy  under 
the  secret  Triple  Alliance  Treaty.  If  Germany  were 
asked  to  take  part  in  a  mediation,  she  would  say  that 
she  could  not  consent  to  haling  her  ally  before  "a  Euro- 
pean areopagus"  for  pursuing  a  just  grievance  against 
Serbia.  She  would  advise  moderation  and  a  "localiza- 
tion" of  the  disturbance. 

If  Russia,  resenting  the  attempt  to  humiliate  Serbia, 
should  mobilize  against  Austria-Hungary,  Germany 
would  hold  that  such  mobilization  was  a  threat  directed 
against  herself  and  would  also  mobilize.  And  mobiliza- 
tion, from  the  German  point  of  view,  meant  war. 

Meanwhile  a  comedy  was  to  be  staged  to  deceive 
the  Entente.  The  Kaiser  was  to  go  on  his  Norwegian 
cruise;  Moltke,  the  chief  of  the  German  General  Staff, 
and  Jagow,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
were  to  leave  Berlin  for  short  vacations.  The  German 
Foreign  Office  was  to  plead  complete  ignorance  of  the 
terms  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum.     Jagow, 


[i9X4]       The  Beginnings  of  the  War  7 

according  to  Dr.  Muhlon,  confided  to  a  friend  that  he 
"thought  he  could  make  a  better  impression  in  Paris 
and  St.  Petersburg  with  a  statement  that  he  never 
knew  the  contents  of  the  note." 

The  presentation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum 
to  Serbia  was  cunningly  timed.  It  was  dispatched 
on  July  23d  and  an  answer  was  required  by  6  p.m., 
on  July  25th.  On  July  24th,  President  Poincare  and 
Premier  Viviani,  who  was  also  the  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  had  just  started  back  to  Paris,  after  a 
visit  of  courtesy  to  St.  Petersburg.  Paris  itself  was 
absorbed  by  the  Caillaux  trial.  Great  Britain  was  in 
the  thick  of  the  crisis  over  the  enforcement  of  the  Irish 
Home  Rule  law.  Ulster  had  defied  the  London  Gov- 
ernment and  civil  war  seemed  imminent.  The  Teuton 
plotters  evidently  calculated  that  the  Entente  Powers 
would  be  unable  to  interfere  diplomatically  to  protect 
Serbia  before  war  between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary 
had  become  an  accomplished  fact. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum  was,  in  effect,  a 
notice  to  Serbia  that  she  must  stamp  out  any  and  all 
Pan-Serbian  propaganda  and  discipline  all  Serbians 
who  might  have  been  in  any  way  engaged  in  it.  Aus- 
trian official  collaboration  in  this  work  was  also  insisted 
upon.  Serbia  was  to  remove  from  the  military  and 
civil  services  all  functionaries  guilty  of  propaganda 
against  Austria-Hungary  or  designated  as  guilty  by 
the  Vienna  Government.  Austria,  in  brief,  demanded 
an  abdication  of  Serbian  sovereignty. 

Acting  on  the  advice  of  the  Entente  Powers,  the 
Serbian  Cabinet  prepared  an  extremely  conciliatory 
reply.  It  granted  most  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
demands  and  made  only  slight  reservations  as  to  the 
others.     It  asked  for  a  restatement  of  a  few  obscure 


8  The  Great  War  [z9z4] 

points  in  the  note  and  offered  to  refer  any  questions 
left  outstanding  to  the  Hague  Tribunal. 

No  state  ever  showed  more  moderation  under  pro- 
vocation than  Serbia  did.  But  the  Austrian  programme 
had  been  determined  on  in  advance.  Baron  Giesl, 
the  diplomatic  representative  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
stationed  at  Belgrade,  received  the  Serbian  reply  at 
5.45  p.m.  on  July  25th.  Within  a  few  minutes  notice 
was  given  to  Premier  Pasitch  that  the  communication 
was  unsatisfactory.  At  6.30  p.m.  the  Austrian  Lega- 
tion Staff  left  Belgrade.  The  Minister  had  not  taken 
the  trouble  to  wire  the  note  to  Vienna  and  await  in- 
structions. Hostilities  began  on  July  26th.  Austria- 
Hungary  formally  declared  war  on  July  28th. 

The  vital  question  from  the  beginning  had  been 
how  far  Russia  would  go  to  protect  Serbia.  Russia's 
course  was  open  and  straightforward.  Her  people 
had  recovered  from  the  depression  following  the  Japan- 
ese War.  Defeat  in  the  East  had  led  the  government 
to  turn  its  attention  again  to  the  Balkans.  The  Bal- 
kan wars  had  helped  Russia,  while  injuring  Austria- 
Hungary.  Popular  feeling  in  the  Empire  demanded 
a  demonstration  of  some  sort  on  Serbia's  behalf. 
Otherwise  Russian  prestige  in  the  Balkans  would  be 
shattered. 

About  the  middle  of  July,  Sazonoff ,  the  Russian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  had  told  the  British  Ambas- 
sador to  Russia  that  "anything  in  the  shape  of  an 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Belgrade  could  not  leave  Russia 
indifferent  and  she  might  be  forced  to  take  some 
precautionary  military  measures."  With  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador,  who  delivered  a  copy  of  the 
ultimatum  on  July  24th,  he  was  equally  outspoken. 
Count   Szapary  reported   to   Vienna  that   Sazonoff's 


[1914J       The  Beginnings  of  the  War  9 

"attitude  was  throughout  unaccommodating  and  hos- 
tile." Count  Pourtales,  the  German  Ambassador  to 
St.  Petersburg,  reported  to  Berlin  that  on  the  same  day 
Sazonoff  declared  to  him  "most  positively  that  Russia 
could  not  permit  under  any  circumstances  that  the 
Serbo- Austrian  difficulty  should  be  settled  between  the 
parties  concerned  alone."  But  the  latter  was  the  only 
sort  of  settlement  which  Berlin  and  Vienna  were  willing 
to  tolerate. 

Diplomatic  efforts  between  July  26th  and  August  1st 
to  head  off  war  by  some  sort  of  joint  European  media- 
tion were  predestined  to  failure.  So  far  as  the  two 
Teuton  Powers  were  concerned,  they  were  a  by-play 
intended  chiefly  to  mystify  the  British  Government. 
France  and  Russia  both  distrusted  German  intentions. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  was  more  optimistic  and  his  illusions 
were  furthered  by  the  fact  that  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor at  London,  Prince  Lichnowsky,  an  honest  and  high- 
minded  diplomat,  had  been  kept  in  ignorance  of  what 
was  actually  going  on  in  Berlin. 

On  July  26th  Austria-Hungary  mobilized  twelve 
of  her  first  line  army  corps — eight  completely  and  four 
partially.  On  July  29th  Russia  mobilized  in  the  mili- 
tary districts  of  Odessa,  Kiev,  Moscow,  and  Kazan. 
Berlin  had  been  informed  in  advance  of  this  move, 
with  a  notice  that  there  was  no  intention  in  it  of  aggres- 
sion against  Germany.  On  the  same  day  Count  Pour- 
tales  served  notice  on  Sazonoff  that  "any  further 
development  of  Russian  military  preparations  would 
compel  us  to  take  counter-measures,  and  that  meant 
war." 

Since  Russia  could  not  mobilize  effectively  against 
Austria-Hungary  without  calling  out  the  troops  in 
the  Poland  district,  which  faced  Germany  as  well  as 


io  The  Great  War  [1914] 

Austria-Hungary,  a  completer  mobilization  was  or- 
dered on  July  30th.  Germany  intended  to  make  this 
an  excuse  for  a  mobilization  against  both  Russia  and 
France.  On  July  31st  she  sent  an  ultimatum,  requir- 
ing Russia  to  stop  within  twelve  hours  "every  measure 
of  war  against  us  and  against  Austria-Hungary."  The 
next  day  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia. 

The  Berlin- Vienna  plot  had  been  carried  out  to  the 
last  detail.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  at  the  last 
moment,  Austria-Hungary  showed  signs  of  weakening. 
These  may  have  been  intended  merely  as  a  climax  in 
deception.  If  they  were  genuine,  they  reflected  the 
eleventh-hour  realization  of  the  Austrian  General  Staff 
that  it  was  hardly  prepared  to  fight  Serbia  on  one  front 
and  Russia  on  another.  At  any  rate,  Vienna,  under 
Entente  pressure,  began  to  admit  that  some  discussion 
of  the  terms  of  the  Serbian  note  was  possible  and  also 
that  Russian  mobilization  need  not  be  interpreted  as 
involving  war.  But  by  this  time — late  on  July  31st — 
the  German  Government  had  clinched  war  by  declar- 
ing practically  that  Russian  mobilization  against  either 
Germany  or  Austria-Hungary  constituted  a  casus  belli. 

It  didn't  suit  the  German  General  Staff  to  mobilize 
against  Russia  alone.  France  must  be  attacked  and 
destroyed  first.  Berlin  could  never  have  imagined 
that  France  would  fail  to  live  up  to  her  obligations  to 
Russia.  Nevertheless,  it  was  desirable  to  draw  France 
in  at  once.  So  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris  was  in- 
structed to  inform  the  French  Government,  if  it  exhibited 
a  desire  to  remain  neutral,  that  neutrality  could  be  pur- 
chased by  the  surrender  to  Germany,  for  the  period  of 
the  war,  of  the  frontier  fortresses  of  Verdun  and  Toul. 

France  did  not  desire  to  remain  neutral.  She  mobil- 
ized on  August  1st,  but  neither  declared  war  nor  com- 


[iPMi       The  Beginnings  of  the  War         n 

mitted  any  hostile  act.  The  German  Government  was, 
therefore,  forced  to  invent  some  fictitious  acts  of  ag- 
gression, and  use  them  as  the  basis  for  a  declaration  of 
war  against  France.  This  declaration  was  made  on 
August  3d.  Thereafter,  Germany  was  free  to  develop 
her  long  elaborated  plans  for  an  invasion  of  France. 

Great  Britain's  attitude  was  still  undefined.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  had  been  the  most  sanguine  supporter 
of  the  futile  diplomacy  of  mediation.  On  August  1st 
he  still  had  some  faith  in  Germany's  willingness  to 
forego  war.  After  Berlin  had  taken  the  final  step,  he 
began  to  have  questionings  as  to  the  extent  of  Great 
Britain's  obligations  to  France  and  Russia,  particularly 
to  France.  Self-interest  and  self-preservation  both 
required  Great  Britain  to  draw  the  sword  against  Ger- 
many. But  the  Asquith  government  had  strongly 
pacifist  tendencies.  It  had  kept  Great  Britain  unready 
for  war,  and  now  shrank  from  facing  the  consequences 
of  unreadiness. 

Fortunately  Germany  herself  resolved  British  hesita- 
tions. The  German  General  Staff  had  decided  to 
attack  France  through  Belgium.  On  August  2d  the 
German  Government  demanded  free  passage  across 
Belgian  territory  for  the  German  armies.  The  Belgian 
Government  refused  this  unwarranted  demand.  On 
August  3d  Berlin  issued  an  ultimatum  to  Belgium  and 
followed  it  by  violating  the  Belgian  border. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  had  now  a  reason  for  siding  with 
Germany's  enemies  which  could  not  be  challenged. 
Great  Britain  had  guaranteed  the  territorial  integrity 
and  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Germany — succeeding  to 
the  diplomatic  contracts  of  Prussia — was  a  co-guarantor. 
Great  Britain  was  morally  bound  to  defend  Belgium.  It 
was  also  to  her  obvious  interest  to  do  so.     Having  once 


12  The  Great  War  [1914] 

assumed  that  attitude,  war  with  Germany  was  sure  to 
follow. 

Great  Britain  protested  against  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  and  asked  for  assurances  that 
Germany  would  not  persist  in  it.  Germany  had  no 
idea  of  giving  such  assurances.  The  British  demand 
hardened  on  August  4th  into  an  ultimatum,  expiring 
at  midnight.  No  assurances  having  been  received  from 
Berlin,  Great  Britain  formally  declared  war  against 
Germany  on  August  5th. 


CHAPTER  II 

NUMBERS  AND   STRATEGY 

When  on  the  evening  of  August  4,  19 14,  Sir  Edward 
Goschen,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  called  on 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  he  found  the  latter  in  a  tremendous 
state  of  excitement.  The  Chancellor  expressed  the 
greatest  astonishment  that  Great  Britain  should  think 
of  going  to  war  just  for  "a  scrap  of  paper" — meaning 
her  engagement  to  uphold  Belgian  neutrality.  He 
accused  Great  Britain  of  "striking  a  man  from  behind 
while  he  was  fighting  for  his  life  against  two  assailants." 
And  he  added  with  a  sneer:  "At  what  price  will  that 
compact  [the  Belgian  treaty]  have  been  kept?  Has 
the  British  Government  thought  of  that?" 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  being  only  a  civilian  and  living 
in  the  unreal  atmosphere  of  Continental  diplomacy, 
may  have  been  startled  by  the  idea  that  German  policy 
had  driven  Great  Britain  into  full  partnership  in  the 
Entente.  But  the  German  military  leaders  could  have 
had  no  illusions  as  to  the  effect  of  their  adventure  in 
Belgium.  They  had  counted  the  cost.  They  were 
willing  to  fight  Great  Britain  rather  than  forego  the 
advantages  of  access  through  Belgium  to  the  open 
plain  of  Northern  France. 

At  first  glance  it  seemed  as  if  Germany  had  recklessly 
plunged  into  a  war  in  which  the  odds  were  enormously 
against   her.     She  had  created   an   enemy   coalition 

13 


M  The  Great  War 

comprising  three  Great  Powers — France,  Great  Brit- 
ain, and  Russia — and  three  smaller  states — Belgium, 
Serbia,  and  Montenegro  (for  Montenegro  was  certain 
to  act  with  Serbia).  Portugal  had  a  military  alliance 
with  Great  Britain.  So  had  Japan.  These  two  coun- 
tries were  to  be  added  to  Germany's  enemies.  Austria- 
Hungary  was  the  only  ally  Berlin  had  in  sight.  Italy 
was  uncertain  and  might  not  remain  "benevolently 
neutral,' '  as  the  Triple  Alliance  treaty  required  her 
to  do  in  case  either  or  both  her  associates  engaged  in  a 
war  of  aggression.  Rumania,  formerly  a  satellite  of 
the  Teuton  Powers,  had  drifted  away  from  them  in 
recent  years  almost  as  far  as  Italy  had. 

The  two  Teuton  empires  were  greatly  outnumbered 
at  the  start,  and  remained  outnumbered.  Turkey 
joined  them  in  the  fall  of  19 14.  But  Italy  joined  the 
Entente  in  May,  191 5.  Bulgaria  sided  with  them  in 
October,  1 91 5.  Rumania  sided  with  the  Entente  in 
August,  1916,  and  Greece  in  the  summer  of  1917. 
When  Russia  dropped  out  of  the  war  the  United  States 
came  in. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  man-power  equation, 
based  on  population  returns  for  the  years  immediately 
preceding,    was : 

The  Teuton  Powers 

Germany 68,000,000 

Austria-Hungary 52,000,000 

Total 120,000,000 

The  Entente  Powers 

France  (without  her  colonies) 39, 600  000 

The  United  Kingdom 46,000,000 


Numbers  and  Strategy  15 

Canada,    Australia,    New    Zealand,    and 

South  Africa 20,000,000 

Belgium 7,500,000 

Serbia  and  Montenegro 3,500,000 

Portugal 6,000,000 

Russia 178,000,000 

Total 300,600,000 

Japan  entered  the  war  on  August  23,  19 14.  But 
her  man  power  is  not  included  in  the  Entente  totai, 
because  she  confined  her  operations  to  Asia.  She  sent 
no  troops  to  Europe  and  only  a  few  of  the  smaller 
units  of  her  navy  to  the  Mediterranean.  On  the  other 
hand,  Great  Britain  was  able  to  recruit  more  than 
one  million  men  in  her  Indian  possessions.  These 
were  used  chiefly  in  Mesopotamia  and  Palestine  (many 
of  them  in  the  non-combatant  services).  A  few  East 
Indian  divisions  fought  in  France  in  the  fall  of  19 14, 
but  the  climate  was  too  severe  for  them.  France 
drew  on  her  African  colonies  for  more  than  five  hundred 
thousand  first  line  troops  and  auxiliaries.  The  best 
of  these  were  employed  regularly  on  the  Western  Front. 

In  19 1 5  the  numerical  equation  stood: 

Quadruple  Alliance 

Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 120,000,000 

Turkey 21,000,000 

Bulgaria 4,750,000 

Total 145,750,000 

Entente 

Members  in  1914 300,600,000 

Italy 35,000,000 

Total 335.6oo.ooo 


i6  The  Great  War 

Germany  and  her  associates  were  always  outnum- 
bered more  than  two  to  one.  The  defection  of  Russia 
did  not  lower  the  ratio,  materially,  in  view  of  the  acces- 
sion of  the  United  States,  Rumania,  and  Greece  and 
the  steadily  increasing  supply  of  British  and  French 
colonials. 

Yet  the  German  General  Staff  had  foreseen  an  enemy 
preponderance  in  crude  man  power,  and  had  frankly 
discounted  it.  The  Germans  knew  that  there  were 
other  factors  in  modern  war  more  important  than 
unorganized  numbers.  Numbers  could  count  little 
against  superior  military  organization,  unified  leader- 
ship, better  trained  troops,  heavier  guns,  and  completer 
technical  equipment.  Germany  was  thoroughly  pre- 
pared for  war.  No  one  of  the  Entente  belligerents, 
except  France,  was  even  moderately  well  prepared  for  it. 

The  German  General  Staff  counted  on  a  relatively 
short  war.  For  a  European  war  lasting  three  years — 
and  against  the  enemies  in  sight  at  the  beginning  of  it 
— Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  had  ample  man 
power.  Their  strength  could  be  fully  developed  within 
twelve  months.  On  the  other  side  only  France's 
could  be.  Great  Britain  could  not  be  ready  to  fight 
on  a  large  scale  until  the  summer  of  191 6.  Russia, 
owing  to  her  isolated  position  and  her  backward  condi- 
tion industrially,  would  never  be  able  to  make  effective 
use  of  her  vast  numbers.  Italy,  after  she  entered  the 
war,  would  be  held  down  to  the  defensive  or  to  inef- 
fectual offensives,  because  of  military  difficulties  she 
faced  on  her  northern  frontier. 

Having  her  military  resources  well  in  hand,  Germany 
also  expected  to  fight  a  war  of  elimination.  She  tried 
to  crush  France  in  19 14,  and  failed.  But  she  extin- 
guished Belgium.    She  overran  Serbia  and  Montenegro 


Numbers  and  Strategy  17 

in  191 5  and  Rumania  in  191 6.  She  put  Russia  out  of 
the  lists  in  19 17.  Had  she  not  unnecessarily  dragged 
the  United  States  into  the  war  at  the  same  time,  she 
might  have  carried  the  struggle  against  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Italy  to  a  draw  (which  would  have  meant 
a  substantial  victory  for  her)  before  her  military  strength 
had  been  exhausted. 

Her  advantages  in  the  way  of  geographical  position, 
rapidity  of  mobilization,  centralized  command,  pos- 
session of  the  strategic  offensive,  larger  munitions  sup- 
plies, and  superiority  in  heavy  artillery  and  machine 
guns,  more  than  offset  the  Allied  advantage  in  potential 
man  power.  Bethmann-Hollweg  ludicrously  distorted 
the  facts  when  he  pictured  Germany  in  19 14  as 
a  man  being  stabbed  in  the  back  by  Great  Britain 
while  he  was  fighting  for  life  with  two  other  assailants 
— Russia  and  France.  There  was  never  any  serious 
shortage  of  German  troops  on  the  Western  Front  until 
September,  191 8.  And  Germany  always  possessed  a 
decided  military  superiority  on  the  Eastern  Front. 

The  general  strategic  objectives  of  the  two  groups  of 
combatants  were  simple  enough,  in  the  broader  sense. 
It  was  Germany's  plan  to  dispose  of  France  first  and 
then  to  turn  east  and  crush  Russia.  France  was  not 
disposed  of  in  the  great  onrush  which  ended  with  the 
First  Battle  of  the  Marne.  But  she  was  pinned  down 
for  four  years  to  an  uncomfortable  defensive  on  her 
own  soil. 

After  19 14,  it  was  Germany's  natural  policy  to  fight 
a  holding  battle  in  the  West,  to  destroy  Russia,  and 
to  bring  into  being  that  Mittel-Europa  of  which  the 
Pan-Germans  had  dreamed.  She  did  create  in  19 15 
and  191 6  a  German  Empire  extending  from  the  Gulf 
of  Riga,  on  the  Baltic,  to  the  mouths  of  the  Dan- 


18  The  Great  War 

ube  and  thence  to  the  Caucasus,  the  lower  Tigris, 
and  the  Sinai  Desert.  After  the  Russian  collapse  she 
added  to  it  Finland,  Esthonia,  Livonia,  Lithuania,  the 
Ukraine,  the  Crimea,  and  Trans-Caucasia.  The  way- 
was  opened  for  German  penetration  to  the  Urals,  to 
Bokhara  and  Herat. 

But  the  German  military  leaders  kept  turning  back 
to  the  original  conception  of  a  war  of  conquest  in  the 
West.  They  could  not  renounce  the  idea  of  capturing 
Paris  and  bringing  Great  Britain  to  her  knees.  So, 
after  finishing  Russia,  they  set  out  to  conquer  the 
world.  It  was  a  vain  and  foolish  quest.  For  the  sub- 
marine war  against  Great  Britain  forced  the  United 
States  in  as  a  belligerent  and  made  a  military  decision 
against  Germany  (which  before  had  been  extremely 
doubtful)  a  practical  certainty.  Overweening  ambi- 
tion and  unsound  strategy  cost  Germany  the  war. 

As  to  the  Entente,  its  primary  strategic  aim  was  to 
connect  the  Western  Front  with  the  Eastern  Front. 
This  was  never  accomplished.  And  failure  to  accom- 
plish it  led  to  the  downfall  and  elimination  of  Russia. 
The  original  Franco-Russian  plan  was  to  defeat  Ger- 
many by  a  concerted  Eastern  and  Western  offensive. 
But  Russia  was  never  equal  to  an  offensive  against 
Germany.  And  the  French  offensive  didn't  really 
get  going  until  July,  19 1 8. 

The  Allies  fought  the  war  disjointedly.  Without 
unity  of  command  they  could  hardly  hope  to  get  any- 
where. But  it  took  nearly  four  years  of  failures  and 
disappointments  to  achieve  unity.  The  Western  Allied 
Powers  held  on,  each  fighting  for  itself,  while  their 
Eastern  associates  went  down  singly  to  disaster.  But 
France,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy  maintained  themselves 
until  America  could  arrive.    And  that  was  long  enough. 


CHAPTER  III 

BELGIUM  AND  THE  MARNE.      AUG.  3,  I914-SEFT.  9,  I9I4 

Germany  began  the  war  with  a  crime.  Inheriting 
the  treaty  obligations  of  Prussia,  the  German  Empire 
had  become  one  of  the  guarantors  of  the  territorial 
integrity  and  neutrality  of  Belgium.  But  because  the 
German  General  Staff  found  it  more  practicable  to 
attack  France  through  Belgium  than  to  attempt  to 
force  the  strongly  fortified  Lorraine  front,  the  German 
Government  broke  its  faith  and  brutally  attacked  a 
people  to  whom  it  owed  protection. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  was  a  revelation  to  the 
world  of  the  moral  and  spiritual  corruption  with  which 
the  Germany  of  William  II  had  been  infected.  Her 
statesmen  and  soldiers  had  lost  respect  even  for  ap- 
pearances. The  elder  Moltke,  though  cold  and  im- 
placable, still  lived  up  to  the  recognized  code  of 
military  honour.  He  fought  cleanly  in  France  in 
1870-71.  But  events  were  soon  to  prove  that  his 
successors  admitted  no  restraints  on  military  ruthless- 
ness.  They  adhered  unconditionally  to  Bethmann- 
Hollweg's  maxim  that  military  necessity  (meaning 
military  convenience)  "knows  no  law."  After  break- 
ing the  law  of  nations  they  began  to  disregard  the  laws 
of  war  and  the  humanitarian  restrictions  thrown 
about  war  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries. 
In  the  massacres  of  Dinant,  Aerschot,  and  Louvain 

19 


20  The  Great  War  [iqhI 

they  relapsed  to  the  standards  of  barbarism — standards 
which  were  to  be  enforced  thereafter  by  German  armies 
wherever  they  went  and  in  German  warfare  at  sea  and 
in  the  air.  Within  three  weeks  after  the  war  began 
German  methods  had  become  infamous  in  the  eyes  of 
all  civilized  nations. 

When  King  Albert  was  faced  with  the  brutal  German 
ultimatum  of  August  3d,  he  elected  to  lose  his  kingdom 
rather  than  yield  his  honour.  He  was  poorly  prepared 
to  contest  the  passage  of  the  Kaiser's  armies  across 
Belgian  territory.  But,  at  the  least,  he  could  delay 
for  a  few  days  the  progress  of  the  huge  flanking  move- 
ment through  Northern  France  on  which  Moltke  the 
Younger  counted  to  envelop  the  French  armies  and 
to  uncover  Paris. 

Liege  was  the  first  barrier  in  the  path  of  the  invaders. 
It  lay  in  the  lower  Meuse  Valley  and  covered  the  main 
trunk  line  up  that  valley  to  the  French  border.  It 
was  surrounded  by  a  circle  of  modern  forts,  built  by 
Brialmont.  It  was  only  lightly  garrisoned,  however; 
and  there  were  not  enough  men  to  defend  the  spaces 
between  the  forts. 

Belgium's  total  available  forces  in  the  first  days  of 
August,  1914,  numbered  135,500.  Of  these  18,500 
were  volunteers.  The  Belgian  Government,  with  a 
scrupulous  regard  for  its  obligations  as  a  neutral,  had 
mobilized  on  the  French  border  and  on  the  coast  facing 
Great  Britain,  as  well  as  on  the  German  front.  The 
bulk  of  the  troops  were  in  the  West.  Only  the  Third 
Division  was  at  Liege  and  it  had  to  cover  the  Meuse 
crossings  below  the  city  as  well  as  defend  the  city  itself. 

The  Belgian  plan  of  campaign  did  not  contemplate 
an  engagement  in  force  with  the  superior  German 
masses.     Instructions  were  given  to  the  division  com- 


[iQi4]  Belgium  and  the  Marne  21 

manders  to  avoid  anything  like  a  pitched  battle  and  to 
elude  envelopment,  the  purpose  of  the  Belgian  High 
Command  being  merely  to  slow  up  the  Germans  and 
to  retire  gradually,  ultimately  effecting  a  junction  with 
the  expected  French  and  British  forces.  In  pursuance 
of  this  sound  policy,  the  Third  Belgian  Division  with- 
drew from  Liege  on  August  6th,  about  a  week  before 
Fort  de  Loncin  fell,  and  General  Leman,  the  commander 
of  the  garrison,  was  taken  prisoner  by  the  Germans. 
The  last  Li6ge  forts  were  not  reduced  until  August 
16th  and  17th. 

German  cavalry  had  crossed  into  Belgium  on  the 
morning  of  August  4th.  The  same  day  the  attack  on 
Liege  opened.  The  Germans  attempted  to  rush  the 
fortress  without  waiting  for  the  siege  artillery  to  come 
up.  These  efforts  failed  with  serious  losses.  In  a 
night  attack  on  August  5th  some  German  troops  suc- 
ceeded in  getting  through  a  gap  between  two  of  the 
forts  and  reaching  the  city.  They  were  thrown  out, 
but  returned  on  August  6th,  when  the  Third  Belgian 
Division  was  sent  away. 

The  forts  had  been  expected  to  hold  out  for  some  time 
although  isolated.  But  after  the  German  and  Austrian 
heavy  howitzers  arrived  it  was  quickly  demonstrated 
that  even  the  new  girdle  fort  systems  of  the  Brialmont 
type  had  become  obsolete.  The  Teuton  monster  bat- 
teries were  emplaced  far  beyond  the  range  of  the  fort 
guns  and  made  practice  just  as  if  they  were  on  the 
proving  grounds.  And  the  projectiles  were  powerful 
enough  to  blow  Brialmont 's  concrete  and  steel  cupola- 
shaped  constructions  into  fragments.  It  was  the  first 
surprise  of  a  war  which  was  to  be  full  of  surprises. 

Until  the  forts  yielded  the  enemy  could  not  make  use 
of  the  railroads  up  the  Meuse  Valley  toward  France. 


22  The  Great  War  [i9i4] 

Their  gallant  resistance  delayed  the  German  advance 
Rightly,  yet  not  materially.  By  August  17th,  when 
the  last  one  fell,  the  Germans  had  just  about  completed 
their  mobilization  and  Kluck's  and  Bulow's  armies 
were  ready  to  execute  the  great  wheel  into  Northern 
France. 

Pushing  up  the  Meuse  Valley  past  Huy  the  German 
and  Austrian  heavy  batteries  invested  Namur,  on 
August  22d.  That  second  Belgian  stronghold,  rated 
almost  as  high  as  Liege,  was  reduced  in  two  days. 
The  fall  of  Namur  cleared  the  way  for  the  advance 
of  the  First  and  Second  German  armies  west  and 
southwest  toward  the  exposed  left  flank  of  the  Allied 
position  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Charleroi,  Mons,  and 
Maubeuge. 

The  Belgian  army  was  now  cut  off  from  the  French 
and  British  forces.  It  had  been  concentrated  on  the 
line  of  the  Gette  River,  covering  Antwerp  and  Brussels. 
On  August  1 8th  Kluck  attacked  this  line,  and  since 
the  Germans  had  an  immense  superiority  in  numbers, 
King  Albert,  pursuing  his  original  policy,  ordered  a 
retirement  behind  the  Dyle  River.  The  next  day  the 
Belgian  army,  still  intact,  moved  within  the  outer 
circle  of  the  Antwerp  forts.     There  it  awaited  events. 

The  stage  was  now  completely  cleared  for  the  first 
German  campaign  in  France.  The  German  plan  of 
operations  was  one  long  ago  worked  out.  By  striking 
through  Belgium  it  sought  to  avoid  the  difficulties  in- 
volved in  an  attack  on  the  B elf ort-Nancy-Toul- Verdun 
front.  There  was  another  reason.  The  Germans  needed 
room  to  carry  out  the  ambitious  envelopment  scheme 
which  Count  Schlieffen  had  devised.  They  could  get 
room  only  by  approaching  Paris  from  the  north-east, 
down  the  Valley  of  the  Oise. 


[igi4]         Belgium  and  the  Marne  23 

This  plan  was  advertised  more  or  less  before  the  war. 
But  the  French  General  Staff  apparently  did  not  take 
it  very  seriously.  Possibly  because  it  involved  a 
violation  of  international  good  faith  and  also  because 
an  exaggerated  value  was  put  on  the  defensive  value 
of  the  fortresses  of  Li6ge  and  Namur,  the  French  strate- 
gists were  never  inclined  to  believe  that  Germany 
would  deliver  her  main  attack  in  the  north. 

The  French  concentration  plans  provided  for  an 
assembling  of  the  main  strength  of  the  French  forces 
on  the  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Luxemburg  border.  In 
the  original  alignment  the  five  French  armies  were 
grouped  as  follows:  the  First,  under  Dubail,  in  the 
Vosges  region,  from  Luneville  south;  the  Second,  under 
de  Castelnau,  covering  Nancy  and  Toul;  the  Third, 
under  Ruffey,  from  Verdun  north  to  Montmedy,  east 
of  the  Meuse ;  the  Fifth,  under  Lanrezac,  in  the  Sedan- 
Mezieres  section,  opposite  the  Ardennes;  the  Fourth, 
under  de  Langle  de  Cary,  in  reserve  behind  the  Third 
Army. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  the  French  to  seize  the  offen- 
sive, if  possible,  before  the  Germans  did,  or,  at  least, 
to  meet  a  German  offensive  in  the  north  with  a  counter- 
offensive  in  the  south.  All  French  preconceptions 
were  in  favour  of  forcing  the  issue  in  the  Upper  Rhine 
Valley. 

The  German  concentration  aimed  at  a  decision  in 
the  north.  Three  armies — the  First,  under  Kluck, 
the  Second,  under  Billow,  and  the  Third,  under  Hausen 
— were  mobilized  on  the  Belgian  border  north  of  Luxem- 
burg. The  Fourth  Army,  under  Crown  Prince  Al- 
brecht  of  Wurttemberg,  covered  the  northern  half  of 
Luxemburg;  the  Fifth,  under  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Prussia,  covered  the  southern  half,  extending  down  to 


24  The  Great  War  [1914] 

Thionville.  The  Sixth  Army,  under  Crown  Prince 
Rupprecht  of  Bavaria,  was  behind  Metz.  The  Seventh, 
under  Heeringen,  was  on  the  Saar,  between  Metz  and 
Strasburg.  There  was  a  special  contingent,  under 
Deimling,  in  Upper  Alsace.  The  German  encirclement 
movement  was  to  pivot  on  the  Fifth  Army.  The 
First  Army  was  to  be  the  tip  of  the  moving  spoke. 

Kluck  got  well  in  motion  about  August  18th.  By 
that  time  Joffre  had  already  attempted  to  take  the 
offensive  in  the  south.  The  first  effort  was  made  on 
August  7th,  when  the  mobilization  was  only  half  com- 
pleted. It  consisted  of  a  reconnoissance  in  force  from 
Belfort  to  Altkirch  and  Mulhouse.  The  latter  city 
was  occupied  for  a  day.  Then  the  French  columns, 
finding  German  resistance  stronger  than  they  had 
expected,  retired  to  the  border. 

The  moral  effect  of  this  adventure  was  discouraging. 
So  Joffre  sent  back  a  new  force,  called  the  Army  of 
Alsace,  under  the  aged  General  Pau,  to  recover 
Altkirch  and  Mulhouse.  The  movement  began  on 
August  15th.  Mulhouse  was  retaken  on  August  19th. 
But  there  progress  ended.  Within  a  few  days  the 
French  General  Staff  was  occupied  with  more  important 
matters  than  a  sentimental  inroad  into  Alsace.  Pau 
was  recalled  to  Belfort  and  the  Army  of  Alsace  was 
disbanded.  Most  of  the  troops  composing  it  were 
already  needed  elsewhere. 

The  Lorraine  offensive  was  on  a  more  ambitious 
scale.  The  First  and  Second  armies  participated  in  it. 
They  both  moved  on  August  14th  across  the  French 
border  in  a  north-easterly  direction,  toward  the  general 
line  of  the  railroad  connecting  Metz  and  Strasburg. 
They  faced  the  German  Sixth  and  Seventh  'armies, 
which  drew  back  in  accordance  with  a  prearranged 


[i9i4i  Belgium  and  the  Marne  25 

plan.  The  First  Army  reached  Sarrebourg — on  the 
Metz-Strasburg  railway,  about  eighteen  miles  north- 
east of  the  frontier — on  August  18th.  It  pushed  a 
little  north  of  that  town  and  was  checked  there  on  the 
19th.  But  its  position  was  good  and  General  Dubail 
expected  to  renew  the  offensive  when  he  received  word 
that  the  Second  Army,  on  his  left,  was  in  trouble.  Fol- 
lowing instructions,  he  withdrew  into  France. 

The  Second  Army  had  more  difficult  ground  to 
march  over  and  fight  on.  It  reached  Chateau  Salins 
and  pushed  on  toward  Morhange,  just  south  of  the 
railroad  line.  There,  however,  it  suffered  a  serious  re- 
verse on  August  20th.  Some  of  the  French  divisions 
were  more  or  less  demoralized  by  the  fire  of  the  im- 
mensely superior  German  heavy  artillery,  to  which  the 
French  field  artillery  could  make  no  adequate  reply. 
The  retreat  was  somewhat  disorderly.  But  the  German 
pursuit  was  feeble.  Dubail  and  de  Castelnau  rallied 
the  troops  and  restored  their  confidence  within  a  few 
days.  Three  weeks  later  the  First  and  Second  armies 
completely  repulsed  the  southern  German  offensive, 
directed  at  Nancy. 

Joffre's  Alsace  and  Lorraine  experiments  had  been 
fruitless  and  costly.  He  was  wasting  strength  in  a  sub- 
sidiary field.  It  was  plain  long  before  August  20th 
that  the  main  German  attack  was  to  come  through 
Belgium,  and  that  the  French  lines  ought  to  be  ex- 
tended north  to  meet  it.  But  the  French  High  Com- 
mand remained  unconvinced  that  the  Belgian  operation 
was  anything  but  a  demonstration,  which  could  be 
halted  by  vigorous  French  offensives  against  the  Ger- 
man centre  and  left  wing. 

As  a  halfway  measure,  however,  the  French  left 
was  carried  farther  north  and  strengthened.     Lanre- 


26  The  Great  War  [1914] 

zac's  Fifth  Army  was  ordered  on  August  15th  to  move 
across  the  Belgian  frontier  and  to  occupy  the  angle 
formed  by  the  Meuse  and  Sambre  rivers,  from  Dinant 
north  to  Namur  and  thence  west  to  Charleroi.  Two 
corps  and  three  colonial  divisions  were  withdrawn  from 
the  Second  Army  and  sent  north.  The  gap  created 
between  the  Fifth  Army  and  the  Third  Army  was 
filled  by  the  Fourth  Army,  hitherto  in  reserve.  Four 
territorial  divisions  were  collected  in  the  region  of 
Arras  and  Lille  under  General  d'Amade,  to  protect 
French  Flanders  against  German  cavalry  raids.  The 
British  Expeditionary  Army,  about  seventy  thousand 
strong,  was  to  concentrate  at  Maubeuge  and  prolong 
the  Allied  line  west  of  Charleroi. 

But  Jofrre  still  believed  that  he  could  derange  the 
German  plan  by  attacks  on  the  eastern  front.  He 
therefore  launched  a  third  offensive,  this  time  north 
of  Metz.  The  Fourth  Army  was  ordered  to  advance 
into  the  Ardennes  Forest  and  strike  at  the  enemy. 
Meanwhile  the  Third  Army,  supported  by  the  special 
Army  of  Lorraine  (a  counterpart  to  Pau's  Army  of 
Alsace),  was  dispatched  east  toward  the  Luxemburg 
border.  They  were  to  defeat  the  German  Fourth  and 
Fifth  armies,  drive  them  back  into  Germany,  and  thus 
dislocate  Moltke's  pivoting  movement. 

This  joint  operation  began  on  August  21st.  The 
battle  of  the  Ardennes  was  fought  on  August  226. ;  for 
the  Germans,  on  their  side,  were  also  advancing.  It 
was  a  confused  engagement,  in  wooded,  almost  road- 
less country.  The  French  Fourth  Army  came  into 
action  in  a  fragmentary,  scattered  way  and  was  easily 
beaten.  It  retreated,  in  disorder,  on  August  23d. 
This  retirement,  lasting  several  days,  carried  it  to  the 
west  bank  of  the  Meuse. 


[1914)         Belgium  and  the  Marne  27 

The  Third  Army  was  checked  at  Virton,  but  suffered 
less  severely  than  the  Fourth  did.  But  the  retreat  also 
carried  it  back  beyond  the  Meuse.  The  special  Army 
of  Lorraine,  under  Maunoury,  distinguished  itself. 
Yet  it  was  now  needed  elsewhere.  It  was  broken  up 
on  August  26th.  Maunoury  took  two  of  its  divisions 
with  him  when  he  went  to  Montdidier  to  organize  the 
new  Sixth  Army,  which  was  to  play  so  important  a 
rdle  less  than  two  weeks  later  at  the  battle  of  the  Marne. 

The  sudden  collapse  of  the  French  offensive  north 
of  Verdun  capped  the  climax  of  Joffre's  ineffective 
strategy.  It  was  a  terrific  setback;  for  the  French 
High  Command,  with  four  of  its  armies  beaten  on 
terrain  on  which  they  were  supposed  to  have  strength 
enough  to  force  the  fighting,  now  had  to  face  the  prob- 
lem of  stopping  the  envelopment  movement  in  which 
three  of  the  seven  German  armies  were  fully  engaged. 

In  a  subsequent  statement,  entitled  U  Expose"  de  Six 
Mots  de  Guerre,  the  French  General  Staff  said: 

On  August  2 1  st  our  offensive  began  on  the  centre 
with  ten  army  corps.  On  August  22d  it  had  failed 
and  the  reverse  seemed  to  be  a  serious  one. 

The  reasons  for  the  failure  are  complex.  There 
were  faults,  both  individual  and  collective;  impru- 
dences committed  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  divi- 
sions badly  engaged,  rash  deployments,  precipitate 
retirements,  a  premature  wastage  of  men,  and,  finally, 
shortcomings  of  certain  of  our  troops,  and  of  their  com- 
manders in  the  employment  of  artillery  and  infantry. 

In  consequence  of  these  errors  the  enemy,  profiting 
from  the  difficulty  of  the  terrain,  was  able  to  reap 
the  maximum  of  profit  and  advantage  from  the 
superiority  of  his  subaltern  officers. 


28  The  Great  War  [1914) 

This  was  a  disingenuous  judgment.  The  troops 
which  fought  in  the  August  offensives  acquitted  them- 
selves most  admirably,  a  couple  of  weeks  later,  in  the 
Marne  campaign.  The  French  defeats  on  the  east 
front  were  apparently  due  more  to  marked  inferiority 
in  artillery  than  to  any  other  single  cause.  But  the 
offensives  themselves  were  wrongly  conceived  and  badly 
managed.  They  violated  the  principle  that  an  offen- 
sive should  always  be  able  to  develop  a  marked  superi- 
ority at  the  point  of  attack. 

The  British  Expeditionary  Army  completed  its 
concentration  at  Maubeuge  on  August  20th.  The 
next  day  it  marched  north  into  Belgium.  The  day 
following  it  was  in  position  about  Mons,  the  right  wing 
connecting  with  the  left  wing  of  Lanrezac's  Fifth  Army, 
to  the  south-west  of  Charleroi.  Lanrezac  had  been 
reinforced  by  one  corps  and  two  North  African  divi- 
sions from  the  Second  Army  and  three  additional 
reserve  divisions  were  on  their  way  to  him.  Without 
counting  these  last-named  units,  there  were  about 
270,000  French  and  British  troops  in  the  Dinant-Namur- 
Charleroi-Mons  angle  when  the  German  northern 
offensive  opened. 

The  three  armies  participating  in  it  totalled  about 
400,000  men.  The  Third  Army  was  marching  across 
Belgium,  through  the  northern  part  of  the  Ardennes, 
to  attack  Lanrezac's  right  wing,  facing  east  on  the 
Meuse.  The  Second  was  approaching  Namur  to  at- 
tack Lanrezac's  refused  left  wing.  The  First,  the 
largest  of  all,  was  rushing  west  at  top  speed  with  the 
purpose  of  overlapping  and  enveloping  the  exposed 
British  flank.  Beyond  the  British  left,  and  quite  out 
of  touch  with  it,  were  a  few  divisions  of  French  terri- 
torials guarding  the  approaches  to  Valenciennes  and  Lille. 


[i9i4i         Belgium  and  the  Marne  29 

Namur  fell  on  August  23d.  But  on  August  21st 
Bulow  had  begun  to  attack  Lanrezac  at  Charleroi. 
The  battle  there  lasted  two  days.  Meanwhile  Hausen, 
with  the  German  Third  Army,  had  come  up  to  the 
Meuse  and  captured  Dinant,  and  Lanrezac's  connec- 
tions with  the  Fourth  French  Army  were  thus  threat- 
ened; and  on  August  24th,  the  day  Kluck  fell  on  the 
British  at  Mons,  the  Fifth  French  Army  had  begun 
to  retire.  The  British  held  out  for  a  day  at  Mons 
against  great  odds.  Then  their  position  became  peril- 
ous and  they,  too,  drew  back  to  recover  connection 
with  Lanrezac.     The  retreat  to  the  Marne  had  begun. 

Joffre  had,  in  fact,  no  option  now  but  to  recoil  on 
the  whole  front — from  Verdun  to  Mons.  He  had 
misjudged  the  situation  and  his  entire  strategical  plan 
was  shattered.  It  is  to  his  credit  as  a  soldier  that  he 
faced  the  consequences  of  his  errors  coolly  and  resolutely. 
He  decided  to  retreat,  and  to  keep  on  retreating  until 
a  really  favourable  opportunity  offered  for  turning  and 
fighting.  What  he  executed  was  a  genuine  strategical 
retirement.  The  Germans  never  understood  that. 
They  thought  that  he  was  merely  running  for  safety. 
And  that  misapprehension  accounts  largely  for  their 
defeat  at  the  Marne. 

Joffre  still  had  confidence  in  himself  and  his  troops. 
His  plan  was  to  pivot  his  retirement  on  Verdun,  as 
the  Germans  had  pivoted  their  envelopment  on  Metz. 
The  Allied  armies  were  to  fall  back  rapidly  enough  to 
avoid  encirclement  on  the  left.  Paris  was  to  be  un- 
covered, if  necessary.  Meanwhile  two  new  armies 
were  created  to  come  into  line  when  a  battle  was  to 
be  delivered.  They  were  the  Sixth  Army,  assigned  to 
Maunoury,  and  the  Ninth,  given  to  Foch,  who  had 
just  shown  his  quality  as  a  corps  commander  at  Mor- 


30  The  Great  War  [1914] 

hange.  With  the  new  formations  included  in  these 
two  armies,  Joffre 's  strength  in  the  field  was  now 
practically  equal  to  Moltke's. 

Joffre  lost  the  garrison  of  Maubeuge — 40,000  strong 
— when,  ignoring  the  lesson  of  Liege  and  Namur,  he 
decided  to  use  that  fortress  as  an  obstacle  to  the  Ger- 
man advance.  It  would  have  been  just  as  much  of  an 
obstacle  if  the  forts  had  been  left  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves, as  the  Liege  forts  were  after  the  Belgian  Third 
Division  was  sensibly  withdrawn.  Maubeuge  fell  on 
September  7th.  The  ony  advantage  gained  by  hold- 
ing it  in  force  was  the  detention  of  three  or  four  Ger- 
man reserve  divisions,  which  could  not  move  south 
until  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne  had  begun. 

Joffre  had  lost  probably  more  than  100,000  men  in 
his  eastern  offensives.  He  was  now  to  make  a  far 
greater  sacrifice — the  abandonment  to  the  Germans  of 
a  great  part  of  the  rich  industrial  section  of  north-east- 
ern France.  This  surrender  of  territory  was  to  weigh 
on  the  French  for  the  next  four  years,  crippling  their 
resources,  paralyzing  their  freedom  of  movement,  and 
injuriously  localizing  their  strategy.  It  was  the  one 
irreparable  consequence  of  the  French  High  Command's 
failure  to  grasp  the  full  meaning  of  Moltke's  invasion 
of  Belgium. 

The  British  Expeditionary  Army  had  to  retreat 
farthest,  and  started  last.  Its  left  flank  was  uncovered 
and  it  had  to  fight  to  frustrate  a  German  envelopment 
as  it  fell  back.  On  August  26th  it  was  so  closely 
pressed  that  the  left  wing,  under  Smith -Dorrien,  stood 
fast  at  Le  Cateau,  and  fought  an  engagement  lasting 
about  ten  hours.  In  his  book  igi^  Field  Marshal 
Viscount  French  sharply  criticizes  Smith- Dorrien  for 
offering  battle  at  Le  Cateau.    Not  even  a  tacit  consent 


lion]         Belgium  and  the  Marne  31 

was  given  from  British  Headquarters,  he  says,  for  this 
stand,  which  played  into  Kluck's  hand  by  interrupting 
the  British  retreat  and  might  have  resulted  in  the 
encirclement  and  capture  of  the  Second  Corps.  "The 
loss  of  fourteen  thousand  men  and  sixty  guns,"  at 
Le  Cateau,  he  insists,  "was  felt  seriously  throughout 
the  subsequent  battle  of  the  Marne,  and  during  the 
early  operations  on  the  Aisne."  The  guns  and  machine 
guns  captured  by  the  enemy  could  not  be  replaced  until 
late  in  September. 

In  his  Forty  Days  in  1914,  Major-General  Sir  Freder- 
ick Maurice,  at  that  time  with  the  British  Expedition- 
ary Army  and  later  Director  of  Military  Information 
in  London,  expresses  a  contrary  view.  He  commends 
Smith- Dorrien  for  boldness  and  cool  judgment  and 
indicates  that  a  battle  was  advisable  in  order  to  ex- 
tricate the  British  left  wing.  He  admits,  however, 
that  the  Second  Corps  escaped  on  the  afternoon  of 
August  26th  only  because  Kluck  let  a  great  opportunity 
slip  through  his  fingers.  General  Maurice  also  says 
that  the  British  losses  in  the  campaign  up  to  the  end 
of  the  battle  of  Le  Cateau  were  only  a  little  over  ten 
thousand. 

French's  plan  of  an  uninterrupted  retreat  was,  how- 
ever, essentially  sound.  After  Le  Cateau  the  two  Brit- 
ish corps  (the  First,  on  the  right,  being  under  the  com- 
mand of  Sir  Douglas  Haig)  retired  by  forced  marches 
until,  on  the  morning  of  August  28th,  French's  army 
crossed  the  Somme  River  at  Ham.  After  that  the 
retreat  was  practically  unmolested.  On  French's 
right  the  French  Fifth  Army  had  turned  on  Bulow  and 
defeated  him  at  Guise.  On  the  left  Kluck's  army  was 
edging  more  and  more  to  the  south-west  and  coming 
into  contact  with  the  French  units  which  were  being 


32  The  Great  War  [1914] 

consolidated  into  the  new  Sixth  Army  under  Maunoury. 
That  commander,  arriving  at  Montdidier  with  a  part 
of  the  disbanded  special  Army  of  Lorraine,  added  to 
it  two  of  d'Amade's  territorial  divisions  and  Sor- 
det's  cavalry  corps.  Kluck,  still  pushing  south-west, 
followed  Maunoury's  only  partially  organized  army 
toward  Paris.  He  moved  south  on  the  roads  west  of 
the  Oise,  whereas  the  British  moved  south  on  the  roads 
east  of  the  Oise.  It  was  not  until  Kluck  changed  the 
direction  of  his  march  suddenly  from  south-west  to 
south-east  that  he  again  found  himself  in  contact  with 
the  British  forces. 

Joffre  prolonged  his  general  retirement  until  Septem- 
ber 5th.  But  as  early  as  August  25th  he  had  given  a 
clear  indication  of  his  purpose  to  halt  at  the  opportune 
moment  and  take  the  offensive.  On  that  day  he  issued 
the  following  instructions: 

The  object  of  our  future  operations  will  be  to  re- 
constitute on  our  left  flank,  with  the  Fourth  and 
Fifth  armies,  the  British  army,  and  new  forces  drawn 
from  our  right,  a  mass  capable  of  resuming  the  offen- 
sive while  the  other  armies  contain  the  enemy  for  the 
time  necessary. 

The  arguments  in  favour  of  continuing  the  retreat 
below  the  Aisne,  the  Oise,  and  the  Marne  were  numer- 
ous. In  the  first  place,  time  would  be  given  to  organ- 
ize the  two  new  armies — the  Sixth  and  the  Ninth. 
The  haste  of  the  pursuit  was  carrying  the  Germans 
far  ahead  of  their  supply  trains  and  heavy  artillery. 
Moreover,  the  nearer  the  Allied  armies  drew  to  Paris 
the  better  protected  their  left  wing  would  be  against 
encirclement,  since  the  left  wing,  more  or  less  exposed 


[iPMi  Belgium  and  the  Marne  33 

all  the  way  down  from  the  Belgian  border,  would  rest 
securely  on  the  Paris  fortifications. 

As  Kluck  approached  the  capital  the  chance  of  a 
successful  envelopment  of  the  Allied  left  wing  went 
glimmering.  The  main  Allied  army  had  withdrawn 
to  the  south-east  of  Paris.  The  German  High  Com- 
mand had  now  to  modify  the  envelopment  plan  and  to 
decide  whether  to  invest  and  reduce  the  capital  or  to 
pursue  the  Allied  armies  toward  the  Upper  Seine,  and 
try  there  to  break  their  connections  with  Paris  and 
double  them  back  against  the  eastern  frontier. 

Kluck  did  change  direction  away  from  Paris  about 
August  31st — not  very  perceptibly  at  first,  but  soon 
unmistakably.  It  was  evidently  the  new  plan  of  the 
German  General  Staff  to  dispose  of  the  enemy  armies 
first  and  then  return  to  occupy  Paris.  But  this  change 
of  direction  vitally  altered  the  strategic  situation. 
Heretofore  the  Germans  had  been  seeking  to  envelop 
the  Allied  left  flank.  Now,  by  abandoning  the  en- 
velopment project  and  drawing  Kluck's  army  in  closer 
to  Bulow's,  the  German  High  Command  carelessly 
exposed  its  own  right  flank  to  envelopment.  Through 
overconfidence  and  a  contemptuous  undervaluation  of 
the  strength  and  morale  of  the  enemy  the  Germans 
fell  headlong  into  the  trap  which  Joffre  had  been  pre- 
paring to  spring. 

It  was  Moltke's  revised  plan  to  concentrate  on 
the  Allied  left  centre  and  effect  a  break  through.  The 
Allied  line  from  Verdun  west  to  Paris  had  taken 
the  shape  of  a  curve,  dipping  gently  to  the  south. 
The  armies  were  stationed  in  the  following  order,  from 
east  to  west.  The  Third,  now  under  Sarrail,  stretched 
from  Souilly,  south-west  of  Verdun,  to  Revigny.  It 
faced  north-west.     The  Fourth,  facing  north,  held  the 


34  The  Great  War  [1914] 

front  from  Sermaize  to  Sompuis.  The  new  Ninth  lay 
south  of  La  Fere-Champenoise,  between  Camp  de 
Mailly  and  Sezanne.  The  Fifth,  now  under  Franchet 
d'Esperey,  inclined  a  little  to  the  south-west,  and  filled 
the  gap  between  Sezanne  and  the  region  below  the  Forest 
of  Crecy,  where  the  British  Expeditionary  Army  was 
posted,  its  left  resting  on  the  south-eastern  sector  of 
the  Paris  entrenched  camp.  The  Sixth  Army,  largely 
reinforced,  was  on  the  north-eastern  outskirts  of  Paris, 
facing  east. 

It  was  thus  already  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  Kluck's 
army,  which  had  pushed  south-east  toward  Coulom- 
miers  and  Esternay,  and  was  confronting  both  the  Fifth 
French  Army  and  the  reinforced  British  army.  Only 
one  reserve  corps  had  been  left  behind  by  Kluck  to 
protect  his  rear  from  an  attack  coming  out  of  Paris. 
Bulow  was  opposite  Foch.  Hausen  was  opposite  Foch 
and  de  Langle  de  Cary.  The  Duke  of  Wtirttemberg 
confronted  Cary's  right  and  Sarrail's  left.  The  army 
of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  extended  past  Sarrail's 
right  and  encircled  the  fortress  of  Verdun.  South-east 
of  Verdun  the  Second  and  First  French  armies  stood 
at  bay,  defending  Nancy. 

The  battle  of  the  Marne  began  on  September  5th, 
when  Maunoury  moved  east  to  attack  Kluck's  lone 
reserve  division,  stationed  to  the  north  of  Meaux. 
Kluck,  himself,  with  his  main  force,  was  many  miles 
to  the  south,  below  Coulommiers,  preparing  to  attack 
the  British  and  d'Esperey.  He  was  quick  to  grasp  the 
situation,  however.  He  didn't  know  that  Joffre  had  set 
September  6th  as  the  date  for  the  forward  movement 
of  the  whole  Allied  left  wing.  But  he  saw  that  under 
any  circumstances  he  would  have  to  meet  the  threat 
to  his  rear.     His  tactics  in  the  next  few  days  showed 


[i9i4]         Belgium  and  the  Marne  35 

that  he  expected  to  turn  back  with  his  main  force  and 
crush  Maunoury,  screening  his  southern  front  with 
cavalry  and  depending  on  his  left  wing  divisions,  acting 
with  Bulow  and  Hausen,  to  keep  the  Fifth  and  Ninth 
French  armies  occupied. 

Kluck  started  his  infantry  north  from  Coulommiers 
on  September  6th,  just  at  the  time  when  Maunoury 's 
attack  began  to  develop.  Maunoury  had  a  great 
advantage  in  numbers  in  the  beginning,  and  forced 
the  single  German  reserve  corps  back  toward  the  Ourcq 
River.  But  Kluck' s  right  wing  and  centre  presently 
furnished  supports  and  the  battle  of  the  Ourcq,  extend- 
ing to  the  north  to  Nanteuil  and  Betz,  continued  un- 
certainly all  through  September  7th  and  8th.  Kluck 
had  almost  turned  Maunoury's  left  wing  and  thrown  it 
back  on  Paris,  when  he  suddenly  interrupted  the  battle 
on  September  9th  and  retreated  toward  the  Aisne. 

The  British  Expeditionary  Army  and  the  Fifth 
French  Army  had  begun  a  forward  movement  on  Sep- 
tember 6th.  They  had  in  front  of  them  only  Marwitz's 
cavalry.  But  their  progress  was  not  rapid  enough 
to  affect  the  course  of  Maunoury's  battle  before  Sep- 
tember 9th.  On  that  day  the  British  were  east  and 
north-east  of  La  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  in  the  rear  of 
Kluck's  battle-line,  and  Kluck's  army  had  been  split 
into  two  sections,  the  one  facing  west  and  fighting 
Maunoury,  the  other  attached  to  the  right  wing  of 
Bulow's  army  and  facing  south.  The  connection 
between  the  two  was  maintained  by  cavalry  only. 
It  was  a  situation  not  to  the  taste  of  the  German  High 
Command,  which  probably  decided  on  September  9th 
to  break  off  the  battle,  in  spite  of  the  apparent  pro- 
gress which  Bulow  and  Hausen  were  making  against 
the  Allied  left  centre. 


36  The  Great  War  [1914] 

Foch's  Ninth  Army  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  Ger- 
man eleventh-hour  effort  to  convert  the  Schlieffen  en- 
velopment— which  had  failed — into  a  breaking  through 
operation  after  the  Napoleonic  manner.  Bulow's  left 
and  centre  and  the  greater  part  of  Hausen's  army  were 
used  in  pounding  Foch,  who  had  to  give  way  all  along 
his  line.  His  left  was  driven  below  the  Marshes  of 
St.  Gond  on  September  7th.  On  the  8th  his  centre  was 
pushed  back  from  La  Fere-Champenoise.  Foch  had  to 
move  his  headquarters  to  the  south. 

But  the  situation  was  already  clearing.  Kluck's 
retirement  had  been  pulling  Biilow  more  and  more  to 
the  west,  and  had  also  so  lightened  d'Esperey's  task 
that  he  could  lend  Foch  an  army  corps.  On  September 
9th  the  drag  to  the  right  had  forced  Bulow  to  leave  a 
gap  in  his  line  between  La  Fere-Champenoise  and  the 
Marshes  of  St.  Gond.  Into  this  gap  Foch  sent  his  elite 
Forty-Second  Division — between  five  and  six  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon.  It  smashed  the  exposed  flank  of 
Bulow's  left  wing  and  compelled  an  immediate  German 
retreat  in  the  centre.  But  several  hours  before  that 
Kluck  had  started  north. 

Technically  the  Marne  represented  an  Allied  counter- 
offensive.  But  throughout  most  of  the  fighting  the 
Allies  stood  on  the  defensive.  Undoubtedly  by  Sep- 
tember 9th  the  Germans  were  ready  to  draw  out  be- 
cause they  saw  that  their  strategical  position  had 
become  highly  unfavourable.  They  retreated  in  good 
order,  losing  few  prisoners  and  little  materiel.  And 
they  were  able  to  hold  their  own  as  soon  as  they  settled 
down  in  new  positions  from  twenty  to  forty  miles  back. 

Joffre  had  saved  Paris  and  restored  Allied  morale 
by  a  brilliant  victory.  And  Allied  success  between 
Verdun  and  Paris  was  supplemented  by  another  clean- 


[i9i4i         Belgium  and  the  Marne  37 

cut  victory  on  the  Nancy  front,  where  de  Castemau 
and  Dubail  defeated  the  German  Sixth  and  Seventh 
armies  much  more  decisively  than  they  had  themselves 
been  defeated  a  couple  of  weeks  earlier  at  Saarebourg 
and  Morhange.  And  this  was  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  Second  and  First  armies  had  been  weakened  to 
reinforce  the  French  left. 

The  results  of  JofTre's  flanking  operation  against 
Kluck's  army  were  disappointing,  however.  Kluck 
faced  about  too  quickly,  and  the  British  army  and  the 
Fifth  French  Army  were  held  back  too  long  by  Mar- 
witz's  cavalry  screen.  Yet  all  these  imperfections  in 
execution  were  forgotten  in  the  emotional  exaltation 
which  swept  France,  Great  Britain,  and  most  of  the 
neutral  countries,  when  it  became  known  that  the  Ger- 
man invasion  had  been  halted  and  the  supposedly 
invincible  German  armies  were  in  retreat.  The  French 
Government  came  back  to  Paris,  never  to  leave  it  again. 

The  Marne  was  hailed  as  "a  miracle"  by  millions 
who  only  vaguely  understood  what  had  happened. 
It  wasn't  that.  It  was  a  battle  thrown  away  by  reck- 
lessness and  self-deception  on  the  part  of  the  German 
High  Command.  It  was  a  retrieval  by  Joflre,  through 
coolness  and  resolution,  of  grievous  errors  of  judgment 
made  by  him  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  IV 

"THE  RACE  FOR  THE  SEA" — SEPTEMBER  15,  I914- 
DECEMBER  I,  1914 

The  battle  of  the  Marne  raised  great  expectations. 
In  their  reaction  from  something  akin  to  despair  the 
Allied  publics  imagined  for  a  time  that  Moltke's  repulse 
would  lead  speedily  to  a  German  retirement  from  France. 
This  was  an  illusion.  The  German  armies  had  been 
turned  back  from  Paris.  But  they  still  retained  a 
grip  on  Northern  France  which  could  not  be  shaken 
loose.  Before  the  year  19 14  ended  they  were  to  enlarge 
and  strengthen  their  hold. 

The  German  High  Command  ignored  the  battle  of 
the  Marne.  No  mention  of  it  was  made  in  the  German 
military  communiques.  Many  months  later,  a  pro- 
German  Swiss  critic,  Stegemann,  wrote  a  treatise  in 
which  the  German  defeat  was  neatly  explained  away. 
It  had  a  limited  circulation  in  Germany.  But  in  1916 
a  German  book  on  the  same  subject  was  suppressed 
by  the  government .  It  was  not  until  1 9 1 7  that  German 
writers  were  allowed  to  discuss  the  causes  of  the  failure 
of  Schlieffen's  double  envelopment  plan. 

By  the  middle  of  September,  1914,  the  German  High 
Command  in  France  recovered  its  balance  sufficiently 
to  try  to  justify  the  assumption  that  the  Marne  was 
only  an  incident,  compelling  a  slight  readjustment  of 
German    offensive    strategy.     The    two    westernmost 

38 


[i9i4i         "  The  Race  for  the  Sea  "  39 

German  armies  had  halted  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Aisne.  Kluck's  right  rested  on  Noyon.  Bulow  was 
north  of  Rheims.  The  other  armies  stretched  east 
across  Champagne  and  the  Argonne  to  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Verdun.  The  Allied  armies,  confidently 
advancing  north,  were  checked  on  the  Aisne  after  Sep- 
tember 13th.  Then  the  Germans  resumed  the  offensive 
themselves,  making  progress  north  of  Soissons  and 
Rheims  and  in  the  Argonne  sector. 

A  force  sent  from  Metz  also  reached  the  Meuse  at 
St.  Mihiel,  reduced  Fort  Troyon,  south  of  Verdun,  to 
ruins,  and  captured  Fort  Camp  des  Romains.  Verdun 
was  nearly  encircled,  and  its  railroad  communications 
west  and  south  were  cut.  The  St.  Mihiel  salient, 
created  in  the  last  week  of  September,  19 14,  remained 
in  German  hands  until  September,  191 8,  when  it  was 
wiped  out  of  existence  in  a  day  by  an  American-French 
offensive. 

But  these  stirrings  of  the  now  moribund  idea  ot 
pinning  down  and  enveloping  the  Allied  armies  to  the 
east  of  Paris  came  to  nothing.  Joffre  had  a  counter- 
plan  to  which  German  strategy  was  quickly  obliged 
to  conform.  This  was  to  extend  the  Maunoury  flank- 
ing operation,  which  had  failed  on  the  Ourcq,  to  the 
region  of  the  Somme  and  then  toward  Arras.  The 
German  left  wing  was  still  "in  the  air."  Joffre  decided 
to  try  to  overlap  it  and  thus  squeeze  the  German 
forces  in  the  north  back  against  the  Belgian  border. 

There  were  other  advantages  in  a  movement  of  this 
sort.  It  was  highly  desirable  for  the  Allies  to  recover 
possession  of  the  industrial  section  of  northern  France, 
abandoned  in  the  retreat  to  the  Marne.  It  was  essen- 
tial to  secure  the  Channel  ports,  which  were  the  most 
convenient  British  bases  in  France.     And  it  was  high 


40  The  Great  War 


[1914] 


time  to  try  to  extricate  the  Belgian  army,  penned  up 
in  Antwerp.  So  Joffre  began,  in  the  latter  half  of 
September,  what  is  known  as  "the  race  for  the  sea." 

French  troops  at  first  penetrated  the  region  east  and 
south-east  of  Amiens.  They  reoccupied  Lassigny, 
Roye,  and  Peronne.  But  they  were  soon  ejected,  fol- 
lowing a  prolongation  north  of  Kluck's  front.  Ba- 
paume,  north  of  the  Somme,  was  also  seized  by  the 
Germans.  Joffre  brought  de  Castelnau's  Second  Army 
around  from  Lorraine  to  Picardy.  A  new  army,  under 
Maud'huy,  was  hurried  to  Arras.  Foch  was  sent  north 
to  take  general  command,  and  the  British  Expedition- 
ary Army  was  transferred  from  the  Aisne  front  to 
Flanders.  By  the  end  of  September  the  French  had 
pushed  their  left  wing  as  far  north  as  Bethune,  carrying 
the  Allied  line  to  within  forty  miles  of  the  Belgian  coast. 

The  German  line  was  extended  north  with  equal 
rapidity.  Biilow  was  moved  from  before  Rheims  to 
the  Arras  sector  and  the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria's 
Sixth  Army  was  shifted  from  German  Lorraine  to  the 
Somme  sector,  and  later  to  Belgium.  Two  months  of 
campaigning  had  rectified  the  misapprehensions  on 
which  the  French  over-concentration  on  the  eastern 
border  were  based.  Alsace  and  Lorraine  were  practi- 
cally abandoned  as  operative  fronts. 

The  relief  of  Antwerp  may  have  been  one  of  Joffre's 
remoter  objectives.  The  Germans  in  Belgium  had 
turned  south  at  the  end  of  August,  leaving  Antwerp 
under  observation  by  two  or  three  reserve  corps.  They 
had  occupied  Brussels  and  covered  their  communica- 
tions with  the  armies  east  of  Paris.  But  they  had  not 
penetrated  north  and  west  of  the  Scheldt.  The  way 
was  open  from  Antwerp  west  to  Bruges  and  Ostend. 
The  German  High  Command  had  not  troops  enough 


[i9i4i         "  The  Race  for  the  Sea  "  41 

available  in  August  both  to  invest  Antwerp  from  the 
south  and  to  cut  it  off  on  the  west.  King  Albert  had 
annoyed  the  Germans  by  making  a  sortie  while  the 
Marne  campaign  was  in  progress.  It  was  decided  by 
Moltke,  after  the  Marne  failure,  to  get  rid  of  a  trouble- 
some enemy,  entrenched  close  to  the  vital  German 
arteries  of  communication  through  Liege  to  Aix-la- 
Chapelle. 

Antwerp  was  rated  as  one  of  the  strongest  fortresses 
in  Europe.  It  was  defended  by  an  outer  girdle  of 
cupola  forts,  built  to  withstand  the  artillery  attack  of 
its  period.  But  these  forts  had  now  become  only  man 
traps.  The  Belgian  army  held  a  sally-port  at  Malines. 
This  city  was  reduced  on  September  27th.  The  next 
day  the  German  and  Austrian  giant  howitzers  opened 
fire  on  the  outer  Antwerp  forts.  Two  were  destroyed 
on  September  29th.  The  Germans  hardly  needed  to 
use  infantry.  They  brought  the  big  guns  up  to  the 
breaches  made  in  the  outer  circle  of  defences  and  soon 
had  the  city  itself  under  fire. 

The  Belgian  field  army  was  helpless.  It  could  easily 
have  made  good  its  escape  in  the  first  days  of  October. 
But  evacuation  was  delayed  until  October  9th,  by 
which  time  the  Germans  were  able  to  harass  the  retreat 
west  and  to  force  across  the  Dutch  boundary  a  portion 
of  the  Belgian  army  and  a  unit  of  British  naval  reserves, 
sent  by  Winston  Churchill  to  help  defend  Antwerp. 
The  main  body  of  the  Belgian  forces  was  extricated, 
however,  by  the  help  of  a  British  infantry  division,  a 
British  cavalry  division,  and  two  French  infantry 
divisions,  under  General  Rawlinson. 

The  British  army  began  to  leave  the  Aisne  front  on 
October  2d,  the  cavalry  and  the  Second  Infantry  Corps 
starting  first.     The  Second  Corps  detrained  at  Abbe- 


42  The  Great  War  [1914] 

ville  on  October  8th  and  moved  north-east  toward 
Bethune,  connecting  there  with  the  left  of  Maud'huy's 
French  army.  The  Third  British  corps  reached  St. 
Omer  on  October  ioth,  and  moved  east  toward  Haze- 
brouck. 

The  Lys  Valley  was  held  at  that  time  by  German 
cavalry,  whose  outposts  were  as  far  west  as  Bailleul 
and  Meteren.  The  plan  agreed  upon  by  Sir  John 
French  and  General  Foch,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
French  troops  north  of  Noyon,  was  that  the  British 
army  should  pivot  on  Bethune,  marching  north-east 
and  clearing  the  Lys  region  as  far  as  Armentieres  and 
Ypres.  If  this  movement  was  successful,  the  British 
and  French  were  to  advance  east,  Lille  being  the  divid- 
ing point  between  the  two  Allies. 

The  transfer  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Army  was 
completed  on  October  19th,  the  last  units  of  the  First 
Corps,  under  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  arriving  then  and 
detraining  at  St.  Omer.  But  on  October  nth  and  12th 
General  Allenby,  commanding  the  cavalry  corps,  had 
come  in  contact  with  the  German  cavalry  to  the  north- 
west of  Bethune,  driving  them  from  the  hills  north- 
east of  Hazebrouck.  The  Second  and  Third  Infantry 
Corps  pushed  up  the  Lys  Valley  and  occupied  the  line 
from  La  Bassee  north  to  Armentieres.  On  October 
1 6th  the  Belgian  army,  with  Rawlinson's  forces  and 
French  supports,  went  into  position  east  and  north  of 
Ypres,  the  line  extending  to  the  North  Sea.  The 
Seventh  Division  and  the  Third  Cavalry  Division,  which 
had  been  with  Rawlinson  in  Belgium,  were  now  consti- 
tuted the  Fourth  Corps,  another  new  division  from 
England,  the  Eighth,  to  be  added  later.  Haig's  First 
Corps  was  used  to  fill  in  a  gap  about  Ypres.  By  orders 
issued  by  Field  Marshal  French  on  October  19th  it 


[i9i4i         "  The  Race  for  the  Sea  "  43 

was  directed  to  move  toward  Bruges  and  drive  the 
enemy,  if  possible,  back  on  Ghent.  But  the  German 
concentration  in  Belgium  was  now  nearly  finished  and 
Haig's  progress  was  blocked  by  greatly  superior  forces. 

Having  failed  at  the  Marne  either  to  destroy  the 
Allied  armies  or  to  take  Paris,  the  German  High  Com- 
mand had  turned  feverishly,  but  belatedly,  to  an  al- 
ternative scheme.  This  was  to  capture  Dunkirk  and 
Calais,  deprive  England  of  her  shortest  Channel  route 
to  France,  and  utilize  the  Belgian  and  northern  French 
coast  as  the  base  for  an  intensive  submarine  warfare 
on  British  shipping.  After  the  fall  of  Antwerp  the 
Germans  had  taken  possession  of  Bruges,  an  admirable 
submarine  haven,  with  its  twin  canals  to  Zeebrugge 
and  Ostend.  They  had  followed  the  retreating  Bel- 
gians to  the  Yser  River  and  were  gathering  in  huge 
masses  for  a  drive  through  Ypres  and  Hazebrouck  to 
the  Channel  coast. 

The  German  High  Command  now  had  large  rein- 
forcements at  its  disposal.  The  secondary  mobiliza- 
tion was  completed.  The  new  formations,  including 
many  volunteers,  were  somewhat  lacking  in  training, 
but  were  filled  with  martial  spirit.  They  were  rushed 
into  Flanders,  where  it  was  thought  the  weight  of 
their  numbers  would  easily  wear  down  a  greatly  inferior 
enemy. 

On  October  21st  the  Allied  line  from  La  Bassee  to 
the  sea  was  constituted,  from  south  to  north,  as  fol- 
lows: The  British  Second  Corps,  under  Smith- Dorrien, 
holding  a  difficult  six-mile  front;  Conneau's  French 
Cavalry  Corps,  filling  a  gap  of  one  mile;  the  British 
Third  Army  Corps,  under  Pulteney,  with  the  Nineteenth 
Brigade  added,  holding  a  twelve-mile  line;  the  British 
Cavalry  Corps,   under  Allenby,   holding   a   four-mile 


44  The  Great  War  [wM 

line;  the  Fourth  British  Corps,  under  Rawlinson,  occu- 
pying a  six-mile  front ;  the  First  British  Corps,  under 
Haig,  occupying  a  seven- mile  front ;  French  Territorial 
divisions,  de  Mitry's  French  cavalry  corps,  French 
marines,  and  the  Belgian  army,  occupying  a  twenty- 
mile  front  ending  at  Nieuport.  Some  units  of  the 
Lahore  Indian  division  were  with  Allenby.  The  Ninth 
French  Corps  arrived  a  day  or  two  later,  and  on  October 
27th  was  put  in  north-east  of  Ypres  on  Haig's  left,  thus 
allowing  him  to  shorten  his  front  a  little.  Later  Raw- 
linson's  small  Fourth  Corps  was  temporarily  merged 
with  the  First  Corps. 

There  had  been  constant  fighting  in  the  Lys  Valley 
region  since  October  15th.  The  first  phase  of  the 
struggle  for  the  Channel  ports  ended  with  the  extrica- 
tion of  the  Belgian  army  and  the  establishment  by  the 
Allies  of  a  continuous  line  north  from  La  Bassee  to 
the  coast.  The  second  phase  opened  with  the  enemy's 
determined  efforts  to  break  that  line.  Had  Moltke 
turned  north  more  quickly,  he  could  undoubtedly  have 
driven  a  wedge  between  the  Belgians  and  Rawlinson's 
relief  force,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  transferred  Expedi- 
tionary Army,  on  the  other.  He  could  have  compelled 
the  former  to  escape  by  sea  and  have  seized  Dunkirk, 
Calais,  and  Dieppe.  Now  he  had  to  sever  a  front 
which  had  been  at  least  loosely  welded  together,  if  he 
wanted  to  reach  the  Channel  ports. 

The  first  powerful  German  effort  was  made  on  the 
sector  nearest  the  sea.  Here  the  Belgians  and  French 
defended  the  line  of  the  Yser.  The  town  of  Dixmude, 
on  this  stream,  was  one  of  the  main  centres  of  resistance. 
After  it  was  finally  taken  by  the  Germans  the  Allies 
flooded  the  swampy  area  to  the  west  of  the  Yser,  block- 
ing any  further  German  advance  in  that  direction  for 


[i9i4i         "  The  Race  for  the  Sea  "  45 

the  rest  of  the  war.  In  the  Nieuport  sector,  on  the 
seacoast,  the  Allied  line  was  protected  by  the  fire  of 
British  monitors  and  other  light  draft  warships. 

Farther  south  the  brunt  of  the  attack  fell  on  the 
sector  which  included  the  Ypres  salient  and  the  line 
down  to  Armentieres.  Here  seven  British  infantry 
divisions  and  three  cavalry  divisions  were  assailed  by 
German  forces  nearly  double  their  strength;  for  on  the 
whole  northern  front  there  were  twelve  German  corps 
against  seven  Allied  corps.  The  Germans  also  had  an 
enormous  superiority  in  artillery.  The  offensive  against 
Ypres  began  on  October  28th.  Its  crisis  was  reached  on 
October  31st  and  November  1st. 

On  October  29th  the  Germans  advanced  in  dense 
masses  on  both  sides  of  the  road  from  Menin  to  Ypres, 
centring  their  effort  about  Gheluvelt.  The  First  and 
Seventh  Divisions  of  the  First  Corps  were  driven  back 
some  distance,  but  later  in  the  day  more  than  recovered 
the  ground  they  had  lost.  On  October  30th  the  enemy's 
attack  shifted  a  little  farther  south,  falling  chiefly  on 
the  British  Cavalry  Corps,  about  Hollebeke.  Hollebeke 
was  captured  and,  still  farther  down,  the  Germans  got 
a  foothold  in  Messines  village,  on  the  south-eastern  side 
of  Messines  Ridge.  The  British  line  here  was  reinforced 
by  a  brigade  detached  from  Smith-Dorrien's  Second 
Corps. 

On  October  31st  the  Germans  renewed  the  assault 
on  the  Gheluvelt  front.  Shortly  after  noon  of  that  day 
the  line  of  the  First  Division  of  the  First  Corps  was 
broken.  Big  guns,  trains,  and  troops  cluttered  the  road 
back  toward  Ypres.  Field  Marshal  French  tells  in 
IQ14  how  he  had  to  abandon  his  motor  car  east  of  Ypres 
and  go  on  foot  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  headquarters  at 
the  chateau  of  Hooge.     There  he  found  Haig  and  his 


46  The  Great  War  [i9i4] 

Chief  of  Staff  "poring  over  maps  and  evidently  much 
disconcerted."  The  situation  was  critical,  because 
British  reserves  were  lacking  and  a  retreat  to  Ypres 
under  the  pressure  of  the  vastly  superior  numbers  of 
the  enemy  would  be  extremely  difficult  and  costly. 

"It  was  a  dramatic  half -hour,  the  worst  I  ever  spent," 
says  the  Field  Marshal.  But  the  aspect  of  things  sud- 
denly altered.  News  came  at  3  p.m.  that  the  First 
Division  had  rallied  and  recovered  Gheluvelt.  This 
brilliant  counter-blow  had  been  organized  by  Brigadier- 
General  FitzClarence  of  the  First  Guards  Brigade. 
He  counter-attacked  from  the  north  of  Gheluvelt  and 
stopped  the  German  advance.  He  was  killed  in  battle 
east  of  Ypres  about  two  weeks  later.  By  dark  the  Bri- 
tish front  in  the  Menin  road  sector  was  re-established. 

During  the  night  of  October  3ist-November  1st 
the  Germans  broke  through  the  positions  held  by  the 
British  cavalry  at  Messines.  Messines  Ridge  was 
seized  early  in  the  morning.  So  was  Wytschaete 
village.  By  10  a.m.  the  exhausted  Second  Cavalry 
Division,  which  had  been  in  the  front  line  many  days, 
was  retiring  on  Mount  Kemmel.  But  the  day  was 
saved  by  the  timely  arrival  of  the  Sixteenth  French 
Army  Corps,  loaned  by  Foch.  It  established  a  new 
line  running  through  the  western  edge  of  Wytschaete 
village. 

Field  Marshal  French  says  that  the  period  of  the 
greatest  danger  in  the  whole  Ypres  campaign  was 
between  2  a.m.  and  11  a.m.  on  November  1st.  Had 
the  Sixteenth  French  Corps  been  an  hour  later,  the 
Allied  troops,  north  of  an  east  and  west  line  running 
through  Mount  Kemmel,  would  have  been  isolated 
and  hemmed  in  against  the  coast.  On  the  4th  and  5th 
of  November  the  Twentieth  French  Corps  arrived  at 


[i9i4]         "  The  Race  for  the  Sea  "  47 

Ypres,  and  the  distressing  shortage  of  Allied  reserves 
was  somewhat  alleviated. 

The  final  phase  of  the  battle  of  Ypres  came  on 
November  nth  and  12th. 

The  Prussian  Guard  was  moved  north  from  Arras 
to  stiffen  the  new  formations  which  Moltke  had  been 
using.  Another  assault  was  made  about  Gheluvelt. 
But  this  time  no  break  was  effected  in  Haig's  line. 
The  Germans  were  repulsed  with  heavy  losses.  They 
also  failed  completely  against  the  French  on  Haig's 
left.  But  on  Haig's  right,  about  Hollebeke,  they  got 
across  the  Ypres-Comines  canal. 

On  the  1 2  th  repeated  violent  attacks  on  both  flanks 
of  the  British  First  Corps  were  brought  to  a  dead  stop. 
The  fighting  then  relaxed.  Foch  arranged  to  relieve 
the  hard-tried  British  divisions.  By  November  21st 
he  had  taken  over  with  French  troops  the  entire  Ypres 
salient. 

The  British  losses  in  the  operations  from  October 
15th  to  November  20th  were  2264  officers  and  18,610 
men.  This  refutes  the  rhetorical  exaggeration  that 
the  British  Expeditionary  Army  "died  in  its  tracks" 
in  Flanders.  Its  losses  were  probably  not  heavier 
than  twenty  per  cent. 

After  the  middle  of  November,  the  failure  of  the 
German  campaign  for  the  Channel  ports  became  ap- 
parent. The  British  were  reinforced  by  another  East 
Indian  division,  by  English  and  Scotch  Territorial 
formations,  and  by  the  first  Canadian  units.  Trench 
lines  had  been  consolidated  on  the  entire  Western  Front 
from  Nieuport  to  the  Swiss  border.  The  long  period 
of  trench  deadlock  began. 

Fighting  died  away  completely  in  Flanders  after 
December  1st.     The  "race  for  the  sea"  had  ended  in 


48  The  Great  War  [i9i4] 

a  draw.  The  German  drive  for  the  Channel  ports 
had  fallen  short  of  its  objectives.  Even  Ypres  was  not 
taken.  Yet  the  net  result  of  the  Flanders  campaign 
showed  a  certain  balance  in  favour  of  the  Germans. 
They  had  conquered  Belgium,  except  for  the  narrow 
strip  west  of  the  Yser.  They  had  largely  increased 
their  holdings  in  Northern  France.  At  the  dose  of 
the  battle  of  the  Marne,  Noyon,  Lassigny,  Roye, 
Chaulnes,  Peronne,  Bapaume,  Arras,  Douai,  Cambrai, 
Lens,  and  Lille  were  in  "No  Man's  Land."  Now  they 
were  in  German  hands,  except  Arras,  which  still  lay  be- 
tween the  lines.  This  part  of  France  constituted  the 
backbone  of  French  industry.  With  it  lost,  the  French 
armies  were  tied  down  to  a  slow  war  of  liberation. 

In  this  territory  the  Germans  systematically  de- 
stroyed what  they  couldn't  carry  away.  France  was 
deprived  of  its  manufacturing  output,  its  coal,  its  har- 
vests, and  the  services  of  its  inhabitants.  And  when 
she  recovered  it  she  found  its  productiveness  crippled 
for  years  to  come. 

Belgium  suffered  the  same  fate.  Her  population 
was  impressed  to  do  war  work  for  Germany.  Many 
able-bodied  Belgians  were  deported  across  the  Rhine. 
The  whole  kingdom  was  subjected  to  the  tyranny  of 
satraps  like  Bissing  and  Falkenhausen. 

Belgium  offered  a  possibility  of  political  assimilation 
if  German  policy  had  been  conciliatory,  or  even  humane. 
The  Flemings  were  of  Teutonic  stock  and  had  a  racial 
grievance.  They  had  been  agitating  for  recognition 
of  their  language.  There  was  a  sharp  line  of  antago- 
nism between  them  and  the  Walloons.  It  had  doubt- 
less been  the  German  idea,  originally,  to  widen  this 
breach  and  to  create  inside  Belgium  a  distinct  Flemish 
state.     But  the  terrorism  practised  by  the  military 


[i9i4]         "  The  Race  for  the  Sea  "  49 

authorities  in  the  first  months  of  the  war  blasted  what- 
ever hope  there  was  of  erecting  a  pro- German  Flemish 
dependency  in  Belgian  territory. 

The  Belgian  atrocities  were  committed  with  the 
sanction  of  military  leaders  who  recognized  no  other 
rule  than  calculated  severity  in  dealing  with  conquered 
populations.  They  slew  and  maimed  civilians  and 
burned  towns  in  order  to  drive  fear  into  the  hearts  of 
those  on  whom  they  intended  to  impose  the  burdens 
of  military  occupation.  They  were  impartial.  They 
committed  the  same  crimes  in  France,  in  Poland,  in 
Russia,  in  Rumania,  and  in  Serbia. 

But  in  Belgium  they  not  only  earned  the  execration 
of  the  civilized  world,  but  they  also  defeated  their  own 
political  ends.  When  they  got  ready  to  set  up  their 
independent  Flemish  state,  no  Flemings,  outside  a 
limited  circle  of  venal  place-holders,  would  accept  that 
odious  shadow  of  independence.  Belgium  remained  a 
millstone  about  Germany's  neck.  It  was,  to  the  end 
of  the  war,  an  insuperable  bar  to  any  reconciliation 
between  the  moral  sense  of  the  world  and  the  brutal 
manifestations  of  German  Kultur. 


CHAPTER  V 

OPERATIONS  ON  THE  RUSSIAN  FRONT.      AUGUST  I,  I914- 
DECEMBER  31,    I9I4 

After  war  was  declared  William  II  denounced 
Nicholas  II  in  unmeasured  terms.  They  had  been 
accustomed  to  address  each  other  as  "Willy"  and 
' '  Nicky. "  But  "  Willy  '&  "  affection  suddenly  turned  to 
violent  personal  rancour.  Since  Germany  had  delib- 
erately planned  to  make  war  on  Russia,  this  exaspera- 
tion seemed  unnatural.  Yet  it  was  genuine  enough. 
It  was  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  Russia,  rightly 
interpreting  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum  to  Serbia, 
had  taken  the  precaution  to  begin  her  mobilization 
as  early  as  July  27th.  (The  mobilization  order  was 
published  on  July  29th.) 

Thus  Russia,  whose  concentration  would  be  nor- 
mally very  slow,  had  obtained  a  three  or  four  days' 
start  on  Germany.  This  was  what  irritated  the  Kaiser. 
Germany's  war  plans  contemplated  a  considerable  de- 
lay in  Russian  mobilization,  which  would  allow  time 
for  the  German  armies  to  crush  France  before  having 
to  turn  east  to  meet  the  Russian  menace.  The  French 
also  had  misgivings  about  Russia's  ability  to  get  into 
the  war  promptly.  But  Russia  did  get  in  more  rapidly 
than  any  one  had  expected. 

As  things  turned  out,  German  calculations  were 
not  greatly  disturbed  by  the  premature  Russian  inva- 

50 


[i9i4i  Operations  on  the  Russian  Front    51 

sion  of  East  Prussia.  The  invaders  were  routed  at 
Tannenberg  before  the  battle  of  the  Marne  had  begun. 
But  Russian  forehandedness  played  havoc  with  Austria- 
Hungary's  military  plans.  And  Austro- Hungarian 
reverses  in  the  fall  of  1914  compelled  Germany  to 
turn  to  the  East  Front  early  in  19 15,  without  having 
accomplished  the  main  purpose  of  her  offensive  against 
France. 

Up  to  May,  191 5,  Russia's  successes  were  the  great 
surprise  of  the  war  on  the  Allied  side.  The  Russian 
armies  overran  thirty-five  thousand  square  miles  of 
Austrian  territory  and  took  more  than  three  hundred 
thousand  prisoners.  These  achievements  were  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  Russians  had  profited  from  the  lessons 
of  the  Japanese  War,  and  were  able  to  put  in  the  field 
at  the  outset  large  bodies  of  troops,  well  equipped, 
amply  munitioned,  and  led,  for  the  most  part,  by  gen- 
erals of  more  experience  and  capacity  than  any  Aus- 
tria-Hungary possessed. 

Russia's  victories  were  won,  moreover,  in  spite  of 
the  handicaps  imposed  by  a  defective  strategical 
frontier.  Poland,  jutting  out  into  Teuton  territory, 
formed  a  salient  extremely  difficult  to  defend.  It 
was  surrounded  on  three  sides  by  Prussia  and  Austria, 
and  was  especially  open  to  attack  on  the  southern 
side.  The  true  strategical  frontier,  and  the  actual 
Russian  zone  of  mobilization,  lay  east  of  the  eastern 
border  of  Poland.  It  ran  north  and  south  through 
Brest-Litovsk.  It  was  covered,  in  the  centre,  by  the 
Bug  River  and,  farther  north,  by  the  Niemen. 

In  order  to  protect  Poland  the  Russians  had  con- 
structed an  outpost  line  based  on  the  Vistula.  It  ran 
from  Ivangorod,  in  the  south,  north  to  Warsaw  and 
thence  north-west  to  the  fortress  of  Novogeorgievsk, 


52  The  Great  War  [1914] 

also  on  the  Vistula.  Thence  it  turned  north-east, 
through  Ostrolenka,  Ossowiec,  and  Augustovo,  to 
Kovno,  on  the  Niemen.  This  line  was  strong  on  the 
northern  end.  But  it  could  easily  be  turned  on  the 
southern  end  by  an  Austro-Hungarian  advance  in 
the  region  east  of  the  Vistula,  bringing  the  invaders 
well  to  the  rear  of  Ivangorod  and  Warsaw. 

The  original  military  agreement  between  France  and 
Russia  contemplated  the  employment  of  the  bulk  of 
the  Russian  forces  against  Germany,  the  ''principal 
enemy,"  while  Austria-Hungary,  "the  secondary 
enemy,"  was  being  contained  in  Galicia.  But  this 
agreement  could  not  be  lived  up  to.  In  the  first  place, 
Russia  was  unequal  to  a  sustained  offensive  against 
Germany.  Germany  outclassed  her  in  military  organi- 
zation, in  training  and  efficiency,  and  in  technical 
equipment.  In  the  second  place,  Russia's  position 
in  Poland  could  not  be  made  secure  until  she  had 
cleared  Galicia  as  far  west  as  Cracow. 

In  response,  however,  to  the  original  understanding 
she  rushed  two  armies  into  East  Prussia  early  in  August. 
This  province  was  lightly  held  by  the  Germans,  who 
had  thought  that  the  Russians  would  not  be  ready  to 
fight  within  a  month  or  six  weeks  following  the  declara- 
tion of  war.  One  army,  under  Rennenkampf,  coming 
from  Kovno,  crossed  the  eastern  boundary  of  Prussia, 
defeated  the  Germans  at  Gumbinnen  on  August  16th, 
and  advanced  west  along  the  railroad  leading  to  Konigs- 
berg.  This  force  reached  Insterburg,  the  Germans 
retiring  before  it  into  the  Konigsberg  fortified  zone. 

A  second  army,  under  Samsonoff,  advanced  from  the 
Narew  line  in  Poland  into  the  southern  part  of  East 
Prussia,  aiming  at  the  railroad  west  of  Allenstein, 
where  Samsonoff  expected  to  make  a  junction  with 


[1914J  Operations  on  the  Russian  Front    53 

Rennenkampf — the  latter  coming  south-west  from 
Insterburg.  Samsonoff  defeated  a  small  German 
force  on  his  front  and  assumed  that  he  was  dealing 
merely  with  covering  troops.  The  invasion  of  East 
Prussia  had  nearly  caused  a  panic  in  Berlin.  Reserves 
were  gathered  and  two  army  corps  were  sent  east  from 
Belgium.  These  reinforcements  were  put  under  the 
command  of  Hindenburg,  hastily  summoned  from 
the  retired  list.  He  had  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
terrain  and  used  it  in  baiting  a  trap  for  Samsonoff. 

The  latter  had  lost  touch  with  bis  wings  and  was 
occupied  in  driving  ahead  with  his  centre,  which  en- 
countered little  opposition.  Hindenburg' s  operation, 
which  lasted  from  August  27th  to  August  30th,  fol- 
lowed the  classical  Cannae  model.  He  concentrated 
his  strength  on  Samsonoff's  flanks,  and  enveloped  the 
Russian  right  completely,  by  marching  from  Allen- 
stein  south  to  Ortelsburg.  The  Russian  left  was  also 
encircled  west  of  Tannenberg.  In  the  Tannenberg 
pine  woods  the  main  body  of  Samsonoff's  army  was 
surrounded  and  captured,  Hindenburg  reporting 
seventy  thousand  prisoners.  Samsonoff  died  alone 
in  the  scrub  forest,  trying  to  escape  at  night.  The 
remnants  of  his  forces  straggled  back  into  Poland. 

Rennenkampf  thereupon  retreated  to  the  line  of 
the  Niemen.  Hindenburg  followed,  on  September  7th, 
teaching  the  Niemen  on  September  21st.  After  a  week 
spent  in  trying  vainly  to  break  the  Niemen  line,  the 
Germans  retreated  into  East  Prussia. 

The  Russian  campaign  which  ended  with  Tannen- 
berg proved  that  Russia  would  never  be  able  to  take 
the  northern  route  to  Berlin.  East  Prussia  was  a 
hopeless  field  to  operate  in,  both  because  of  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  terrain  and  because  of  the  broad  barrier  of 


54  The  Great  War  [19141 

the  Vistula,  behind  which  lay  a  network  of  German 
strategical  railroads.  Russia  was  to  make  another 
offensive  bid  later,  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Vistula 
toward  Posen.  But,  at  her  best,  she  was  no  match 
for  Germany,  except  on  the  defensive.  Her  true  theatre 
of  operations,  while  her  initial  superiority  in  man- 
power lasted,  was  in  the  south,  where  Francis  Joseph's 
generals  had  undertaken  a  task  much  beyond  their 
capacity. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  General  Staff  had  planned 
to  open  the  war  with  an  ambitious  offensive.  This  was 
strategically  sound  in  conception.  But  it  undervalued 
the  enemy.  The  Austrians  had  two  armies  in  Galicia. 
One,  under  Dankl,  undertook  to  invade  Poland  and  turn 
the  Ivangorod- Warsaw  line.  The  other,  under  Auffen- 
berg,  covered  Dankl's  right  and  defended  Lemberg. 

Dankl  started  north  on  August  nth,  with  Lublin, 
on  the  Warsaw-Brest-Lit ovsk  railroad,  as  his  objective. 
He  encountered  inferior  Russian  forces  and  won  the 
battle  of  Krasnik  on  August  23d-26th.  But  he  never 
got  much  farther  than  Krasnik.  Three  Russian  armies 
had  been  formed  on  the  Brest-Litovsk  line.  The 
northernmost,  under  Ivanoff,  pushed  west  to  cover 
Lublin.  The  middle  one,  under  Russky,  advanced 
from  the  north-east  and  east  on  Lemberg,  while  the 
southernmost,  under  Brusiloff,  approached  Lemberg 
from  the  south-east.  This  joint  forward  movement 
began  on  August  14th. 

Brusiloff  turned  Auffenberg's  line  at  its  southern 
end,  when  he  forced  the  crossings  of  the  Zlota  Lipa 
and  the  Gnila  Lipa  and  captured  Halicz.  The  Austro- 
Hungarians  evacuated  Lemberg  on  September  2d, 
and  fell  back  to  the  line  of  the  Grodek  Lakes.  But 
this  line  was  quickly  turned  at  its  northern  end  by 


[i9i4i  Operations  on  the  Russian  Front    55 

Russky's  army,  which  broke  through  at  Rawa  Russka, 
at  the  point  where  Auffenberg's  left  wing  connected 
with  Dankl's  right. 

Auffenberg  fell  back  in  great  confusion  toward  the 
Carpathian  Mountains.  Dankl's  flank  was  now  un- 
covered. IvanofT  was  attacking  his  front,  while  Russky 
threatened  his  rear.  He  retreated  rapidly  toward  the 
San  River.  Being  unable  to  make  a  stand  there, 
because  Auffenberg  had  already  sought  shelter  on  the 
south  side  of  the  Carpathian  range,  he  abandoned 
Jaroslav,  left  a  garrison  in  Przemysl  and  then  withdrew 
into  Western  Galicia. 

Austria-Hungary  was  not  capable  in  1914  of  con- 
ducting campaigns  on  both  the  Serbian  and  the  Russian 
fronts.  She  had  at  least  400,000  men  on  the  Danube. 
She  had  to  keep  some  observation  corps  on  the  Italian 
frontier  and  also  on  the  Rumanian  frontier.  She  could 
not  have  had  more  than  800,000  men  in  Galicia  and 
Poland,  while  Russia  probably  had  well  over  1 ,000,000. 
The  secondary  Austro-Hungarian  mobilization  was 
slow.  It  was  not  until  the  winter  months  of  191 5  that 
the  Austrian  military  establishment,  reorganized  by 
the  German  General  Staff,  could  compete  on  even 
terms  with  the  Russian. 

The  Austrian  High  Command  spent  September 
reorganizing  its  armies  behind  the  Carpathian  barrier 
and  before  Cracow.  The  Russians  occupied  Buko- 
wina  and  Eastern  and  Middle  Galicia,  carrying  then- 
west  front  forward  to  the  Vistula,  from  Ivangorod  up 
to  a  point  north  of  Tarnow,  and  then  across  Galicia 
to  the  western  Carpathian  passes.  Thus  the  weak 
southern  face  of  the  Polish  salient  was  covered  and 
Warsaw  was  safeguarded  from  the  south  as  well  as 
the  north. 


56  The  Great  War  [1914] 

It  was  important,  from  the  German  point-of-view, 
that  the  new  Russian  lines  protecting  Poland  should 
not  be  consolidated.  Hindenburg,  therefore,  shifted 
the  bulk  of  his  army  from  East  Prussia  to  Silesia  and 
began,  about  October  1st,  an  offensive  against  Ivan- 
gorod  and  Warsaw.  A  German  army  moved  east  from 
Kalisz  and  an  Austro:Hungarian  army  moved  north- 
east from  the  neighbourhood  of  Cracow.  The  purpose 
of  this  operation  was  obscure.  After  its  failure  the 
Germans  described  it  as  a  mere  reconnoissance  in  force. 

There  were  few  Russian  troops  in  Western  Poland, 
and  Hindenburg  got  close  up  to  Warsaw,  practically 
unopposed.  On  October  14th  he  was  on  the  western 
outskirts  of  the  city,  near  enough  for  his  field  artillery 
to  shell  it.  The  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  the  Russian 
Commander-in-Chief,  called  up  reinforcements  from 
the  south.  These  held  the  enemy  before  Warsaw  and 
Ivangorod  for  several  days.  Then  both  the  German 
and  Austrian  armies  retreated,  under  a  threat  of  en- 
velopment. The  Russians  followed  them  to  the 
western  frontier  of  Poland. 

In  order  to  save  Warsaw,  Nicholas  had  stripped  the 
Galician  front.  The  Russian  armies  there  withdrew 
from  the  Carpathians  and  recrossed  the  San.  The 
siege  of  Przemysl  was  raised  for  a  few  days.  But 
Hindenburg's  recoil  involved  a  similar  recoil  in  Galicia. 
The  Austro-Hungarian  forces  again  retreated  quickly 
to  the  Carpathian  ridges  and  toward  Cracow.  Hoetzen- 
dorff,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  committed  once  more  the  error 
of  leaving  a  large  garrison  in  Przemysl,  where  it  was 
eventually  to  be  starved  into  a  surrender.  Przemysl 
was  Austria's  prize  fortress.  The  Russians  had  no 
siege  artillery  with  which  to  reduce  it  as  the  Germans 
had  reduced  Liege,  Namur,  Maubeuge,  and  Antwerp. 


[1914J  Operations  on  the  Russian  Front    57 

But  it  was  certain  to  fall  to  them  if  they  could  hold 
Middle  Galicia.  Hoetzendorff  had  the  absurd  idea 
that  by  clinging  to  Przemysl  he  would  materially 
hamper  Russian  operations.  He  sacrificed  to  that 
idea  a  first  line  army  of  130,000  men. 

In  November  the  Russians  pushed  west  to  within 
eight  miles  of  Cracow  and  almost  to  the  border  of 
Silesia  and  Posen.  This  was  the  extreme  development 
of  the  Russian  approach  to  Berlin  by  the  southern 
route.  It  was  nipped  by  another  Hindenburg  offen- 
sive, just  as  the  approach  by  the  northern  route  had 
been  nipped  at  Tannenberg.  While  the  Russian  armies 
were  spread  out  on  a  long  front  in  Western  Poland, 
Hindenburg  concentrated  his  forces  in  the  region 
about  Thorn  and  moved  south-east  with  the  intention 
of  breaking  through  the  Russian  line  and  interposing 
between  the  southern  Russian  armies  and  Warsaw. 
Mackensen,  Hindenburg's  lieutenant,  effected  a  partial 
break-through  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lodz.  But 
before  this  operation  was  completed  a  Russian  force, 
under  Rennenkampf,  moved  south  from  the  Vistula 
River,  below  Novogeorgievsk,  and  got  on  Mackensen's 
left  flank.  A  great  deal  of  confused  fighting  followed, 
lasting  into  December.  Rennenkampf  failed  to  en- 
velop Mackensen's  left  wing  and  on  December  6th 
Hindenburg  entered  Lodz. 

Encouraged  by.  this  success  he  continued,  all  through 
December,  his  pounding  tactics  on  the  Warsaw  front. 
Here  he  repeated  the  costly  frontal  assaults  which  had 
marked  the  futile  German  effort  in  the  West  to  break 
through  in  Flanders.  The  Russians  yielded  gradually, 
giving  up  Lowicz  and  Skierniewice.  But  when  they 
reached  the  Bzura  and  Rawa  rivers,  twenty  miles 
west  of  the  Vistula,  they  held  fast.     Though  he  tried 


58  The  Great  War  [1914] 

again  and  again,  Hindenburg  was  never  able  to  shake 
this  line,  which  the  Russians  held  until  August,  1915, 
when  the  collapse  of  the  armies  in  Galicia  and  the 
Teuton  advance  to  Lemberg  compelled  the  evacuation 
of  Warsaw. 

On  the  whole,  Russia  met  the  first  tests  of  the  war 
with  surprising  credit.  She  had  successfully  readjusted 
her  military  frontier.  Her  armies  had  advanced  from 
the  line  of  the  Bug  to  the  line  of  the  Vistula.  She  had 
defeated  Austria-Hungary  with  ease.  Her  offensives 
against  Germany  had  failed.  But  she  had  held  her 
own  against  Germany  on  the  defensive.  Her  troops 
were  better  adapted  to  trench  warfare  than  they  were 
to  open  or  semi-open  warfare.  And  trench  warfare 
had  now  become  the  rule  on  the  Eastern  as  well  as  the 
Western  Front. 

But  Russia  was  drawing  rapidly  on  her  capital  as 
a  military  power.  Industrially  she  was  unequal  to 
the  demands  of  modern  war.  Her  transportation 
system  was  poor.  She  could  not  supply  herself  with 
guns  and  munitions.  She  had  no  heavy  field  guns, 
such  as  the  Germans  were*  using.  She  had  no  siege 
howitzers.  She  had  to  depend  on  her  allies  and  on 
neutrals  for  war  supplies.  And  her  communications 
with  Western  Europe  were  round-about  and  precarious. 

The  wastage  of  the  campaigns  of  19 14  was  negligible 
so  far  as  raw  man-power  was  concerned.  But  the  loss 
in  officers  was  irreparable.  The  material  from  which 
regimental  subalterns,  or  even  good  non-commissioned 
officers,  could  be  recruited,  was  limited.  Universal 
service,  too,  produced  conscripts  of  great  unevenness 
of  quality.  Worst  of  all,  the  supply  of  ammunition 
for  the  artillery  had  begun  to  run  low.  Satisfactory 
as  the  military  situation  appeared  on  the  surface  at 


[i9i4i  Operations  on  the  Russian  Front    59 

the  end  of  1914,  those  behind  the  scenes  knew  that 
Russia  had  passed  the  peak  of  her  effort.  Germany 
was  gathering  strength  for  an  offensive  in  the  East 
and  aid  from  the  Western  Entente  nations  was  indis- 
pensable, if  Russia  was  to  be  put  in  condition  to  meet 
that  attack.  On  January  2,  19 15,  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment appealed  to  Great  Britain  to  make  a  demonstra- 
tion against  Constantinople,  with  a  view  to  opening  the 
Dardanelles.  Germany,  operating  on  interior  lines, 
could  strike  on  either  front  at  will.  In  order  to  neu- 
tralize that  advantage  and  to  save  Russia,  it  had  become 
absolutely  necessary  for  the  Allies  to  link  up  their 
Eastern  and  Western  fronts. 


CHAPTER  VI 

AUSTRIA'S  FAILURES  IN  SERBIA.      AUGUST  12,  I9I4 — 
DECEMBER  1 4,  I914 

Austria-Hungary's  determination  to  send  a  "puni- 
tive expedition"  into  Serbia  started  the  world  war. 
But  the  Austrian  High  Command  had  miscalculated 
the  difficulties  of  such  an  expedition.  Serbia  possessed 
a  veteran  army  and  had  emerged  victorious  from  two 
successive  Balkan  wars.  It  was  beyond  Austria- 
Hungary's  strength  to  hold  the  Russians  on  one  front 
and  to  discipline  the  Serbs  on  another.  Serbia  was 
not  conquered  until  Germany  sent  Mackensen's  army 
south  in  September,  1915,  and  Bulgaria  joined  the 
Teuton  Alliance. 

Vienna  was  committed,  however,  in  August,  1914, 
to  a  Serbian  offensive.  About  400,000  Austro-Hun- 
garians  had  been  mobilized  on  the  Danube  and  in 
Bosnia.  Serbia  is  protected  on  the  north  and  west  by 
three  rivers.  The  Danube  is  the  northern  boundary 
line  east  of  Belgrade.  West  of  that  city  the  Save 
separates  Serbia  from  Slavonia.  The  Drina,  which 
flows  north  into  the  Save,  divides  Serbia  from  Bosnia. 
But  because  Northern  Serbia  formed  a  salient  project- 
ing into  Austro-Hungarian  territory,  it  was  always  diffi- 
cult for  the  Serbs  to  defend  it  against  superior  numbers. 

On  the  Danube  front  the  Austrian  High  Command 
contented  itself  with  bombarding  Belgrade  from  across 
the  river.     The  Serbian  Government  abandoned  the 

60 


[i9i4i      Austria's  Failures  in  Serbia         61 

capital,  so  dangerously  exposed,  and  retired  south  to 
Kraguievatz,  and  then  to  Nish.  But  the  serious 
Austrian  attack  was  to  come,  not  from  the  north, 
but  from  the  west  and  north-west.  On  August  12, 
19 1 4,  strong  Austrian  forces  were  pushed  across  the 
Drina  River,  at  three  different  points — Liubovia, 
Zvornik,  and  Losnitza — and  across  the  Save  at  Shabatz. 
The  Austrian  columns  were  to  move  east  and  south- 
east, converging  on  Valievo,  the  main  Serbian  military 
supply  base.  If  they  reached  Valievo,  they  would  com- 
pel an  evacuation  of  the  whole  Belgrade  sector. 

Field  Marshal  Putnik,  the  experienced  and  brilliant 
Serbian  Commander-in-Chief,  hurried  his  army  west 
to  break  up  this  converging  movement.  From  August 
1 6th  to  August  23d  was  fought  the  battle  of  the  Jadar, 
in  the  angle  formed  by  the  Save  and  the  Drina.  It 
was  the  first  large  scale  engagement  of  the  war. 
Putnik  was  entirely  successful.  He  defeated  the 
separated  Austrian  columns  in  detail  and  drove  them 
back  into  Bosnia  and  Slavonia.  The  Austro-Hunga- 
rians  lost  about  forty  thousand  men,  forty-six  guns, 
and  large  quantities  of  military  stores.  The  Serbian 
losses  were  less  than  twenty  thousand. 

The  battle  of  the  Jadar  disclosed  the  weakness  of 
the  Austrian  military  organization.  It  forecast  the 
defeats  which  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  to  suffer  in 
Poland  and  Galicia  at  the  hands  of  the  Russians. 
Austria  came  back  to  the  attack  in  the  second  week 
of  September,  again  crossing  the  Drina.  But  the 
offensive  made  little  progress  and  was  soon  called  off 
because  of  the  critical  condition  of  the  armies  in  the 
Carpathians.  The  Serbians,  meanwhile,  had  crossed 
the  Danube  into  Hungary  and  taken  Semlin,  holding 
it  for  a  brief  period. 


62  The  Great  War 


[1914] 


After  Hindenburg's  October  offensive  against  War- 
saw had  relieved  the  situation  in  the  north,  a  second 
invasion  of  Serbia  was  undertaken.  This  came  again 
from  the  west.  The  Serbians  were  greatly  outnum- 
bered and  had  to  retreat  rapidly.  They  abandoned 
Valievo.  The  Austrian  left  wing  enveloped  Belgrade, 
which  fell  on  December  2d.  The  right  wing  reached 
Ushitza,  and  the  centre  pressed  east  toward  Kraguie- 
vatz,  the  chief  Serbian  arsenal,  threatening  to  cut  the 
Belgrade- Nish-Constantinople  trunk  line. 

But  at  the  end  of  November,  the  Russians  were 
again  pushing  through  the  Carpathian  passes  and 
approaching  Cracow.  The  Austrian  advance  in  Serbia 
halted.  Troops  were  sent  north.  Putnik  grasped 
the  situation  and  began  an  offensive  of  his  own.  Tak- 
ing the  hesitating  Austro-Hungarians  by  surprise, 
he  broke  through  their  centre  and  right,  recovering 
Ushitza  and  Valievo,  and  captured  twenty  thousand 
prisoners.  The  Austrian  right  and  centre  retreated 
in  disorder  into  Bosnia,  where  they  were  further  cut 
up  by  a  Montenegrin  army  in  an  engagement  at 
Vishegrad.  By  December  14th  Serbian  territory  was 
completely  cleared  by  the  enemy  and  Belgrade  was 
reoccupied. 

Hostilities  in  this  theatre  now  practically  ceased 
until  the  fall  of  191 5.  But  Serbia  was  left  isolated 
and  at  the  mercy  of  the  Central  Powers,  whenever  they 
should  choose  to  fall  upon  her.  The  Allies  weakly 
entrusted  her  protection  to  their  Foreign  Offices,  which 
were  wholly  unable  to  cope  with  the  complexities  of 
the  Near  Eastern  situation.  Within  a  year  Serbia 
was  to  fall  a  victim  to  the  abject  failure  of  Allied 
diplomacy  in  the  Balkans. 


CHAPTER  VII 

TURKEY  ENTERS  THE  WAR.      OCTOBER   29,    I914- 
DECEMBER  31,    1914 

Turkey  was  the  first  recruit  to  the  Teuton  Alliance. 
Her  accession  was  reluctant,  so  far  as  the  ruling  house 
and  the  great  majority  of  the  Turkish  population  were 
concerned.  It  was  accelerated  through  the  ascendancy 
which  Germany  had  gained  in  the  councils  of  the  little 
group  of  Young  Turk  leaders  who  ruled  the  Empire. 
The  truculent  Enver  Pasha,  almost  a  dictator  in 
Constantinople,  was  an  extreme  pro-German  and  a 
willing  tool  of  Wangenheim,  the  German  Ambassador. 
He  and  Talaat  Pasha  were  German  agents  first  and 
Turkish  statesmen  afterwards. 

Yet  there  were  other  and  impersonal  reasons  for 
Turkey's  choice.  The  Porte  had  gradually  drifted 
into  close  political  relations  with  Germany.  While 
Great  Britain  had  maintained  an  isolated  position  in 
Europe,  Turkey  had  looked  to  her  as  a  protector. 
The  policy  of  Palmerston  and  Disraeli  had  been  to 
oppose  Russia;  and  Russia  was  Turkey's  century-old 
enemy.  But  when  Great  Britain  was  drawn  into  the 
Entente  and  began  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with 
Russia,  Turkey  became  distrustful.  Great  Britain 
and  France  had  encouraged  Italy  to  seize  Tripoli. 
Germany  alone  among  the  major  European  Powers 
had  sympathized  with  the  Osmanli.     Germany,  too, 

63 


64  The  Great  War  [i9i4] 

had  never  taken  a  foot  of  territory  belonging  to  the 
Porte  or  under  its  suzerainty.  Russian  designs  on 
Constantinople  were  well  known,  and  in  a  European 
war  in  which  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  were 
ranged  against  Germany,  Turkish  policy  would  natu- 
rally incline  toward  dependence  on  the  friendship  of 
Berlin. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  Turkey  declared  her 
neutrality.  But  the  Goeben  and  Breslau  incident  soon 
proved  how  benevolently  inclined  toward  Germany 
Turkish  neutrality  was.  The  Young  Turk  government 
was  under  treaty  obligations  to  deny  those  war  vessels, 
fleeing  from  an  Allied  squadron,  passage  through  the 
Dardanelles.  But  Enver  and  Talaat  accepted  nominal 
title  to  them,  thus  assuring  their  safety  and  also  ac- 
quiring the  means  to  over-awe  Constantinople. 

On  September  ioth  the  Turkish  Government  an- 
nulled the  Capitulations,  which  had  conferred  special 
privileges  on  the  nationals  of  foreign  powers.  On 
September  28th  the  Dardanelles  were  closed  to  all 
merchantmen,  thus  cutting  off  communications  between 
the  Western  Allies  and  Russia.  It  was  apparent  that 
the  Young  Turk  dictators  were  only  awaiting  the  word 
from  Berlin  to  throw  off  the  mask  of  neutrality.  The 
signal  was  given  by  Berlin  late  in  October.  On  Octo- 
ber 29th  the  Breslau  bombarded  the  Black  Sea  port 
of  Theodosia,  and  Turkish  war  vessels  destroyed  some 
Russian  merchantmen  and  a  Russian  gunboat  lying 
off  the  harbour  of  Odessa.  Russia  accepted  this  raid 
as  an  act  of  war,  although  the  Turkish  Cabinet  tried 
to  explain  that  hostilities  were  begun  without  its 
sanction  by  German  officers  serving  in  the  Turkish 
navy.  Great  Britain  and  France  declared  war  on 
Turkey  on  November  5th.     Great  Britain  at  once  an- 


[i9i4i         Turkey  Enters  the  War  65 

nexed  Cyprus  and  announced  the  complete  indepen- 
dence of  Egypt. 

Turkey's  entrance  into  the  war  was  of  enormous 
benefit  to  the  Teuton  Allies,  because  it  promised  to 
isolate  Russia.  The  primary  objective  of  Entente 
strategy  was  to  connect  the  Eastern  and  Western  fronts. 
Now  Turkey  interposed  a  barrier  to  the  use  of  the 
warm  water  route  through  the  Dardanelles.  So  long 
as  that  barrier  held  Russian  food  supplies,  which  the 
Western  Allies  needed,  could  not  come  out  and  guns 
and  munitions,  which  Russia  needed,  could  not  go  in. 

In  another  way  Turkey  was  expected  to  be  of  great 
value  to  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  Constan- 
tinople was  the  seat  of  the  Sheik-ul-Islam,  the  head  of 
the  Moslem  faith.  Conforming  to  political  instruc- 
tions this  dignitary  proclaimed  a  "Holy  War"  against 
unbelievers.  The  logic  of  this  document  was  impaired 
by  the  fact  that  it  was  obliged  to  distinguish  between 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  unbelievers,  as  well 
as  neutral  unbelievers,  and  the  unbelievers  who  were 
subjects  of  the  Entente  Powers.  It  effected  this  dis- 
crimination rather  lamely  by  stating :  ' '  Know  ye  that 
the  state  [the  Moslem  State]  is  at  war  with  Russia, 
England,  France,  and  their  allies,  and  that  these  are 
the  enemies  of  Islam." 

The  obvious  political  character  of  the  "Holy  War" 
weakened  the  appeal  made  to  Moslem  fanaticism.  It 
did  not  stir  to  revolt  the  populations  of  India,  Egypt, 
Tripoli,  Tunis,  Algeria,  and  Morocco.  As  a  matter 
ot  fact,  the  non-Turkish  part  of  Islam  ignored  it.  Ara- 
bia, a  Turkish  province,  containing  the  Holy  Cities 
of  Medina  and  Mecca,  allied  herself  with  the  infidels 
and  presently  expelled  the  Turkish  garrisons  and 
helped  to  conquer  Syria. 


66  The  Great  War  torn 

Yet  Turkey's  appearance  as  a  belligerent  greatly 
increased  the  Entente's  military  burdens.  Russia  had 
now  an  enemy  to  fight  on  the  Caucasus  front  and  in 
Persia.  Great  Britain  was  obliged  to  defend  India 
and  her  southern  Persian  oil  territory  by  undertaking 
an  expedition  up  the  Tigris.  She  had  also  to  protect 
Egypt.  These  new  tasks  strained  Allied  resources 
and  relieved  Germany. 

Turkey  at  once  began  to  gather  an  army  in  Palestine 
with  which  to  threaten  the  Suez  Canal.  Enver  Pasha 
set  off  for  the  Caucasus,  with  the  intention  of  recap- 
turing Batum  and  Kars,  overrunning  Georgia  and 
occupying  north-western  Persia.  The  Russians,  with 
somewhat  inferior  forces,  had  anticipated  the  Turkish 
offensive.  On  November  30th  their  left  wing  crossed 
the  Turkish  border  and  took  the  town  of  Bayazid, 
near  the  Persian  line.  Farther  north-west  they  ap- 
proached Lake  Van.  In  the  centre  they  advanced  from 
Kars  and  took  Koprukeui,  on  the  road  to  Erzerum. 
But  in  a  few  days  they  were  driven  back  toward  the 
Russian  frontier. 

The  Turkish  offensive  developed  first  in  the  Batum 
sector.  After  some  hard  fighting  the  left  wing,  on 
November  19th,  reached  a  point  only  thirteen  miles 
south  of  Batum.  On  the  extreme  right  the  Turks 
invaded  the  north-eastern  corner  of  Persia  and  turned 
the  Russian  positions  on  the  Araxes  River,  on  the 
Caspian  side  of  the  Ararat  range.  The  Russians,  on 
November  1 4th,  retired  toward  the  Koura  River.  Then 
the  Turkish  right  turned  south  and  occupied  the  borders 
of  Lake  Urumiah  in  Persia. 

The  way  was  now  cleared  for  Enver's  attack  on  the 
Russian  centre,  east  of  Erzerum.  His  plan  was  the 
familiar  Cannae  one  (German  model);  for  Enver  had 


[i9i4i  Turkey  Enters  the  War  67 

been  a  military  student  in  Berlin.  He  attempted 
to  envelop  the  Russian  forces  defending  Kars  by  en- 
circling them  on  both  flanks,  while  standing  fast  in  the 
centre.  On  November  20th  the  Turks  invaded  the 
Olty  Valley,  north-west  of  Kars,  defeated  the  Russians, 
and  advanced  toward  Ardahan,  on  the  Koura,  south- 
east of  Batum  and  north-east  of  Kars.  They  also  won 
a  victory  at  Sarykamitch,  to  the  south-east  of  Kars. 

Enver  had  turned  the  Russian  flanks.  But  the 
operation  was  too  complicated  for  the  rugged  terrain  and 
the  weather  conditions  at  that  season  of  the  year.  A 
blizzard  came  on,  and  the  Turks  suffered  severely  in 
their  flanking  marches  through  the  mountains.  The 
Russians,  in  the  nick  of  time,  began  a  counter-offensive. 
This  resulted,  on  January  2,  191 5,  in  a  double  victory, 
near  Ardahan,  on  the  north,  and  at  Sarykamitch,  at 
the  south.  The  Turkish  Ninth  Corps  was  badly  cut 
up  and  what  was  left  of  it  surrendered.  The  battle  of 
Kara-Ourgan  completed  the  rout  of  Enver's  forces, 
which  retreated  on  Erzerum.  The  Turkish  loss  was 
about  fifty  thousand. 

The  British  seized  Basra,  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Tigris,  on  November  22,  1914.  On  April  II,  1915, 
they  took  Kurna,  at  the  junction  of  the  Tigris  and  the 
Euphrates,  thus  paving  the  way  for  the  expedition  to 
Bagdad. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

GERMANY    LOSES    HER    COLONIES.       AUGUST    25,     I914- 
DECEMBER   31,    I914 

The  German  colonial  system,  like  the  German  navy, 
was  an  outgrowth  of  William  II 's  illusory  fiat:  "Ger- 
many's future  lies  on  the  sea."  The  Germany  of  Bis- 
marck and  William  I  grew  great  without  a  navy  and 
without  colonies.  Bismarck,  realizing  the  natural 
limitations  of  Germany's  geographical  position  and 
military  policy,  scoffed  at  overseas  possessions.  He 
knew  that  Germany's  true  future  lay  on  the  continent 
of  Europe. 

William  II  reversed  the  normal  processes  of  empire 
building.  Empire  follows  power.  Germany's  power 
was  on  land.  Colonies  are  the  fruit  of  long -developed 
sea  power.  Yet  Germany  started  in  to  create  a  colo- 
nial system  at  the  same  time  that  she  was  creating  a 
navy.  Thus  she  only  enlarged  her  military  liabilities. 
For  her  adventure  was  a  challenge  to  Great  Britain, 
and  if  she  should  start  a  war  in  which  Great  Britain 
should  be  involved  on  the  opposite  side,  she  could 
neither  hold  her  colonies  nor  send  her  fleet  to  sea. 

The  folly  of  the  great  adventure  of  William  II  and 
Tirpitz  was  demonstrated  as  soon  as  the  world  war 
began.  The  German  colonial  edifice  fell  to  pieces. 
The  German  flag  was  driven  from  the  ocean.  The 
German  home  fleet  interned  itself  in  the  Kiel  Canal 
and  at  Wilhelmshaven. 

68 


(i9i4l     Germany  Loses  Her  Colonies        69 

Tsingtau  was  the  most  valuable  German  colony  in 
a  military  sense,  since  it  provided  a  strong  naval  base 
in  Eastern  Asia.  It  was  acquired  in  1897  from  China, 
along  with  the  Kiao-chau  concessions  on  the  Shantung 
peninsula,  as  reparation  for  the  murder  of  two  German 
missionaries.  It  lay  across  the  Yellow  Sea  from  Korea. 
Japan  had  long  regarded  Germany  as  an  unwelcome 
neighbour.  Her  own  interests,  as  well  as  her  obliga- 
tions under  her  treaty  of  alliance  with  Great  Britain, 
made  her  jump  at  the  chance  to  expel  Germany  from 
China. 

On  August  15,  1914  the  Tokio  Government  sub- 
mitted an  ultimatum  to  Berlin,  requiring  the  delivery 
of  the  leased  territory  of  Kiao-chau  into  Japanese 
custody  before  September  15th.  Eight  days  were 
allowed  for  a  reply.  Receiving  none,  Japan,  on  August 
23d,  declared  war  on  Germany.  Her  treaty  arrange- 
ments with  Great  Britain  pledged  her  to  police  the 
East  and  protect  Great  Britain's  Asiatic  interests,  if 
her  ally  became  engaged  in  war  elsewhere.  German 
activities  in  the  Far  East  were  a  menace  to  the  peace 
of  that  region.  So  Japan  undertook,  as  a  part  of  her 
police  duty,  to  reduce  Tsingtau  and  to  occupy  the 
German  islands  in  the  Pacific  which  lay  north  of  the 
equator. 

On  September  2d  10,000  Japanese  troops  were 
landed  on  Shantung  peninsula,  outside  the  German 
leased  territory.  This  force  was  soon  increased  to 
21,000  men.  An  East  Indian  contingent  of  1360  men 
was  contributed  by  Great  Britain.  On  September  27th 
the  Japanese  began  operations  against  the  Tsingtau 
fortress.  The  siege  lasted  until  November  7th,  when 
the  garrison  of  4000  men  capitulated.  The  losses  of 
the  assailants  were  about  1600. 


70  The  Great  War  [x9i4i 

The  Japanese  navy  seized  the  Caroline  Archipelago, 
the  Marshall  Islands  and  the  Marianne  Islands  in 
October.  German  Samoa  was  captured  by  a  New 
Zealand  expedition  on  August  29th.  An  Australian 
expedition  took  over  the  Bismarck  Archipelago  and 
Solomon  Islands  on  September  nth,  and  Kaiser  Wil- 
helmsland  (a  part  of  New  Guinea)  on  September  24th. 

Togo,  the  German  African  colony  on  the  north  shore 
of  the  Gulf  of  Guinea,  surrendered  to  French  and  Brit- 
ish forces  on  August  25th.  Kamerun,  on  the  west 
African  coast,  north  of  the  Congo,  was  invaded,  at  the 
end  of  August,  by  two  British  columns,  coming  from 
British  Nigeria.  These  were  both  repulsed  by  the 
German  forces,  and  the  enemy  crossed  the  British  Nige- 
rian border  at  one  or  two  places,  seizing  British  stations. 
On  September  27th,  however,  British  and  French  con- 
tingents occupied  Duala,  the  principal  Kamerun  port. 
The  fight  for  the  possession  of  this  colony  continued 
through  191 5.  The  Germans  were  not  finally  expelled 
from  it  until  February,  1916. 

Two  other  colonies  remained — German  South-west 
Africa  and  German  East  Africa.  The  Union  of  South 
Africa  assumed  the  burden  of  reducing  these.  Union 
forces  entered  South-west  Africa  and  captured  Luderitz 
Bay  on  Setpember  19th.  But  the  invasion  was  sud- 
denly halted  by  a  Boer  uprising  at  home.  The  Germans 
in  South-west  Africa  had  maintained  secret  relations 
with  the  more  irreconcilable  Boer  elements.  The  deter- 
mination of  the  Union  government  to  conquer  South- 
west Africa  aroused  these  malcontents  to  revolt. 

Early  in  October,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Maritz  started 
an  insurrection  along  the  southern  border  of  the  South- 
west African  colony.  He  was  driven  across  into  enemy 
territory.     But  General  Christian  de  Wet,  one  of  the 


[iqi4]     Germany  Loses  Her  Colonies       71 

heroes  of  the  Boer  War,  and  General  Christian  T. 
Beyers,  a  former  Transvaal  leader  and,  until  a  few 
weeks  before,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Union  of 
South  Africa  forces,  soon  joined  the  rebellion.  They 
operated  in  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State 
and  didn't  try  to  make  a  junction  with  the  Germans. 

General  Botha,  however,  held  the  majority  of  the 
Boers  in  line.  He  proceeded  vigorously  against  the 
rebels,  who,  during  November,  were  defeated  in  many 
small  engagements.  De  Wet  was  taken  prisoner  on 
December  1st.  Beyers  was  killed  a  few  days  later.  By 
the  end  of  December  the  revolt  was  practically  crushed. 
Of  the  ring-leaders  only  Maritz  remained  at  large ;  and 
he  had  retired  into  the  interior  of  South-west  Africa. 
The  invasion  of  that  colony  was  resumed  in  191 5. 

German  East  Africa,  a  region  extremely  difficult  to 
operate  in,  was  not  cleared  of  German  forces  until  near 
the  end  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  IX 

naval  operations  in  i914.    august  5,  i9i4~ 
December  31,  1914 

Germany  spent  billions  of  marks  creating  a  navy, 
which,  in  19 14,  ranked  second  only  to  Great  Britain's. 
But  ranking  second  in  naval  power  was  of  little  benefit 
to  Germany,  once  Great  Britain  had  entered  the  war. 
The  French  fleet,  concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean, 
was  much  superior  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  fleet.  So 
neither  of  the  Teuton  allies  was  in  a  position  to  dispute 
the  Entente's  mastery  of  the  seas.  The  German  marine, 
naval  and  merchant,  was  a  precarious  investment,  so 
long  as  German  policy  contemplated  the  possibility 
of  a  war  in  which  Great  Britain  might  become  the  ally 
of  France  and  Russia.  Germany's  violation  of  Bel- 
gium's neutrality  presented  a  casus  belli,  which  Great 
Britain  couldn't  ignore.  But  the  Kaiser  and  Tirpitz 
had  already  made  Great  Britain  a  potential  belligerent 
by  their  efforts  to  challenge  British  supremacy  on  the 
ocean. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  German  merchantmen 
everywhere  ran  for  shelter.  Those  which  didn't  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  Allies  took  refuge  in  neutral  har- 
bours. Vessels  of  more  than  one  million  tonnage  were 
interned  in  this  way.  Shipping  laid  up  in  the  ports  of 
Italy,  the  United  States,  Brazil,  Peru,  Cuba,  and  China 

72 


[xgi4]        Naval  Operations  in  191 4  73 

was  transferred  to  Allied  service  after  those  countries 
entered  the  war.  The  High  Sea  Fleet  clung  to  its  home 
stations  and  avoided  battle.  For  purposes  of  com- 
merce raiding  the  Germans  turned  to  the  submarine. 

Naval  operations  in  1914  consisted  chiefly  in  round- 
ing up  the  few  German  warships  which  were  on  distant 
service  and  unable  to  make  for  home.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  was  the  battle  cruiser  Goeben,  which 
was  in  the  Mediterranean,  with  the  cruiser  Breslau, 
when  the  war  broke  out.  They  bombarded  two  Alge- 
rian ports  in  the  hope  of  interrupting  the  transportation 
of  Algerian  troops  to  France.  Then  they  ran  for  Mes- 
sina, coaling  there  on  August  5th.  On  the  evening  of 
August  6th,  they  started  east.  A  British  squadron 
was  awaiting  them  in  the  Straits  of  Otranto,  its  com- 
mander thinking  that  they  would  try  to  reach  Pola, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  naval  base. 

But  the  German  Government  had  no  idea  of  using 
these  ships  merely  to  reinforce  the  Austro-Hungarian 
fleet.  They  had  another  mission,  of  much  greater  con- 
sequence. That  was  to  run  for  Constantinople,  where 
they  would  aid  Ambassador  Wangenheim  and  his  Young 
Turk  confederates  in  forcing  Turkey  into  the  war  on 
Germany's  side. 

The  Goeben  and  the  Breslau  were  both  faster  than 
any  corresponding  Allied  warships  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean. They  made  good  their  escape  to  the  east  and 
steamed  leisurely  for  the  Dardanelles,  which  they 
entered  on  August  10th.  Under  the  provisions  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  of  1856  and  of  the  Treaty  of  London 
of  1 87 1,  warships  were  not  allowed  to  use  the  Darda- 
nelles except  in  time  of  peace.  But  Wangenheim  got 
around  all  difficulties  by  announcing  a  transfer  of  title 
to  Turkey.     The  Goeben  and  the  Breslau  remained  in 


74  The  Great  War  [1914] 

the  hands  of  their  German  officers,  dominated  Con- 
stantinople and  presently,  with  the  connivance  of  Enver 
Pasha  and  Talaat  Pasha,  engaged  in  the  Black  Sea 
raid  which  brought  Turkey  into  collision  with  Russia. 
The  escape  of  these  two  vessels  was  therefore  the  most 
fruitful  exploit  of  the  German  surface  navy.  It  had  a 
far-reaching  effect  on  the  course  and  progress  of  the 
war. 

The  first  naval  battle,  which  was  little  more  than  a 
skirmish,  took  place  on  August  28,  1914,  off  Heligoland 
Bight.  Vice-Admiral  Sir  David  Beatty  commanded 
the  British  forces.  He  sent  three  submarines  close  in 
to  Heligoland  in  order  to  tempt  the  German  destroyers 
and  light  cruisers  stationed  there  into  giving  pursuit. 
With  the  first  battle-cruiser  squadron  and  the  first  light- 
cruiser  squadron  he  lay  some  distance  to  the  rear. 
Two  light  cruisers,  the  Arethusa  and  the  Fearless,  were 
assigned  to  cut  in  behind  the  German  light  warships 
after  they  got  some  distance  out  to  sea. 

Beatty's  ruse  worked  successfully.  German  destroy- 
ers, supported  by  the  light  cruisers  Ariadne  and  Str ass- 
burg,  gave  chase  to  the  decoys.  The  two  cruisers 
sighted  the  Arethusa  and  Fearless  and  attacked  them, 
damaging  the  A  reihusa.  Then  the  A  riadne  was  crippled 
and  she  and  her  consort  withdrew.  Later  the  Koln  and 
Mainz  reinforced  the  Strassburg.  The  British  lighter 
ships  were  now  hard-pressed.  But  Beatty  hurried  up 
with  the  battle  cruisers  Lion  and  Queen  Mary  and  ended 
the  battle.  The  Koln  and  the  Mainz  were  sunk,  as 
was  also  the  crippled  Ariadne.  The  Strassburg  was 
badly  damaged.  The  British  lost  no  ship,  but  the 
Arethusa  and  several  destroyers  were  just  able  to  limp 
home. 

The  largest  group  of  German  warships  in  foreign 


[i9M)        Naval  Operations  in  191 4  75 

waters  when  the  war  began  was  Admiral  Spee's  Asiatic 
squadron.  It  was  stationed  at  Kiao-chau,  the  German 
naval  base  in  China.  Spee  had  with  him  the  armoured 
cruisers  Scharnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  and  four  light 
cruisers,  the  Leipsic,  Number g,  Karlsruhe,  and  Emden. 
He  sent  the  Emden  south  into  the  Indian  Ocean,  to 
prey  on  Allied  commerce.  The  Karlsruhe  finally  made 
her  way  across  into  the  South  Atlantic,  where  she  dis- 
appeared from  sight  mysteriously  many  months  later. 

Spee  started  east  across  the  South  Pacific  with  the 
other  four,  meeting  the  light  cruiser  Dresden  on  the 
American  side.  He  encountered  on  November  1st,  off 
the  coast  of  Chile,  a  British  squadron,  under  Admiral 
Sir  Christopher  Craddock.  The  latter's  force  consisted 
of  the  old  battleship  Canopus,  the  amoured  cruisers  Good 
Hope  and  Monmouth,  and  the  light  cruiser  Glasgow. 
The  Canopus  was  much  slower  than  the  others  and  at 
the  time  of  the  engagement  was  250  miles  to  the  south 
of  them.  The  German  squadron  was  therefore  some- 
what superior  in  power.  It  also  had  the  advantage  of 
being  better  able  to  fight  in  a  rough  seaway,  its  heavier 
guns  being  mounted  higher  than  those  of  the  Good 
Hope  and  Monmouth. 

Omitting  the  Canopus,  which  didn't  figure  in  the 
action  off  Cape  Coronel,  Craddock  had  one  armoured 
cruiser  (the  Good  Hope)  of  14,100  tons  displacement, 
carrying  two  9.2-inch  guns  and  sixteen  6-inch  guns, 
and  another  (the  Monmouth)  of  9800  tons  displace- 
ment, carrying  fourteen  6-inch  guns.  Spee  had  the 
twin  armoured  cruisers,  the  Gneisenau  and  the  Scharn- 
horst, each  of  11,600  tons  displacement,  and  carrying 
eight  8. 2 -inch  guns  and  six  6-inch  guns.  The  British 
armoured  cruisers  were  half  a  knot  faster  than  the 
German. 


76  The  Great  War  [1914] 

Craddock  was  supported  by  the  scout  cruiser  Glasgow 
of  4800  tons,  carrying  two  6-inch  guns  and  ten  4-inch 
guns,  and  the  transport  Otranto,  which  was  dispatched 
south  for  safety  before  the  battle  started.  Spee's  two 
scout  cruisers,  the  Niirnberg  and  Dresden,  and  his  pro- 
tected cruiser,  the  Leipsic,  ranged  in  tonnage  from  3250 
to  3600.  Each  carried  ten  4-inch  guns.  But  the 
Glasgow  was  two  and  a  half  knots  faster  than  the 
Niirnberg  and  Dresden  and  three  and  a  half  knots  faster 
than  the  Leipsic. 

The  British  Admiral  was  not  obliged  to  fight.  He 
could  easily  have  drawn  away  to  the  south  and  made 
a  junction  with  the  Canopus,  which  carried  12-inch 
guns.  But  without  counting  the  risks  of  engagement 
with  an  opponent  slightly  superior  in  tonnage  and  gun 
power,  he  sent  a  wireless  to  the  Canopus:  "I  am  going 
to  attack  the  enemy  now." 

The  battle  began  about  6.20  p.m.  The  German 
squadron  was  inshore  and  had  the  advantage  of  firing 
at  targets  outlined  against  the  western  sky.  Its  gun- 
nery was  effective  from  the  start.  The  Good  Hope  and 
the  Monmouth  were  quickly  disabled.  The  former 
sank  at  7.23  p.m.,  following  an  explosion.  The  latter, 
put  completely  out  of  action  about  the  same  time,  was 
dispatched  by  the  Niirnberg  at  8.58  p.m.  The  Glasgow 
escaped  in  the  dark.  The  Germans  had  only  two  men 
slightly  wounded. 

The  news  of  Craddock's  defeat  caused  great  chagrin 
in  Great  Britain.  A  strong  naval  detachment,  includ- 
ing battle  cruisers,  was  at  once  hurried  into  the  South 
Atlantic  to  dispose  of  the  victorious  German  squadron. 
Spee  knew  nothing  of  this,  though  he  should  have  sus- 
pected it.  He  passed  leisurely  into  the  Atlantic  him- 
self, with  the  intention  of  destroying  the  British  wireless 


[i9Mi        Naval  Operations  in  19 14  77 

and  coaling  station  at  the  Falkland  Islands.  On  the 
morning  of  December  8th  he  confidently  approached 
the  islands,  taking  no  precautions  whatever.  But 
sheltered  within  the  harbour  of  Port  Stanley  lay  Ad- 
miral Sturdee's  powerful  squadron,  consisting  of  two 
battle  cruisers,  the  Invincible  and  Inflexible,  with  eight 
1 2-inch  guns  apiece;  three  armoured  cruisers,  the  Car- 
narvon, Cornwall,  and  Kent;  the  scout  cruiser  Bristol, 
the  Glasgow,  and  the  Canopus.  The  British  ships  had  a 
tonnage  of  87,000,  the  German  ships  a  tonnage  of  35,500. 
The  weight  of  the  British  broadside  was  nearly  five  times 
that  of  the  German.  The  two  British  battle  cruisers 
were  three  knots  faster  than  the  Scharnhorst  and  the 
Gneisenau.  The  British  ships  had  arrived  on  Decem- 
ber 7th  and  needed  coal;  so  that  if  Spee  had  quickened 
his  schedule  a  little  he  could  probably  have  destroyed 
the  station,  in  spite  of  the  Canopus  and  the  Glasgow,  and 
still  had  plenty  of  time  to  get  away  in  safety. 

The  Kent  lay  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbour  and  the 
Canopus  was  visible  inside.  The  Gneisenau  and  Nurn- 
berg  closed  in  to  attack.  Then,  grasping  the  situation, 
they  turned  away  to  the  east.  The  British  squadron 
got  under  way  at  9.45  A.M.  Travelling  in  close  forma- 
tion, it  could  not  gain  on  the  Germans.  Sturdee 
decided  at  11.20  a.m.  to  press  the  pursuit  with  the  two 
fast  battle  cruisers  and  the  Glasgow,  all  with  a  speed  of 
26^  knots.  He  had  closed  in  by  12.55  P-M-  and  opened 
fire.  The  three  German  light  cruisers  now  turned  to 
the  south-west,  while  the  Gneisenau  and  Scharnhorst 
continued  east-south-east.  The  Cornwall  and  the  Kent, 
joined  by  the  Glasgow,  pursued  the  lighter  enemy  vessels. 
The  battle  cruisers  and  the  Carnarvon  kept  on  after  the 
heavier  ones.  The  Gneisenau  and  the  Scharnhorst  had 
no  chance.     Their  batteries  were  outranged  and  the 


78  The  Great  War  m 

Invincible  and  Inflexible  easily  outpointed  them  and 
crossed  their  course.  The  Scharnhorst  was  sunk  at 
4. 17  p.m.  and  the  Gneisenau  at  6.00  p.m.  The  Number g 
and  the  Leipsic  were  sunk  later  in  the  evening.  The 
Dresden  escaped  and  cruised  back  into  the  Pacific. 
She  was  discovered  on  March  14,  191 5,  at  anchor  off 
Juan  Fernandez  (Robinson  Crusoe's)  Island  and  was 
destroyed  by  the  Kent  and  the  Glasgow.  Great  Britain 
afterwards  apologized  to  Chile  for  an  apparent  violation 
of  Chilean  territorial  waters.  The  British  lost  nine 
men  killed  and  nine  wounded  in  the  action  of  the 
Falkland  Islands. 

The  Emden  had  an  adventurous  career  in  the  Indian 
Ocean.  She  was  at  large  for  three  months,  destroyed 
twenty-five  or  more  vessels  and  cost  the  Allies  a  mone- 
tary loss  of  over  twenty-five  million  dollars.  At  one 
time  there  were  nineteen  Allied  warships  searching  for 
her.  Her  captain,  Muller,  showed  great  daring  and 
strictly  observed  the  rules  of  war.  One  of  the  Emden 's 
exploits  was  to  run  into  the  harbour  of  Penang  and 
destroy  the  small  Russian  cruiser  Jemtchug  and  the 
French  destroyer  Mousquet.  She  cruised  in  the  Bay  of 
Bengal,  around  Ceylon  and  in  the  Malay  Archipelago. 

Her  end  came  on  November  9th,  when  she  attempted 
to  destroy  the  wireless  station  on  South  Keeling  Island. 
The  wireless  called  for  help  and  the  Australian  cruiser 
Sydney,  employed  in  convoying  Australian  troops  to 
Egypt,  turned  aside  to  engage  her.  The  Sydney  had 
heavier  guns  and  was  faster.  The  Emden  was  soon 
driven  in  a  wrecked  condition  on  a  reef  off  North  Keel- 
ing Island.  The  party  which  had  landed  on  South  Keel- 
ing Island  to  destroy  the  station  seized  the  schooner 
Ayesha  and  sailed  for  Arabia,  landing  there  safely  and 
making  their  way  overland  to  Constantinople. 


[i9i4i        Naval  Operations  in  1914  79 

The  German  light  cruiser  Konigsberg  destroyed  the 
British  cruiser  Pegasus  in  Zanzibar  harbour  on  Septem- 
ber 20th.  Later  she  took  refuge  in  Rufiji  River,  in 
German  East  Africa,  where  she  was  sunk  on  July  II, 
1915.  The  North  German  Lloyd  liner,  Kaiser  Wilhelm 
der  Grosse,  fitted  up  as  a  commerce  destroyer  and 
operating  in  the  Atlantic,  was  sunk  in  September. 

One  of  the  most  sensational  incidents  of  the  first 
phase  of  German  submarine  warfare  was  the  sinking 
of  the  three  British  cruisers,  the  Aboukir,  the  Hogue, 
and  the  Cressy,  by  Captain-Lieutenant  Otto  Weddigen 
of  the  U-Q.  They  were  destroyed  in  succession,  within 
an  hour,  while  patrolling  the  coast  of  Holland  early 
in  the  morning  of  September  22,  19 14.  It  was  the  first 
startling  demonstration  of  the  power  of  the  submarine. 
The  British  Admiralty  censured  the  commanders  of 
the  Hogue  and  the  Cressy  for  standing  by  after  the 
Aboukir  had  been  hit.  But  great  laxity  had  been 
shown  in  sending  three  large  cruisers  out  on  patrol 
duty  without  a  screen  of  destroyers. 

On  November  2*jy  19 14,  the  Audacious,  one  of  Great 
Britain's  newest  super dreadnaughts,  was  sunk  in 
Lough  Swilly,  off  the  north  coast  of  Ireland.  But  her 
loss  was  apparently  due  to  a  floating  mine. 

Naval  operations  in  19 14  were  largely  tentative. 
The  British  Grand  Fleet  had  sought  a  base  to  the  north 
of  Scotland,  at  Scapa  Flow,  where  it  could  be  pro- 
tected from  submarine  attack  and  whence  it  could 
issue  to  meet  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  if  the  latter 
should  come  out.  But  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet 
was  not  ready  to  come  out.  German  naval  policy 
was  defensive.  It  preferred  to  wait  and  to  develop 
the  submarine. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    RUSSIAN   WINTER    CAMPAIGN.       JANUARY    I,    I915- 
MAY    I,    191 5 

The  first  winter  of  the  war  brought  operations  to  a 
standstill  on  the  Western  Front,  in  Serbia,  and  in  the 
Caucasus.  It  didn't  interrupt  them  on  the  Eastern 
European  Front,  where  Germany  had  now  definitely 
resolved  to  break  the  power  of  Russia. 

German  policy  required  a  continuation  of  the  fight- 
ing in  the  East  despite  weather  conditions.  Russia 
was  under-developed  industrially.  Her  munitions  sup- 
plies were  depleted.  To  give  her  a  three  months'  re- 
spite would  enable  her  to  stock  up  again  with  the  aid 
of  shipments  from  Japan,  and  possibly  from  Great 
Britain  and  France.  Austria-Hungary  was  also  press- 
ing for  relief.  The  Russian  armies  in  Bukowina  were 
up  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Carpathians,  and  Cos- 
sacks had  made  occasional  raids  into  Hungary.  The 
Austrian  High  Command  was  anxious  to  quiet  Tran- 
sylvania, and  to  overawe  Rumania,  where  public  opin- 
ion had  been  affected  by  the  westward  sweep  of  the 
Russians.  It  was  also  eager  to  raise  the  siege  of 
Przemysl,  where  a  large  army,  foolishly  left  behind 
to  hold  that  fortress,  was  being  slowly  starved  into 
submission. 

On  January  I,  191 5,  the  Russians  occupied  a  line 
about  nine  hundred  miles  long,  stretching  from  the 

80 


[1915]    The  Russian  Winter  Campaign      81 

Baltic  Sea  to  southern  Bukowina.  In  Bukowina  a 
Russian  army,  under  Alexieff,  held  the  Kirlibaba 
Pass  and  had  pushed  down  to  the  Rumanian  border 
at  Kimpolung.  A  second  army,  under  Brusiloff,  was 
stationed  along  the  Carpathians,  to  the  south-west 
and  south  of  Przemysl.  A  reserve  army,  under  Seli- 
vanoff ,  was  besieging  that  fortress.  Radko  DimitriefTs 
army  faced  west  toward  Cracow,  along  the  Dunajec. 
Evert's  army  was  on  the  line  of  the  Nida,  in  south- 
western Poland.  The  Russian  centre,  under  Russky, 
covered  the  Vistula,  up  to  Novogeorgievsk,  and  then 
extended  north  to  the  East  Prussian  border,  at  Mlawa. 
Thence  the  right,  also  under  Russky,  ran  north-east 
behind  the  Mazurian  Lakes  region  to  the  Niemen 
River. 

Hindenburg  commanded  in  person  the  German 
armies  in  East  Prussia  and  Poland.  He  had  also  as- 
sumed general  direction  of  all  the  Teuton  forces  on  the 
Eastern  Front.  On  his  extreme  left,  in  the  Courland 
sector,  was  an  army  under  Below.  Next  to  it,  in  the 
region  of  the  Mazurian  Lakes,  was  the  Tenth  Army, 
under  Eichhorn.  The  Eighth  Army,  under  Scholz, 
occupied  the  line  between  Lomza  and  Plock.  In  the 
Bzura  sector  was  the  Ninth  Army,  under  Mackensen. 
On  Mackensen 's  right,  stretching  south  to  the  Carpa- 
thians, were  two  Austro-Hungarian  armies — the  First, 
under  Dankl,  in  the  Pilica  and  Nida  sector,  and  the 
Fourth,  under  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  in  the 
Dunajec  sector.  The  Second  Austro-Hungarian  Army, 
under  Boroevic,  defended  the  Carpathian  passes. 
Another  army,  under  Prince  Eugene,  extended  the 
Teuton  line  down  along  the  western  border  of  Buko- 
wina to  the  Rumanian  frontier.  Kusmanek's  army 
was  shut  up  in  Przemysl. 


82  The  Great  War  [1915] 

Hindenburg  still  clung  to  the  idea  that  Warsaw 
could  be  taken  from  the  west,  or,  at  least,  that  a  de- 
monstration against  Warsaw  would  raise  the  siege  of 
Przemysl,  as  it  had  done  in  the  preceding  October.  On 
February  ist  he  sent  Mackensen  against  the  Russian 
centre.  The  attack  came  on  a  seven -mile  front,  about 
Bolimov.  It  was  made  in  a  heavy  snowstorm,  which 
masked  the  assailants.  The  Germans,  in  dense  mass 
formations,  broke  through  the  first  Russian  trench  line 
on  the  Rawa  River.  On  February  2d  they  took  the 
second  and  third  trench  lines,  and  advanced  in  the 
next  two  days  five  miles  toward  Warsaw.  But  Russky 
brought  up  reinforcements  on  February  4th  and  by 
February  8th  he  was  back  on  the  Rawa. 

In  January  the  Russians  had  pushed  forward  into 
East  Prussia  in  the  district  north  of  the  Mazurian 
Lakes  and  south  of  the  Niemen.  They  seized  the  line 
of  the  Angerapp  River  and  threatened  to  outflank  the 
four  German  corps  standing  on  the  defensive  west  of 
the  Mazurian  Lakes.  Hindenburg  felt  called  on  to 
check  this  movement.  He  reinforced  Eichhorn  heavily 
and  brought  a  part  of  Below' s  army  south  from  the 
Courland  front.  German  forces,  marching  east  from 
Tilsit  along  the  south  bank  of  the  Niemen,  broke  the 
connection  between  the  two  northernmost  corps  of  the 
Russian  invading  army,  commanded  by  Baron  Sievers. 
The  more  southerly  corps  was  then  attacked  on  the 
flank  and  in  the  rear,  and  was  driven  in  disorder  across 
the  Russian  border.  Hindenburg  claimed  forty  thou- 
sand prisoners.  The  isolated  northern  corps  retreated 
to  Kovno.  The  German  army  under  Below,  on  Eich- 
horn' s  right,  attacked  and  defeated  the  Russians  east  of 
the  Mazurian  Lakes  and  pursued  them  toward  Grodno 
and  Ossowietz. 


[19X5]     The  Russian  Winter  Campaign    83 

East  Prussia  was  again  cleared.  Eichhorn  crossed 
the  Niemen,  north  of  Grodno,  on  February  20th,  and 
reached  a  point  only  ten  miles  from  the  Warsaw- Petro- 
grad  railway.  Below  made  an  attempt  on  the  fortress 
of  Ossowietz.  But  these  operations  came  to  nothing. 
Early  in  March  the  German  forces  engaged  in  them 
withdrew  behind  their  own  frontier. 

Still  Hindenburg  would  not  give  up  the  idea  of  a 
break-through  in  the  north.  He  tried  next  to  get  to 
the  rear  of  the  Polish  capital  and  cut  its  railroad  com- 
munications east  by  striking  south  from  East  Prussia 
at  the  Russian  line  between  Lomza  and  Plock.  Here 
again  the  Warsaw-Petrograd  railroad  was  his  objective. 
While  Below  was  trying  to  invest  Ossowietz,  Scholz's 
Eighth  Army  attacked  all  along  the  line  from  the  fort- 
ress of  Lomza  south-west  to  the  Vistula.  Plock,  on  the 
Vistula,  north-west  of  Novogeorgievsk,  was  taken  on  Feb- 
ruary 1 8th,  and  progress  was  made  from  Mlawa  toward 
Prasnyz.  On  the  German  left,  north  of  Lomza,  the  of- 
fensive was  quickly  checked.  Scholz  renewed  it  in  the  cen- 
tre.    On  February  24th,  Prasnyz  was  taken  by  assault. 

The  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  had,  however,  prepared  a 
strategic  reserve  for  use  in  this  sector.  He  hurried  up 
reinforcements  toward  Prasnyz,  south-west  of  which 
city  a  single  Russian  division  had  stubbornly  held  on 
and  prevented  a  break-through.  On  February  26th  the 
Russians  were  in  Prasnyz.  Scholz  tried  to  retake  it  the 
next  day.  But  he  was  now  threatened  with  envelop- 
ment and  hurriedly  retreated,  losing  ten  thousand 
prisoners.  The  Germans  then  retired  on  the  entire 
front  of  forty  miles  from  Plock  east.  In  March  Scholz 
made  a  third  attempt  to  capture  Prasnyz,  getting 
within  three  miles  of  it  on  March  nth.  But  he  was 
again  repulsed. 


84  The  Great  War  \mS 

The  most  substantial  success  of  the  winter  campaign 
on  the  Teuton  side  was  the  recapture  of  most  of  Buko- 
wina.  The  northern  half  of  this  Austrian  crownland 
was  overrun  by  the  Russians  in  the  fall  of  1914.  Early 
in  January,  1915,  General  Alexieff's  left  wing  pushed 
south  to  the  Rumanian  border,  and  west  through  the 
Kirlibaba  Pass,  leading  across  the  Carpathians  into 
Hungary.  The  loss  of  this  pass  caused  great  excite- 
ment in  Budapest.  Germany  was  appealed  to  to  quiet 
popular  alarm. 

The  German  General  Staff  sent  several  German 
divisions  into  Hungary — and  supervised  a  general  re- 
grouping of  the  Austro-Hungarian  armies.  The  south- 
ernmost, under  Prince  Eugene,  moved  east  through 
Transylvania  and  retook  Kirlibaba  Pass  on  January  226.. 
Then  it  swept  on  through  Bukowina  to  Czernowitz, 
which  was  captured  on  February  1 8th.  Having  cleared 
the  province,  Prince  Eugene  turned  north  into  Galicia, 
by  way  of  Kolomea.  He  captured  Stanislau,  seventy 
miles  south-east  of  Lemberg,  and  held  it  until  March 
4th.     Then  he  was  driven  back  to  Kolomea. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  push  into  Galicia  was  part 
of  the  Teuton  plan  to  relieve  Przemysl.  On  Prince 
Eugene's  left  a  newly  constituted  German  army,  un- 
der Linsingen,  had  moved  north-east  from  Munkacs 
against  the  Wyzkow  Pass,  to  the  south-east  of  Przemysl. 
It  cleared  this  passageway,  but  was  held  in  the  foot- 
hills on  the  northern  side  of  the  Carpathian  range. 
Farther  west  the  Second  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  now 
under  Boehm-Ermolli,  vainly  tried  to  free  the  Dukla 
and  Lupkow  passes,  directly  south  of  Przemysl.  It 
got  part  of  the  way  through  Lupkow,  but  was  blocked 
at  Dukla. 

The  field  army  left  in  Przemysl  was  now  beyond  help. 


[i9i5i     The  Russian  Winter  Campaign    85 

The  Russians  lacked  the  siege  guns  to  reduce  the  circle 
of  forts.  They  simply  sat  down  and  contained  the 
garrison.  Sorties  were  futile,  for  the  besieged  army 
had  no  other  base  than  Przemysl,  and  it  would  have 
been  obliged,  in  order  to  escape,  to  cut  its  way  not 
only  through  the  lines  of  the  besiegers,  but  also  through 
those  of  the  Russian  armies  on  the  Carpathian  front. 
General  Kusmanek  had  used  up  his  food  supplies  by 
the  middle  of  March.  On  March  18th  he  made  a  half- 
hearted sortie.  On  March  226.  he  surrendered  his 
garrison  of  from  120,000  to  130,000  men. 

The  southern  Austro-German  campaign  thus  failed 
of  its  main  objective.  A  secondary  objective,  the 
recovery  of  Bukowina,  had  been  attained.  Przemysl 
was  the  most  spectacular  of  Russia's  successes  in  the 
earlier  period  of  the  war,  although  the  strategical 
results  of  the  campaign  for  Lemberg  were  far  more 
important.  The  capture  of  the  fortress  cost  the  Rus- 
sians practically  nothing.  The  Austrian  attempt  to 
hold  it  was  an  inexcusable  blunder.  Yet  for  the  Rus- 
sians the  circumstances  of  the  capitulation  were  omi- 
nous. General  Gourko  testifies  in  his  book,  War  and 
Revolution  in  Russia,  that  the  Russians  had  no  guns 
of  heavier  calibre  than  6-inch  until  the  spring  of  191 6. 
All  through  191 5  the  supply  of  shells  was  painfully  low. 
Yet  the  Germans  and  Austrians  had  already  begun  to 
use  12-inch  guns  in  field  operations. 

Reinforced  by  the  army  released  by  the  surrender  of 
Przemysl,  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  resumed  the  offen- 
sive on  the  Carpathian  front.  He  made  some  progress 
at  the  southern  end  of  Dukla  Pass.  He  strengthened 
his  hold  on  Lupkow  Pass  and  captured  Rostok  Pass, 
between  Lupkow  and  Uszok. 

But  he  was  driven  out  of  Uszok  Pass,  and  farther 


86  The  Great  War  [1915] 

to  the  south-east  the  enemy  was  everywhere  on  the 
Galician  side  of  the  range. 

Fighting  died  down  about  the  middle  of  April.  By 
May  1st  the  tide  of  battle  was  to  begin  to  flow  back 
through  Galicia  and  Poland,  wiping  out  all  the  sensa- 
tional gains  which  Russia,  astonishing  herself  as  well 
as  her  allies,  had  made  since  September  1,  1914. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE    DARDANELLES-GALLIPOLI     CAMPAIGN.       FEBRUARY 
19,    I915-DECEMBER  31,    I915 

Excluding  Foch's  Victory  Offensive,  the  Dar- 
danelles-Gallipoli  campaign  was  the  one  bold  and  ag- 
gressive conception  of  Entente  strategy.  It  failed  not 
because  it  was  not  eminently  sound  in  theory,  but 
because  it  was  faultily  executed. 

The  Allies  were  fighting  on  isolated  fronts.  They 
had  to  operate  on  exterior  lines,  their  forces  scattered 
around  the  circumference  of  a  vast  circle.  Their  efforts 
could  be  only  feebly  co-ordinated.  Their  great  need 
was  to  join  up  the  western  and  southern  European  front 
with  the  Russian  front,  so  that  Russia  could  be  sup- 
plied with  guns  and  munitions  and  her  overplus  of  man 
power  could  be  utilized  to  the  best  possible  advantage. 

To  force  a  passage  through  the  Dardanelles  would 
create  a  direct  contact  between  Russia  and  the  Western 
Allies.  It  would  do  much  more.  It  would  isolate 
Turkey,  driving  her  government  and  armies  into  Asia, 
where  they  would  be  comparatively  harmless.  It 
would  also  solve  the  troublesome  Balkan  problem  by 
bringing  all  the  Balkan  states  into  the  war  on  the  side 
of  the  Entente.  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  would 
then  be  closely  beleaguered  in  Central  Europe. 

As  early  as  November  25,  1914,  the  British  War 
Council  had  discussed  the  advisability  of  an  attempt 
on  the  Dardanelles.     Such  an  operation  was  clearly 

87 


88  The  Great  War  [19151 

in  line  with  British  policy,  since  Egypt  and  India  could 
be  protected  by  carrying  the  war  to  the  gates  of  Con- 
stantinople. On  January  2,  191 5,  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, then  alarmed  by  the  situation  in  the  Caucasus, 
asked  Great  Britain  to  make  a  demonstration  against 
Turkey.  Opinion  in  the  British  Council  originally 
favoured  a  joint  military  and  naval  operation.  It  was 
estimated  that  150,000  men  would  be  needed  to  support 
the  fleet.  Had  that  number  been  available  at  the  time 
the  ships  attacked,  the  chances  are  that  the  straits  would 
have  been  cleared  and  Constantinople  taken. 

The  obstacles  in  the  way  of  supplying  150,000  men 
immediately  led  to  consideration  of  the  alternative 
plan  of  a  purely  naval  attack.  On  January  3d  a  tele- 
gram was  sent  to  Vice- Admiral  Garden,  commanding 
the  British  naval  forces  in  the  Mediterranean,  asking 
him  whether  it  was  practicable  to  force  the  Dardanelles 
by  the  use  of  ships  alone.  He  answered  that  he  didn't 
think  that  the  Straits  could  be  " rushed,"  but  that 
they  "  might  be  forced  by  extended  operations  with  a 
large  number  of  ships."  On  January  nth  he  outlined 
four  successive  operations : 

(1)  The  reduction  of  the  entrance  forts. 

(2)  Clearing  the  Straits  up  to  the  Narrows. 

(3)  Destruction  of  the  defences  at  the  Narrows. 

(4)  Passage  through  the  mine  field  up  to  the  Sea  of 
Marmora. 

It  was  estimated  that  these  four  operations  would 
cover  a  month.  On  January  15th  Lord  Fisher,  the 
chief  of  the  Naval  War  Staff,  submitted  a  memorandum, 
concurring  generally  in  Carden's  plans.  He  suggested, 
however,  that  unless  experience  gained  in  the  first  two 
operations  justified  further  action,  the  last  two  opera- 
tions should  be  abandoned. 


[1915]  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  Campaign      89 

On  February  16th,  the  Turkish  attack  on  the  Suez 
Canal  having  failed,  it  was  decided  to  mass  troops  in 
the  Mediterranean  for  the  Dardanelles  campaign. 
The  Twenty-ninth  Division  (regulars)  was  to  be  sent 
from  England  to  Lemnos  and  a  considerable  force  was 
to  be  transferred  from  Egypt.  The  sailing  of  the 
Twenty-ninth  Division  was  fixed  for  February  22d. 
But  Lord  Kitchener  countermanded  this  order  on  his 
own  responsibility  and  without  notice  to  the  War 
Council.  The  Twenty-ninth's  start  was  thus  delayed 
three  weeks. 

Preparations  were  meanwhile  made  for  the  naval 
offensive.  The  new  super  dread  naught  Queen  Eliza- 
beth, armed  with  15-inch  guns,  was  sent  to  the  JEgesm. 
So  was  the  battle  cruiser  Inflexible,  just  back  from  the 
battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands.  The  British  navy 
contributed  eight  pre-dreadnaught  battleships,  the 
Agamemnon,  Irresistible,  Vengeance,  Triumph,  Albion, 
Lord  Nelson,  Ocean,  and  Majestic.  The  French  navy 
supplied  four  pre-dreadnaughts — the  Charlemagne, 
Suffren,  Gaulois,  and  Bouvet.  An  auxiliary  fleet  of 
light  cruisers,  destroyers,  submarines,  and  mine  sweep- 
ers was  also  provided.  The  islands  of  Tenedos,  Lemnos, 
and  Mudros  were  occupied  as  naval  and  military  bases. 

The  Dardanelles  passageway  is  about  forty  miles 
long.  At  the  A&gean  end  it  is  about  two  miles  wide. 
The  entrance  was  defended  by  four  obsolete  forts — 
Kum  Kale  and  Orkanieh,  on  the  Asiatic  side,  and 
Cape  Helles  battery  and  Sedd-el-Bahr,  on  the  European. 
The  first  real  defences  were  encountered  about  eleven 
miles  up,  where  the  passage  begins  to  contract.  Here 
the  Dardanos  Battery  had  been  constructed  on  the 
Asiatic  side,  facing  south-west  and  commanding  the 
whole  lower  section  of  the  Straits.     On  the  Narrows 


90  The  Great  War  [1915] 

proper,  three  to  four  miles  farther  up,  where  the  passage 
is  only  three  quarters  of  a  mile  wide,  were  the  fortifica- 
tions known  as  Kilid  Bahr,  on  the  European  shore,  and 
Anadolu  Hamidieh  battery,  on  the  Asiatic.  Kilid 
Bahr  was  of  little  value. 

Anadolu  Hamidieh  battery  was  armed  with  Krupp 
guns  of  the  model  of  1885.  They  had  an  extreme  range 
of  about  nine  miles.  The  only  other  relatively  modern 
guns  were  at  Dardanos — Krupps  of  the  1905  model 
and  some  naval  pieces  taken  from  the  Goeben.  The 
channel  below  the  Narrows  was  covered  by  a  mine  field. 

The  entrance  forts  were  bombarded  on  February 
19th  and  partially  silenced.  On  February  25th  they 
were  completely  destroyed.  The  lower  strait  was 
entered  on  February  26th  and  Dardanos  was  bom- 
barded at  long  range.  Attacks  were  made  again  on 
March  6th  and  7th.  Then  operations  were  suspended, 
pending  the  arrival  of  the  Allied  land  forces.  The 
British  troops,  to  be  assembled  at  Mudros,  together 
with  a  French  contingent,  which  had  mobilized  at 
Bizerta,  were  expected  to  number  about  one  hundred 
thousand  men. 

By  this  time,  the  Allied  fleet  had  also  been  materi- 
ally strengthened.  Eight  British  pre-dreadnaughts  were 
added:  the  Swiftsure,  Cornwallis,  Queen,  Implacable, 
London,  Goliath,  Canopus  (which  also  had  taken  part  in 
the  battle  of  the  Falkland  Islands),  and  Prince  George. 
The  French  sent  three  more  old- type  battleships:  the 
St.  Louis,  Henri  IV,  and  Jaureguiberry.  A  British 
monitor,  the  Humber,  arrived,  as  did  the  Askold,  a  Rus- 
sian cruiser,  and  some  additional  British  and  French 
cruisers.  General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  was  designated 
to  command  the  land  forces.  He  reached  Lemnos  on 
March  17th. 


[I9I51  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  Campaign     91 

Meanwhile  the  British  Admiralty  kept  urging  an 
attack  on  the  forts  in  the  Straits.  Admiral  Carden 
suggested  on  March  nth  that  military  operations  on 
a  large  scale  should  also  be  undertaken  at  once.  Carden 
now  resigned  because  of  ill  health  and  Vice-Admiral 
de  Robeck  took  his  place.  A  conference  was  held  at 
Lemnos  on  March  17th,  attended  by  Admiral  de  Ro- 
beck, Rear- Admiral  Gueprette,  commanding  the  French 
squadron;  General  Hamilton,  and  General  d'Amade, 
in  command  of  the  French  land  contingent. 

General  Hamilton  deprecated  immediate  co-opera- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  land  forces,  because  he  had 
discovered  that  the  British  transports  were  improperly 
loaded  for  quick  debarkation  of  materials.  He  pre- 
ferred to  send  them  back  to  Egypt  to  be  reloaded. 
This  decision,  which  was  concurred  in  by  Kitchener, 
proved  disastrous,  for  it  gave  the  Turks  a  month's 
time  to  prepare  a  defence  of  the  Gallipoli  peninsula. 

De  Robeck  decided  to  go  it  alone.  On  March  18th, 
for  the  first  time,  the  Allied  fleet  approached  within 
moderate  range  of  the  Dardanos  battery  and  the  forts 
higher  up  in  the  Narrows.  At  10.45  a.m.,  the  Queen 
Elizabeth,  Inflexible,  Agamemnon,  Lord  Nelson,  Triumph, 
and  Prince  George  engaged  the  Turkish  works.  Shortly 
after  noon  the  Suffern,  Gaulois,  Charlemagne,  and  Bouvet 
steamed  closer  in.  By  1.25  p.m.  the  forts  had  ceased 
firing.  They  were  not  silenced,  however,  and  renewed 
firing  later. 

All  the  attacking  ships  had  been  hit,  but  none  was 
seriously  injured. 

The  Vengeance,  Irresistible,  Albion,  Ocean,  Swiftsure, 
and  Majestic  now  appeared  to  relieve  the  French 
battleships,  which,  with  the  Triumph  and  Prince  George, 
started  back  for  the  lower  Straits.     The  Bouvet  struck 


92  The  Great  War  [19x5] 

a  mine  going  out  and  sank  in  three  minutes.  Nearly 
all  her  crew  went  down  with  her.  Late  in  the  afternoon 
the  Irresistible  and  the  Ocean  fell  victims  to  floating 
mines,  though  few  of  the  men  on  them  were  lost.  The 
Gaulois,  injured  by  gun  fire,  but  able  to  move  out  under 
her  own  steam,  had  to  be  beached  on  the  little  island 
of  Drepano.  The  Inflexible,  also  damaged  by  shells, 
had  to  be  beached  at  Tenedos.  After  these  losses  the 
battle  was  broken  off. 

Vice-Admiral  de  Robeck  was  not  discouraged  by  the 
results  of  the  attack.  He  reported  to  London  on  the 
evening  of  the  18th: 

The  power  of  the  fleet  to  dominate  the  fortresses 
by  superiority  of  fire  seems  to  be  established.  Various 
other  dangers  and  difficulties  will  have  to  be  encoun- 
tered, but  nothing  has  happened  which  justifies  the 
belief  that  the  cost  of  the  undertaking  will  exceed 
what  always  has  been  expected  and  provided  for. 

General  Golz,  the  German  supervisor  of  the  Turk- 
ish military  establishment,  had  told  Wangenheim,  the 
German  Ambassador,  that  the  British  could  force  the 
Straits  by  sacrificing  ten  ships.  Wangenheim  shared 
this  belief  and  so  did  most  of  the  high  Turkish  officials. 
De  Robeck  telegraphed  to  London  on  March  19th 
that  he  purposed  renewing  the  assault  and  received 
word  to  go  ahead  if  he  thought  fit  to  do  so.  But 
General  Hamilton  evidently  dissuaded  him.  For,  on 
March  26th,  after  several  conferences  with  the  latter, 
who  strongly  urged  delay  until  the  land  forces  could 
co-operate,  de  Robeck  telegraphed  the  Admiralty : 

The  check  on  the  18th  is  not,  in  my  opinion, 
decisive,  but  on  the  22 d  of  March  I  met  General 


[1915)  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  Campaign     93 

Hamilton  and  heard  his  views,  and  I  now  think 
that,  to  obtain  important  results  and  to  achieve  the 
object  of  the  campaign,  a  combined  operation  will  be 
essential. 

What  Hamilton  and  de  Robeck  did  not  take  suffi- 
ciently into  account  was  the  strong  probability  that 
the  forts  in  the  Narrows  were  short  of  ammunition. 
That  fact  was  disclosed  later  by  Ambassador  Morgen- 
thau,  who  visited  the  Turkish  defences  just  before  the 
battle,  and  by  Mr.  George  A.  Schreiner,  the  correspond- 
ent of  the  American  Associated  Press,  who  was  an  eye- 
witness of  the  action  of  March  18th.  Mr.  Schreiner 
says  that  General  Mertens,  the  chief  technical  officer  at 
the  Straits,  advised  him  to  get  up  early  on  the  morning 
of  March  19th  and  take  to  the  Anatolian  hills,  adding: 
11  We  expect  the  British  will  come  back  early  tomorrow 
morning,  and  if  they  do,  we  may  be  able  to  hold  out 
for  a  few  hours." 

Mr.  Morgenthau,  in  his  book  of  reminiscences,  makes 
the  unqualified  statement  that  on  the  evening  of  March 
1 8th  the  Anadolu  Hamidieh  battery,  the  most  powerful 
of  the  defences  on  the  Asiatic  side,  had  only  seventeen 
armour-piercing  shells  left,  and  Fort  Kilid  Bahr,  the 
main  defence  on  the  European  side,  only  ten.  If  these 
forts  had  been  abandoned,  Constantinople  would 
have  fallen  to  the  Allied  fleet  and  the  whole  face  of  the 
war  would  have  been  changed. 

The  naval  offensive  having  been  dropped,  Great 
Britain  became  committed  to  a  far  more  difficult  and 
costly  venture — that  of  reducing  Constantinople  by 
land.  General  Hamilton  went  to  Egypt  to  oversee 
the  reloading  of  the  transports.  He  wasn't  ready  to 
begin  operations  until  April  25th.     This  long  delay 


94  The  Great  War  [1915] 

enabled  the  Turks  to  make  the  most  of  the  unusual 
defensive  possibilities  of  the  Gallipoli  terrain. 

The  peninsula  is  about  forty-five  miles  long  and 
from  three  to  ten  miles  wide.  It  consists  of  a  tangle 
of  hills  and  gulches,  with  few  roads  and  no  pronounced 
valleys,  either  north  and  south,  or  east  and  west. 
Worst  of  all,  the  beaches  are  shallow  and  exposed. 
Landings  could  be  made  only  under  observation  and 
galling  fire.  General  Hamilton  had  available  on  April 
25th  about  eighty  thousand  men,  including  two  Anzac 
divisions,  a  Royal  Naval  Division,  the  Twenty-ninth 
Regular  Division,  recently  arrived  from  England,  and 
a  French  division,  15,000  strong,  composed  mostly  of 
colonials  and  foreign  legionaries.  An  East  Indian 
brigade  arrived  from  Egypt  on  May  1st.  The  British 
Forty-second  Territorial  Division,  also  from  Egypt, 
began  to  debark  on  May  4th. 

Hamilton's  objective  was  the  high  ground  com- 
manding the  defences  of  the  Narrows.  He  could 
reach  it  either  by  pushing  north-east  from  the  tip  of 
the  peninsula  or  by  driving  across  it  from  the  JEgesai 
shore,  either  above  or  below  Kilid  Bahr.  Or  an  army 
could  be  landed  on  the  Bulair  Isthmus,  to  take  the 
Turks  in  the  rear  and  cut  off  their  land  communications 
with  Constantinople. 

The  British  commander  chose  a  combination  of  two 
plans.  On  the  night  of  April  24th-25th  he  landed 
troops  at  five  points  about  the  toe  of  the  peninsula,  with 
the  intention  of  working  northward  to  Krithia  village 
and  Achi  Baba  peak.  At  the  same  time  he  disem- 
barked the  Anzacs  on  the  JEgean  side,  north  of  Gaba 
Tepe,  facing  the  rugged  elevation  known  as  Sari  Bahr. 
A  French  force  of  three  thousand  went  ashore  at  Kum 
Kale,  on  the  Asiatic  side.    This  operation  was  merely 


[I9I51  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  Campaign     95 

a  demonstration  to  cover  the  landings  on  the  opposite 
bank,  north  of  Sedd-el-Bahr.  The  French  troops  on 
the  Asiatic  shore  were  transferred  on  April  26th  to  the 
Gallipoli  peninsula,  where  the  united  French  contin- 
gent thereafter  constituted  the  extreme  right  of  General 
Hamilton's  Krithia  front. 

Hamilton  had  expected  to  march  forward  to  Achi 
Baba,  seize  it,  press  on  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Gaba 
Tepe,  join  the  Anzacs  there  and  then  cut  across  the 
peninsula  to  Maidos,  above  the  Narrows.  It  was  an 
ambitious  plan,  far  beyond  his  resources.  His  greatest 
disability  was  a  lamentable  shortage  in  guns  and  muni- 
tions with  which  to  prepare  infantry  attacks.  By 
April  28th  his  entire  army  was  on  shore  and  the  tip  of 
the  Gallipoli  boot  had  been  cleared  three  miles  up  the 
iEgean  coast  and  about  two  miles  up  inside  the  Straits. 

The  landings  were  made  at  heavy  cost,  the  one  at 
V  Beach  failing  entirely  on  the  first  trial.  By  May  ist 
the  Allied  forces  on  the  tip  of  the  peninsula  had  ad- 
vanced close  to  Krithia.  On  that  day  the  Turks 
counter-attacked  fiercely.  The  first  battle  of  Krithia 
followed,  lasting  until  May  5th.  It  was  a  stand-off.  Up 
to  May  5th,  Hamilton's  losses  were  13,979.  A  second 
battle  was  fought  on  May  6th-8th.  It  represented  a 
desperate  Allied  effort  to  alter  a  situation  which  was 
fast  hardening  into  deadlock.  But  the  Twenty-ninth 
Division,  which  was  in  line  here,  made  in  all  a  gain  of 
only  about  one  thousand  yards. 

The  fighting  at  Krithia,  in  fact,  quickly  degenerated 
into  the  most  rigid  form  of  positional  warfare.  It 
differed  in  no  way  from  the  fighting  in  Flanders  and 
Artois,  except  that  there  was  far  less  artillery  prepara- 
tion, and  the  first  line  enemy  trenches  were  never 
smothered.     The  Turks  had  dug  in  and  couldn't  be 


96  The  Great  War  [1915] 

dislodged.  General  Hamilton  delivered  a  third  attack 
on  June  4th.  It  also  failed.  Only  scattering  efforts 
were  made  thereafter,  up  to  July  15th,  when  the  British 
commander  realized  that  there  was  no  longer  any 
prospect  of  reaching  the  Narrows  forts  by  the  Krithia- 
Achi  Baba  route. 

The  power  of  the  Allied  offensive  was  materially 
weakened,  toward  the  end  of  May,  by  the  withdrawal 
of  the  major  part  of  the  fleet.  On  May  12th  the 
British  battleship  Goliath  was  torpedoed  inside  the 
Straits  by  a  Turkish  destroyer.  The  battleship  Tri- 
umph was  sunk  by  a  German  submarine  on  May  25th, 
off  Anzac  Cove.  The  Majestic  suffered  a  similar  fate 
on  May  27th.  The  Queen  Elizabeth  and  the  newer 
battleships  had  to  seek  shelter  at  Mudros.  The  joint 
naval  and  land  offensive  had  practically  come  to  an 
end. 

During  the  severe  struggles  at  the  tip  of  the  penin- 
sula the  Anzac  divisions,  north  of  Gaba  Tepe,  had 
maintained  and  slightly  strengthened  their  shore  posi- 
tions. In  front  of  them,  and  a  short  distance  inland, 
lay  the  massif  of  Sari  Bahr,  from  the  culminating  points 
of  which,  Chunuk  Bahr  and  Hill  305,  the  Narrows  were 
in  plain  sight.  After  discussing  other  plans — including 
an  operation  on  the  Asiatic  side,  which  the  French 
had  always  stood  out  for — General  Hamilton  decided  in 
favour  of  a  frontal  attack  on  Sari  Bahr.  It  was  to  be 
supplemented  by  a  turning  movement,  undertaken  by 
a  new  force,  landed  a  little  distance  above  the  Anzac 
positions,  at  Suvla  B  ay.  This  was  a  far  more  promising 
venture  than  the  Krithia  one.  But  it  called  for  an  ex- 
act co-ordination  in  action  which  was  somewhat  beyond 
the  capabilities  of  General  Hamilton's  staff  and  of 
some  of  his  subordinate  commanders. 


[i9i5i  Dardanelles-GalHpoli  Campaign     97 

The  Suvla  Bay  contingent,  consisting  of  the  newly 
arrived  Tenth  and  Eleventh  British  divisions,  was  to 
go  ashore  on  the  evening  of  August  6th  and  push  across 
the  open  beaches  of  that  sector  to  the  Anaf arta  ridge, 
rush  it  and  then  turn  south  to  the  flank  and  rear  of  the 
Sari-Bahr  positions,  which  the  Anzacs  would  be  pre- 
paring to  storm. 

The  Anzacs  gloriously  carried  out  their  part  of  the 
programme.  The  offensive  began  on  August  7th, 
with  an  assault  along  the  whole  Anzac  Bay  front. 
Feinting  at  the  southern  end,  the  Australians  took  and 
held  Lone  Pine  Hill.  They  also  contained  the  bulk  of 
the  Turkish  forces  in  the  centre  by  an  attack  on  Baby 
700.  The  operation  to  the  north  was  the  serious  one. 
Here,  on  the  night  of  August  6th,  General  Johnston 
penetrated  the  Turkish  front  and  by  the  evening  of 
August  7th  had  arrived  at  the  foot  of  Chunuk  Bahr. 
Through  August  8th  and  9th  Anzac,  East  Indian,  and 
British  troops  held  the  slopes  of  Chunuk  and  Hill  305 
and  even  reached  the  crests,  from  which  they  could 
look  down  on  the  Narrows. 

The  story  of  the  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  campaign  is 
one  long  series  of  tragic  mishaps.  Success  was  many 
times  within  easy  reach.  Then  some  fault  in  organiza- 
tion intervened,  to  make  useless  extraordinary  sacrifices 
and  heroism .  During  the  night  of  August  8 th~9th  a  part 
of  General  Cox's  column,  the  left  of  General  Godley's 
assaulting  force  (the  right  column  being  commanded 
by  General  Johnston),  pushed  up  the  steep  sides  of  the 
Chunuk  ridge,  between  Chunuk  Bahr  proper  and  "Hill 
2."  At  dawn  of  August  9th  the  Sixth  Gurkhas  and 
two  companies  of  the  Sixth  South  Lancashires  stormed 
the  summit  and  drove  the  Turks  down  the  eastern  side. 

In  his  admirable  book,  The  Dardanelles  Campaign, 


98  The  Great  War  [*«) 

Mr.  Henry  W.  Nevinson,  an  eye-witness  of  much  of 
the  later  fighting  on  Gallipoli,  gives  this  vivid  picture 
of  the  scene: 

For  a  moment  Major  Allanson  and  his  men  paused 
to  draw  breath.  They  were  standing  on  the  saddle 
between  Chunuk  Bahr  and  "Hill  2."  The  dead  lay 
thick  around  them.  But  below,  straight  in  front, 
lit  by  the  rising  sun,  like  a  white  serpent  sliding  be- 
tween the  purple  shores,  ran  the  sea,  the  Narrows, 
the  Dardanelles,  the  aim  of  all  these  battles  and 
sudden  deaths.  Never  since  Xenophon's  Ten 
Thousand  cried  "The  sea!  The  sea!"  had  sight 
been  more  welcome  to  a  soldier's  eyes.  There  were 
the  ships.  There  were  the  transports  bringing  new 
troops  over  from  Asia.  There  ran  the  road  to  Mai- 
dos,  though  the  town  of  Maidos  was  just  hidden  by 
the  hill  before  it.  There  was  the  Krithia  road. 
Motor  lorries  moved  along  it  carrying  shells  and  sup- 
plies to  Achi  Baba.  So  Sir  Ian  had  been  right. 
General  Birdwood  (who  planned  the  Chunuk 
offensive)  had  been  right.  This  was  the  path  to 
victory.     Only  hold  that  summit  and  victory  is  ours. 

The  Gurkhas  and  Lancashire  men  ran  down  the  far- 
ther slope  after  the  Turks.  But  they  had  gone  hardly 
a  hundred  yards  when  five  or  six  heavy  shells,  appar- 
ently from  the  direction  of  the  Mgean,  fell  among  them 
and  exploded.  There  is  still  a  dispute  as  to  where 
these  shells  came  from.  The  common  belief  is  that 
they  were  fired  by  the  British  naval  vessels  which  had 
bombarded  the  summit  just  before  the  assault.  But 
since  they  fell  on  a  reverse  slope,  Mr.  Nevinson  holds 
that  they  could  hardly  have  been  discharged  from  low 


[1915]  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  Campaign      99 

trajectory  naval  guns.  He  suggests  that  they  came 
from  British  howitzers  on  land,  which  had  been  ordered 
to  bombard  the  reverse  side  of  the  ridge,  on  the  theory 
that  the  Turks  would  be  rallying  there  for  a  counter- 
attack. 

At  any  rate  the  Gurkhas  and  Lancastrians  were  dumb- 
founded. They  stumbled  back  to  the  crest  and  over  it. 
The  Turks  saw  them  retreat  and  again  seized  the 
summit.  Meanwhile  the  brigade  under  General  Bald- 
win, assigned  to  support  the  assault  on  the  ridge,  lay 
at  the  foot  of  it,  on  the  ^Egean  side.  Baldwin  had  lost 
his  way  during  the  night  and  had  missed  the  chance  of 
ascending  while  the  top  was  cleared  of  Turks. 

To  the  right,  the  Sixth  Lancashires  occupied  a  posi- 
tion near  the  top  of  Rhododendron  Ridge.  But  they 
were  driven  from  it  by  a  Turkish  counter-offensive  on 
August  ioth,  the  Turks  being  enabled  to  concentrate 
heavily  on  this  front  because  of  the  failure  of  the  Suvla 
Bay  operation. 

The  Anzac  army  lost  12,000  men  in  the  Sari  Bahr 
fighting,  from  August  6th  to  August  ioth.  The  Thir- 
teenth (New  Army)  British  Division,  supporting  the 
Anzacs,  lost  6,000  men.  A  great  deal  of  ground  was 
gained,  the  area  of  the  Anzac  sector  being  enlarged  from 
three  hundred  acres  to  eight  square  miles.  But  the 
summits  of  Sari  Bahr  were  still  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy. 

The  object  of  the  Suvla  Bay  operation  was  to  seize 
the  ridges  north  of  Sari  Bahr  and  to  turn  the  Turkish 
position  on  "Hill  2"  by  emerging  into  the  plain  in  its 
rear,  about  the  town  on  Biyuk  Anafarta.  Lieutenant 
General  Sir  Frederick  Stopford  employed  for  this 
purpose  the  major  part  of  his  own  corps,  the  Ninth. 
One  division  (the  Thirteenth)  and  one  brigade  of  it 


ioo  The  Great  War  [1915] 

had  been  assigned  to  the  Anzac  front.  He,  therefore, 
was  left  with  the  Eleventh  Division  and  two  brigades 
of  the  Tenth.  All  his  men  belonged  to  the  New  Army 
and  had  never  been  in  action  before.  He  should  have 
had  112  guns.  But  only  twelve  guns  were  brought 
along  and  landed. 

Stopford,  however,  took  the  Turks  completely  by 
surprise.  He  had  an  easy,  flat  coast  to  land  on.  He 
had  from  25,000  to  28,000  men,  and  the  Turks  had  only 
about  four  thousand.  The  landing  was  almost  unop- 
posed. Yet  after  getting  ashore  during  the  night  of 
August  6th~7th,  the  commands  became  entangled  and 
fatal  delays  ensued.  Instead  of  advancing  early  on 
August  7th  to  seize  the  first  line  of  hills,  while  the 
Turkish  defence  was  still  unorganized,  Stopford  did 
not  take  the  nearest  eminence — Chocolate  Hill — until 
sunset.  The  next  day  was  wasted  in  inaction.  Sir 
Ian  Hamilton  was  worried  and  went  to  Suvla  himself. 
He  couldn't  arouse  General  Stopford  out  of  his  state 
of  complacent  lethargy  and  took  the  unusual  step  of 
dealing  directly  with  the  division  commanders.  Failure 
of  the  arrangements  to  distribute  water  had  demoralized 
the  troops  to  some  extent.  But  one  of  the  battalions 
of  the  Thirty-second  Brigade  had  pushed  east  during 
the  day,  of  its  own  motion,  and  occupied  Scimitar 
Hill,  one  of  the  key  points  of  the  ridge  which  the 
Turks  had  abandoned. 

This  fact  was  not  known  at  division  headquarters 
and  the  division  commander  designated  the  battalion 
on  Scimitar  Hill  as  one  of  those  to  be  used  in  a  move- 
ment farther  to  the  north,  suggested  by  Hamilton. 
Scimitar  Hill  was  accordingly  evacuated. 

The  movement  which  Sir  Ian  had  ordered  for  the 
evening  of  August  8th,  toward  Tekke  Tepe,  was  not 


dels]  Dardanelles-Gallipoli  Campaign    101 

undertaken  until  the  morning  of  August  9th.  It 
failed  because  the  Turks  had  rushed  up  reinforcements 
and  reoccupied  the  crests  from  which  they  had  fled 
on  August  7th.  On  August  9th  an  effort  was  made 
to  capture  Scimitar  Hill  and  Hill  W,  south  of  it,  which 
it  commanded.     But  this  came  to  nothing. 

In  the  night  of  August  ioth-nth  the  Fifty-fourth 
Division  was  sent  to  support  Stopford.  He  made  no  use 
of  it  for  several  days.  The  great  opportunity  of  August 
8th~9th  had  been  frittered  away.  By  August  10th  the 
Sari  Bahr  assault  on  the  Anzac  front  had  broken  down. 
Any  help  given  from  Suvla  would  now  come  too  late. 
Fighting  continued  on  the  Suvla  front  until  August  15th. 
But  it  had  only  a  local  importance.  General  Stopford 
was  removed  from  command  on  the  evening  of  August 
15th,  Major  General  De  Lisle  replacing  him. 

Hamilton's  losses  during  the  second  week  of  August 
were  about  thirty  thousand  on  his  three  fronts.  The 
British  War  Office  became  discouraged  at  the  paucity 
of  the  results  attained  at  Gallipoli,  and  perhaps  dis- 
trustful of  Hamilton's  leadership.  It  had  sent  him 
one  hundred  thousand  men  since  July  1st.  When  he 
asked,  on  August  15th  for  forty -five  thousand  replace- 
ments and  fifty  thousand  additional  troops,  his  request 
was  refused.  The  War  Office  sent  him  only  one  divi- 
sion from  Egypt,  the  Second  Mounted,  about  five  thou- 
sand strong.  The  Second  Australian  Division  arrived, 
however,  early  in  September. 

The  Suvla  Bay  fiasco  was  practically  the  last  act  of 
the  Gallipoli  tragedy.  General  De  Lisle  attempted,  on 
August  2 1st,  to  take  Scimitar  Hill  and  Hill  W,  but  was 
repulsed,  with  a  loss  of  five  thousand  men.  That  was 
the  last  engagement  of  consequence  on  Gallipoli. 

By  the  middle  of  September  the  Allied  situation  in 


''*•.  I  Ul  ?\  i<& 1 1 ..  \  s\  % *   The  Great  War  [1915] 

the  Balkans  had  become  painful.  Serbia  was  threatened 
with  invasion.  Bulgaria  was  on  the  point  of  joining  the 
Teuton  alliance.  Greece  was  drifting  away.  France  was 
finally  aroused  to  the  necessity  of  military  action  in  the 
Near  East.  Under  her  agreements  with  Great  Britain 
she  was  to  have  command  of  any  Mediterranean  expedi- 
tion— a  right  she  waived  at  the  Dardanelles  because  she 
wanted  to  keep  her  armies  in  France  intact. 

Now — when  it  was  too  late — an  Army  of  the  Orient 
was  organized.  It  was  put  under  the  command  of 
General  Sarrail,  and  destined  for  use  in  Macedonia 
and  Serbia.  On  October  6th  a  large  part  of  the  French 
division  was  recalled  from  Cape  Helles  for  service  at 
Salonica.  On  October  nth  Lord  Kitchener  asked 
General  Hamilton  what  losses  an  evacuation  of  the 
peninsula  would  entail.  Hamilton  replied  that  an 
evacuation  was  "  unthinkable. "  He  believed  that  the 
loss  entailed  would  be  fifty  per  cent.  A  few  days  later 
he  was  replaced  by  General  Sir  Charles  C.  Monro. 
Kitchener  visited  Gallipoli  in  November  to  talk  over 
the  details  of  the  retirement.  At  that  time,  with  Serbia 
lost  and  Bulgaria  allied  with  Germany  and  Turkey, 
there  was  no  strategical  justification  for  holding  on 
in  Gallipoli.  The  withdrawal  began  on  December 
2 1  st  and  was  completed,  practically  without  interfer- 
ence, on  January  8,  191 6. 

The  British  losses  were  shocking,  considering  the 
results  achieved.  The  casualties  were  112,308.  Nearly 
one  hundred  thousand  men  had  also  been  incapacitated 
at  one  time  or  another  by  sickness.  Gallipoli  became  a 
synonym  for  vain  and  misused  effort.  It  cost  Great 
Britain  enormous  sacrifices  in  men  and  prestige.  Yet 
it  also  shattered  the  Turkish  army.  For  Turkey's  mili- 
tary power  declined  rapidly  after  the  end  of  191 5. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  RUSSIAN  RETREAT.      MAY  I,   I915-OCTOBER  I,  I915 

The  Russian  defeats  in  Poland  and  Galicia  in  191 5 
were  due  primarily  to  Russian  inferiority  in  guns  and 
munitions.  General  Gourko  says  in  his  illuminating 
book,  War  and  Revolution  in  Russia,  that  for  months 
in  that  year  "batteries  in  action  daily  did  not  receive 
more  than  four  shells  per  gun  per  day."  He  also  testi- 
fies: "An  army  corps  would  receive  no  more  than 
one  thousand  shells  at  one  delivery  and  would  not 
know  the  date  when  another  delivery  would  be  made." 

A  second  cause  was  the  rapidity  with  which  German 
strength  on  the  Eastern  Front  was  increased,  once  the 
German  High  Command  decided  to  make  its  main 
effort  against  Russia. 

The  German  winter  campaign  of  191 5  had  been 
marked  by  ineffectual  efforts  to  break  through  the 
Russian  lines  in  Poland.  The  old  mass  methods  of 
attack  had  been  used  and  had ,  proved  futile.  The 
German  General  Staff  now  sought  a  more  vulnerable 
front  and  introduced  new  offensive  tactics. 

A  breaking-through  operation  east  of  Cracow  was 
entrusted  to  Mackensen.  He  depended  for  success  on 
the  greatest  artillery  concentration  the  war  had  seen 
up  to  that  time  and  on  a  special  follow-up  infantry 
formation  which  came  to  be  known  as  the  Mackensen 
phalanx. 

103 


io4  The  Great  War 


119x5] 


Mackensen  had  directed  the  winter  assaults  on  the 
Russian  lines  west  of  Warsaw.  He  was  now  put  in 
command  of  a  new  army,  the  Eleventh,  on  the  Dunajec 
sector,  facing  Gorlice.  The  Russian  front,  which  had 
been  drawn  back  some  distance  from  the  direction  of 
Cracow,  ran  on  May  1st  from  the  Carpathians,  west 
of  Dukla  Pass,  north  along  the  Biala  River  to  the 
latter's  junction  with  the  Dunajec,  near  Tarnow,  and 
thence  up  the  Dunajec,  to  the  Vistula.  Mackensen' s 
army  of  two  hundred  thousand  men  was  stationed 
opposite  the  southern  section  of  the  Biala  line.  An 
Austrian  army,  the  Sixth,  under  the  Archduke  Joseph- 
Ferdinand,  stood  opposite  the  northern  section,  facing 
Tarnow.  The  Third  Russian  Army,  under  the  Bul- 
garian general,  Radko  Dimitrieff,  the  victor  of  Lule 
Burgas,  confronted  the  two  Teuton  armies.  In  south- 
ern Poland  the  Ninth  German  Army,  under  Woyrsch, 
adjoined  the  Archduke  Joseph-Ferdinand.  On  its 
left  was  the  First  Austrian  Army,  under  Dankl.  On 
Mackensen's  right,  forming  a  connection  between  him 
and  Linsingen,  was  an  army  or  group  of  armies,  vari- 
ously described  as  under  the  command  of  Boroevic, 
Boehm-Ermolli,  and  Marwitz.  To  the  south-east  of 
Linsingen  lay  Pflanzer's  army,  formerly  Prince  Eugene's. 
In  northern  Poland  and  East  Prussia  were  the  Twelfth, 
Eighth,  and  Tenth  German  armies  and  additional 
forces  under  Below,  which  were  about  to  undertake  a 
raid  into  Courland. 

Mackensen  began  his  attack  on  May  1st  by  concen- 
trating the  fire  of  two  thousand  heavy  guns  on  a  front 
a  few  miles  east  of  Gorlice.  The  unexampled  severity 
of  this  bombardment  dumbfounded  the  Russians. 
Their  trench  lines  disappeared.  The  German  shock 
infantry  advanced  after  the  artillery  preparation  and 


[iQi5]  The  Russian  Retreat  105 

encountered  little  resistance.  DimitriefT  had  not  pre- 
pared secondary  lines  on  the  Wisloka  River,  a  few  miles 
back,  or  on  the  Wistok,  still  farther  east.  His  disor- 
ganized troops  could  not  prevent  Mackensen  from 
driving  ahead.  On  May  6th  the  Germans  took  Jaslow 
and  Zmigrod  and  cut  the  road  north  out  of  the  Dukla 
Pass. 

BrusilofTs  Eighth  Russian  Army  found  its  right  flank 
and  rear  uncovered  by  DimitriefFs  retreat.  It  was 
obliged  to  retire  hastily  toward  the  San,  followed  by 
Boroevic.  A  division  of  this  army,  under  Korniloff, 
was  enveloped  north  of  Dukla  Pass,  and  captured. 
Linsingen's  army  advanced,  farther  east,  on  Sambor, 
to  the  south-east  of  Przemysl.  The  Archduke  Joseph- 
Ferdinand  had  taken  Tarnow  on  May  6th  and  about 
May  ioth  he  crossed  the  Wistok  at  Frysriak.  In  ten 
days  the  whole  Dunajec  salient  had  been  flattened  out 
and  the  Russians  thrown  back  to  the  line  of  the  San, 
with  the  loss  of  about  one  hundred  thousand  prisoners. 
A  Russian  success  at  this  juncture  on  the  extreme 
southern  front  did  little  to  alleviate  the  situation. 

Could  the  retreating  Russians  hold  the  line  of  the 
San?  If  they  couldn't,  the  entire  Polish  salient  would 
again  be  threatened  on  its  weak  southern  face.  Prze- 
mysl was  now  Mackensen's  immediate  objective. 
While  the  Austrian  army  on  his  left  was  being  held 
up  on  the  San,  north  of  Jaroslav,  he  forced  a  passage 
on  that  stream  between  Jaroslav  and  Przemysl.  On 
the  same  day,  May  25th,  he  occupied  Jaroslav  and  then 
moved  south-east  with  the  idea  of  enveloping  Przemysl. 
He  was  halted  only  five  miles  north-east  of  the  city. 

Meanwhile  Boroevic  had  been  approaching  the  fort- 
ress from  the  south.  On  May  27th  he  was  within 
seven  miles  of  it.     On  May  31st  three  of  the  half 


106  The  Great  War  [i9i5] 

demolished  northern  forts  were  stormed  by  Bavarian 
troops.  On  June  3d,  fearing  to  be  surrounded,  the 
Russians  evacuated  the  place,  escaping  to  the  south- 
east. Its  fall  cleared  the  upper  San  front,  the  Russians 
falling  back  to  the  Grodek  Lakes  line,  which  covered 
Lemberg. 

The  Grodek  Lakes  positions  were  formidable  in  the 
centre  and  on  the  southern  end,  but  weak  at  the  north. 
Mackensen  therefore  struck  north-east  for  Rawa- 
Russka,  reversing  the  manoeuvre  by  which  Russky 
had  taken  Lemberg  in  September,  1914.  On  June  19th 
he  delivered  a  powerful  attack  on  the  Russians  bar- 
ring the  way  to  his  objective.  Their  front  was  broken 
through.  The  Russian  line  was  now  outflanked  on  the 
north  and  Lemberg  had  become  untenable.  It  was 
evacuated  on  June  226..  All  Galicia  had  been  lost, 
except  a  narrow  strip  along  the  Russian  frontier.  And 
there  was  no  sign  of  stabilization  anywhere. 

With  the  fall  of  Lemberg  the  German  campaign 
entered  its  second  and  major  phase.  Mackensen  had 
broken  the  Russian  left  centre  and  had  uncovered  the 
southern  side  of  the  Warsaw  salient.  That  salient  could 
now  be  attacked  on  three  sides.  The  Russian  armies 
in  it  were  threatened  with  envelopment.  An  oppor- 
tunity was  offered  to  the  German  General  Staff  to 
work  out  on  a  grand  scale  Count  Schieffen's  favourite 
Cannae  theory. 

The  Russians  were  back  in  nearly  the  same  awkward 
situation  in  which  they  were  when  their  mobilization 
began  in  August,  1914.  Poland  jutted  out  again  dan- 
gerously into  enemy  territory.  Then  the  Warsaw 
bulge  was  menaced  from  the  south  by  only  two  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies.  Now  it  was  under  pressure  on 
the  south,  west,  and  north  from  two  Austro- Hungarian 


[iQi5]  The  Russian  Retreat  107 

and  seven  German  armies.  German  strategy  contem- 
plated a  break-through  on  either  the  southern  or  the 
northern  side,  or  on  both,  and  the  closing  of  the  mouth 
of  the  sack  on  the  Russian  forces  retreating  from  the 
Vistula. 

A  slight  rearrangement  of  the  Teuton  forces  was 
effected  at  the  end  of  June.  Hindenburg  retained 
command  of  the  northern  group  of  armies — Below* s, 
the  Tenth,  the  Eighth,  and  the  Twelfth.  Prince  Leo- 
pold of  Bavaria  brought  a  new  army  east,  which  re- 
placed Dankl's,  transferred  to  the  Italian  front.  He 
also  assumed  command  of  Woyrsch's  Ninth  Army, 
facing  the  Vistula,  from  Warsaw  up  to  Sandomir. 
Mackensen  continued  in  command  of  his  own  Eleventh 
Army  and  of  the  Fourth  Austrian  Army,  operating 
between  the  Vistula  and  the  Bug.  The  Second  Austro- 
Hungarian  Army  protected  Mackensen's  right  and 
Linsingen  and  Pflanzer  prolonged  the  line  south  into 
Bukowina.  Hindenburg's  task  in  the  north  was  to 
force  the  Niemen  and  Narew  rivers  and  cut  the  con- 
nections of  the  Warsaw  salient  with  Petrograd.  Mac- 
kensen was  to  move  north-east,  cutting  Warsaw's 
connections  with  Kiev,  and  Brest-Litovsk. 

The  Archduke  Joseph-Ferdinand,  following  Dankl's 
trail  of  August,  1914,  moved  forward  on  July  5th  to 
Krasnik,  aiming  at  Lublin.  He  was  checked  there  for 
a  time.  Mackensen,  on  his  right,  started  for  Cholm. 
Slow  progress  was  made  at  first.  But  on  July  18th  the 
Russians  were  beaten  at  Krasnotow  and  the  whole 
southern  Polish  front  recoiled.  The  Archduke  entered 
Lublin  on  July  30th.  Mackensen  reached  Cholm  on 
July  31st. 

Mackensen,  however,  had  delayed  too  long.  In 
Northern   Poland  the  Eighth  and  Twelfth  German 


108  The  Great  War  [1915] 

armies  forced  a  passage  of  the  Narew  on  July  19th, 
above  and  below  Ostrolenka.  The  Russians  retired 
south-east  to  the  Bug.  The  German  Ninth  Army,  on 
the  Vistula  front,  took  Radom,  south-west  of  Ivangorod 
on  July  20th.  On  July  29th  it  crossed  the  Vistula. 
The  Russians  evacuated  Ivangorod  on  August  2d. 
This  was  the  signal  for  the  evacuation  of  Warsaw, 
which  Prince  Leopold  entered  on  August  5th. 

The  Russian  armies  in  Poland  now  fell  back  rapidly 
toward  the  line  running  north  and  south  through 
Brest-Litovsk,  on  which  they  had  mobilized.  Mean- 
while Hindenburg  had  sent  Below  into  Courland.  The 
latter  advanced  rapidly,  defeated  the  Russians  at 
Schadovon  July  21st  and  occupied  Mitau  on  July  30th. 
The  Tenth  Army  advanced  at  the  same  time  on  the 
line  between  Kovno  and  Ossowietz. 

The  German  centre  was  held  up  for  a  week  or  two 
by  the  resistance  of  the  fortress  of  Novogeorgievsk. 
on  the  Vistula  north  of  Warsaw.  This  stronghold  fell 
on  August  19th.  Mackensen  was  still  struggling  to 
reach  his  objective  of  Brest-Litovsk.  But  he  didn't 
arrive  there  until  August  25th,  when  the  Russian  armies 
of  the  centre  had  made  good  their  retreat  toward 
Pinsk.  Kovel,  south-east  of  Brest-Litovsk,  was  cap- 
tured a  few  days  later.  But  long  before  this  the 
hope  of  an  envelopment  on  the  southern  front  had 
vanished. 

A  chance  still  remained  on  the  northern  front.  After 
the  war  General  Hoffmann,  one  of  Ludendorff's  ablest 
lieutenants,  severely  criticized  Falkenhayn  for  letting 
it  slip  through  his  fingers.  Hoffmann  held  that  a  real 
envelopment,  involving  the  destruction  of  the  Russian 
armies,  could  have  been  obtained  in  191 6  by  directing 
the  main  attack  against  Kovno,  instead  of  trying  to 


[I9I51  The  Russian  Retreat  109 

envelop  Warsaw  from  the  south.  Kovno  was  the  key 
to  the  northern  Russian  front.  Below' s  operation  in 
Courland  showed  how  easily  it  could  have  been  turned 
from  that  direction.  Even  when  Hindenburg  began 
to  press  his  belated  attack  in  the  north,  he  nearly 
entrapped  a  Russian  army  in  Vilna. 

Ossowietz,  a  bulwark  of  the  northern  line,  fell  on 
August  22d.  Kovno  had  been  surrendered,  under 
suspicious  circumstances,  on  August  1 7th.  Only  Grod- 
no remained  of  the  strongholds  on  the  Russian  secon- 
dary line  of  defence.  This  fortress  was  captured  on 
September  20th.  Then  the  Germans  moved  rapidly 
east  of  it  as  far  as  Nida,  directly  south  of  Vilna. 

The  Czar  took  personal  command  of  the  Russian 
Western  armies  on  September  6th,  relieving  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas.  His  first  impulse  was  to  stop  the 
retreat  and  to  strike  back.  He  was  reluctant  to 
abandon  Vilna  and  the  Russians  waited  on  there  until 
they  were  nearly  surrounded  on  three  sides  and  German 
cavalry  had  appeared  in  their  rear. 

Vilna  was  evacuated  on  September  18th.  The  re- 
treating army  dispersed  the  cavalry  blocking  its  retreat 
and  extricated  itself  from  the  trap,  bringing  up  on  the 
Pinsk-Dvina  line,  which  now  ran  north  and  south 
from  Riga  to  Czernowitz.  In  Volhynia  the  Russians 
lost  Lutsk  and  Dubno — two  of  the  three  fortresses  of 
the  Lutsk-Dubno-Rovno  triangle,  protecting  the  ap- 
proaches to  Kiev.  But  by  October  1st  the  battle  on 
the  East  Front  died  down.  The  Czar  had  brought  the 
Russian  retreat  to  an  end  and  infused  a  certain  amount 
of  new  energy  into  the  troops.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
German  High  Command,  realizing  the  failure  of  its 
grandiose  Cannae  conception,  yet  measurably  satisfied 
with  the  immense  results  attained,  was  ready  to  call  a 


no  The  Great  War  [1915] 

halt  on  the  Russian  front  in  order  to  turn  its  attention 
to  the  Balkans. 

Mackensen  had  started  before  the  end  of  September 
for  the  Danube  front.  The  Eleventh,  Ninth,  and 
Twelfth  German  armies  were  withdrawn  entirely  from 
Russia.  So  was  the  Fourth  Austrian  Army.  The 
Second  Austrian  Army  was  reduced  in  size.  So  was 
Hindenburg's  right  wing,  opposite  Minsk.  The  Ger- 
mans and  Austro-Hungarians  dug  in  everywhere  in 
order  to  offset  these  reductions.  Four  army  groups 
were  established:  one,  under  Hindenburg,  from  Riga 
to  the  Niemen;  one,  under  Leopold  of  Bavaria,  from 
the  Niemen  to  Pinsk;  one,  under  Linsingen,  from  Pinsk 
to  Rovno;  and  one,  under  the  Archduke  Frederick, 
from  Rovno  to  Bukowina.  Two  masses  of  manoeuvre 
were  established — one  before  Riga  and  the  other  on 
the  Styr. 

The  great  retreat  of  191 5  cost  Russia  approximately 
350,000  killed  and  wounded  and  1,250,000  prisoners. 
It  was  the  beginning  of  the  end  for  Russia  as  a  military 
power.  The  Teuton  losses  were  probably  well  under 
300,000;  for  the  German  victories  were  won  largely 
by  superiority  in  artillery. 

The  German  territorial  gains  were  enormous.  Thirty- 
five  thousand  square  miles  in  Galicia  were  recovered. 
On  October  1st  the  German  lines  included  all  of  Poland, 
Courland,  the  Russian  governments  of  Grodno,  Kovno, 
and  Vilna,  and  parts  of  the  governments  of  Minsk  and 
Volhynia.  The  Russians  retained  a  small  piece  of 
eastern  Galicia,  below  Tarnopol.  The  territory  ac- 
quired by  Germany  aggregated  more  than  one  hundred 
thousand  square  miles.  This  was  nearly  half  the  area 
of  the  German  Empire.  The  population  of  the  con- 
quered regions  was  over  twenty  millions,  nearly  one 


[igisi  The  Russian  Retreat  us 

third  of  Germany's  population.  The  Mitlel-Europa 
which  the  Pan-Germans  had  visualized  had  sprung 
into  being,  almost  overnight,  on  the  Galician  and  Polish 
battlefields. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

ITALY  ENTERS   THE  WAR.      MAY    24,    I915 — DECEMBER, 

$1.  1915 

Italy  entered  the  war  on  May  24,  191 5.  In  break- 
ing away  from  an  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
Germany,  which  had  lasted  thirty-three  years,  and 
associating  themselves  with  the  Entente  Powers,  the 
Italian  people  obeyed  a  sound  and  deep-seated  instinct. 
They  returned  to  the  normal  policy  of  the  statesmen 
who  created  modern  Italy. 

The  Teuton  alliance  was  an  unnatural  expedient. 
It  was  entered  into  in  1882  by  Crispi  at  a  time  when 
Italy  was  incensed  by  the  French  annexation  of  Tunis. 
Bismarck  had  encouraged  this  move  on  France's  part 
and  knew  how  to  profit  by  it.  He  promptly  attached 
Italy  to  his  Central  European  bloc  and  thereby  made 
himself  independent  of  Russia. 

Italy's  position  in  the  early  eighties  had  become 
highly  uncomfortable.  At  odds  with  France,  she  was 
compelled  to  turn  somewhere  for  support.  Austria- 
Hungary  was  her  ancient  enemy  and  oppressor  and  her 
obvious  rival  in  the  Adriatic  and  the  Balkans.  After 
Solferino  and  Sadowa  Francis  Joseph  had  yielded  up 
Lombardy  and  Venetia.  But  he  still  held  on  to  the 
Trentino  and  Istria.  Their  Italian-speaking  popula- 
tions were  treated  with  the  severity  which  the  Haps- 
burgs  had  always  shown  to  subject  races.     Italy  could 

112 


[i9i5]  Italy  Enters  the  War  113 

not  wholly  close  her  ears  to  the  appeal  of  these  two 
provinces  for  liberation. 

In  a  military  sense,  too,  Austria-Hungary  retained 
the  mastery  of  northern  Italy.  She  held  all  the  moun- 
tain passes.  In  the  Trentino  she  possessed  a  bastion 
jutting  down  into  the  plains  of  Venetia  and  Lombardy. 
On  the  Adriatic  she  held  all  the  available  naval  bases. 
The  western  coast  of  that  sea  is  almost  bare  of  har- 
bours. The  eastern  coast,  on  the  contrary,  is  bounti- 
fully supplied  with  them.  At  Pola,  Austria  was  in  a 
position  to  dominate  the  Adriatic. 

Lacking  a  defensible  military  frontier,  Italy  was  at 
the  mercy  of  her  powerful  and  at  the  same  time  un- 
friendly neighbour.  The  alliance  with  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy, unpalatable  as  it  was,  had  at  least  the  merit, 
in  Crispi's  time,  of  safeguarding  Italy  on  the  north  and 
giving  her  a  chance  to  devote  herself  to  internal  devel- 
opment. Germany,  growing  more  and  more  prosper- 
ous, was  willing  to  contribute  a  large  part  of  the  capital 
needed  for  that  development. 

So  Rome  tried  to  forget  Italia  Irredenta  and  culti- 
vated as  amicable  relations  as  she  could  with  her  mis- 
mated  Hapsburg  ally.  The  Triple  Alliance  was  re- 
newed in  1887,  1891,  1903,  and  1912.  But  even  before 
1 91 2  Italy  had  begun  to  draw  away  in  sympathy  and 
policy  from  her  associates.  Rome  accepted  advances 
made  to  her  by  France  and  Great  Britain.  Prince 
Bulow,  when  he  was  German  Imperial  Chancellor, 
scandalized  Berlin  by  referring  to  these  manifestations 
of  something  more  than platonic interest  as  "little  spins 
taken  by  Italy  with  rival  suitors."  But  there  was  more 
danger  in  the  flirtation  than  he  thought. 

The  Italian  sense  of  nationality  had  been  intensified. 
Italy  was  ambitious  for  territorial  expansion.     Austria- 


ii4  The  Great  War  [i*ti 

Hungary's  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 
annoyed  her.  She  wanted  to  extend  her  influence  in 
the  Mediterranean  and  the  Near  East,  and  Vienna 
stood  squarely  in  her  way. 

Her  occupation  of  Tripoli,  leading  to  war  with  Tur- 
key, was  a  shock  to  her  allies,  since  Germany  had  be- 
come Turkey's  chief  European  backer  and  Austria- 
Hungary  resented  the  prospect  of  any  change  in  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean  to 
Italy's  profit.  It  was  also  evident  that  Italy  had 
seized  Tripoli  with  the  full  approval  of  Great  Britain 
and  France.  The  Balkan  wars  and  the  scramble  for 
Albania  had  further  estranged  Italy  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  Dual  Monarchy  was  anxious  to  attack 
Serbia  in  191 3,  after  the  Bucharest  partition,  but  Italy 
refused  her  assent. 

When  Austria- Hungary  did  attack  Serbia  in  19 14, 
Italy  was,  therefore,  a  decidedly  unsympathetic  specta- 
tor. The  Triple  Alliance  compact  permitted  her  a 
great  deal  of  latitude.  She  was  not  bound  to  go  to  the 
aid  of  her  associates  unless  one  of  them,  without  provo- 
cation on  its  part,  should  be  attacked  by  some  out- 
side Power.  Austria-Hungary  forced  a  quarrel  on 
Serbia  and  then  declared  war.  Germany  forced  a 
quarrel  on  Russia  and  France  and  also  took  the  initia- 
tive in  declaring  war.  Italy  was,  therefore,  released 
from  her  bond.  Neither  Vienna  nor  Berlin  claimed 
that  she  was  not  living  up  to  her  obligations.  All  that 
she  was  required  to  do  under  the  circumstances  was 
to  maintain  a  "benevolent  neutrality,"  toward  her  late 
partners. 

But  there  were  other  complications  in  the  Triple 
Alliance  agreement.  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary  had 
pledged  each  other  not  to  disturb  the  territorial  status 


[i9i5i  Italy  Enters  the  War  115 

quo  in  the  Near  East  without  consultation  and  provision 
for  "reciprocal  compensation."  The  text  of  Clause  VII 
of  the  treaty  read : 

Should,  however,  the  case  arise  that,  in  the  course 
of  events,  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the 
territory  of  the  Balkans,  or  of  the  Ottoman  coasts 
and  islands  in  the  Adriatic,  or  the  ^Egean  Sea,  be- 
comes impossible,  and  that,  either  in  consequence  of 
the  action  of  a  third  Power,  or  for  any  other  reason, 
Austria-Hungary  or  Italy  should  be  obliged  to  change 
the  status  quo  for  their  part  by  a  temporary  or  per- 
manent occupation,  such  occupation  would  take 
place  only  after  previous  agreement  between  the  two 
Powers,  which  would  have  to  be  based  upon  the 
principle  of  a  reciprocal  compensation  for  all  territorial 
or  other  advantages  that  either  of  them  might  acquire 
over  and  above  the  existing  status  quo,  and  would 
have  to  satisfy  the  interests  and  rightful  claims  of 
both  parties. 

This  clause  had  been  made  use  of  by  Austria-Hungary 
to  limit  Italy's  operations  against  Turkey.  It  now 
became  a  weapon  in  Italy's  hands.  Austria-Hungary 
twice  invaded  Serbia  and  temporarily  occupied  Serbian 
territory,  yet  without  previous  agreement  or  hint  of 
compensations.  The  Italian  Government,  on  Decem- 
ber 9,  1914,  opened  negotiations  looking  toward  an 
understanding  with  Vienna  on  the  compensation  issue. 

On  November  1st  Italian  forces  had  occupied  the  har- 
bour of  Avlona,  in  Albania.  Two  weeks  before  that  the 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  inclined  to  a  colourless  foreign  policy,  had  died  and 
been  succeeded  in  the  Salandra  Cabinet  by  Sydney 
Sonnino,  an  ardent  and  uncompromising  nationalist. 


n6  The  Great  War  [1915] 

Austria-Hungary  did  not  dispute  Italy's  right  to 
compensation.  Neither  did  Germany.  The  latter 
undertook  to  act  as  mediator.  Prince  Bulow,  a  familiar 
figure  in  Roman  society  and  connected  by  marriage 
with  the  Italian  aristocracy,  was  chosen  to  put  through 
a  compromise  which  would  insure  the  continuance  of 
Italian  neutrality.  He  made  concessions  which  Ger- 
many considered  liberal  and  which  Vienna  considered 
humiliating. 

The  Italian  demands,  as  finally  formulated,  comprised 
the  cession  of  the  Trentino,  including  the  towns  of 
Rovereto,  Trent,  and  Bozen ;  the  extension  of  the  Italian 
frontier  in  the  Isonzo  region  so  as  to  take  in  Gorizia, 
Tolmino,  Gradisca,  Monfalcone,  and  other  towns;  the 
conversion  of  Trieste  into  an  independent  state;  the 
transfer  of  various  Dalmatian  islands,  and  the  recogni- 
tion of  Italian  sovereignty  over  Avlona. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  negotiations,  in  April,  191 5, 
Vienna  offered,  through  Bulow,  the  Trentino,  the  west- 
ern bank  of  the  Isonzo  (in  so  far  as  the  population  was 
purely  Italian),  and  Gradisca;  sovereignty  over  Avlona, 
and  special  privileges  to  Italian  nationals  residing  with- 
in the  Dual  Monarchy.  Trieste  was  to  be  made  an  im- 
perial free  city  and  to  have  an  Italian  university. 

These  terms  were  rejected  by  Salandra  and  Sonnino 
as  inadequate.  Italian  patriots  of  all  groups  now  saw 
a  chance  to  complete  the  unification  of  Italy,  to  obtain 
a  genuine  military  frontier  in  the  Alps  and  on  the 
Adriatic,  and  to  end  for  ever  the  Austrian  menace. 
The  government  had  been  steadily  preparing  for  war. 
It  had  entered  into  close  relations  with  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia.  It  concluded  on  April  26th  a  secret 
compact,  known  as  the  Treaty  of  London,  by  which 
Italy  was  to  obtain  southern  Tyrol,  as  well  as  the  Tren- 


[i9i5]  Italy  Enters  the  War  117 

tino,  all  of  Istria,  and  part  of  Dalmatia.  This  treaty 
bound  Italy  to  declare  war  within  thirty  days.  On 
May  3d  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary 
was  denounced. 

One  obstacle  had  yet  to  be  overcome  before  Italy 
could  enter  the  war  unitedly.  Giolitti,  former  Premier 
and  the  most  powerful  politician  in  Italy,  controlled 
the  lower  branch  of  the  legislature.  He  was  a  neutral- 
ist and  on  friendly  terms  with  Bulow.  He  appeared 
in  Rome  on  May  ioth  to  protest  against  war  with 
Austria-Hungary.  His  majority  in  the  assembly 
seemed  ready  to  back  him  up.  Salandra  resigned. 
But  at  this  stage  the  masses  took  control  of  the  situa- 
tion. Popular  demonstrations  overawed  the  Giolittists. 
On  May  15th  the  King  asked  Salandra  to  resume 
office,  and  on  May  20th  Giolitti's  followers  helped  to 
pass  a  vote  of  confidence  in  the  ministry,  the  count 
standing  407  to  72.  Italy,  recalling  the  long  history 
of  Austrian  oppressions  and  imbued  with  hopes  of 
completer  nationalization,  enthusiastically  indorsed 
the  war  which  the  Salandra  Cabinet  had  foreseen  and 
prepared  for.  On  May  23d  notice  was  given  of  the 
existence  of  a  state  of  war  against  Austria-Hungary. 
Diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  were  broken  off. 
But  war  with  Germany  was  not  declared  until  several 
months  later. 

Italy's  political  aims  determined  her  military  policy. 
She  entered  the  war  for  a  definite  purpose  and  was  not 
to  be  moved  from  that  purpose.  She  committed  her- 
self to  an  effort  to  expel  the  Austro-Hungarians  from 
the  Trentino  and  Istria.  She  hoped  to  occupy  southern 
Tyrol,  to  capture  Trieste  and  Laibach,  and  to  march 
victoriously  on  Vienna.  But  the  handicaps  imposed  by 
her  lack  of  a  true  military  frontier  were  insuperable. 


u8  The  Great  War 


[1915] 


She  was  never  able  to  force  the  northern  mountain 
barrier.  Eventually  her  own  territory  was  invaded. 
When  the  armistice  was  signed,  Austro-Hungarian 
armies  were  still  in  Venetia  and  Friuli. 

Italy's  participation  in  the  war  was  of  great  value 
indirectly  to  the  Entente.  She  contained  Austro- 
Hungarian  forces  amounting  on  the  average  to  about 
750,000.  As  Ludendorff  has  pointed  out,  she  pre- 
vented him  from  drawing  heavily  on  Austria  for  rein- 
forcements in  1 91 8,  after  Russia  had  been  disposed  of. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  Italy's  absorption  in  a  military 
enterprise,  local  in  character  and  without  promise, 
accentuated  the  unfortunate  lack  of  co-ordination  in 
Allied  strategy  and  contributed  further  to  that  un- 
economic dispersion  of  energy  which  was  the  besetting 
sin  of  Allied  military  policy. 

The  Italian  campaign  began  on  May  25th.  Troops 
crossed  the  northern  boundary  at  many  points.  The 
main  movement  was  toward  Gorizia,  on  the  Isonzo. 
A  secondary  effort  was  made  in  the  Trentino  section. 
From  the  offensive  point  of  view  the  Isonzo  campaign 
bulked  larger.  That  way  lay  the  road  to  Trieste  and 
to  Vienna.  But  from  the  defensive  point  of  view 
possession  of  the  Adige  Valley,  from  Trent  northward, 
was  more  essential,  since  as  long  as  the  Austrians 
controlled  this  highway  they  would  be  able  to  hold  a 
dagger  at  the  heart  of  northern  Italy. 

General  Cadorna's  idea  was  to  seize  some  advantage- 
ous positions  on  the  Adige  front  and  in  the  Carnic  Alps, 
in  order  to  protect  his  flank  and  rear,  while  he  forced 
the  Austrian  defences  on  the  Isonzo.  Italian  mountain 
troops  invaded  the  Trentino  from  the  south  and  south- 
east, pushing  up  the  Adige  Valley  to  the  neighbourhood 
of  Rovereto.     Others  advanced,  farther  east,  from  the 


[X9i5i  Italy  Enters  the  War  119 

Sette  Comuni  Plateau  and  occupied  Borgo,  in  the  Val 
Sugana,  through  which  a  branch  railroad  ran  west  to 
Trent.  The  Italian  advance  was  halted  there  in  June 
by  Austrian  counter-attacks  and  the  difficulties  of 
mountain  warfare.  It  had  not  gone  far  enough  to 
make  the  Trentino  front  secure,  as  was  demonstrated 
the  following  spring  by  Hoetzendorff's  offensive  in  this 
region. 

On  the  Isonzo  front  Cadorna  had  some  encouraging 
successes  at  first.  Here  the  bridgehead  opposite  Gori- 
zia  was  the  chief  obstacle.  The  Italian  Commander-in- 
Chief  sought  to  turn  it  from  the  south,  and  also  from 
the  north.  Early  in  the  summer  he  broke  through 
the  enemy  line  to  the  north  of  Gorizia  and  captured 
Monte  Nero.  Tolmino  and  Plava,  south  of  Monte 
Nero,  were  also  captured.  Below  Gorizia,  Monfalcone 
was  taken  on  June  ioth.  But  the  bridgehead  held  out. 
The  envelopment  movement  on  the  south  was  halted 
by  the  natural  fortress  of  the  Carso.  That  from  the 
north  flattened  out  against  the  equally  strong  defences 
of  Monte  Santo,  an  outlying  spur  of  the  Bainsizza 
Plateau.  The  Italians  were  reduced  to  siege  operations 
against  the  bridgehead,  which  was  not  stormed  until 
August,  1 91 6. 

In  October,  191 5,  Cadorna  made  a  fresh  and  costly 
effort  to  get  a  foothold  on  the  Carso.  It  yielded  slight 
gains.  But  the  Carso  was  virtually  impregnable. 
This  curious  plateau,  furnished  by  nature  with  pitted 
surfaces,  underground  passages,  hidden  gun  platforms, 
shelter  caves  for  troops  and  munitions,  had  been  forti- 
fied with  extreme  ingenuity  by  Austrian  engineers. 
It  was  a  bomb-proof  labyrinth  in  which  an  army  could 
hide  and  fight,  and  at  the  same  time  live  in  comfort. 
The  Italian  armies  beat  against  it  again  and  again. 


i20  The  Great  War  [1915] 

But  it  always  performed  its  mission.    So  long  as  the 
Austrians  held  it  Trieste  was  safe. 

The  Italian  campaign  of  191 5  was  conducted  with 
admirable  energy  and  courage.  But  its  results  were 
meagre.  That  was  becau'se  Italy  had  to  fight  nature 
as  well  as  the  Austrians.  And,  of  the  two,  nature  was 
the  more  formidable  antagonist. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  CONQUEST  OF   SERBIA.      OCTOBER  4,    I915-DECEM- 
BER  25,    I915 

Allied  strategy  failed  signally  in  the  Near  East 
when  it  didn't  push  home  the  opportunity  offered  it 
to  force  the  Dardanelles  and  seize  Constantinople. 
The  naval  attack  on  the  Straits  was  within  a  hair's 
breadth  of  success  when  it  was  abandoned.  The  Galli- 
poli  expedition  could  have  reached  its  goal,  if  it  had 
been  properly  planned  and  directed. 

But  if  Allied  strategy  failed,  Allied  diplomacy  piti- 
fully aggravated  the  failure.  Its  obtuseness  and  over- 
confidence  were  unpardonable.  They  produced  tragic 
results.  In  the  spring  of  191 5,  when  the  Russians  were 
on  the  crests  of  the  Carpathians,  and  Turkey  was 
fighting  for  existence  on  the  Gallipoli  peninsula,  the 
way  seemed  cleared  for  a  re-constitution  of  the  Balkan 
Alliance  and  its  entry  into  the  war  on  the  side  of  the 
Entente. 

Serbia  and  Montenegro  were  already  belligerents. 
Greece  was  pro- Ally  and  was  bound  by  treaty  to  aid 
Serbia,  if  the  latter  were  attacked  by  any  other  Balkan 
state.  Rumania  had  broken  away  entirely  from  her 
old  association  with  the  Central  Powers,  and  was 
looking  forward  to  acquiring  Transylvania — the  Ruma- 
nian Irredenta.  Only  Bulgaria  remained  aloof.  And 
though  she  still  cherished  a  bitter  grudge  against  Serbia, 
Greece,  and  Rumania,  it  was  a  fair  assumption  that 

121 


122  The  Great  War  [1915] 

her  cynical  and  wily  Czar — Ferdinand  the  Auctioneer — 
would  swallow  his  revenge  if  he  were  made  to  see  that 
it  was  profitable  to  do  so.  According  to  the  Entente 
programme  both  Turkey  and  Austria- Hungary  were 
to  be  partitioned.  Those  partitions  would  guarantee 
ample  territorial  compensations  for  all. 

The  Allies  lacked  unity  of  military  command.  They 
had  also  failed  to  achieve  unity  in  the  field  of  diplomacy. 
Each  Foreign  Office  pursued  its  own  policy  and  was 
governed  by  its  own  prepossessions.  Great  Britain 
was  pro-Bulgar.  France  was  pro-Greek.  Italy  was 
anti-Greek.     Russia  was  cold  toward  Rumania. 

Greece,  under  Venizelos,  her  greatest  statesman  of 
the  modern  period,  had  shown  every  disposition  to  aid 
the  Allies.  Venizelos  allowed  them  to  use  Greek  islands 
as  bases  for  the  attack  on  the  Dardanelles.  He  invited 
them  later  to  occupy  Salonica  and  the  territory  in 
Macedonia  which  they  needed  to  create  an  intrenched 
camp. 

King  Constantine,  a  brother-in-law  of  William  II, 
and  a  Hohenzollern  by  predilection,  did  not  venture 
in  the  spring  of  191 5  to  oppose  Venizelos' s  programme. 
He  secretly  hoped  to  bargain  his  services  in  return  for 
Constantinople — a  hope  which  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria 
may  also  have  entertained.  But  when  the  Allies  in- 
discreetly proclaimed  the  existence  of  a  compact  by 
which  Constantinople  was  to  go  to  Russia,  Greece, 
Bulgaria,  and  Rumania  were  all  chagrined.  They 
became  more  critical  of  Allied  suggestions  and  Con- 
stantine and  Ferdinand,  at  least,  began  to  look  toward 
Berlin  for  counter  terms. 

Owing  to  her  geographical  position  and  exposed 
coast  line,  Greece  could  not  well  enter  the  war  on 
Germany's  side,  whatever  Constantine's  wishes.     But 


[1915]  The  Conquest  of  Serbia  123 

Bulgaria  could.  Allied  diplomacy,  therefore,  centred 
its  attentions  on  Bulgaria.  By  her  agreement  with 
the  other  members  of  the  First  Balkan  League,  Bul- 
garia was  to  receive,  after  the  victory  over  Turkey,  a 
large  section  of  Macedonia.  The  London  Conference 
upset  the  Balkan  League  compact,  forcing  Serbia  to 
surrender  the  Adriatic  territory  allotted  to  her  and  to 
claim  part  of  Macedonia  instead.  Bulgaria  contested 
the  claim,  attacked  Serbia  and  Greece,  and  was  de- 
feated. The  Treaty  of  Bucharest  divided  Macedonia 
between  Serbia  and  Greece.  Bulgaria,  the  Allied  diplo- 
mats thought,  might  be  appeased  by  an  offer  to  return 
certain  portions  of  Macedonia,  thus  purchasing  her 
adherence  at  the  expense  of  Greece  and  Serbia — mostly 
at  the  expense  of  the  latter. 

It  was  a  cruel  sacrifice  to  impose  on  the  Serbians. 
But  they  couldn't  well  resist  the  pressure  of  the 
greater  Powers.  On  August  24th  the  Assembly  at 
Nish  reluctantly  voted  to  alienate  a  part  of  the  Serbian 
kingdom  to  the  hated  Bulgars.  As  for  Greece,  although 
Venizelos  magnanimously  recommended  yielding 
Kavala,  Seres,  and  Drama,  King  Constantine  vetoed 
the  project.  The  Allied  diplomats  appeared  in  Sofia 
on  September  14th  with  an  offer  of  Serbian  Macedonia 
and  of  what  was  left  of  Turkish  Thrace  outside  Con- 
stantinople. But  they  were  then  many  weeks  too  late. 
Ferdinand  had  made  other  arrangements. 

The  failure  of  the  Gallipoli  campaign  and  the  great 
Russian  retreat  had  completely  changed  the  aspect  of 
the  diplomatic  and  military  situation.  German  agents 
had  been  active  in  the  Balkans.  They  obtained  Tur- 
key's consent  to  a  rectification  of  the  Bulgarian  frontier, 
giving  Bulgaria  all  the  territory  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Maritza  River  and  direct  access  by  railroad  to 


124  The  Great  War  [1915] 

Dedeagatch,  on  the  Mgean  Sea.  Berlin  promised  Fer- 
dinand both  Serbian  Macedonia  and  a  part  of  Old 
Serbia.  These  compensations  were  also  to  be  imme- 
diate; for  Mackensen  was  soon  to  invade  Serbia  from 
the  north  and  west  with  an  overwhelming  force,  and 
all  Bulgaria  would  have  to  do  would  be  to  march  in 
from  the  east  and  take  possession. 

Ferdinand  duped  the  Allied  diplomats  completely. 
On  September  20th  M.  Radoslavov  submitted  the 
German  proposals  to  a  secret  meeting  of  the  majority 
members  of  the  Sobranje.  They  were  enthusiastically 
approved.  On  September  21st  the  Turkish  boundary 
agreement  was  published  and  mobilization  was  ordered. 
To  soothe  the  credulous  Allied  representatives  in  Sofia, 
M.  Radoslavov  announced,  on  September  24th,  that 
the  Bulgarian  mobilization  was  not  a  threat  to  anybody 
and  that  Bulgaria  simply  intended  to  maintain  an 
attitude  of  armed  neutrality. 

Only  Serbia  seems  to  have  grasped  the  real  meaning 
of  Ferdinand's  manoeuvres.  Her  government  asked 
permission  to  attack  Bulgaria  while  the  process  of 
mobilization  was  still  incomplete.  That  would  have 
been  a  saving-  move  for  the  Serbs,  since  it  would 
have  concentrated  their  forces  in  Middle  Serbia, 
and  thus  kept  open  a  way  of  communication  south 
to  Salonica.  But  the  Allied  chancelleries  forbade 
this  manoeuvre.  They  still  had  hopes  of  winning  over 
Bulgaria. 

On  October  3d,  however,  the  light  began  to  break. 
The  Allies  united  in  an  ultimatum  to  Bulgaria,  requir- 
ing her  to  expel  the  German  officers  who  were  helping 
to  conduct  the  mobilization.  Ferdinand  could  afford 
to  laugh  at  this.  On  October  4th  diplomatic  relations 
between  the  Allied  Powers  and  Bulgaria  were  severed. 


[1915]  The  Conquest  of  Serbia  125 

War  was  not  declared  on  either  side  until  October  13th, 
several  days  after  hostilities  had  begun. 

Meanwhile  things  had  gone  steadily  against  the 
Allies  in  Greece.  Constantine  had  used  the  Entente's 
request  that  Greece  cede  Kavala,  Seres,  and  Drama  to 
Bulgaria,  to  damage  Venizelos's  prestige.  The  latter 
had  resigned  on  March  6th,  after  a  quarrel  with  the 
King  over  Greece's  attitude  toward  the  Entente.  He 
was  restored  to  power,  however,  by  the  June  elections. 
When  Bulgaria  mobilized  on  September  21st,  Venizelos 
held  that  his  government's  obligations  to  Serbia  com- 
pelled a  Greek  mobilization.  This  was  ordered  on 
September  23d. 

The  military  authorities  in  France  and  Great  Britain 
had  now  begun  to  sense  the  crisis  in  the  Balkans.  They 
decided  to  create  an  Army  of  the  Orient,  under  French 
command,  and  to  use  it  to  protect  Serbia.  The  Allied 
Powers  served  notice  at  Athens,  on  October  2d,  that 
an  Anglo-French  expedition  would  be  landed  at  Salonica 
and  would  use,  in  traversing  Macedonia,  the  railroad 
line  reserved  by  treaty  to  Serbia,  as  an  outlet  to  the 
^Egean.  Venizelos  was  in  sympathy  with  this  project. 
But,  in  order  to  preserve  appearances,  he  entered  a 
formal  protest  against  it. 

On  October  4th  he  made  a  speech  in  the  lower  house 
of  Parliament,  advocating  a  fulfilment  of  Greece's 
treaty  pledges  to  Serbia.  The  lower  house  approved 
his  policy  by  a  vote  of  142  to  102.  But  the  next  day 
Constantine  dismissed  him  as  Prime  Minister,  refused 
to  sanction  armed  intervention  in  Serbia's  favour,  and 
appointed  a  neutralist  and  anti-Entente  Cabinet, 
headed  by  Zaimis. 

When  Serbia  was  invaded,  Zaimis,  adopting  the 
specious  logic  of  Constantine,  announced  that  Greece 


126  The  Great  War  [**$] 

would  not  help  Serbia  against  Bulgaria,  because  the 
defensive  alliance  between  the  two  countries  had  con- 
templated a  war  in  which  Balkan  states  alone  should 
be  engaged. 

Entente  diplomacy  had  made  the  mistake  of  dealing 
nonchalantly  and  condescendingly  with  the  Balkan 
powers.  Now  it  began  to  pay  court  to  them.  On 
October  22d,  when  the  Serbian  military  situation  had 
become  highly  critical,  Great  Britain  offered  to  give 
Cyprus  to  Greece,  if  the  latter  would  agree  to  intervene 
in  Macedonia.  Zaimis  brusquely  declined  the  offer. 
He  was  defeated  in  the  lower  house  on  November 
4th  and  went  out  of  office.  But  Const  antine  re- 
organized the  ministry,  making  it  still  more  neutral- 
ist. A  week  after  Zaimis's  fall  the  King  dissolved  the 
Parliament. 

Irritated  by  the  growing  hostility  of  the  government 
at  Athens,  Great  Britain  clapped  down  a  partial  block- 
ade on  Greek  shipping.  The  new  ministry  then  un- 
willingly gave  guarantees  for  the  security  of  the  Salonica 
expedition.  On  December  19th  a  new  lower  house 
was  elected,  with  a  government  majority,  Venizelos 
and  his  followers  having  abstained  from  voting.  Thus, 
within  six  months,  through  Const  antine' s  malign  ac- 
tivities, Greece  had  been  converted  from  a  pro- Ally 
into  an  anti-Ally  state.  German  influence  prevailed  at 
the  capital.  The  mobilized  Greek  army  threatened  the 
rear  of  the  Allied  forces  at  Salonica  and  contributed 
for  nearly  two  years  to  render  that  army  inactive. 
The  tolerance  shown  Constantine  by  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Russia,  the  constitutional  guardians  of 
the  Greek  kingdom  and  people,  is  one  of  the  enigmas 
of  Allied  policy.  They  had  the  power  and  the  right 
to  dethrone  him.     Why  should  they  not  have  exercised 


[ipisl  The  Conquest  of  Serbia  127 

that  option  in  the  fall  of  191 5,  instead  of  two  years 
later? 

Rumania,  after  the  attack  on  Serbia  developed, 
was  left  dangerously  isolated.  She  shut  herself  up  in 
her  shell.  Though  still  strongly  pro-Ally,  she  wisely 
determined  to  remain  neutral  until,  in  her  judgment, 
the  tide  of  the  war  had  turned. 

The  utter  collapse  of  Entente  diplomacy  in  the 
Balkans  caused  the  retirement  of  Delcasse,  the  French 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  He  resigned  on  October 
13th.  The  Viviani  Cabinet  fell  a  few  days  later. 
Briand  became  Premier.  France  was  no  more  to  blame 
for  the  Balkan  fiasco  than  any  other  of  the  major  Allies. 
But  she  had,  at  least,  the  grace  to  make  open  acknow- 
ledgment of  responsibility  for  a  series  of  lamentable 
diplomatic  blunders. 

Serbia,  which  the  Entente  statesmen  had  intended 
to  partition  in  order  to  satisfy  Bulgarian  demands, 
was  now  to  be  the  victim  of  the  shortsightedness  and 
miscalculations  of  her  Allies.  This  gallant  little  nation 
was  left  to  face  the  concentric  attack  of  German,  Aus- 
trian, and  Bulgarian  armies,  vastly  superior  to  her  own. 
Serbia  had,  at  most,  250,000  soldiers.  The  Germans, 
Austro-Hungarians,  and  Bulgarians  operating  against 
her  numbered  more  than  five  hundred  thousand.  The 
general  plan  of  the  enemy  was  to  clear  the  railroad 
trunk  line  running  from  Belgrade  to  Nish  and  thence 
to  Sofia  and  Constantinople.  This  was  the  main 
artery  of  communication  between  the  Teuton  Powers 
and  Turkey.  The  Serbs  were  to  be  cut  off  from  their 
natural  path  of  retreat,  south  through  Nish  and  Uskub 
to  Salonica,  and  herded  back  into  the  mountainous 
interior,  there  to  be  enveloped  or  dispersed. 

Mackensen  was  put  in  command  of  the  Teuton 


128  The  Great  War  m 

forces,  which  were  to  invade  Serbia  from  the  north 
and  west.  He  was  ready  to  start  on  October  6th.  He 
had  under  him  a  German  army,  Gallwitz's,  and  an 
Austro-Hungarian  army,  Koevess's.  The  first  com- 
prised five  divisions  brought  from  the  Russian  front. 
It  was  concentrated  on  the  Danube.  The  second  was 
composed  of  two  divisions  from  the  Italian  front,  three 
from  the  Russian  front,  and  the  various  elements  which 
had  been  held  in  observation  on  the  Serbian  frontier 
since  January,  191 5.  This  army  was  concentrated  in 
Bosnia  and  was  to  attack  Serbia  from  the  west.  In 
reserve  behind  the  two  groups  was  a  German  corps, 
transferred  from  France.  The  strength  of  the  Teuton 
contribution  was  nearly  three  hundred  thousand.  In 
artillery  Mackensen  completely  outclassed  the  Serbians. 

The  Bulgarians  put  two  armies  in  the  field.  The 
northern  one,  under  Bojadeff,  was  to  operate  on  the 
eastern  border  of  Serbia,  south  of  the  Danube,  and  to 
effect  a  junction  with  the  Germans  coming  down  from 
Belgrade  and  the  Iron  Gates.  The  second,  under 
Theodoroff ,  was  to  seize  Uskub  and  the  Vardar  Valley, 
cutting  Serbian  communications  down  that  valley  with 
Salonica.  A  third  army,  in  reserve,  was  stationed  along 
the  Rumanian  frontier. 

The  Serbs  divided  their  forces  into  five  groups.  One 
in  the  west,  supported  by  the  Montenegrins,  held  the 
line  of  the  Drina.  One  faced  north  on  the  Danube. 
Two  tried  to  hold  the  Bulgarian  frontier.  A  fifth  was 
in  the  extreme  south,  in  the  region  of  Monastir.  The 
Anglo-French  expeditionary  army,  intended  to  relieve 
Serbia,  comprised  one  British  and  three  French  divi- 
sions, about  sixty  thousand  men.  It  never  got  far 
enough  north,  however,  to  form  a  junction  with  any 
Serbian  forces  except  those  about  Monastir. 


[i9i5i  The  Conquest  of  Serbia  129 

Gallwitz's  army  crossed  the  Danube  on  October  6th, 
occupying  Belgrade  on  October  8th,  and  Semendria 
on  October  nth.  The  extreme  left  crossed  at  Orsova. 
Koevess  crossed  the  Save  and  the  Drina.  His  extreme 
right  wing  marched  from  Visegrad,  in  Southern  Bosnia, 
south-east  into  the  Sanjak  of  Novi-Bazar,  which  had 
been  incorporated  into  Serbia  after  the  Balkan  wars. 
Gallwitz's  centre  pushed  up  the  Morava  Valley,  fol- 
lowing the  line  of  the  Belgrade-Constantinople  rail- 
road. Koevess  carried  the  line  of  the  Kolubara  River 
after  an  obstinate  defence  by  the  Serbian  First  Army, 
under  Michitch,  and  pressed  on  east  to  join  Gallwitz 
in  the  Morava  region.  By  the  end  of  October  one  divi- 
sion of  the  northern  Bulgarian  army,  operating  in  the 
Timok  Valley  sector,  had  reached  Negotin,  on  the 
Danube,  below  Orsova,  and  there  joined  Gallwitz's 
left  wing.  The  two  columns  then  turned  south-west 
and  entered  Nish  on  November  6th,  thus  cutting  the 
Serbian  line  of  retreat  toward  Macedonia.  From 
Nish  these  forces  marched  north-west,  down  the 
Morava  Valley  to  join  the  main  body  of  Gallwitz's 
army. 

The  Serbs  in  the  north  were  now  forced  to  retreat 
through  the  mountains  to  the  west  of  the  Morava. 
Kraguievatz,  the  chief  Serbian  arsenal,  half-way  be- 
tween Belgrade  and  Nish,  was  taken  by  Mackensen  on 
November  ist.  Paracin,  farther  south,  fell  on  Novem- 
ber 4th.  Krushevats,  north-west  of  Nish,  fell  on  Nov- 
ember 7th.  The  Serbs  of  the  north  had  no  avenue  of 
escape  left  them  except  west  through  Montenegro  and 
Albania  to  the  Adriatic. 

In  the  south  things  had  gone  even  worse.  The 
Bulgarian  army,  under  Theodoroff,  aiming  at  Uskub, 
had  penetrated  to  the  valley  of  the  Vardar  by  October 


i3°  The  Great  War  [1915] 

19th.  After  hard  fighting  it  occupied  Kumanova  and 
Vrania,  north  of  Uskub ;  Uskub  itself  and  Veles,  farther 
down  the  Vardar.  The  Serbs  recaptured  Veles,  but 
lost  it  again  on  October  30th.  The  Serbs  now  tried 
to  hold  Babuna  Pass,  in  order  to  cover  Prilep  and 
Monastir.  But  on  November  18th,  the  Bulgarians 
turned  this  pass  from  the  west  and  entered  Prilep. 
The  Serbian  forces  in  Monastir  then  withdrew  into 
Greece.  But  the  bulk  of  the  Serbian  Second  Army  had 
been  thrust  back  into  the  Albanian  mountains. 

The  Second  Army  covered  the  retreat  across  the 
inhospitable  fastnesses  of  Albania.  That  terrible  ex- 
perience could  not  but  disorganize  troops  even  of  as 
high  quality  as  King  Peter's.  The  Serbian  forces  which 
reached  the  coast — probably  about  one  hundred  thous- 
and strong — were  the  shadow  of  an  army.  They  were 
conveyed  to  the  Island  of  Corfu  for  a  long  period  of  re- 
cuperation. The  Bulgarians  pursued  the  Serbian  rear 
guards  as  far  as  Elbasan.  There,  on  December  24th, 
the  chase  was  broken  off. 

The  Allied  expedition  from  Salonica,  under  Sarrail, 
started  too  late.  And  it  was  too  weak  to  accomplish 
anything.  One  French  and  one  British  division  (both 
recalled  from  Gallipoli)  moved  north  about  the  middle 
of  October.  On  the  21st  they  invaded  the  south- 
western corner  of  Bulgaria  and  seized  Strumnitza. 
They  then  pushed  up  the  Vardar  Valley  toward  Veles 
and  extended  their  left  toward  Prilep  and  Monastir. 
Two  more  French  divisions  arrived  in  Salonica  at 
the  end  of  October  and  were  sent  to  the  front.  By 
the  middle  of  November  the  British  were  holding  the 
region  about  Lake  Doiran  and  the  French  had  crossed 
the  Cerna  River,  to  the  west  of  the  Vardar,  in  an  effort 
to  relieve  the  Serbians  about  Prilep  and  Monastir. 


[i9i5]  The  Conquest  of  Serbia  13 l 

But  on  November  18th  Prilep  was  lost  and  Monastir 
became  untenable.  The  latter  city  fell  to  the  Bulga- 
rians on  December  ist. 

The  Allied  expedition  was  now  left  without  any 
mission  to  perform.  Moreover,  it  was  exposed  to  at- 
tack by  much  stronger  Bulgarian  and  Teuton  forces. 
The  French  withdrew  to  the  east  of  the  Cerna  on 
November  25th.  Between  December  6th  and  13th, 
under  constant  enemy  pressure,  the  Allies  retired  down 
the  Vardar,  into  Greek  territory.  They  had  held  a 
triangular  position,  with  the  apex  at  the  confluence  of 
the  Cerna  and  the  Vardar,  the  left  leg  extending  south- 
west along  the  Cerna  and  the  right  leg  running  from  the 
junction  of  the  two  rivers  south-east  to  Lake  Doiran. 
This  was  the  scene  of  Franchet  d'Esperey's  victorious 
offensive  in  the  fall  of  191 8.  But  the  eastern  side  was 
weak  and  had  yielded  to  Bulgarian  attacks. 

Sarrail's  retreat  was  unmolested  after  the  Greek 
border  was  reached.  The  Bulgarians  hesitated  to 
violate  Greek  neutrality,  fearing  the  effect  of  such  a 
challenge  on  the  Greek  people,  who,  whatever  else 
they  were,  were  strongly  anti-Bulgar.  Sarrail  had  ex- 
ceptional talent  and  experience  as  a  military  engineer. 
He  began  at  once  to  create  the  great  entrenched  camp 
of  Salonica,  in  which  an  Allied  army  was  to  be  immured 
almost  up  to  the  close  of  the  war.  The  Teuton  forces 
never  disturbed  him.  It  was  essential  that  the  Entente 
should  maintain  a  foothold  in  the  Balkans,  if  only  to 
contain  Bulgaria,  save  Greece,  and  leave  the  way  open 
for  military  co-operation  with  Rumania,  should  the 
latter  enter  the  war.  San-ail's  work  proved  valueless 
in  1 91 6,  when  Rumania  came  in.  But  it  justified  itself 
in  the  end. 

Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Albania  were  now  lost, 


132  The  Great  War  [1915] 

however.  One  Allied  blunder  had  succeeded  another. 
The  Serbian  situation  might  have  been  relieved  a  little, 
if  King  Peter's  armies  had  hurriedly  abandoned  northern 
Serbia  and  made  their  fight  against  the  Bulgarians  in 
the  Vardar  Valley.  Then  the  horrors  of  the  Albanian 
retreat  would  have  been  avoided.  But  it  would  have 
been  expecting  much  of  a  warlike  people  like  the  Ser- 
bians not  to  make  at  least  a  show  of  defending  their 
homes. 

German  strategy  in  the  Balkan  campaign  stood  out 
brilliantly  in  contrast  with  Allied  blunders  and  short- 
comings. With  very  little  effort  Germany  had  opened 
up  the  corridor  she  needed  to  the  Bosporus  and  Asia 
Minor.  She  had  incorporated  Serbia,  Montenegro, 
Albania,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  in  that  Middle  Empire 
of  which  she  expected  to  become  master  after  the  war. 
A  six  months'  campaign  on  the  Eastern  Front  had 
added  over  100,000  square  miles  of  enemy  territory 
to  its  area  and  over  20,000,000  to  its  population.  A 
three  months'  campaign  in  the  Balkans  added  94,000 
square  miles  and  13,000,000  population,  besides  firm- 
ly attaching  Turkey,  with  700,000  square  miles  and 
21,000,000  population,  to  the  future  German  state. 
As  a  purely  military  operation  the  Serbian  campaign 
was  child's  play  to  the  German  General  Staff.  But 
it  represented  a  singularly  effective  combination  of 
military  skill  with  far-reaching  political  strategy. 


CHAPTER  XV 

"NIBBLING"    ON    THE    WESTERN    FRONT.      JANUARY    I, 
I915-DECEMBER   31,    I915 

While  a  war  of  movement  was  in  full  swing  on  the 
Eastern  Front  all  through  191 5,  and  vast  stretches  of 
territory  were  overrun  by  the  victorious  German  armies, 
war  on  the  Western  Front  never  escaped  the  limita- 
tions of  trench  deadlock.  The  reason  for  this  was 
simple.  On  the  Eastern  Front  Germany  had  an  enor- 
mous superiority  in  artillery  and  technical  equipment. 
Her  armies  could  break  through  enemy  positions  and 
exploit  the  break-through  strategically.  In  the  West, 
where  the  Allies  had  assumed  the  offensive,  they  were 
somewhat  superior  to  the  Germans  in  numbers,  but 
decidedly  weaker  in  artillery.  The  Germans,  more- 
over, had  developed  a  defence  of  fixed  positions  which 
the  Russians,  with  their  shortage  of  guns,  munitions, 
aircraft,  and  mechanical  appliances,  could  not  hope 
to  equal. 

On  the  Western  Front  in  191 5  the  Allies  matched  the 
splendid  courage  of  their  infantry  against  the  strength 
of  the  German  trench  lines — living  material  against 
dead  material.  It  was  a  costly  and  fruitless  experiment. 
At  the  stage  which  positional  warfare  had  reached  in 
191 5  such  tactics  were  inappropriate.  Artillery  had 
displaced  infantry  as  the  primary  offensive  arm.  As 
General  Mallterre  has  well  said  in  his  Campaigns  of 

133 


134  The  Great  War  [1915] 

1915,  the  warfare  of  attrition  in  rigidly  fixed  positions 
had  developed  a  new  formula:  "The  artillery  conquers, 
the  infantry  occupies."  Allied  offensives  in  the  West 
could  have  no  real  chance  of  success  until  an  Allied 
superiority  in  artillery  had  been  established. 

Joffre  aimed  at  break-throughs  in  France,  just  as 
Falkenhayn  did  in  Galicia  and  Poland.  But  since  the 
former  never  effected  any,  his  method  came  to  be 
described,  somewhat  disparagingly,  as  "nibbling." 
It  amounted,  at  best,  only  to  a  grand  scale  series 
of  ventures  in  what  the  French  call  the  "war  of 
usury." 

The  year  191 5  began  with  the  opposing  armies 
grouped  as  follows  on  the  long  trench  line  from  the 
Swiss  border  to  Nieuport.  The  Belgian  army  and  the 
Eighth  French  Army  (the  latter  under  d'Urbal)  held 
the  North  Sea  coast  sector,  south  to  Ypres.  The 
Second  and  First  British  armies,  under  Field  Marshal 
French,  were  stationed  between  Ypres  and  Lens. 
Smith-Dorrien  commanded  the  Second,  in  the  region 
of  Armentieres,  and  Haig  the  First,  in  the  section  about 
La  Bassee.  The  Tenth  French  Army,  under  Maud'- 
huy,  held  the  Arras  sector.  The  Second  French  Army, 
under  de  Castelnau,  was  in  the  Somme  region.  These 
northern  armies,  except  the  British  and  Belgian,  were 
under  the  general  direction  of  Foch. 

The  Sixth  French  Army,  under  Maunoury,  was  on 
the  Aisne  front;  the  Fifth,  under  Franchet  d'Esperey, 
was  on  the  Rheims  front;  the  Fourth,  under  de  Langle 
de  Cary,  was  on  the  Champagne  front,  east  of  Rheims; 
the  Third,  under  Sarrail,  was  in  the  Argonne.  These 
armies  were  under  direct  control  from  general  head- 
quarters. Dubail  commanded  the  eastern  group, 
below  Verdun.    It  comprised  the  First  Army,  under 


[i9i5i  "  Nibbling  M  on  the  Western  Front  135 

Roques,  and  two  detachments,  under  Humbert  and 
Putz,  the  first  in  Lorraine  and  the  second  in  Alsace. 

On  the  German  side  the  armies  were  from  north  to 
south:  Fourth,  under  the  Grand  Duke  of  Wurttem- 
berg;  Sixth,  under  the  Crown  Prince  Rupprecht  of 
Bavaria;  Second,  under  Bulow;  First,  under  Kluck; 
Seventh,  under  Heeringen;  Third,  under  Einem;  Fifth, 
under  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia.  On  the  upper 
Meuse,  in  Lorraine  and  in  Alsace,  were  three  detach- 
ments under  Stranz,  Falkenhausen,  and  Gaede,  re- 
spectively. 

The  first  battle  on  the  Western  Front  was  that  of 
Soissons,  lasting  from  the  8th  to  the  15th  of  January. 
The  French  held  the  north  bank  of  the  Aisne  from 
Soissons  to  Missy.  In  order  to  relieve  the  city  from 
bombardment  the  French  High  Command  ordered  an 
advance  toward  Crouy,  north-east  of  Soissons.  This 
village  was  taken  on  January  1 2th.  Then  the  Germans 
hurried  up  large  reinforcements  and  began  a  counter- 
attack on  the  entire  French  line  north  of  the  river. 
On  the  1 2th  the  Aisne  rose  and  carried  away  the 
bridges  east  of  Soissons.  This  gave  Kluck  an  oppor- 
tunity to  push  home  his  counter-attack.  The  French, 
cut  off  from  support,  held  fast  until  January  14th, 
when  they  retreated  to  the  river  bank.  Kluck  had 
cleverly  taken  advantage  of  an  accidental  situation 
and  won  a  substantial  local  success.  He  claimed  to 
have  taken  three  thousand  prisoners  and  eight  guns. 
On  the  Kaiser's  birthday,  January  27th,  Kluck  at- 
tacked and  captured  Hurtebise  Farm,  on  the  Craonne 
Plateau. 

In  February,  Joffre  launched  a  minor  offensive  in 
Champagne.  The  operation  continued  intermittently 
from  February  15th  until  March  18th.    An  advance 


136  The  Great  War  i*&$ 

of  two  miles  was  made  on  a  front  of  about  five  miles, 
from  Souain  east  to  Beausejour.  The  artillery  prepara- 
tion was  insufficient  to  reduce  the  German  defences 
and  the  infantry  found  progress  difficult,  after  the 
first  two  days.  The  battle  died  down  to  local  trench 
fighting,  with  severe  losses  on  both  sides.  The  French 
took  over  two  thousand  prisoners.  But  from  the 
strategical  point  of  view  the  effort  was  futile.  A  purely 
local  operation  in  the  Argonne — February  17th  to 
March  6th — resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  fortified 
position  of  Vauquois,  south  of  Varennes. 

A  more  ambitious  minor  offensive  in  the  Meuse 
sector,  lasting  from  February  17th  to  April  12th,  had 
for  its  object  the  squeezing  out  of  the  German  salient 
at  St.  Mihiel.  The  French  tried  to  force  the  north 
side  of  the  salient  by  taking  the  strongly  fortified  hill 
known  as  Les  Eparges,  on  the  heights  of  the  Meuse. 
Three  attempts  were  made — one  in  February,  one  in 
March,  and  one  in  April.  The  first  two  were  partially 
successful,  the  French  gaining  a  foothold  on  the  slopes. 
The  last  wrested  the  summit  from  the  enemy.  The 
First  Army  attacked  the  south  side  of  the  salient  in 
April  and  gained  a  little  ground.  But  St.  Mihiel  re- 
mained in  German  hands  until  September,  191 8. 

The  French  lost  Hartmansweiler  Kopf,  a  mountain 
in  Alsace,  north  of  Thann,  in  January,  and  recovered 
it  by  a  series  of  operations,  lasting  from  February  25th 
to  March  26th. 

The  first  British  attempt  to  break  through  the  Ger- 
man West  Front  barrier  was  made  at  Neuve  Chapelle — 
March  10th  to  12th.  Neuve  Chapelle  lay  about  twelve 
miles  west  of  Lille  and  about  five  miles  north  of  La 
Bassee.  Field  Marshal  Sir  John  French  gathered  three 
hundred  heavy  guns  on  a  front  of  little  over  a  mile 


[19X5]  "  Nibbling  "  on  the  Western  Front  137 

and  subjected  the  German  line  to  a  "drum  fire,"  un- 
precedented in  severity.  It  was  the  beginning  of  the 
evolution  which  was  to  make  artillery  the  predomi- 
nant factor  in  fixed  positional  fighting.  The  German 
first  line  trenches  were  demolished  and  their  occu- 
pants stunned.  The  British  infantry  occupied  the 
village  of  Neuve  Chapelle  with  little  resistance.  A 
narrow  breach  was  made  in  the  enemy  front.  But  to 
the  north  of  the  village,  where  the  Germans  held  the 
Aubers  Ridge,  one  of  the  keys  to  Lille,  the  artillery  pre- 
paration had  not  been  equally  effective.  Endeavour- 
ing to  open  out  the  breach  on  that  side,  the  British 
were  checked. 

Delays  in  sending  up  reserves  and  disappointing 
staff  work,  due  in  part  to  the  destruction  of  telephone 
wires,  paralysed  the  offensive.  The  Germans  rallied 
and  counter-attacked.  After  two  days  of  disconnected 
fighting,  French  suspended  the  operation.  He  had 
lost  thirteen  thousand  men  for  the  sake  of  advancing 
a  mile  on  a  three-mile  front.  The  British  took  three 
thousand  prisoners.  They  also  learned  that  their 
munitions  supply  was  inadequate  to  meet  the  demands 
of  the  new  style  of  positional  warfare,  and  that  the 
shrapnel  with  which  they  had  been  supplied  would 
have  to  be  replaced  by  high  explosive  shells,  if  trench 
systems  were  to  be  made  thoroughly  ripe  for  storming. 
Neuve  Chapelle  was  a  depressing  failure.  But  it 
helped  to  dispel  the  military  illusions  which  the  British 
Government  and  public  still  cherished. 

Germany  had  elected  to  stand  on  the  defensive  in 
France  and  Belgium.  She  made  one  notable  departure 
from  that  policy  in  April,  when  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Wurttemberg  made  a  partially  successful  attempt  to 
squeeze  out  the  Allied  salient  east  of  Ypres.     The 


i3»  The  Great  War  [i9i5] 

British  Second  Army  had  captured  Hill  60,  south-east 
of  Ypres,  on  April  17th.  German  counter-attacks 
there  failed  and,  as  if  in  retaliation,  the  Grand  Duke  on 
April  22d,  savagely  assaulted  the  north-eastern  face 
of  the  salient. 

This  operation  is  known  as  the  Second  Battle  of 
Ypres.  It  attracted  world-wide  attention  from  the 
fact  that  the  infantry  attack  was  prepared  not  by  artil- 
lery fire,  but  by  the  use  of  chlorine  gas  fumes.  The 
Allied  troops  were  taken  completely  by  surprise  when 
a  greenish  vapour  was  carried  by  the  north  wind  across 
their  trenches.  It  had  an  asphyxiating  and  torturing 
effect.  The  Colonial  divisions  of  the  French  Eighth 
Army,  holding  the  line  east  from  Steenstraate  to  Lan- 
gemarck,  broke  for  safety.  The  German  infantry, 
equipped  with  gas  masks,  seized  the  French  front  and 
extended  their  right  wing  across  the  Yser  Canal  to 
Lizerne,  Zuydschoote,  and  Boesinghe. 

The  retreat  of  the  French  uncovered  the  left  wing  of 
a  Canadian  division,  holding  the  line  from  Langemarck 
to  the  apex  of  the  salient.  The  Canadians  refused 
their  left  and  continued  to  resist  the  German  advance. 
The  situation  of  the  Allied  forces  east  of  Ypres  became 
critical.  For  if  the  Germans  pushed  south  along  the 
Yser  Canal  to  Ypres  all  these  troops  would  be  pocketed. 

But  on  April  24th  the  French  and  Belgians  recap- 
tured Lizerne.  The  Canadian  left  was  covered  by 
British  reinforcements  and  a  new  line  was  established 
west  to  the  canal.  The  Germans  tried  their  new  gas 
weapon  again,  on  the  east  face  of  the  salient,  and  the 
Canadians  and  British  were  forced  to  surrender  nearly 
half  of  the  area  which  they  occupied  to  the  east  of 
Ypres.  After  May  9th  the  battle  died  down,  the  Allied 
offensive  in  Artois  having  intervened. 


[iQisi  "  Nibbling  "  on  the  Western  Front  139 

On  the  German  side  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres  was 
probably  intended  only  as  a  diversion.  The  gas  attack 
succeeded  beyond  expectation.  But  when  the  front 
northeast  of  Ypres  was  cleared  and  an  opportunity  was 
offered  to  drive  west  toward  Poperinghe  and  to  envelop 
the  British  and  Canadians  in  the  apex  of  the  salient, 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Wurttemberg  had  no  reserves  in 
readiness  to  exploit  his  surprise.  Possibly  the  chief  pur- 
pose of  the  operation  was  to  try  out  the  chlorine  gas. 

Joffre  was  now  ready  to  put  the  "nibbling"  policy 
to  a  sharper  test.  The  idea  behind  his  "nibbles"  was 
always  to  make  a  breach  in  the  German  line,  by  widen- 
ing out  which  a  considerable  enemy  retirement  would 
be  necessitated.  He  confided  the  new  venture  to 
Foch,  whose  mission  was  to  be  to  push  the  Germans  off 
the  heights  to  the  west  of  Lens  and  then  drive  them 
across  the  Artois  plain  toward  Douai. 

Foch  had  assembled  in  the  North  a  special  "mass  of 
manoeuvre,"  consisting  of  ten  divisions.  These,  with 
his  other  troops,  were  distributed  on  a  semicircular 
front  extending  from  a  point  west  of  Arras  around 
toward  Bethune.  His  first  task  was  to  eject  the  Ger- 
mans from  their  powerful  trench  systems  in  the  ridges 
covering  Lens  from  the  south  and  west,  including  Vimy 
Ridge  and  N6tre  Dame  de  Lorette.  Seven  army 
corps  and  three  separate  divisions  (about  280,000  men) 
were  used  in  the  operation,  which  is  known  as  the 
Battle  of  Artois  and  lasted  from  May  9th  until  June 
19th. 

After  a  violent  bombardment  the  French  troops 
dashed  forward  on  May  9th  and  seized  the  enemy's 
first  line  trenches.  The  Thirty-third  Corps,  under 
General  Petain,  specially  distinguished  itself  in  the 
initial  assault.     It  conquered  all  the  slopes  of  Ndtre 


Ho  The  Great  War  [19151 

Dame  de  Lorette,  to  the  west  of  Lens.  The  villages 
of  Ablain-St.  Nazaire  and  Neuville-St.  Vaast,  to  the 
south-east  of  N6tre  Dame,  were  also  taken.  A  real 
break-through  seemed  on  the  point  of  being  accom- 
plished. But  no  supports  were  at  hand  to  follow  up 
this  success.  Possibly  P6tain's  advance  had  outrun  all 
calculations,  just  as  iByng's  did  at  Cambrai  two  years 
and  a  half  later.  At  all  events,  the  golden  moments 
slipped  away  on  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  May 
9th. 

The  breach  was  closed  during  the  night  by  German 
reserves.  They  halted  the  French  attack  on  May 
ioth  and  after  that  date  reduced  the  Artois  battle  to 
an  interminable  siege  operation.  On  May  12th  the 
French  took  Carency .  By  June  I  st  they  had  conquered 
the  Souchez  sugar  factory.  To  the  south-west  of  Vimy 
lay  a  formidable  network  of  trenches  known  as  the 
Labyrinth.  This  was  attacked  on  May  30th  and  was 
finally  cleared,  after  an  incessant  struggle,  on  June 
17th.  Vimy  Ridge  still  protected  Lens  from  the  south. 
It  was  not  taken  by  the  Allies  until  the  spring  of  191 7. 
Foch  captured  five  thousand  prisoners  in  the  first  as- 
sault. But  the  battle,  as  a  whole,  was  fruitless.  It 
was  the  kind  of  attrition  which  got  nowhere. 

To  support  the  operation  about  Lens  the  British 
First  Army  made  an  assault  on  May  9th  on  Aubers 
Ridge.  It  failed  because  of  inadequate  artillery  prepa- 
ration. A  second  assault  was  delivered  on  May  16th, 
at  a  point  east  of  Festubert.  The  battle  of  Festubert 
lasted  ten  days.  The  British  captured  the  German 
first  line  trenches  on  a  front  of  3200  yards  and  also 
some  second  line  trenches.  Marshal  French  reported 
a  moderate  local  success.  But  the  cost  was  dispropor- 
tionate to  the  results. 


[i9i5]  "Nibbling"  on  the  Western  Front  141 

Throughout  the  summer  the  French  and  British 
worked  feverishly  to  enlarge  their  munitions  stocks 
and  to  repair  their  shortage  in  large  calibre  artillery. 
"Nibbling"  was  not  renewed  until  September,  when 
Joffre  started  an  attack  in  Champagne  which  had  as 
its  objective  a  break-through  to  Vouziers.  Simultane- 
ously another  attempt — in  the  nature  of  a  diversion — 
was  made  to  recover  Lens. 

The  Allied  line  had  been  reconstituted  to  some  extent 
since  January.  The  French  Eighth  Army  had  been 
withdrawn  from  Flanders.  The  British  Second  Army 
extended  its  left  wing  north  to  connect  with  the  Bel- 
gians on  the  Yser.  The  newly  created  British  Third 
Army,  under  General  Allenby,  replaced  the  French 
Second  Army  on  the  Somme  front.  The  latter,  now 
under  Petain,  was  shifted  to  Champagne.  General 
Humbert  had  been  appointed  to  command  the  Third 
Army,  in  the  Argonne  sector,  succeeding  Sarrail,  who 
was  ordered  to  Salonica.  The  French  Seventh  Army, 
under  Maud'huy,  was  assigned  to  the  extreme  right 
in  Alsace.  The  front  of  the  French  Sixth  Army  had 
been  extended  somewhat  to  the  north  in  Picardy  to 
connect  with  the  British  Third  Army. 

The  Second  Army,  supported  by  the  right  wing  of 
the  Fourth,  bore  the  burden  of  the  attack  in  Cham- 
pagne. It  was  made  on  a  line  running  east  from 
Moronvillers  through  Auberive-sur-Suippes,  Souain, 
Perthes-les-Hurlus,  and  Mesnil-les-Hurlus  to  Massiges. 
The  operating  front  was  about  sixteen  miles  long. 
The  eastern  half  of  it  had  been  the  scene  of  the  Cham- 
pagne offensive  of  February  and  March. 

The  artillery  preparation  lasted  three  days.  The 
German  first  line  defences  were  battered  down.  The 
infantry  advanced  rapidly  on  the  morning  of  September 


H2  The  Great  War  [1915] 

25th.  By  evening  they  had  penetrated  the  German 
front  to  the  depth  of  about  two  miles,  where  the  second 
German  defence  line  was  reached.  On  the  first  day 
25,000  prisoners  were  taken  and  150  guns — these  totals 
including  the  captures  made  in  Artois. 

On  September  26th  and  27th  contact  was  established 
with  the  second  German  position  and  a  halt  was  called 
until  the  heavy  artillery  could  be  brought  up.  On 
October  6th  the  second  German  line  was  broken  at 
several  points.  But  the  Germans  threw  in  reinforce- 
ments and  French  progress  became  exceedingly  costly. 
The  artillery  was  unable  to  destroy  the  defences  of  the 
third  German  line.  The  infantry  assaults  failed  and 
the  offensive  had  to  be  broken  off.  The  French  losses 
were  estimated  at  about  120,000.  The  German  loss 
was  probably  about  the  same.  De  Castelnau,  who 
now  commanded  the  central  group  of  armies,  had  made 
a  slight  dent  in  the  German  positions.  But  he  was 
still  a  long  way  from  Vouziers,  his  objective.  He  hadn't 
even  reached  the  lateral  railroad  behind  the  German 
front,  running  east  and  west  through  Somme-Py. 

In  Artois  the  French  Tenth  Army  captured  Souchez, 
west  of  Lens,  on  September  25th,  and  made  progress 
toward  the  village  of  Vimy.  But  it  could  make  no 
impression  on  Vimy  Ridge.  The  British  First  Army 
attacked  toward  Loos,  on  the  north  side  of  the  heights 
system  covering  Lens.  Considerable  gains  were  made 
on  the  first  day.  The  German  first  trench  line  was 
carried  from  Grenay,  north-west  of  Lens,  to  and  beyond 
the  Hohenzollern  Redoubt — four  miles  farther  north. 
The  British  took  Loos  and,  advancing  east,  crossed 
the  Lens-La  Bassee  road  at  Hulloch  The  second  Ger- 
man line  was  overrun.  Hill  70  was  captured  and 
some  British  units  penetrated  as  far  as  the  third  Ger- 


fioi5]  "  Nibbling  M  on  the  Western  Front  143 

man  line.  Lens  was  now  almost  enveloped  from  the 
north,  and  a  little  stronger  push  would  have  compelled 
its  evacuation. 

But,  as  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  the  attack  was  not 
promptly  supported.  The  Germans  counter-attacked 
on  September  26th,  retook  Hill  70,  and  recrossed  the 
Lens-La  Bass6e  road.  By  September  27th  they  were 
nearly  back  in  their  old  positions. 

Field  Marshal  French  took  three  thousand  prisoners 
and  twenty -five  guns.  But  his  own  losses  were  about 
sixty  thousand.  His  failure  was  bitterly  criticized 
at  home.  On  December  15th  he  was  relieved  and  the 
command  of  the  British  armies  in  France  was  given 
to  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  who  remained  in  charge  of  them 
until  the  end  of  the  war.  A  few  days  before  French's 
recall  General  Joffre  was  raised  to  the  command  of  all 
the  French  armies — in  the  Near  East  as  well  as  in  the 
West — the  forces  in  the  colonies  alone  being  excepted. 

After  the  Champagne  and  Artois  offensives  fighting 
slackened  in  the  West.  The  Allies  had  shown  them- 
selves powerless  to  break  the  deadlock  of  rigid  positional 
(trench)  warfare.  The  Germans  had  developed  the 
trench  system  enormously,  building  everywhere  elabo- 
rate second  and  third  lines.  The  dugouts  had  been 
deepened  into  underground  forts.  The  front  was 
heavily  manned  everywhere  and  reserves  were  close 
at  hand  to  repair  any  breach. 

In  The  Strategy  of  the  Great  War,  I  have  discussed 
at  length  the  development  of  field  tactics  on  the  West- 
ern Front.  Warfare  ran  in  a  cycle.  First  the  vast 
increase  in  the  range  and  power  of  gun  fire  drove  the 
combatants  underground.  Then  there  was  a  sudden 
reversion  to  ancient  hand-to-hand  methods  of  fighting. 
The  opposing  battle  lines  ran  within  earshot  of  each 


144  The  Great  War  [1915] 

other.  Warfare  of  movement  disappeared.  Artillery 
caused  this  recession.  It  alone  could  undo  its  own 
work.  It  was  the  mission  of  the  artillery  arm  to  make 
the  deep  permanent  trench  fortification  untenable. 
So  the  destructive  power  of  artillery  was  fabulously 
expanded.  By  the  end  of  191 5  and  the  beginning  of 
1 91 6  it  had  begun  to  master  the  field  fortress.  Deep, 
permanent,  and  strongly  held  fore-front  works  gradu- 
ally had  to  be  abandoned,  because  they  had  become 
traps.  Then  the  rigid  trench  system  gave  way  to  the 
more  elastic  zone  systems,  in  which  the  front  lines  were 
lightly  held  and  the  main  defence  was  made  in  battle 
positions  farther  back.  The  "pill  box"  replaced  the 
deep  dugout  in  the  forward  zones.  "Drum  fire"  was 
wasted  on  "pill  boxes."  Any  line  could  now  be  broken 
through  with  a  sufficient  effort.  Attacks  which  got 
through  were  met  by  counter-attacks.  Finally  the 
tank  was  developed  as  a  "pill  box"  destroyer  and  the 
fixed  positions  of  191 5  and  1916  became  fluid.  The 
trench  deadlock  ended  definitely  with  the  Battle  of 
Cambrai,  in  November,  191 7.  Thereafter  open  or 
semi-open  warfare  became  the  rule. 

This  cycle  of  tactical  development  must  be  kept 
in  mind  in  order  to  understand  clearly  the  conditions 
of  the  offensives  in  the  West  from  1915  to  1918,  so 
different  in  scope  and  results  from  the  German  offensives 
in  Galicia,  Poland,  Serbia,  and  Rumania.  In  the  West 
neither  antagonist  could  hope  for  a  strategical  decision 
until  the  stalemate  of  rigid  positional  warfare  had 
come  to  an  end. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ASIATIC  AND  COLONIAL   CAMPAIGNS.       JANUARY    I, 
I915-DECEMBER  31,    I915 

Former  Ambassador  Morgenthau  tells  us,  in  his 
valuable  book  of  reminiscences,  that  when  Djemal 
Pasha,  Turkish  Minister  of  Marine  and  one  of  the 
Young  Turk  triumvirs,  left  Constantinople  in  Novem- 
ber, 1914,  to  take  command  of  the  army  in  Syria,  a 
remarkable  demonstration  occurred  in  his  honour.  At 
the  railroad  station,  just  before  his  train  started,  he 
said  magniloquently :  "I  shall  not  return  to  Constan- 
tinople until  I  have  conquered  Egypt." 

Djemal  was  a  politician  rather  than  a  soldier.  He 
didn't  understand  the  difficulties  presented  by  an  in- 
vasion of  Egypt.  Egypt  is  cut  off  from  Syria  by  the 
Desert  of  Sinai.  On  the  one-hundred-mile  land  front 
between  Port  Said  and  Suez  there  is  only  one  practicable 
route  across  the  desert  for  an  army  of  considerable 
size.  That  is  the  route,  near  the  Mediterranean  coast, 
from  Gaza  through  El  Arish  and  Katie  to  El  Kantara. 
There  are  two  caravan  trails  farther  south,  one  ending 
at  Ismalia,  the  midway  point  on  the  Suez  Canal;  the 
other,  used  by  pilgrims  going  from  Cairo  to  Mecca, 
crossing  from  Akaba  to  Suez.  These  trails,  owing  to 
scarcity  of  water,  are  fit  only  for  reconnoissances. 

The  Turks  lacked  in  191 5  the  mechanical  appliances 
10  145 


146  The  Great  War  [1915] 

with  which  to  transport  an  adequate  force  across  the 
Sinai  wastes.  They  could  threaten  the  Suez  Canal. 
But  they  could  hardly  hope  to  destroy  that  vital  artery 
of  communication  between  Great  Britain  and  India. 
German  policy,  however,  required  an  attempt  on  Egypt, 
which  would,  at  least,  compel  Great  Britain  to  maintain 
a  large  army  of  occupation  there. 

In  November,  19 14,  a  small  Turkish  column  cap- 
tured the  fort  of  El  Arish,  just  across  the  Egyptian 
boundary,  defeated  a  native  Egyptian  force  at  Kartaba, 
and  pushed  west  as  far  as  El  Kantara.  Another  small 
party,  starting  from  Akaba,  on  the  southernmost  route, 
got  half  way  across  the  desert  toward  Suez. 

Turkish  preparations  for  a  descent  on  the  canal 
continued  through  December  and  January.  It  was 
announced  through  Beirut  on  January  28th,  that 
48,000  Turks  and  Germans  were  concentrated  at  El 
Arish  and  32,000  near  Akaba.  These  figures  were 
probably  exaggerated.  On  February  3d,  however, 
three  Turkish  columns  appeared  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  the  canal.  One  made  a  feint  at  El  Kantara.  An- 
other, twelve  miles  farther  south,  bombarded  Ismalia. 
The  only  serious  attempt  to  cross  the  waterway  was 
made  at  Toussoun,  twelve  miles  below  Ismalia. 

About  ten  thousand  Turks  pushed  up  to  the  east 
bank  and  tried  to  lay  pontoon  bridges.  Allied  war- 
ships interfered  with  this  operation.  British  troops 
crossed  the  water-way  at  Serapeum  and  came  up  on 
the  left  flank  of  the  Turkish  division.  The  engagement 
lasted  twelve  hours.  Then  the  Turks  retreated,  losing 
five  hundred  prisoners.  By  February  10th  the  Sinai 
peninsula  was  cleared  of  the  enemy.  Djemal's  en- 
terprise was  fantastic.  There  were  150,000  British, 
Australian,  and  East  Indian  troops  in  Egypt,  beside 


[igi5]  Asiatic  and  Colonial  Campaigns    147 

the  native  army.  In  March  Great  Britain  decided  to 
defend  Egypt  at  Gallipoli.  Djemal's  best  divisions 
were  recalled  to  Constantinople  and  the  Sinai  front 
became  inactive  for  more  than  a  year. 

In  answer  to  Turkey's  declaration  of  war,  Great 
Britain  had  abolished  Turkish  suzerainty  over  Egypt 
(December  17,  19 14),  and  declared  a  British  protector- 
ate. Late  in  191 5,  Southern  Arabia  threw  off  the 
Turkish  yoke.  The  Sheriff  of  Mecca,  Hussein  Ibn 
Ali,  was  encouraged  by  the  British  Government  to 
set  up  the  independent  kingdom  of  Hedjaz.  This 
chief  occupied  most  of  the  territory  south  of  Medina, 
the  terminus  of  the  Hedjaz  railroad.  Later  he  con- 
tributed substantial  aid  in  the  Palestine  campaigns. 

On  the  Caucasus  front  the  Russians  had  won  an 
important  victory  over  Enver  Pasha's  army  in  the  first 
weeks  of  January.  The  Turkish  offensive  for  Kars  and 
Batum  was  abandoned '.  The  defence  of  Constanti- 
nople absorbed  Turkish  energies.  The  Russians  con- 
sequently were  able  to  dislodge  the  Turks  from  the 
Black  Sea  coast  districts,  south-west  of  Batum,  which 
they  had  overrun  in  1914.  The  Czar's  forces  captured 
Hoppa  on  March  2d  and  Archavi  on  March  15th.  The 
Turks  also  evacuated  Artivin,  across  the  Caucasian 
border.  They  maintained  their  hold,  however,  through 
191 5,  on  the  Olty  Valley,  north-west  of  Kars. 

Greater  activity  was  shown  farther  south — in  the 
Lake  Van  region  and  in  north-western  Persia.  The 
Turks  occupied  Tabriz  on  January  15th,  but  were  driven 
out  on  January  28th.  Their  hold  on  this  part  of  Persia, 
which  they  had  invaded  in  the  fall  of  1914,  was  gradu- 
ally broken.  On  May  2d  Khabil  Bey,  the  Turkish 
commander,  was  defeated  near  Lake  Urumiah  and  on 
May  24th  he  withdrew  into  Kurdistan. 


148  The  Great  War  [19151 

Another  Russian  column  penetrated  through  the 
Ararat  range  into  Southern  Armenia.  On  May  20th  it 
captured  Van  and  pushed  along  the  southern  border  of 
Lake  Van  toward  Bitlis.  The  Turks  began  a  counter- 
offensive  in  this  region  in  the  fall,  but  recovered  very 
little  ground. 

The  most  spectacular  operation  on  the  Asian  front 
was  the  British  offensive  up  the  Tigris  toward  Bagdad. 
This  was  conducted  by  General  C.  F.  V.  Townshend, 
with  great  boldness  and  energy.  But  the  forces  at 
his  disposal  were  too  small.  He  got  to  Ctesiphon, 
eighteen  miles  below  Bagdad.  But  there  he  found 
himself  facing  a  reinforced  Turkish  army,  much  stronger 
than  his  own.  He  then  retreated,  but  not  quickly 
enough  to  extricate  himself.  The  pursuing  Turks 
penned  him  up  in  Kut-el-Amara,  where  he  was  forced 
to  capitulate  on  April  29,  191 6. 

In  November,  1914,  the  British  had  seized  Basra, 
below  the  confluence  of  the  Tigris  and  the  Euphrates. 
On  April  n,  191 5,  they  occupied  Kurna,  at  the  junction 
of  the  two  rivers.  The  Tigris  offered  the  only  practi- 
cable route  of  invasion  into  Upper  Mesopotamia,  for 
it  was  navigable  up  as  far  as  Bagdad,  and  the  terrain 
on  both  banks  was  fit  to  march  and  fight  over.  The 
Euphrates,  on  the  contrary,  spread  its  waters  over 
a  marshy  country  and  had  no  fixed  and  dependable 
channel.  Before  Townshend  started  north  from  Kurna 
he  sent  a  British  column  east  to  the  Persian  border 
to  dispose  of  a  Turkish  force  which  had  gathered  there. 
On  May  19th  this  British-Indian  contingent  won  a 
complete  victory  on  the  bank  of  the  Kerkla  River, 
an  affluent  of  the  Tigris,  thus  ending  all  danger  of  a 
Turkish  flank  attack  from  the  east. 

A  similar  operation  was  necessary  to  protect   the 


[X9i5i  Asiatic  and  Colonial  Campaigns    149 

British  left  flank.  Another  column,  under  General 
Goringe,  was  dispatched  up  the  Euphrates  to  scatter 
the  Turks  and  nomad  tribes  who  had  established  a 
base  in  that  region.  Goringe  reached  Sukesh  Sheyuk, 
about  seventy  miles  up  the  river,  on  July  4th.  Then 
he  advanced  toward  Nasiriyeh.  Near  that  place  he 
fought  an  indecisive  battle  on  July  14th.  A  second 
battle,  on  July  24th,  routed  the  enemy.  Most  of  the 
Turkish  guns  and  supplies  were  captured.  The  diffi- 
culties of  navigation  on  the  Euphrates  prevented  the 
Turks  from  re-establishing  another  base  in  this  part  of 
Mesopotamia. 

The  main  Tigris  expedition  (about  fifteen  thousand 
men,  mostly  East  Indians)  left  Kurna  in  May.  On 
May  31st  a  battle  was  fought  south  of  Amara.  The 
Turks  were  defeated  and  retreated  in  haste.  Amara 
was  occupied  by  General  Townshend  on  June  3d.  The 
hot  season  intervened.  Active  campaigning  is  limited 
in  Mesopotamia  by  climatic  conditions  to  five  months 
of  the  year — May,  June,  September,  October,  and  Nov- 
ember. Townshend  resumed  his  advance  in  Septem- 
ber and  on  the  25th  of  that  month  brought  up  against 
powerful  Turkish  positions,  organized  on  both  sides  of 
the  Tigris  seven  miles  south  of  Kut-el-Amara. 

The  British  commander  made  a  demonstration  on 
September  27th  on  the  right  bank.  During  the  night 
the  Turks  transferred  most  of  their  forces  to  that  side 
of  the  river.  On  the  28th  the  main  British  attack  was 
delivered  on  the  left  bank.  After  hard  fighting  the 
Turkish  positions  were  carried.  On  the  29th  the  Turks 
retreated  beyond  Kut. 

A  few  weeks  later  the  British  advance  was  resumed. 
By  slow  stages  Ctesiphon,  within  two  days'  march 
of  Bagdad,  was  reached.     Here  the  Turks  stood  and 


i5o  The  Great  War 


[1915] 


fought  on  November  226.,  but  were  again  defeated. 
The  failure  of  the  Gallipoli  campaign,  however,  had 
enabled  the  Turkish  Government  to  send  reinforce- 
ments to  the  Mesopotamian  front.  These  were  brought 
into  line  on  November  25th  and  in  a  second  engage- 
ment at  Ctesiphon  Townshend's  progress  was.  stopped. 
His  losses  compelled  him  to  fall  back  toward  his  base; 
for  he  had  outrun  his  supports.  He  retired  to  Kut, 
which  he  entered  on  December  3d.  The  Turks  pursued 
him  closely  and  with  the  aid  of  nomad  Arabs  succeeded, 
on  December  7th,  in  cutting  his  line  of  retreat. 

Townshend  had  now  lost  one  third  of  his  original 
force.  He  decided  to  try  to  hold  Kut  until  a  British 
relief  expedition  could  arrive.  The  Turks  fortified  the 
banks  of  the  Tigris  below  Kut  and  waited.  The  Brit- 
ish and  Indian  governments  sent  an  army  to  raise  the 
siege.  But  it  failed  to  disturb  the  Turkish  investment. 
Kut  and  Townshend's  army  were  left  to  their  fate. 

Forces  of  the  Union  of  South  Africa  had  undertaken 
the  conquest  of  South-west  Africa  in  the  fall  of  19 14. 
The  Boer  revolt  interrupted  this  operation.  It  was 
not  resumed  seriously  until  February,  191 5.  Two 
columns  landed  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  at  Luderitz  Bay 
and  Walfisch  Bay.  A  third  advanced  north  from  the 
Cape  Colony  border.  General  Louis  Botha  was  in 
command  of  the  expedition.  The  Germans  were  out- 
numbered and  fell  back  under  pressure.  Windhoek, 
the  capital  of  the  colony,  was  reached  on  May  12th 
by  the  converging  columns.  The  Germans  retreated 
north,  maintaining  a  hopeless  fight.  After  losing 
several  small  engagements  they  capitulated  on  July 
9th.  The  forces  which  surrendered  included  204  officers 
and  3293  men. 

Kamerun  did  not  yield  as  easily  as  German  South- 


[i*i8]  Asiatic  and  Colonial  Campaigns    151 

west  Africa.  In  1914  the  Germans  not  only  fairly  held 
their  own,  but  also  occupied  some  stations  in  British 
Nigeria.  In  May  and  June,  191 5,  French  and  British 
contingents  conquered  the  north-west  section  of  the 
colony.  The  Germans,  with  about  3250  troops,  suc- 
cessfully held  the  rest.  In  October,  the  Allies  col- 
lected about  ten  thousand  men — British,  French, 
Belgians,  and  East  Indian  natives — and  attacked 
Kamerun  from  all  sides.  Yaunde,  the  capital,  capitu- 
lated on  January  I,  191 6.  The  governor  and  most  of 
the  German  officers  fled  to  Spanish  New  Guinea.  On 
February  18,  1916,  the  last  German  post  surrendered. 

German  East  Africa  held  out  much  longer  than  any 
other  of  the  German  colonies.  It  was  an  immense 
region,  difficult  to  penetrate,  and  was  defended  with 
skill  by  well-trained  African  troops.  No  progress  to- 
ward reducing  it  was  made  in  19 14.  East  Indian 
troops  landed  on  the  coast  near  Tanga  in  November, 

1 914,  but  were  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.     In  January, 

1 91 5,  some  Hindu  units  made  a  second  landing  and 
captured  the  fortified  post  of  Jassin.  But  the  garrison 
left  behind  at  this  post  soon  had  to  surrender  to  the 
Germans. 

In  the  spring  and  summer  there  was  some  fighting 
in  the  Victoria- Nyanza  and  Tanganyika  regions.  Lit- 
tle progress  was  made  by  the  Allies,  however,  in  191 5. 
At  the  end  of  the  year  the  Union  of  South  Africa 
agreed  to  raise  an  army  of  twenty-five  thousand  men  for 
use  in  German  East  Africa.  It  was  only  after  the 
South  Africans  arrived  that  the  German  hold  on  the 
colony  began  to  weaken. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

NAVAL   OPERATIONS,    I915 

Apart  from  the  Allied  attempt  to  force  the  Darda- 
nelles (dealt  with  in  Chapter  XI,  in  connection  with 
the  Gallipoli  campaign)  naval  operations  in  191 5  were 
of  minor  consequence.  The  only  high  sea  encounter 
was  that  off  Dogger  Bank,  on  January  24th.  Five 
British  battle  cruisers  were  engaged  there  with  three 
German  battle  cruisers  and  one  armoured  cruiser. 
The  German  armoured  cruiser,  the  Blilcher,  was  sunk. 
Dogger  Bank  was  the  first  real  test  of  modern  big 
gun  ships  in  action.  It  threw  little  light,  however, 
on  the  relative  fighting  power  of  the  British  and 
German  navies,  because  the  action  was  broken  off  too 
early. 

In  a  spirit  of  bravado,  the  Germans  had  bombarded 
the  undefended  English  east  coast  towns  of  Scarboro, 
Hartlepool,  and  Whitby,  on  December  16,  1914.  The 
German  public  applauded  this  illegitimate  method  of 
punishing  the  English.  So  a  second  raid  was  planned 
for  January  24th.  The  British  navy  was  on  the  look- 
out for  the  raiders.  Sir  David  Beatty's  battle  cruiser 
squadron  was  patrolling  off  the  Dogger  Bank,  in  com- 
pany with  four  light  cruisers.  Three  light  cruisers  and 
some  destroyers  were  thrown  out  in  advance.  About 
daylight  the  Aurora,  an  outpost  light  cruiser,  became 

152 


[i9i5]  Naval  Operations  153 

engaged  with  an  enemy  light  cruiser.  The  five  battle 
cruisers,  coming  up,  found  themselves  in  sight  of  the 
German  raiding  squadron,  under  Rear-Admiral  Hipper. 
The  Germans  turned  toward  home  and  a  stern  chase 
ensued. 

In  tonnage  the  British  squadron  had  a  great  advan- 
tage. The  displacements  of  the  ships  were  as  follows: 
British:  Lion,  26,350;  Tiger,  28,000;  Princess  Royal, 
26,350 ;  New  Zealand,  1 8,800 ;  Indomitable,  1 7,250.  Ger- 
man :  Derfflinger,  28,000 ;  Seydlitz,  24,640 ;  Moltke,  22,640 ; 
Blucher,  15,550.  Hipper  was  also  outclassed  in  weight 
of  metal.  His  best  ship,  the  Derfflinger,  carried  eight 
12-inch  guns.  The  two  smaller  battle  cruisers,  the 
Seydlitz  and  the  Moltke,  carried  ten  1  i-inch  guns  apiece. 
The  Blucher,  an  old-style  armoured  cruiser,  carried 
twelve  8.2-inch  guns.  Beatty's  three  best  ships,  the 
Lion,  the  Tiger,  and  the  Princess  Royal,  were  armed 
with  eight  13.5-inch  guns  apiece.  The  two  smaller 
battle  cruisers,  the  New  Zealand  and  the  Indomitable, 
had  batteries  of  eight  12-inch  guns. 

In  speed  the  two  squadrons  were  more  evenly  matched 
— 29.2  knots  for  the  Seydlitz,  28.4  for  the  Moltke,  and 
27  for  the  Derfflinger,  against  28.5  for  the  Lion  and 
the  Princess  Royal,  and  28  for  the  Tiger.  The  New 
Zealand's  capacity  was  25  knots  and  the  Indomitable' s 
26.  The  Blucher1  s  was  25.3.  Hipper  was  handicapped 
by  the  fact  that  the  Blucher,  his  smallest  and  slowest 
ship,  was  the  last  in  the  column  and  was  bound  to  be 
overtaken  in  a  runaway  fight  by  the  faster  and  stronger 
British  units.  The  three  German  battle  cruisers  were 
more  heavily  armoured  than  their  antagonists.  The 
Blucher,  on  the  contrary,  had  lighter  armour  than  any 
other  of  the  major  units. 

Hipper  could  escape  only  by  sacrificing  the  Blilcher. 


i54  The  Great  War 


[19151 


This  he  did.  His  battle  cruisers  kept  up  a  long  range 
fight  and  drew  off  toward  Heligoland.  The  Blilcher 
was  gradually  overhauled.  She  was  badly  punished  by 
shell  fire  from  the  British  battle  cruisers  and  fell  out 
of  line  at  10.48  a.m.  She  was  sunk  by  a  torpedo  at 
12.37  p.m.  The  Lion,  which  had  been  leading  the  pur- 
suit, was  disabled  at  11.03  A.m.  and  dropped  out,  Ad- 
miral Beatty  transferring  his  flag  to  a  destroyer.  The 
British  squadron  ceased  pursuit  about  noon,  fearing  a 
submarine  attack.  It  was  then  about  seventy  miles 
from  Heligoland. 

The  German  fleet  attempted  in  August,  191 5,  an 
operation  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  the  Allied  fleet 
at  the  Dardanelles.  It  tried  to  force  an  entrance  into 
the  Bay  of  Riga,  which  was  defended  not  only  by 
Russian  warships  but  by  fixed  mines.  Three  cruisers 
and  eight  destroyers  were  lost  on  August  19th  and 
20th.  The  fleet  retired  on  August  21st.  On  August 
20th  a  British  submarine  operating  in  the  Baltic 
damaged  the  battle  cruiser  Moltke  and  a  little  later 
another  submarine  injured  the  Pommern. 

The  Allied  navies  also  suffered  numerous  losses  from 
submarines  or  mines.  The  British  pre-dreadnaught 
Formidable  was  sunk  on  January  2d.  The  French 
cruiser  Leon  Gambetta  was  torpedoed  in  the  Adriatic, 
on  April  26th.  The  Italian  cruiser  Amalfi  was  sunk 
in  the  Adriatic  on  July  7th.  The  Italian  cruiser, 
Giuseppe  Garibaldi,  was  destroyed  off  Cattaro  on  July 
1 8th. 

Two  German  commerce  destroyers  were  forced  to 
take  refuge  in  American  waters  in  the  spring  of  191 5. 
On  March  10th  the  Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich  entered  New- 
port News,  and  on  April  nth,  the  Kronprinz  Wilhelm 
entered  the  same  port.     Both  were  interned.     After 


[X9I51  Naval  Operations  155 

the  summer  of  1 91 5  only  stray  commerce  raiders, 
escaping  in  disguise  from  German  ports,  were  left  to 
prey  on  Allied  shipping  beyond  the  range  of  the  German 
submarines. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

NEUTRAL  RIGHTS  AT  SEA.      THE  "LUSITANIA."     AUGUST 

3,  1914-DECEMBER  31,   1915 

What  Germany  could  not  accomplish  through  her 
surface  navy  or  auxiliary  commerce  destroyers  she  be- 
gan to  think  of  accomplishing  through  her  submarines. 
That  thought  was  her  undoing.  The  theory  of  sub- 
marine blockade  which  she  developed  became  event- 
ually the  keystone  of  her  naval  and  military  policy. 
It  clouded  her  vision  and  perverted  her  true  military 
aims.  It  forced  the  United  States  into  the  war.  More 
than  anything  else — more  than  everything  else — it 
dragged  Germany  down  to  defeat. 

Early  in  the  war  Great  Britain  proclaimed  a  block- 
ade of  the  German  coasts  and  disclosed  an  intention 
of  cutting  off  the  flow  of  foreign  merchandise  into 
Germany.  The  United  States,  as  the  neutral  whose 
commerce  would  be  most  restricted  by  belligerent  op- 
erations, asked  the  powers  at  war  whether  they  would 
agree  to  respect  the  laws  of  naval  warfare  "  as  laid  down 
by  the  Declaration  of  London  of  1909."  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  made  a  favourable  response. 
Great  Britain  insisted  on  various  modifications.  The 
United  States  then  withdrew  its  suggestion.  Block- 
ade and  naval  warfare  were  left  to  be  conducted  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  of  international  law  in  force  prior  to 
the  London  Declaration. 

156 


[i9i5]  Neutral  Rights  at  Sea  157 

These  were  elastic  and  capable  of  a  wide  expansion. 
The  British  Government,  through  Orders  in  Council, 
extended  the  principle  of  ultimate  destination  invoked 
by  the  United  States  in  the  Civil  War.  It  established 
a  long  range  "cruiser  cordon"  blockade  of  German 
North  Sea  and  Baltic  Sea  ports.  It  also  held  that 
neutral  commerce  to  neutral  countries  adjacent  to  Ger- 
many, like  Holland,  Norway,  Denmark,  and  Sweden, 
should  be  subject  to  blockade  and  contraband  regula- 
tion, if  there  was  any  reason  to  suspect  transshipment 
across  the  German  border.  Foodstuffs  were  included 
among  the  articles  which  could  not  be  delivered  to  neu- 
tral countries — even  foodstuffs  intended  for  the  use  of 
the  civilian  population.  Under  earlier  practice  food- 
stuffs were  conditionally  contraband,  only  if  destined 
for  the  use  of  a  government  or  its  military  forces.  In 
modern  war,  however,  such  a  distinction  has  become 
fanciful,  since  all  food  stocks  are  now  pooled  and 
disposed  of  under  governmental  regulation. 

The  Germans  complained  bitterly  of  the  British  ban 
on  the  importation  of  foodstuffs.  They  said  it  implied 
a  purpose  to  starve  Germany's  non-combatant  popula- 
tion. Attacking  it  as  violation  of  international  law, 
they  claimed  the  right  to  retaliate  by  declaring  a 
"war  zone"  about  the  British  Isles  and  sinking  at 
sight  enemy  merchantmen  trying  to  leave  or  enter 
British  harbours. 

The  famous  German  "war  zone"  order  was  issued  on 
February  4,  191 5.  It  not  only  gave  notice  that  Ger- 
man submarines  would  sink  enemy  merchantmen 
found  in  the  zone,  even  if  it  were  found  impossible  to 
save  passengers  and  crews,  but  also  warned  neutral 
merchantmen  out  of  the  "blockaded"  waters  because, 
owing  to  "  the  hazards  of  naval  warfare,  neutral  vessels 


158  The  Great  War  [1915] 

cannot  always  be  prevented  from  suffering  from  the 
attacks  meant  for  enemy  ships." 

Up  to  the  appearance  of  this  proclamation  the  fric- 
tion arising  from  the  blockade  operations  had  been 
almost  exclusively  between  neutrals  and  the  Allies. 
The  United  States  Government  had  vigorously  pro- 
tested against  the  extreme  doctrines  asserted  in  the 
Orders  in  Council  and  against  the  hardships  imposed 
by  them  on  neutral  commerce.  Now  Germany  as- 
sumed Britain's  burden.  For  if  the  British  orders 
subjected  neutral  carriers  to  annoyance  and  loss,  the 
German  proclamation  threatened  them  with  destruc- 
tion of  life  as  well  as  property. 

Germany  never  claimed  that  submarine  warfare  on 
merchantmen,  carried  to  the  point  of  sacrificing  the 
lives  of  crews  and  passengers,  was  legal.  She  merely 
pleaded  that  as  a  violation  of  law  it  was  excused  by 
British  violations  of  a  different  character.  But  this 
was  an  excuse  which  could  hardly  be  accepted  by  neutral 
governments,  disposed  to  stand  on  their  rights  to  a 
lawful  use  of  the  high  seas. 

The  American  Government  took  notice  of  the  German 
"war  zone"  order  in  a  note,  made  public  on  February 
10th.  .  It  was  firm  and  to  the  point.  Secretary  Bryan 
asked  the  German  Government  to  consider,  before  the 
order  was  carried  into  effect, l '  the  critical  situation  which 
might  arise  were  the  German  naval  forces,  in  carrying 
out  the  policy  foreshadowed  in  the  Admiralty's  pro- 
clamation, to  destroy  any  merchant  vessel  of  the  United 
States  or  cause  the  death  of  American  citizens."  The 
Secretary  then  laid  down  two  propositions : 

(1)  If  the  commanders  of  German  vessels  of  war 
.  .  .  should  destroy  on  the  high  seas  an  American 


[i9i5i  Neutral  Rights  at  Sea  159 

vessel  or  the  lives  of  American  citizens,  it  would  be 
difficult  for  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
to  view  the  act  in  any  other  light  than  as  an  inde- 
fensible violation  of  neutral  rights,  which  it  would 
be  very  hard  indeed  to  reconcile  with  the  friendly 
relations  now  so  happily  subsisting  between  the 
two  governments. 

(2)  If  such  a  deplorable  situation  should  arise  .  .  . 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  be  con- 
strained to  hold  the  Imperial  German  Government 
to  a  strict  accountability  for  such  acts  of  their  naval 
authorities  and  to  take  any  steps  it  might  be  neces- 
sary to  take  to  safeguard  American  lives  and  property 
and  to  secure  to  American  citizens  the  full  enjoy- 
ment of  their  acknowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas. 

The  "war  zone"  proclamation  went  into  effect  on 
February  18th.  Meantime  Germany  had  hinted  that 
she  would  withdraw  it  if  Great  Britain  would  agree  to 
observe  the  Declaration  of  London,  without  modifica- 
tion, or  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  under  either  of  which  it 
was  permissible  to  ship  food  into  Germany  for  the  use 
of  the  civilian  population. 

On  February  20th  the  United  States  Government 
addressed  identical  notes  to  Great  Britain  and  Germany 
suggesting  a  compromise  which  would  make  the  situa- 
tion of  neutrals  more  tolerable.  It  was  proposed  to 
prohibit  the  sowing  of  floating  mines,  to  forbid  sub- 
marines to  attack  merchantmen  except  in  pursuance 
of  the  rules  of  visit  and  search,  and  to  bar  the  use  of 
neutral  flags  by  belligerent  merchant  ships.  Germany 
was  asked  to  agree  that  all  foodstuffs  sent  her  from 
the  United  States  should  be  distributed  by  agencies 
designated  by  the  United  States  and  in  no  case  should 


160  The  Great  War  [1915] 

be  requisitioned  by  the  German  Government.  Great 
Britain  was  to  agree  that  foodstuffs  should  not  be 
made  absolute  contraband  or  detained,  if  consigned  to 
American  agencies  in  Germany. 

Berlin  responded  favourably,  in  the  main,  to  these 
proposals,  which  would  have  been  highly  advanta- 
geous to  Germany.  Great  Britain,  unwilling  to  forego 
the  food  blockade,  was  much  less  sympathetic.  The 
effort  to  arrange  a  modus  vivendi  came  to  nothing. 

A  new  Order  in  Council  was  issued  on  March  15th, 
absolutely  stopping  the  sailing  of  merchant  vessels  to 
or  from  German  ports  and  taking  jurisdiction  of  all 
merchant  vessels  sailing  to  or  from  a  neutral  port, 
which  carried  goods  with  an  enemy  destination  or  of 
enemy  origin,  or  goods  classifiable  as  enemy  property. 
This  order  was  certain  to  evoke  a  spirited  protest  from 
the  United  States.  But  meanwhile  causes  of  friction 
with  Germany  were  arising  which  completely  over- 
shadowed American  grievances  against  Great  Britain 
and  France. 

On  March  28th  a  German  submarine  torpedoed  the 
Falaba,  a  British  merchant  ship  bound  for  Africa.  An 
American  citizen,  Leon  Thrasher,  who  was  a  passenger 
on  it,  was  lost.  The  German  Government  expressed 
regret  at  this  incident,  but  tried  to  shift  responsibility 
for  it  on  the  British  policy  of  arming  merchantmen, 
thus  making  it  difficult  for  a  submarine  to  approach 
them  for  purposes  of  search.  On  April  28th  a  Ger- 
man aeroplane  dropped  three  bombs  on  the  American 
steamer  Cushing.  One  of  them  hit  the  mark.  Nobody 
was  killed.  On  May  1st  the  American  oil  steamship 
Gulflight  was  torpedoed  off  the  Scilly  Islands.  The  cap- 
tain died  from  shock  and  ten  of  the  crew,  who  jumped 
overboard,  were  drowned. 


[i9i5i  The  "  Lusitania  "  «6i 

That  same  day  an  advertisement  was  inserted  in 
various  American  newspapers  warning  Americans  not 
to  travel  through  the  "war  zone"  on  ships  of  Great 
Britain  or  her  allies.  It  bore  the  signature  of  the  Im- 
perial German  Embassy.  The  occasion  of  the  warning 
was  disclosed  on  May  7th  when  a  German  submarine 
sank  the  British  passenger  liner  Lusitania  off  the  south 
coast  of  Ireland.  The  Lusitania  carried  1251  passen- 
gers and  a  crew  of  667.  Of  these  11 53  were  drowned. 
The  American  passengers  numbered  188.  One  hundred 
and  fourteen  of  them,  including  women  and  children, 
lost  their  lives. 

The  reaction  in  the  United  States  to  this  cold-blooded 
massacre  was  vehement  and  intense .  It  was  Germany '  s 
answer  to  our  Government's  notification  of  February 
10th  that  it  would  hold  Germany  to  "  strict  accountabil- 
ity" for  the  destruction  of  "an  American  vessel  or  the 
lives  of  American  citizens"  and  its  further  warning 
that  it  would  "take  any  steps  it  might  be  necessary 
to  take  to  safeguard  American  lives  and  property  and 
to  secure  to  American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of 
their  acknowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas." 

What  steps  were  to  be  taken  was  gradually  disclosed 
in  the  Lusitania  correspondence,  which  continued  un- 
til September  1st  in  the  form  of  open  exchanges  and 
then  lapsed,  so  far  as  the  Lusitania  case  itself  was 
concerned,  into  a  silent  deadlock.  The  first  American 
note  was  made  public  on  May  13th.  Two  days  before 
the  German  Foreign  Office  had  handed  Ambassador 
Gerard  a  memorandum  which  apparently  disposed  of 
the  issue  raised  by  the  Cushing  and  Gulflight  cases. 
It  characterized  the  attacks  on  the  two  vessels  as 
"mistakes"  and  announced  that  if  a  neutral  ship 
came  to  harm  through  German  submarines  or  aircraft 


162  The  Great  War  [19151 

in  the  zone  of  naval  warfare,  "the  German  Govern- 
ment would  unreservedly  recognize  its  responsibility 
therefor.  In  such  a  case  it  would  express  its  regrets 
and  afford  damages  without  first  instituting  a  prize 
court  action."  If  there  was  any  question  whether  or 
not  the  damage  was  done  by  a  German  U-boat  or  air- 
ship, recourse  would  be  had  to  a  commission  appointed 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Hague  conventions. 

This  left  open  only  the  question  of  attacks  on 
enemy  merchantmen  through  which  American  passen- 
gers had  lost  their  lives.  The  first  American  note, 
though  mentioning  the  Cushing  and  the  Gulflight,  was 
really  addressed  to  the  Falaba  and  Lusitania  cases.  It 
emphasized  the  fact  that  Americans  were  entitled 
under  the  rules  of  international  law  to  travel  on  the 
high  seas  in  full  confidence  that  their  lives  would  "not 
be  endangered  by  acts  done  in  clear  violation  of  uni- 
versally acknowledged  international  obligations." 

The  satisfaction  due  to  the  United  States  was  thus 
denned : 

It  confidently  expects,  therefore,  that  the  Imperial 
German  Government  will  disavow  the  acts  of  which 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  complains, 
that  they  will  make  reparation  so  far  as  reparation 
is  possible  for  injuries  without  measure,  and  that  they 
will  take  immediate  steps  to  prevent  the  recurrence 
of  anything  so  obviously  subversive  of  the  principles 
of  warfare  for  which  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment have  in  the  past  so  wisely  and  so  firmly  con- 
tended. 

On  May  25th  the  American  steamer  Nebraskan  had 
a  hole  blown  in  her  bow  off  Fastnet  Rock.     The  cap- 


[i9i5i  The  "Lusitania"  163 

tain  thought  he  was  the  victim  of  a  submarine  attack, 
though  no  submarine  was  seen.  No  lives  were  lost 
and  the  vessel  reached  port. 

Jagow,  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  sent  a  reply  to  Washington  on  May  28th.  It 
was  published  on  May  31st.  It  repeated  the  assur- 
ances as  to  neutral  vessels  contained  in  his  earlier 
memorandum  of  May  nth.  It  tried  to  exculpate  the 
commander  of  the  U-boat  which  sank  the  Falaba.  But 
it  justified  the  attack  without  warning  on  the  Lusitania 
by  imputing  a  semi-military  character  to  that  vessel. 
The  answer  was  absolutely  evasive. 

Secretary  Bryan  had  signed  the  note  of  February  10th 
and  the  first  Lusitania  note.  But  his  ideas  of  holding* 
Germany  to  "strict  accountability"  for  the  invasion 
of  neutral  rights  were  coloured  by  his  ardent  pacifistic 
predilections.  He  wanted  to  forbid  Americans  to 
take  passage  on  the  ships  of  belligerent  nations  or  on 
neutral  vessels,  carrying  cargoes  of  ammunition.  He 
also  wanted  the  Lusitania  dispute  referred  to  an  inter- 
national commission,  telling  Germany  in  advance  that 
the  United  States  would  be  bound  by  the  principle  of 
no  warlike  action  within  a  year,  contained  in  the  ar- 
bitration treaties  which  our  State  Department  had 
negotiated  with  various  other  countries. 

In  Mr.  Bryan's  philosophy  "strict  accountability M 
was  a  purely  platonic  phrase.  He  didn't  want  to  seem 
to  pretend  that  it  was  anything  else.  So  he  resigned 
on  June  8th,  on  the  eve  of  the  transmission  of  the  second 
Lusitania  note.  This  refuted  the  German  claims  as 
to  the  semi-military  character  of  the  torpedoed  liner 
and  then  "very  earnestly  and  very  solemnly "  renewed 
the  representations  and  demands  of  the  first  note. 

The  answer  from  Berlin,  dated  July  8th,  was  made 


1 64  The  Great  War  [19151 

public  on  July  ioth.  It  defended  German  naval  policy 
and  suggested  that  American  passengers  to  Europe 
should  use  American  liners  or  neutral  liners  under  the 
American  flag.  These  would  receive  a  safe  conduct 
through  the  German  "war  zone,"  provided  they  carried 
no  contraband.  As  a  further  concession,  Germany 
would  allow  four  enemy  liners  to  sail  under  the  American 
flag  and  guarantee  them  similar  protection.  Nothing 
was  said,  naturally,  about  a  disavowal  of  the  Lusitania 
crime. 

The  third  Lusitania  note,  dated  July  21st,  described 
Jagow's  reply  as  "very  unsatisfactory."  The  demand 
for  disavowal  was  made  for  a  third  time  in  this  language : 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  cannot  be- 
lieve that  the  Imperial  Government  will  longer  refrain 
from  disavowing  the  wanton  act  of  its  naval  com- 
mander in  sinking  the  Lusitania  or  from  offering  re- 
paration for  American  lives  lost,  so  far  as  reparation 
can  be  made  for  a  needless  destruction  of  human  life 
by  an  illegal  act. 

This  communication  produced  no  formal  reply.  On 
July  12th  the  German  Foreign  Office  delivered  a  memo- 
randum to  Ambassador  Gerard  admitting  that  the 
Nebraskan  had  been  torpedoed  by  a  German  submarine, 
apologizing  for  the  "unfortunate  accident"  and  offering 
to  pay  damages.  Other  incidents  continued  to  show 
Germany's  slight  regard  for  the  American  contentions. 
The  Orduna,  with  twenty-one  American  passengers 
aboard,  was  attacked  by  a  U-boat  on  July  9th.  A 
torpedo  narrowly  missed  her  and  she  was  then  chased 
and  shelled.  The  Leelanaw,  an  American  freighter, 
was  sunk  on  July  25th,  off  the  Orkney  Islands.     She 


[19*51 


The  "Lusitania"  165 


carried  a  contraband  foreign-owned  cargo.  But  the 
destruction  of  the  ship  was,  like  the  destruction  of 
the  William  P.  Frye  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  on  January 
28,  1 91 5,  a  violation  of  a  still  valid  treaty  of  commerce 
and  amity  with  Prussia. 

The  climax  of  German  effrontery  came  on  August 
20th.  The  White  Star  liner  Arabic,  bound  from 
Liverpool  to  New  York,  was  sunk  off  the  coast  of  Ire- 
land. Forty-four  passengers,  of  whom  two  were  Ameri- 
can citizens,  lost  their  lives. 

Ambassador  Bernstorff  made  a  public  statement  on 
August  24th,  serving  notice  that  he  had  asked  the 
American  Government  to  withhold  judgment  on  this 
case.  "If  Americans  should  actually  have  lost  their 
lives,"  he  said,  "  this  would  naturally  be  contrary  to  our 
intentions." 

The  sinking  of  the  Arabic  raised  a  storm  of  indigna- 
tion in  the  United  States.  It  was  partly  allayed  when 
Count  Bernstorff  appeared  at  the  State  Department 
and  submitted  a  memorandum,  conveying  the  informa- 
tion that  his  instructions  in  regard  to  the  third  Lusitania 
note  contained  this  passage: 

Liners  will  not  be  sunk  by  our  submarines  without 
warning  and  without  safety  of  the  lives  of  non- 
combatants,  provided  that  the  liners  do  not  try  to 
escape  or  offer  resistance. 

This  was  a  partial  recognition  of  the  principle  for 
which  the  United  States  was  contending.  In  fact,  the 
German  Government  seemed  disposed  to  use  the  Arabic 
case  as  a  means  of  squaring  the  Lusitania  account. 
On  September  7th  the  Foreign  Office  delivered  a  memo- 
randum to  Ambassador  Gerard  which  said:  "Accord- 


i66  The  Great  War 


[1915] 


ing  to  his  instructions  the  commander  was  not  allowed 
to  attack  the  Arabic  without  warning  and  without 
saving  lives,  unless  the  ship  attempted  to  escape  or 
offered  resistance."  It  argued,  however,  that  the 
commander  might  not  have  exceeded  his  orders,  since 
he  was  convinced  that  the  Arabic  intended  to  ram  him. 
Regret  was  expressed  for  the  loss  of  American  lives  and 
an  offer  was  made  to  send  the  question  of  indemnity 
to  The  Hague  tribunal.  On  October  5th,  however, 
Count  Bernstorff  announced  that  his  government  ad- 
mitted a  departure  from  instructions  and  disavowed 
the  act  of  the  U-boat  commander. 

It  refused,  however,  to  disavow  the  act  of  the  com- 
mander who  sank  the  Lusitania.  Secret  negotiations 
for  the  settlement  of  the  Lusitania  case  continued  into 
1 91 6.  Various  evasive  adjustments  were  discussed. 
But  Germany  would  not  yield  on  the  essential  point — 
the  thrice-repeated  American  demand  for  a  disavowal. 
After  February,  191 6,  Germany  remaining  obdurate, 
the  Lusitania  controversy  was  allowed  to  lapse  into 
oblivion. 

Late  in  191 5  an  issue  arose  with  Austria-Hungary 
over  the  Ancona  case.  On  November  7th  this  Italian 
liner  was  attacked  in  the  Mediterranean  by  an  Austro- 
Hungarian  submarine.  She  tried  to  escape,  and  was 
halted.  Later  she  was  sunk  and  the  boats  to  which 
the  crew  and  passengers  took  were  fired  on.  Nine 
American  passengers  were  drowned.  Ambassador 
Penfield  was  instructed  to  ask  for  an  explanation. 
On  November  14th  the  Austro- Hungarian  Admiralty 
issued  a  statement  exculpating  itself.  The  United 
States  was  not  satisfied  with  this  ex  parte  justifica- 
tion and  on  December  6th  demanded  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the   Dual   Monarchy  "denounce  the  sinking 


[X9*5l 


The  "Lusitania"  167 


as  an  illegal  and  indefensible  act,"  punish  the  U-boat 
commander,  and  offer  reparation. 

Vienna  assumed  a  haughty  tone  at  first,  barely  notic- 
ing the  suggestions  of  the  American  note.  On  Decem- 
ber 19th  our  State  Department  renewed  its  demands. 
Germany  didn't  want  the  submarine  issue  reopened  in 
an  aggravated  form.  She  brought  pressure  to  bear  on 
her  ally.  The  government  at  Vienna  then  reversed 
itself.  On  December  29th  a  note  was  sent  to  the 
United  States,  agreeing  that  the  obligations  of  human- 
ity must  be  lived  up  to,  even  in  war;  accepting  the  prin- 
ciple that  "hostile  private  vessels,  in  so  far  as  they 
do  not  flee  or  offer  resistance,  may  not  be  destroyed 
without  the  persons  on  board  having  been  placed  in 
safety";  announcing  the  punishment  of  the  U-boat 
commander,  and  promising  reparation. 

The  year  ended,  therefore,  with  a  partial  renuncia- 
tion by  both  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  of  the  illegal 
practices  against  which  the  United  States  had  protested. 
This  renunciation  was  insincere,  however,  and  only 
temporary.  Germany  was  building  bigger  U-boats 
and  biding  her  time.  She  intended  to  repudiate  all 
her  promises  to  the  United  States  when  she  got  ready 
for  a  real  campaign  of  submarine  frightfulness. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

VERDUN.       FEBRUARY  21,   I916-DECEMBER  1 6,  I916 

Throughout  191 5  German  strategy  had  been 
crowned  with  complete  success.  It  had  overthrown 
the  military  power  of  Russia  and  extinguished  Serbia 
and  Montenegro.  It  had  created  a  Teuton  Middle 
Europe,  stretching  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea, 
and  the  Bosporus.  It  had  stripped  Russia  of  Poland, 
Courland,  Lithuania,  and  a  part  of  Volhynia.  It  could 
have  annexed  Riga  and  Petrograd,  Salonica  and  Athens, 
in  1 91 6,  if  it  had  cared  to  do  so. 

On  the  Western  Front  it  had  conducted  a  wary  and 
impenetrable  defensive.  Why  did  it  drop  its  easy  and 
profitable  campaigns  in  the  East  and  turn  West  in 
the  winter  and  spring  of  191 6  to  experiment  with  the 
disastrous  offensive  against  Verdun? 

Falkenhayn  may  have  been  unduly  puffed  up  by  his 
victories  in  Galicia,  Poland,  and  the  Balkans.  These 
were  won  against  opponents  weak  in  artillery  and  tech- 
nical appliances  and  inferior — at  least  so  far  as  Russia 
was  concerned — in  fighting  quality  to  the  Allied  forces 
on  the  Western  Front.  Did  Falkenhayn  think  he 
could  stage  another  Dunajec  at  Verdun?  He  repro- 
duced there  all  the  tactical  features  of  Mackensen's 
triumph  over  Radko  Dimitrieff.  The  French,  too, 
were  in  a  more  hazardous  position  than  DimitriefTs 

168 


[I9i6] 


Verdun  169 


army  was,  for  they  had  the  gorge  of  the  Meuse  at  their 
backs.  But  at  Verdun  Falkenhayn  met  an  antagonist 
nearly  as  well  supplied  with  artillery  as  he  was.  The 
picked  German  infantry  encountered  an  infantry  with 
an  endurance  and  tenacity  superior  to  its  own. 

Verdun  was  the  most  intensive  battle  of  the  war. 
It  was  fought  on  a  narrowly  restricted  area,  the  struggle 
for  minute  portions  of  which  was  renewed  again  and 
again.  It  was  a  soldiers'  battle — a  pure  test  of  individ- 
ual grit  and  staying  power.  When  it  ended  France 
had  been  glorified  and  the  indefinable  prestige  of  Ger- 
man arms — a  legacy  of  Sedan  and  Sadowa — had  been 
eclipsed. 

Falkenhayn  attempted  a  break-through  on  the 
Meuse  front.  Because  he  failed  the  German  General 
Staff  minimized  his  strategical  objectives,  saying  that 
he  merely  wanted  to  destroy  the  French  sally-port 
at  Verdun  and  thus  strengthen  the  German  defensive 
positions  in  France.  This  was  plainly  an  afterthought. 
No  German  commander-in-chief  but  Falkenhayn  ever 
worried  about  the  existence  of  the  Verdun  sally-port. 

The  battle  of  Verdun  was  fought  on  both  sides  of 
the  Meuse,  in  the  region  north-east,  north,  and  north- 
west of  the  fortress.  Verdun  lies  in  a  bowl.  The 
heights  of  the  Meuse  rise  abruptly  on  the  east  and 
cut  off  the  river  from  the  plain  of  the  Woevre.  On 
the  opposite  bank  are  hills  and  ridges  which  stretch 
west  and  north-west  toward  the  Argonne.  East  of 
the  Meuse  the  French  line  described  a  semicircle, 
running  from  Brabant,  on  the  river,  about  eleven  miles 
north  of  Verdun,  eight  miles  east  to  Herbebois,  where 
it  bent  to  the  south  to  reach  the  edge  of  the  plain  at 
Ornes.  It  then  curved  through  the  plain  until  it 
touched  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse  again  to  the  south- 


170  The  Great  War  [1916] 

east  of  Verdun.  The  fighting  on  the  east  bank  was 
all  in  the  northern  sector  of  the  semicircle.  The  Ger- 
mans carried  their  attack  across  the  Meuse  after  their 
first  check  on  the  east  bank.  On  the  west  side  the 
righting  front  extended  from  the  mouth  of  Forges 
Brook,  opposite  Brabant,  about  ten  miles  south-west 
to  Malancourt  and  Avocourt.  All  this  area,  on  both 
sides  of  the  river,  had  been  converted  into  a  powerful 
entrenched  camp  by  General  Sarrail  while  he  had  com- 
mand of  the  French  Third  Army  in  the  Meuse- Argonne 
sector. 

The  French  High  Command  expected  a  German 
offensive  in  the  spring  of  191 6.  It  guessed  that  Fal- 
kenhayn  would  try  to  repeat  the  younger  Moltke's 
experiment,  just  as  Ludendorff  was  to  try  to  repeat  it 
in  191 8.  The  lure  of  Paris  was  too  strong  to  be  re- 
sisted by  any  of  the  German  chiefs  of  staff  except 
Hindenburg,  who  was  the  one  consistent  Easterner  at 
German  Grand  Headquarters.  So  during  the  winter 
the  Allied  lines  in  France  were  reorganized  to  meet  the 
anticipated  German  attack. 

The  front  from  Dixmude  down  to  the  Somme  was 
assigned  exclusively  to  the  British  armies,  now  increased 
in  number  to  four.  Above  Dixmude,  connecting  with 
the  right  wing  of  the  Belgian  army,  was  one  French 
corps,  under  General  d'Oissel.  South  of  the  Somme  the 
Sixth  French  Army,  now  under  Fayolle,  prolonged  the 
British  front.  The  northern  French  forces  remained 
under  Foch.  The  central  group  of  armies  stretched 
from  the  Oise  to  the  Meuse.  De  Castelnau,  on  be- 
coming Chief  of  Staff,  had  turned  over  the  command 
of  this  group  to  de  Langle  de  Cary.  The  armies  were 
arranged  from  west  to  east  in  this  order:  the  Fifth, 
under  Micheler,  about  Compiegne;  the  Fourth,  under 


[X9i6]  Verdun  171 

Mazel,  from  Soissons  to  Rheims;  the  Second,  under 
Gouraud,  in  Champagne;  the  Third,  under  Humbert, 
in  the  Argonne.  General  Herr  commanded  the  troops 
in  the  entrenched  camp  of  Verdun. 

Franchet  d'Esperey  had  succeeded  Dubail  at  the 
head  of  the  Eastern  group.  This  comprised  the  First 
Army,  under  Gerard,  below  Verdun;  a  detachment  on 
the  Nancy  front,  under  Deprez;  a  detachment  in  the 
Vosges,  under  Villaret,  and  a  detachment  in  the  Belfort 
sector,  under  Demange. 

But  behind  the  first  line  a  strategic  reserve  of  picked 
troops  had  been  collected.  The  celebrated  Twentieth 
Corps,  the  "Iron  Corps"  of  the  French  army,  was  held 
in  camp  at  Mailly.  An  army  of  four  corps,  all  shock 
units,  was  constituted  under  the  command  of  Petain 
and  stationed  at  Beauvais.  These  forces  awaited  the 
development  of  the  German  offensive. 

Falkenhayn  decided  early  in  the  winter  to  make  his 
main  attempt  at  Verdun.  He  gathered  there,  during 
December  and  January,  enormous  parks  of  heavy  artil- 
lery. His  heavy  pieces  numbered  over  two  thousand. 
They  included  guns  of  210,  280,  305,  380,  and  420 
calibre  (French  measure).  The  front  chosen  for  attack 
was  the  six-mile  sector  north  of  Verdun  from  the 
Meuse,  at  Brabant,  east  to  Herbebois. 

Here  the  offensive  had  obvious  advantages.  For 
while  the  line  to  be  broken  was  short,  permitting  the 
massing  of  shock  infantry,  it  was  also  subject  to  con- 
centric artillery  fire  from  a  front  of  more  than  twenty- 
five  miles.  German  batteries  could  enfilade  it  from  the 
west  side  of  the  Meuse,  as  well  as  from  Spincourt  Forest, 
to  the  east  and  north-east  of  Herbebois.  Although 
the  Verdun  camp  was  one  of  the  strongest  bastions  of 
the  Allied  positions  in  France,  its  outer  trench  line, 


i72  The  Great  War  [19x61 

north-east  of  the  city,  was  as  exposed  a  stretch  as  could 
be  found  anywhere  from  Switzerland  to  the  North  Sea. 

The  German  attack  began  on  February  21,  1916, 
with  a  stupendous  artillery  preparation,  lasting  twenty- 
four  hours.  The  German  shells  razed  woods  and 
villages  and  ploughed  up  the  surface  of  the  whole 
sector  under  bombardment.  The  French  trench 
systems  were  demolished.  The  troops  who  were 
unhurt  remained  under  what  cover  they  could  find, 
dazed  and  stunned.  But  their  resistance  had  not  been 
broken.  When  the  German  shock  waves  advanced, 
on  February  22d,  expecting  to  find  the  front  line  de- 
serted, they  met  stout  opposition  from  units  all  along 
the  front.  Fortunately  the  French  first  line  had  not 
been  heavily  manned,  General  Herr  having  only  a 
force  of  one  hundred  thousand  with  which  to  garrison 
the  entire  camp.  The  losses  from  the  bombardment 
itself  and  from  the  follow-up  infantry  attack  on  the 
northern  sector  were  therefore  comparatively  light. 
Falkenhayn  had  about  three  hundred  thousand  men. 
But  he  could  not  use  a  very  large  proportion  of  them 
on  the  extremely  short  operating  front  which  he  had 
selected. 

On  February  22d  the  German  infantry  occupied 
Haumont,  in  the  centre  of  the  French  line;  Ville  Wood, 
a  little  farther  east ;  a  part  of  Herbebois  and  a  part  of 
the  village  of  La  Wavrille,  at  the  southern  edge  of  Ville 
Wood.  On  February  23d,  they  took  Brabant;  Samo- 
gneux,  on  the  Meuse,  about  two  miles  south  of  Brabant; 
La  Wavrille  and  Hill  344,  the  latter  a  mile  south-east 
of  Samogneux.  This  represented  a  considerable  break- 
through in  the  sector  along  the  Meuse.  On  February 
24th,  the  French  lost  Caures  Wood,  east  of  Ville  Wood, 
to  which  they  had  held  on  stubbornly  for  two  days; 


[19x6]  Verdun  173 

the  Bois  des  Fosses,  a  mile  south  of  Caures  Wood ;  and 
the  village  of  Ornes,  on  the  edge  of  the  Woevre.  To  the 
south  of  Ornes  the  French  advanced  lines  were  with- 
drawn everywhere  from  the  plain  to  the  Heights  of  the 
Meuse. 

The  salient  east  of  Verdun  was  shrinking  rapidly. 
The  French  had  the  river  behind  them,  whose  crossings 
would  be  exposed  to  direct  artillery  fire,  were  the  Ger- 
mans to  make  a  little  more  progress  from  the  north  and 
north-east.  On  the  25th  the  Germans  were  held  up 
on  the  river  sector  at  Champneuville,  south  of  Samo- 
gneux.  But  in  the  centre,  after  a  day  of  bitter  hand- 
to-hand  fighting,  they  reached  the  village  of  Douau- 
mont  and  penetrated  into  the  old  Fort  de  Douaumont, 
one  of  the  principal  links  in  the  girdle  of  fortifications 
on  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse. 

The  fort  had  been  evacuated  by  the  French.  It 
was  occupied  by  a  Brandenburg  regiment,  which  soon 
found  itself  practically  marooned  there.  But  its  capture 
was  made  the  occasion  of  triumphant  announcement 
by  the  Kaiser,  that  the  corner-stone  of  the  permanent 
defence  system  of  Verdun  had  been  shattered  by  his 
faithful  Brandenburgers. 

This  telegram  was  a  rash  anticipation  of  a  victory 
which  never  materialized.  The  situation  looked  dark 
for  the  French  on  the  evening  of  February  24th.  Up  to 
that  time  the  garrison  on  the  right  bank  had  been  left 
to  its  own  resources.  It  remains  an  open  question 
whether  or  not  General  de  Langle  de  Cary  had  or  had 
not  actually  made  preparations  for  abandoning  Verdun 
and  withdrawing  all  his  forces  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse.  However  that  may  have  been,  a  final  decision 
to  stay  and  fight  it  out  on  the  east  bank  was  reached 
by  the  24th. 


174  The  Great  War  [1916] 

General  de  Castelnau,  the  French  Chief  of  Staff,  ar- 
rived in  Verdun  on  February  25th.  He  brought  with 
him  much  needed  reinforcements.  The  Twentieth 
Corps  left  its  camp  at  Mailly  on  the  24th  and  on  the 
25th  was  thrown  into  the  fight  about  Douaumont. 
A  little  later  the  First  Army  Corps,  under  General 
Guillaumat,  arrived  and  was  put  in,  on  February  26th, 
on  the  left  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  barring  the  German 
advance  in  the  sector  between  the  Meuse  and  the 
Haudromont  Farm,  north-west  of  Douaumont.  In 
the  next  two  days  there  was  a  continuous  struggle  for 
footing  on  the  Douaumont  front.  Every  German 
attack  was  met  by  a  French  counter-attack.  Neither 
side  gained  ground.  The  dismantled  Fort  de  Douau- 
mont was  left  in  German  hands.  The  village  of 
Douaumont,  west  of  the  fort,  was  abandoned  by  both 
combatants. 

De  Castelnau  had  brought  with  him  on  February 
25th  General  Petain,  who  at  once  displaced  General 
Herr  as  commander  of  the  Verdun  garrison.  This 
extraordinary  soldier  infused  new  vigour  into  the  de- 
fence. He  introduced  the  policy  of  relentless  counter- 
attack, under  which  the  Germans  were  held  down  to 
local  gains,  made  at  a  huge  cost  and,  as  a  rule,  quickly 
nullified.  With  his  and  de  Castelnau' s  arrival  the 
crisis  of  the  first  stage  of  the  battle  passed. 

The  Germans  had  gained  considerable  ground  in  the 
northern  half  of  the  Verdun  salient,  east  of  the  Meuse. 
They  had  taken  ten  thousand  prisoners  and  eighty 
guns.  They  had  made  a  barren  prize  of  Fort  de 
Douaumont .  But  they  were  still  far  from  their  primary 
objective,  which  was  the  French  second  line  of  defence 
on  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse.  Petain  had  stopped  their 
first  and  most  dangerous  rush.     It  was  now  only  a 


[i9i6]  Verdun  175 

question  of  wearing  out  an  offensive  which  had  lost 
its  surprise  character  and  its  initial  chance  of  success. 

There  was  a  lull  in  the  fighting  on  February  29th 
and  March  1st.  On  March  2d  a  new  effort  was  made 
by  the  Germans  on  the  front  from  Douaumont  south- 
east to  Vaux.  The  assaults  were  continued  until 
March  4th  and  spread  around  to  the  west  of  Douaumont. 
But  the  results  were  barren.  The  offensive  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  Meuse  had  been  definitely  halted. 
Falkenhayn  now  decided  to  turn  his  attention  to  the 
west  bank. 

A  German  advance  on  that  side  was  made  necessary 
by  the  fact  that  the  French  artillery  on  Goose  Hill  and 
other  elevations  west  of  the  Meuse  was  now  able  to 
enfilade  the  advanced  German  lines  on  the  east  side, 
thus  seriously  hindering  operations  against  the  Cdte 
de  Talou  and  Pepper  Hill,  which  guarded  the  ap- 
proaches to  Douaumont  from  the  north-west.  On 
the  west  bank  the  original  French  position  stretched 
west  along  Forges  Brook  to  Bethincourt  and  then 
south-west  to  Malancourt,  Avocourt,  and  the  Forest 
of  Hesse. 

On  March  2d  the  Germans  began  to  bombard  the 
French  lines  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river.  The  artil- 
lery preparation  lasted  four  days.  The  infantry  attack 
opened  in  a  snow-storm,  on  the  morning  of  March  6th. 
The  French  front  line  was  lightly  held  and  the  troops 
could  only  hope  to  delay  the  progress  of  the  heavy 
German  storming  columns.  Two  German  divisions 
took  Forges  village  and  pushed  south  to  seize  Goose 
Hill  Ridge.  At  the  eastern  end  of  the  ridge  Regneville 
was  captured.  The  Germans  also  penetrated  to  the 
Bois  des  Corbeaux  (Crow  Wood)  before  sundown  on 
the  6th. 


176  The  Great  War  [1916] 

Hill  265,  an  outpost  north  of  Goose  Hill  Ridge,  was 
taken  on  the  afternoon  of  March  7th.  The  Crow  Wood 
and  Cumieres  Wood  were  cleared  later  in  the  evening. 
Then  Petain  resorted  to  his  favourite  method  of  counter- 
attack. Cumieres  Wood  was  retaken  on  March  8th, 
with  a  part  of  Crow  Wood.  The  latter  was  recaptured 
in  its  entirety  on  March  9th.  The  next  day  the  Ger- 
mans re-ejected  the  French  from  Crow  Wood  and  failed 
in  an  attack  south  of  Bethincourt.  Then  the  battle 
on  the  west  bank  died  down.  The  Germans  had  pushed 
the  French  back  west  of  the  Meuse,  so  that  their  lines 
on  both  sides  of  the  river  now  ran  on  the  same  level. 
Up  to  the  end  of  this  phase  of  the  battle  the  German 
communiques  claimed  the  capture  of  about  twenty-five 
thousand  French  prisoners. 

Prudence  would  have  counselled  Falkenhayn  to  drop 
his  offensive  at  this  point.  He  had  won  a  considerable 
local  success — equal  to  the  French  success  in  Cham- 
pagne in  September  and  October,  191 5.  And  he  had 
nearly  exhausted  the  possibilities  of  an  operation 
against  Verdun;  for  the  French  had  concentrated 
ample  reserves  there  and  were  nearly  as  strong  in 
artillery  as  he  was.  But  he  had  risked  his  personal 
reputation  and  his  future  as  chief  of  the  General  Staff 
on  a  grandiose  break-through  like  that  at  the  Dunajec. 
He  therefore  decided  to  go  on  with  a  venture  which, 
in  a  military  sense,  had  lost  its  promise. 

The  battle  of  Verdun  from  March  nth  on  was  a 
series  of  deadly  local  engagements  for  hills,  woods, 
villages,  and  scraps  of  ground,  where  progress  or  reces- 
sion was  measured  in  yards.  It  marked  a  final  stage 
in  the  warfare  of  mere  attrition.  It  was  a  gruelling 
and  ghastly  test  of  morale  in  which  the  element  of 
military  science  was  reduced  to  a  minimum.     And 


[xqi6]  Verdun  177 

from  that  test,  so  cruel  and  so  searching,  Germany 
emerged  an  unqualified  loser. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse  the  struggle  spread 
farther  and  farther  to  the  west.  Unable  to  take 
Goose  Ridge,  Falkenhayn  directed  his  attack  on  March 
14th  against  Hill  265,  south  of  Bethincourt.  This 
was  the  northern  crest  of  the  famous  Dead  Man's  Hill, 
the  southern  one  being  marked  on  the  maps  as  295. 
It  fell.  But  295  still  commanded  it.  On  March  20th 
the  Germans,  coming  south-east  from  the  direction  of 
Montfaucon,  penetrated  the  Avocourt  Wood,  trying 
to  reach  from  the  west  Hill  304,  which  commanded 
Dead  Man's  Hill  proper.  The  French  then  evacuated 
Malancourt,  which  was  becoming  isolated.  Early  in 
April  the  French  lost  Haucourt.  But  they  held  on  to 
Hill  304.  On  April  9th,  10th,  and  1  ith  a  general  attack 
was  delivered  on  the  whole  French  front  west  of  the 
Meuse,  from  Goose  Hill  to  Avocourt.  It  failed  with 
enormous  losses. 

On  April  30th  Petain  was  promoted  to  command  the 
central  group  of  armies,  replacing  de  Langle  de  Cary. 
General  Nivelle  assumed  command  in  the  Verdun 
sector. 

In  May  the  operations  on  the  west  bank  reached 
their  climax.  Four  separate  assaults  were  made  on  the 
French  positions — on  May  7th-8th,  May  20th,  May 
23d-May  25th,  and  May  29th.  The  net  result  of  these 
was  that  the  French  lost  Cumieres  Wood,  Caurettes 
Wood,  part  of  Hill  304,  and  all  but  the  southern  slope  of 
Dead  Man's  Hill.  Thereafter  fighting  on  the  west  bank 
lapsed  back  to  the  customary  inertia  of  trench  warfare. 

On  the  east  bank  Falkenhayn's  efforts  had  been 
equally  violent  and,  in  the  large  sense,  equally  fruitless. 
Early  in  March,  the  Germans  had  extended  the  front 

12 


178  The  Great  War  [1916] 

of  their  attack  south-east  from  Douaumont  to  Vaux 
Village  and  Fort  de  Vaux.  The  village  lay  in  a  ravine, 
running  east  and  west,  and  the  fort  on  a  hill  to  the 
south  of  it.  They  were  a  little  more  than  a  mile  dis- 
tant from  Fort  de  Douaumont.  On  March  8th  German 
infantry  entered  the  village,  but  were  expelled  by  a 
counter-attack.  On  March  ioth  they  regained  a  foot- 
ing in  the  village  and  tried  vainly  to  storm  the  fort. 
Another  unsuccessful  attack  was  made  on  the  fort 
on  March  16th.  On  March  30th  the  Germans  in 
great  force  drove  past  Vaux  Village  into  and  through 
Caillette  Wood,  which  lies  just  south  of  Fort  de  Douau- 
mont. They  were  expelled  without  delay  by  the  French. 
On  April  18th  a  formidable  assault  was  launched  against 
Pepper  Ridge,  at  the  other  end  of  the  line,  close  to  the 
Meuse.     It  was  repelled  with  great  slaughter. 

General  Nivelle  undertook  his  first  counter-offensive 
on  May  226..  It  was  preceded  by  a  two  days'  bombard- 
ment of  the  Douaumont  front.  Six  divisions  parti- 
cipated in  it.  The  infantry  reached  and  penetrated 
Fort  de  Douaumont,  but  did  not  succeed  in  expelling 
all  the  garrison.  After  two  days  the  Germans  struck 
back  and  recovered  the  fort.  Then  the  German  of- 
fensive was  resumed.  Fort  de  Vaux  was  its  objective. 
This  work  was  cut  off  on  the  north  and  west  by  the 
recapture  of  Vaux  Village  and  was  approached  from 
the  south-east  through  the  village  of  Damloup,  taken 
early  in  June.  On  June  7th  the  garrison  surrendered, 
after  a  magnificent  defence. 

Falkenhayn  had  now  opened  a  breach  in  the  main 
girdle  of  forts,  north-east  of  Verdun.  His  next  objec- 
tive was  Fort  de  Souville,  two  miles  south-west  of  Fort 
de  Vaux  and  about  three  miles  directly  south  of  Fort 
de  Douaumont.     The  approach  to  it  from  the  north 


[i9i6]  Verdun  179 

was  through  Thiaumont  Redoubt  and  Fleury  Village 
and  from  the  north-east  across  Damloup  Redoubt 
and  Le  Chenois  and  La  Lauf6e  Woods.  Thiaumont 
Redoubt  and  Fleury  were  taken  by  the  Germans  in 
June  but  were  subsequently  lost  again  to  the  French. 
The  fighting  on  this  narrow  sector  continued  through 
July  and  August,  with  changing  fortunes.  But  with 
the  beginning  of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme,  on  July  ist, 
all  serious  thought  of  pressing  the  campaign  for  Verdun 
was  abandoned. 

From  February  to  July  Falkenhayn  had  gained  about 
130  miles  of  nearly  valueless  territory.  He  had  lost 
from  250,000  to  300,000  men,  had  failed  utterly  to 
break  the  French  front,  or  even  to  close  the  "  sally- 
port'* of  Verdun.  He  had  made  his  own  deposition 
as  Chief  of  Staff  inevitable. 

The  trifling  value  of  the  territorial  gains  he  had  put 
to  his  credit  was  soon  to  be  demonstrated.  On  October 
24th  General  Nivelle  launched  his  second  counter- 
offensive  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Meuse.  It  was  pre- 
ceded by  slight  artillery  preparation  and  was  strikingly 
successful.  Nivelle  broke  through  the  German  lines  on 
a  four-mile  front  to  a  depth  of  two  miles.  He  retook 
Douaumont  village,  Fort  de  Douaumont,  Thiaumont 
Redoubt,  and  Haudromont  quarries.  Six  thousand 
Germans  were  made  prisoners.  Fort  de  Vaux,  which 
had  been  enveloped,  was  evacuated  by  the  enemy.  On 
November  5th  Vaux  and  Damloup  villages  were  retaken. 

On  December  nth  Nivelle  was  appointed  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  all  the  French  armies  on  the  West- 
ern Front.  On  December  I5th-i6th  General  Mangin, 
who  succeeded  to  the  command  in  the  Verdun  sector, 
enlarged  Nivelle' s  success.  After  an  intense  artillery 
preparation  he  carried  the  German  first-line  trenches, 


180  The  Great  War  [1916] 

on  a  front  of  six  miles  and  a  quarter,  advancing 
nearly  two  miles.  Eighty  guns  were  captured  and 
11,400  prisoners.  Vacherauville,  Louvemont,  Bezon- 
vaux,  and  apart  of  Caurieres  Wood  were  recovered  and 
the  Germans  were  pushed  well  back  toward  the  French 
positions  two  days  after  the  battle  began.  Later  the 
old  lines  were  restored  in  their  entirety. 

Long  before  this,  however,  Falkenhayn  had  paid 
the  penalty  of  the  colossal  fiasco  on  the  Meuse.  On 
August  28, 1916,  he  was  demoted  as  Chief  of  the  German 
General  Staff,  Hindenburg  taking  his  place. 


CHAPTER  XX 

RUSSIA'S  LAST  REAL  OFFENSIVE.      JANUARY   I,   I916- 
SEPTEMBER   I,    I916 

Russia  never  recovered  from  the  defeats  of  191 5. 
They  shattered  the  military  power  of  the  Empire. 
But  their  effects  were  for  a  long  time  hidden.  Russia 
remained  a  factor  in  the  war  all  through  1916.  The 
armies  seemed  to  recover  their  morale.  The  Russian 
military  leaders  had  lost  none  of  their  zeal  and  con- 
fidence and  continued  to  work  in  co-ordination — in  the 
slight  degree  to  which  that  was  possible — with  the 
general  staffs  of  the  Western  Entente  states. 

In  the  winter  months  of  1 916  the  Grand  Duke  Nicho- 
las won  some  notable  victories  in  the  Caucasus.  The 
greater  part  of  Armenia  was  wrested  from  Turkey. 
General  Brusiloff's  summer  campaign  repeated  to  some 
extent  the  successes  achieved  in  19 14  against  the  Austro- 
Hungarians.  But  when  these  two  operations  were  over 
Russia  had  shot  her  bolt. 

The  war  had  been  brought  closer  to  the  people  in 
191 5  and  19 16.  This  was  because  the  interior  ad- 
ministration had  broken  down  and  war  activities — the 
care  of  the  wounded,  the  provisioning  and  clothing  of 
the  troops,  and  the  direction  of  war  industries — had 
to  be  taken  over  by  volunteer  organizations,  and  local 
political  bodies,  like  the  zemstvos.     This  democratiza- 

181 


1 82  The  Great  War  [1916] 

tion  of  the  war  undermined  the  old  imperial  system.  It 
aroused  revolutionary  sentiment.  The  Duma,  hitherto 
a  debating  society,  began  to  look  ahead  to  assuming 
real  power. 

Nicholas  II  was  personally  strongly  pro-Ally  and 
pro- war.  But  he  was  not  his  own  master  in  matters 
of  domestic  politics.  His  wife,  a  German  princess 
by  birth  and  intensely  interested  in  the  preservation 
of  the  Romanoff  dynasty,  saw  safety  for  it  only  in  the 
early  conclusion  of  a  separate  peace  with  Germany. 
Her  fears  were  played  on  by  reactionary  politicians 
and  her  superstitions  made  her  an  easy  victim  of 
mystical  impostors  like  Rasputin,  who  was  a  tool  of 
the  reactionaries  and  the  strong  pro-German  elements 
at  the  Russian  court. 

The  Czarina  was  responsible  for  the  appointment 
of  Sturmer,  the  anti-Entente  Premier,  and  of  Protopo- 
poff ,  an  enemy  of  the  Duma  and  of  liberalism  of  any 
sort. 

If  Russia  had  been  successful  in  the  field,  the  mon- 
archy could  have  maintained  itself  with  the  masses. 
But  the  great  retreat  of  1915  and  the  enormous  losses 
of  the  armies  had  shaken  its  prestige.  Russia  was 
therefore  drifting  toward  a  crisis  in  domestic  politics. 
And  the  imperial  administration  was  becoming  more 
and  more  associated  in  the  public  mind  with  a  policy 
of  internal  repression  and  of  peace  at  any  price  with 
Germany. 

This  attitude  could  not  be  long  persisted  in  without 
destroying  popular  faith  in  the  government  and  the 
dynasty  and  provoking  revolution.  Yet  the  military 
power  of  the  Empire  was  wrapped  up  in  the  survival 
of  the  old  regime.  It  was  the  only  regime  which  could 
control  the  armies  and  maintain  the  Entente  Alliance. 


fi9i6]      Russia's  Last  Real  Offensive      183 

When  the  Empire  fell  the  armies  became  at  first  de- 
moralized and  then  uncontrollable.  But  even  toward 
the  end  of  191 6  the  Russian  military  machine  had 
begun  to  run  down. 

In  January  the  Russian  western  front  was  reorgan- 
ized. The  Czar  remained  Commander-in-Chief,  with 
General  Alexieff  as  Chief  of  Staff.  The  armies  were 
divided  into  three  groups.  Those  on  the  northern 
sector,  from  Riga  to  Dvinsk,  were  put  under  Kuropat- 
kin,  Commander-in-Chief  in  the  war  with  Japan.  The 
second  group,  from  Dvinsk  to  the  Pripet,  was  entrusted 
to  General  Evert.  The  third,  from  the  Pripet  to  the 
Dniester,  was  given  to  Brusiloff,  perhaps  the  most 
aggressive  of  all  the  Russian  commanders.  An  in- 
dependent army,  under  Lechitsky,  faced  the  Bukowina 
border. 

The  German  forces  were  also  divided  into  three 
groups:  the  northern,  under  Hindenburg;  the  central, 
under  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria,  and  the  southern 
under  the  Archduke  Joseph-Ferdinand.  The  last  group 
alone  contained  Austro-Hungarian  contingents. 

On  December  28,  191 5,  Lechitsky  had  begun  an 
offensive  against  Czernowitz,  the  capital  of  Bukowina. 
He  got  within  gun  range  of  the  city,  but  was  held  up 
there  by  the  Austro-Hungarians.  After  three  weeks 
of  stubborn  fighting,  he  broke  off  the  attack.  His 
losses  amounted  to  sixty  thousand  men. 

Another  winter  operation — more  ambitious  in  scope 
— was  attempted  on  the  northern  front  in  March.  It 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  demonstration  to  relieve  German 
pressure  at  Verdun. 

General  Gourko  says  that  the  Russians  had  available 
for  artillery  preparation  not  more  than  one  hundred  guns, 
mostly  6-inch  types  taken  from  the  fortresses  of  Kovno 


1 84  The  Great  War  [1916] 

and  Grodno.  There  were  munitions  enough  for  only  a 
short  day's  bombardment.  The  sector  chosen  for  the 
attack  was  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Dvina  River,  south 
of  Dvinsk.  In  the  region  between  Lake  Driswiaty  and 
Lake  Naroch,  Kuropatkin  expended  his  ammunition 
on  March  1 7th  without  destroying  the  German  machine- 
gun  shelters.  The  infantry  advanced  on  the  18th  and 
was  cut  to  pieces.  Other  engagements  were  fought 
along  the  Dvina  front,  both  above  and  below  Dvinsk. 
The  Germans  were  everywhere  superior  in  artillery 
and  machine  guns  and  Kuropatkin  paid  excessively 
for  immaterial  territorial  gains  on  a  100-mile  line. 
An  «early  thaw  also  interfered  with  his  operations. 
On  March  28th  the  offensive  ended  with  a  loss  of  about 
140,000  men. 

Undiscouraged  by  these  early  set-backs,  the  Russian 
General  Staff  went  ahead  with  preparations  for  a 
summer  offensive,  to  be  opened  about  July  1st,  con- 
jointly with  Anglo-French  offensive  on  the  Somme. 
The  main  attack  was  to  be  made  on  the  Vilna  sector, 
with  secondary  demonstrations  on  the  northern  and 
southern  fronts.  But  in  May,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
offensive  in  the  Trentino  seemed  to  be  sweeping  the 
Italians  back  into  the  plain  of  Venetia,  and  Italy 
urgently  requested  Russia  to  come  to  her  rescue  by 
making  an  attack  on  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces  in 
Galicia  and  Bukowina.  To  meet  this  emergency  ap- 
peal, the  Russian  General  Staff  recast  its  offensive 
plans.  The  date  of  the  opening  of  the  summer  offensive 
was  advanced  a  month  and  the  projected  Brusiloff 
demonstration  on  the  south  front  was  converted  into 
a  major  offensive.  Supplies  concentrated  behind  Vilna 
had  to  be  transferred  to  Volhynia  and  an  army — that  of 
Lesh — was  shifted  from  Evert's  group  to  Brusiloff's. 


[i9i6]       Russia's  Last  Real  Offensive      185 

Brusiloff  then  had  four  armies  directly  under  him 
— Lesh's,  Kaledin's,  SakharofFs,  and  ScherbatchefTs — 
with  Lechitsky's  co-operating  on  the  extreme  left 
wing.  These  five  armies  were  over  one  million  strong, 
while  Archduke  Joseph-Ferdinand's  armies  numbered 
probably  less  than  eight  hundred  thousand.  The 
situation  was  almost  an  exact  counterpart  of  that  in 
August-September,  1914,  before  Lemberg. 

BrusilofTs  front  stretched  for  two  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  south  from  the  Pripet  Marshes  to  the  Pruth  River, 
east  of  Czernowitz.  He  was  moderately  well  supplied 
with  munitions  and  had  large  reserves  of  men.  He 
also  profited  enormously  from  the  fact  that  the  depleted 
Austro-Hungarian  armies  facing  him  were  unprepared 
for  an  attack. 

The  offensive  started  on  June  3d,  with  a  preparatory 
bombardment.  It  had  its  greatest  initial  success  in 
the  Volhynian  sector,  west  of  Rovno.  Rovno  stood  at 
the  apex  of  the  triangle  of  fortresses — Rovno,  Dubno, 
and  Lutsk — which  guarded  Kiev  from  an  invasion 
coming  north-east  out  of  Galicia.  The  two  western 
anchor  points  of  the  triangle  had  fallen  to  the  Germans 
in  the  last  days  of  the  retreat  of  191 5.  From  Rovno 
a  railroad  ran  south-west  through  Dubno  to  Lemberg. 
Another  railroad,  running  north-west  to  Kovel  and 
Brest-Litovsk,  passed  close  to  Lutsk.  Kovel  and 
Lemberg  were  BrusilofTs  two  objectives.  They  were 
joined  by  a  north  and  south  railroad  which  it  was  his 
purpose  to  cut. 

The  advance  west  from  Kovno  carried  everything 
before  it.  Two  Austro-Hungarian  divisions,  composed 
mostly  of  Czechs  and  other  Slavic  elements,  were 
encountered  on  the  enemy's  first  line.  They  cheer- 
fully surrendered  and  a  wide  gap  was  opened  through 


i86  The  Great  War  fi9i6] 

which  Kaledin's  Eighth  Army  poured.  On  the  first 
two  days  the  advance  covered  twenty  miles.  On  June 
6th  the  Russians  entered  Lutsk,  which  the  Archduke 
Joseph-Ferdinand  had  hastily  abandoned,  leaving 
behind  him  valuable  stores  and  thousands  of  wounded 
soldiers.  Dubno  was  now  threatened  with  envelop- 
ment from  the  north.  The  Austrians  evacuated  it  on 
June  ioth. 

The  Russian  armies  spread  out  to  the  west  of  the 
triangle  of  fortresses.  North-west  of  Rovno  the  town 
of  Kolki,  on  the  Styr  River,  was  reached  and,  a  little 
farther  south  and  west,  the  town  of  Svidniki,  on  the 
Stokhod  River,  about  fifteen  miles  south-east  of  Kovel. 
Directly  west  of  Lutsk  the  Russians  advanced  twenty- 
five  miles,  to  Zaturtsy,  a  little  more  than  twenty  miles 
from  Vladimir- Volynski,  on  the  Kovel-Lemberg  rail- 
road. Farther  south  they  reached  a  point  less  than 
fifteen  miles  from  the  railway.  These  gains  were 
made  between  June  17th  and  23d.  Pushing  south- 
west from  Dubno,  Kaledin's  troops  covered  thirty 
miles  in  six  days,  reaching  the  Galician  frontier  on  June 
1 6th.  The  Eighth  Army  had  driven  a  wedge  fifty 
miles  deep  into  the  Austrian  lines  and  had  captured 
seventy  thousand  prisoners  and  eighty-three  guns. 

SakharofFs  Eleventh  Army,  on  Kaledin's  left,  was 
much  less  successful.  It  failed  to  break  the  lines  held 
by  the  Bavarian  army,  under  General  Count  Bothmer, 
west  of  Tarnopol.  Scherbatcheff's  Seventh  Army,  on 
SakharofTs  left,  advanced  into  south-eastern  Galicia, 
carried  the  Austrian  positions,  and  on  June  8th  captured 
Buczacz,  on  the  Strypa  River. 

To  Lechitsky's  Ninth  Army,  on  the  extreme  left, 
was  assigned  the  task  of  recovering  Bukowina.  This 
it  accomplished  in  a  brilliant  manner.     A  passage  of 


[i9i61 


Russia's  Last  Real  Offensive      187 


the  Dniester  was  forced  on  June  4th  and  the  Austro- 
Hungarians  were  badly  defeated  on  June  nth  at 
Dobronovtse,  between  the  Dniester  and  the  Pruth, 
eighteen  thousand  prisoners  being  captured.  Sniatyn 
fell  on  June  13th  and  on  the  same  day  Lechitsky 
arrived  on  the  Pruth,  opposite  Czernowitz.  On  June 
1 6th  the  Pruth  was  crossed.  Czernowitz  fell  the  next 
day.  Lechitsky  had  captured  up  to  that  date  37,832 
men  and  49  guns. 

The  Austro-Hungarians  in  Bukowina  were  now  in 
full  retreat  toward  the  Carpathian  passes.  Cossack 
cavalry  overran  the  crownland  between  June  18th 
and  26th.  On  June  23d  they  reached  Kimpolung,  on 
the  Rumanian  border,  and  then  spread  west  toward 
the  Transylvanian  passes. 

Bukowina  having  been  cleared,  Lechitsky  turned 
north-west  into  Galicia,  aiming  at  the  Jablonitsa  Pass, 
through  which  a  railroad  runs  from  the  Hungarian 
plain  to  Kolomea,  and  thence  north  to  Lemberg.  The 
retreating  Austro-Hungarians  tried  to  make  a  stand 
before  Kolomea,  but  were  routed,  with  a  loss  of  10,500 
prisoners.  The  Russians  entered  Kolomea  on  June 
28th.  On  July  8th  Delatyn,  in  the  foothills  just  north 
of  the  Jablonitsa  Pass,  was  seized  and  the  approaches 
from  the  Galician  side  were  secured.  This  pass  and 
the  other  Carpathian  passes  to  the  south  were  intended 
to  be  used  by  the  Russians  to  invade  Hungary  and 
Transylvania  in  co-operation  with  the  Rumanians, 
after  Rumania  should  enter  the  war.  Lechitsky  now 
suspended  operations.  He  had  taken,  since  June  4th, 
69,000  prisoners  and  sixty-seven  guns. 

The  Brusiloff  offensive  was  a  staggering  blow  to 
Austria-Hungary.  It  compelled  an  abandonment  of 
the  campaign  against  Italy.     Men  and  big  guns  began 


1 88  The  Great  War  [19161 

to  flow  back  from  the  Tyrol  to  Galicia.  German  aid 
was  also  summoned.  Hindenburg  sent  several  divi- 
sions down  from  the  north  and  four  were  shifted  to 
the  Eastern  Front  from  France.  The  Austrian  High 
Command  had  made  the  mistake  of  thinking  that 
Russia  was  incapable  of  another  real  offensive.  It 
had  stripped  the  Galician  and  Bukowina  fronts  in 
order  to  conquer  Northern  Italy.  Now  it  had  to 
pay  in  men,  territory,  and  prestige  for  a  glaring 
error  of  judgment. 

Reinforcements  in  the  Lutsk  sector  enabled  the 
Germans  to  turn  after  June  1 6th  and  recover  a  few 
miles  of  territory.  But  on  July  4th  Lesh's  army,  on 
Kaledin's  right,  began  a  movement  west  toward  the 
Stokhod  River  line.  In  three  days  it  reached  the 
river — an  advance  of  thirty  miles.  There  the  Rus- 
sians were  held  up  by  German  troops  and  suffered 
heavy  losses  trying  to  clear  the  Stokhod  barrier. 
Between  June  28th  and  August  3d,  Lesh,  with  Kale- 
din's  assistance,  got  across  the  river  at  several 
points.  But  the  German  line  held.  Kovel,  the  main 
Russian  objective  in  this  region,  was  never  seriously 
threatened. 

South  of  Lutsk,  however,  Sakharoff's  army  got  in 
motion  again  on  July  16th.  It  stormed  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  trenches  at  Shklin  (eighteen  miles  south- 
west of  Lutsk),  capturing  13,000  prisoners.  The 
Austro-Hungarians  fell  back  to  the  Lipa  River.  There 
Sakharoff,  on  July  20th-22d,  again  defeated  the  disor- 
ganized enemy  and  took  12,000  prisoners.  A  third 
engagement  gave  him  the  town  of  Brody,  and  14,000 
prisoners.  Turning  south,  the  Eleventh  Russian  Army 
now  brought  up  on  the  flank  of  Bothmer's  Bavarians, 
who  had  been  holding  Scherbatcheff  in  check,  west  of 


[i9i6]      Russia's  Last  Real  Offensive      189 

Tarnopol.  Bothmer  was  forced  to  retreat  to  the  line 
up  the  Zlota-Lipa  River. 

About  the  same  time  Scherbatcheff  and  Lechitsky 
turned  Bothmer's  southern  flank.  Joining  forces  on 
August  7th  they  pushed  north-west  toward  Stanislau, 
which  city  was  evacuated  by  the  enemy  on  August  ioth. 
Lechitsky  then  cleared  all  the  district  between  Stanislau 
and  the  Carpathians,  while  Scherbatcheff  pushed  north- 
west to  Mariampol,  which  he  occupied  on  August  13th. 
Up  to  that  date  he  had  captured  56,421  prisoners. 
In  the  first  week  of  September  he  broke  Bothmer's 
line  on  the  Zlota-Lipa  at  Brzezany  and  almost  reached 
Halicz.  Early  in  August  Hindenburg  was  put  in 
charge  of  the  Eastern  Front  from  Riga  down  to  Tarno- 
pol. He  borrowed  several  Turkish  divisions  and  gave 
them  to  Bothmer.  With  these  troops  the  latter  began 
to  counter-attack  in  Galicia.  These  counter-attacks 
marked  the  end  of  the  last  phase  of  the  Brusiloff  offen- 
sive. 

The  results  of  the  drive  had  exceeded  the  most 
sanguine  Allied  expectations.  The  Teuton  Eastern 
Front  had  been  broken  on  a  stretch  of  310  miles,  to 
a  depth  of  from  twenty  to  fifty  miles.  Bukowina  and 
south-eastern  Galicia  had  been  reconquered.  A  con- 
nection with  Rumania  along  the  Carpathians  had  been 
established.  Nearly  four  hundred  thousand  prisoners 
were  taken  and  405  guns.  The  Austro-Hungarian  and 
German  losses  -vere  probably  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
a  million. 

But  the  Russian  losses  were  also  enormous.  The 
offensive  stopped  because  Russia  had  nearly  exhausted 
her  munitions  stocks  and  had  worn  down  her  best 
armies.  She  would  never  be  capable  again  of  an 
effort   like   Brusiloff's.     Her   intervention   had   saved 


190  The  Great  War  [1916] 

Italy.  But  it  had  disabled  her  from  playing  a  similar 
role  when  Rumania  entered  the  war  in  the  fall  of  1916 
and  found  herself  facing  a  fate  like  Serbia's.  Russia 
had  established  a  satisfactory  contact  with  Rumania. 
But  when  the  time  came  to  join  the  Rumanians  in  an 
invasion  of  Hungary,  Russian  power  to  break  through 
the  Carpathian  barrier  had  vanished. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE  SOMME.      JULY    I,    I916-NOVEMBER   1 8,    I916 

France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia  had  agreed  to 
start  a  two-front  offensive  on  July  1,  1916.  As  has 
been  noted,  the  opening  date  of  the  Russian  offensive 
was  advanced  to  June  1st,  in  order  to  help  out  the 
Italians.  Germany  had  sought  to  derange  the  Franco- 
British  plans  by  striking  for  Verdun.  Nevertheless, 
when  July  1st  came,  the  French  and  British  began 
their  scheduled  operation,  which  was  to  develop  into 
the  longest,  stubbornest,  and  most  sanguinary  battle 
of  the  war. 

Probably  it  would  have  taken  a  more  definite  char- 
acter as  an  effort  on  a  grand  scale  to  break  through 
and  roll  up  the  German  positions  in  Northern  France, 
if  the  French  had  not  been  obliged  to  commit  them- 
selves so  deeply  at  Verdun.  Joffre  used  only  one  army 
in  the  first  stages  of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme.  That 
was  Fayolle's,  the  westernmost  of  the  group  in  the 
sector  from  Soissons  to  Amiens,  now  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Foch.  Micheler's  army,  formerly 
attached  to  the  central  group,  was  not  employed  until 
September.  Humbert's  did  not  take  part  in  the  battle, 
as  it  undoubtedly  would  have  done,  if  the  French  effort 
had  not  been  circumscribed  by  the  drain  of  the  long 
struggle  on  the  Meuse.     France  needed  to  economize 

191 


192  The  Great  War 


[1916] 


on  men  and  wisely  adopted  a  policy  of  limited  offensives 
in  1916  and  1917* 

The  British  "New  Army"  had,  however,  rounded 
into  battle  form.  It  was  now  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the 
western  offensive,  testing  its  training  and  quality  against 
seasoned  German  troops.  A  Fourth  Army  had  been 
organized  and  put  under  the  command  of  Sir  Henry 
Rawlinson.  It  was  stationed  on  the  right  of  the  Third 
Army,  organized  in  the  summer  of  191 5.  Its  front 
extended  south  from  Gommecourt  nearly  to  the  Somme. 
The  arrival  of  the  Third  Army  had  enabled  Joffre  to 
transfer  the  Second  French  Army  to  Champagne,  in 
September,  19 15.  The  arrival  of  the  Fourth  had  made 
possible  the  withdrawal  from  the  northern  sectors  of 
many  French  divisions  which  were  needed  in  the  spring 
of  19 1 6,  at  Verdun.  For  the  Somme  operation  the 
strength  of  the  Fourth  Army  was  raised  to  five  corps. 
Two  of  these  were  constituted  a  separate  command 
under  General  Gough,  operating  on  Rawlinson's  left. 
Gough's  left  was  supported  by  Allenby's  Third  Army. 

Although  the  Allied  commanders  disclaimed  any  large 
strategical  objective  (preferring  to  say  that  the  bat- 
tle was  fought  for  the  purpose  of  wearing  down  the 
enemy  and  relieving  his  pressure  at  Verdun  and  on  the 
Eastern  fronts),  it  is  evident  that  the  underlying  pur- 
pose of  the  Somme  offensive  was  to  compel  the  enemy 
to  evacuate  the  huge  Noyon  salient,  which  he  had  held 
without  serious  molestation  since  the  close  of  the  First 
Marne  campaign.  The  direction  of  the  attack  indi- 
cated such  a  purpose,  however  it  might  be  disavowed. 
And  the  after-effect  of  the  offensive  was,  in  fact,  to 
force  such  a  withdrawal.  The  German  positions  in 
the  salient,  although  still  held  in  the  main  at  the  end 
of  the  battle,  had  become  so  exposed  that  Hindenburg 


[iqi6]  The  Somme  193 

thought  it  prudent  to  evacuate  them  early  in  191 7. 
The  Somme  operation,  therefore,  attained  a  strategic 
result  which  the  Allied  High  Commands  were  too  cau- 
tious to  claim  for  it  when  it  had  ended  in  an  apparent 
relapse  into  deadlock. 

The  Noyon  salient  extended,  roughly  speaking, 
from  Arras  south  and  east  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
La  Fere.  The  German  line  ran  slightly  south-west 
from  Arras  to  Gommecourt,  whence  it  turned  south-east 
to  Fricourt,  a  little  east  of  Albert.  Then  it  stretched 
directly  east  for  about  four  miles  and  turned  south 
again,  crossing  the  Somme  at  Curlu.  Thence  it  passed 
almost  due  south,  west  of  Chaulnes  and  Roye,  to  a 
point  near  Lassigny,  where  it  bent  at  a  right  angle 
east  past  Noyon,  to  the  St.  Gobain  and  Coucy  forests, 
below  La  F&re. 

The  point  of  attack  chosen  by  the  British  and  French 
was  midway  in  the  western  face  of  the  salient,  on  both 
sides  of  the  Somme.  A  successful  drive  there  would 
have  the  effect  of  breaking  the  western  part  of  the 
German  salient  into  two  smaller  salients.  The  Arras 
sector  would  be  separated  by  a  broad  wedge  from  the 
Chaulnes-Roye  sector,  and  each  remnant  would  become 
subject  to  hostile  pressure  in  two  directions.  Bapaume 
was  the  objective  of  the  British  attack.  Peronne  was 
the  objective  of  the  French  attack.  If  Bapaume  and 
Peronne  both  fell,  the  Noyon  salient  would  be  no 
longer  defensible. 

The  east-and-west  portion  of  the  German  line  just 
north  of  the  Somme  offered  a  tempting  mark  to  an 
assailant.  By  changing  their  frontage  from  west  to 
south  the  Germans  had  created  a  salient,  east  of  Albert, 
which  could  be  attacked  simultaneously  from  the  south 
and  from  the  west.  An  opportunity  was  offered  to  the 
13 


194  The  Great  War  [I9i6j 

British  to  work  north-east,  cut  the  Peronne-Bapaume 
high  road  and  approach  Bapaume  from  the  rear. 
Meanwhile  a  French  drive  straight  east  would  take 
Peronne  and  put  the  Allies  in  the  rear  of  the  German 
positions  covering  Chaulnes  and  Roye. 

Artillery  preparation  began  on  June  24th  and  lasted 
a  week.  It  was  the  heaviest  "drum  fire"  the  Allies 
had  yet  indulged  in ;  for  they  now  had  an  ample  supply 
of  munitions  and  heavy  guns.  The  infantry  moved 
forward  at  7.30  a.m.,  July  1st.  The  main  British 
front  extended  from  Maricourt,  about  two  miles  north 
of  the  Somme,  west  to  Fricourt,  and  then  north  along 
the  west  face  of  the  salient  to  St.  Pierre  Divion,  on  the 
Ancre  River.  A  subsidiary  holding  attack  was  made 
by  the  Third  Army  at  Gommecourt. 

The  German  positions  in  the  region  north  of  the 
Somme,  covering  Bapaume,  were  unusually  formidable. 
A  ridge  crossing  this  sector  in  a  south-east-north-west 
direction,  from  the  Ancre  River  to  the  Tortille  River, 
formed  the  backbone  of  the  Teuton  defence.  The  first 
line  trenches  lay  on  the  southern  slopes  of  this  cross 
ridge.  Nearly  two  years  had  been  spent  by  the  Germans 
in  elaborating  their  main  lines  and  communicating 
systems.  In  spite  of  the  powerful  artillery  preparation 
the  British  therefore  met  with  vigorous  resistance 
all  along  the  line.  In  the  section  below  the  Ancre 
River  hardly  any  progress  was  made.  But  on  the  rest 
of  the  front  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  first  line  was 
carried  in  fighting  which  lasted  until  July  5th.  The 
Germans  were  driven  back  a  mile  on  a  six  mile  sector, 
losing  5818  prisoners.  Sir  Douglas  Haig  now  called 
a  halt  to  reorganize  an  attack  on  the  second  German 
defence  line. 

The  French  attack  on  July  1st  was  made  on  a  front 


[i9i6]  The  Somme  195 

from  Maricourt,  north  of  the  Somme,  to  a  point  west 
of  Chaulnes.  North  of  the  river,  Fayolle's  army — the 
Sixth — took  the  villages  of  Curlu,  Hem,  and  Harde- 
court.  South  of  it  they  broke  completely  through  the 
German  first  and  second  lines,  advancing  six  miles 
on  a  front  of  ten  and  a  half  miles.  On  July  9th  the 
French  carried  the  village  of  Biaches,  directly  across  the 
Somme  from  Peronne.  Farther  south  they  had  reached 
Belloy-en-Santerre  on  July  4th.  Chaulnes  was  threat- 
ened with  envelopment  from  the  north,  and  Peronne 
seemed  on  the  point  of  falling.  Up  to  July  14th  the 
French  took  12,235  prisoners.  But  from  that  date 
on  the  German  counter-attacks  became  persistent. 
The  impetus  of  the  offensive  south  of  the  Somme  was 
lost.  The  French  effort  was  suspended  and  was  not 
renewed  until  September. 

On  July  14th  Marshal  Haig,  having  brought  up  his 
guns,  delivered  an  assault  on  the  second  and  main  line 
of  the  German  defences.  It  was  made  on  a  front  of 
six  thousand  yards,  from  Longueval  to  Bazentin-le- 
Petit  Wood.  The  British  stole  forward  in  the  night 
to  the  foot  of  the  southern  crest  of  the  cross-ridge  and 
stormed  the  German  trenches  at  early  dawn.  Four 
villages  and  three  strongly  fortified  woods  were  cap- 
tured and  the  enemy  was  pushed  back  about  a  mile. 
Counter-attacks  were  repelled  and  advanced  British 
units  came  into  touch  with  the  third  German  defence 
line,  on  the  northern  and  lower  crest  of  the  cross-ridge. 
Two  thousand  additional  prisoners  were  captured  from 
July  14th  to  July  1 6th. 

This  operation  ended  the  first  phase  of  the  battle. 
The  British  were  now  established  in  the  main  German 
positions  for  a  distance  of  more  than  three  miles.  But 
the  centre  had  advanced  much  farther  than  the  wings. 


196  The  Great  War 


fiQl6] 


The  Germans  continued  to  hold  the  Tortille-Ancre 
plateau,  west  of  Bazentin-le-Petit,  where  the  British 
line  bent  to  the  south-west.  They  also  held  the  power- 
ful plateau  positions,  east  and  south-east  of  Delville 
Wood,  extending  beyond  Combles.  It  was  necessary 
to  clear  both  flanks  before  the  wedge  in  the  centre 
could  be  driven  farther  in. 

The  German  High  Command  now  awakened  to  the 
fact  that  the  Somme  front  was  crumbling.  It  rushed 
up  reserves  and  began  to  counter-attack  savagely. 
The  British  and  the  French — the  latter  operating  on 
the  right  in  the  direction  of  Combles — found  then- 
progress  practically  blocked  during  the  seven  weeks 
from  July  18th  to  September  ist.  On  July  18th  the 
Germans  regained  a  part  of  Delville  Wood  and  of  the 
village  of  Longueval.  On  July  23d  a  general  British 
assault  from  Guillemont,  on  the  east,  to  Pozieres,  on 
the  west,  failed  to  produce  any  gains.  Delville  Wood 
and  Longueval  were  recovered  on  July  30th.  Early 
in  August  attempts  to  take  Guillemont  failed.  On 
August  1 6th  a  joint  French  and  British  attack  in  the 
Combles  sector  yielded  insignificant  results. 

The  battle  had  not  come  to  a  standstill.  But  it  had 
resumed  the  deadlock  characteristics  of  the  fixed  posi- 
tional warfare  of  1 9 1 5 .  It  was  immensely  costly  to  both 
sides — more  costly  even  than  the  fighting  at  Verdun  had 
been,  because  the  operating  front  on  the  Somme  was 
wider  and  many  more  troops  were  constantly  engaged. 

The  third  phase  of  the  Somme  began  in  September. 
Micheler's  army  was  brought  up  to  the  support  of 
Fayolle's  and  the  French  assumed  a  larger  r61e  in  the 
drive  for  Bapaume.  Their  immediate  objective  was 
Combles,  which  they  now  sought  to  envelop  from  the 
south  and  east. 


[i9i6]  The  Somme  *Q7 

South  of  the  Somme  Micheler  opened  a  local  offen- 
sive on  September  4th,  on  a  thirteen  mile  front,  north 
and  south  of  Chaulnes.  South  of  that  city  Chilly 
was  captured,  on  September  4th ;  north  of  it,  Soyecourt, 
on  September  4th ;  Berny-en-Santerre,  September  17th, 
and  Vermandovillers,  September  17th.  The  French 
took  seven  thousand  prisoners  and  thirty-six  guns. 
On  October  10th  Micheler  reached  the  outskirts  of 
Ablaincourt.  On  November  7th  Ablaincourt  and 
Pressoire,  two  miles  north-east  of  Chaulnes,  were 
stormed.  But  the  Germans  clung  successfully  to 
Chaulnes,  although  it  was  nearly  surrounded. 

The  Allied  offensive  north  of  the  Somme  was  renewed 
with  violence  on  September  3d.  The  British  carried 
Guillemont  on  that  day  and  pushed  north  to  Ginchy, 
two  miles  north-west  of  Combles.  Fayolle's  army  broke 
the  German  line  below  Combles,  from  Le  Forest,  south, 
to  the  Somme.  The  final  struggle  for  the  cross-ridge, 
all  the  way  from  Combles  west  to  Thiepval,  was  now 
on.  Tanks  appeared  in  the  fighting  line  for  the  first 
time  on  September  6th.  The  Germans  put  up  a  des- 
perate resistance,  but  were  slowly  crowded  off  the  ridge. 
Martinpuich  and  Courcelette,  on  the  British  left 
centre,  and  Flers,  on  the  British  right  centre,  fell  on 
September  15th;  Les  Bceufs  and  Morval,  on  the  British 
right,  on  September  25th.  Below  Combles  Fayolle 
took  Bouchavesnes,  September  12th,  Le  Priez  Farm, 
September  14th,  Rancourt  and  Fregicourt,  September 
25th. 

Combles  was  now  practically  surrounded.  It  was 
evacuated  by  the  Germans  on  September  26th.  Thiep- 
val, at  the  opposite  end  of  the  line,  was  stormed  by 
the  British  on  the  same  day.  On  the  right  centre  the 
British  line  was  pushed  north  to  Gueudecourt.  In  these 


198  The  Great  War  [1916] 

attacks  the  Allied  armies  took  ten  thousand  more 
prisoners.  Heavy  rains  now  set  in  and  slowed  down 
the  fighting.  But  the  driving  power  of  the  offensive 
was  also  nearly  gone.  In  October  Fayolle  several  times 
captured  Sailly  and  Saillisel,  north  of  Combles,  only  to 
lose  them  again .  They  were  finally  occupied  on  Novem- 
ber 12th,  thus  giving  the  Allies  complete  possession  of 
the  south-east-north-west  ridge  from  the  Tortille  to 
Thiepval,  for  which  they  had  been  fighting  for  four 
months  and  a  half.  Between  October  1st  and  7th  the 
British  advanced  their  centre  to  within  four  miles  of 
Bapaume  by  capturing  Le  Sars  and  Eaucourt  l'Abbaye. 

But  though  the  Germans  had  been  thrust  out  of  all 
their  original  lines  and  were  now  standing  on  open 
ground,  the  Allies  were  unequal  to  the  task  of  expelling 
them  from  Bapaume.  The  German  High  Command, 
in  one  of  the  volumes  issued  under  its  direction  for  the 
guidance  of  opinion  in  Germany,  designated  September 
25th  as  the  crisis  of  the  battle.  On  that  day  it  looked 
for  a  time  as  if  the  Allies  were  going  to  effect  a  real 
break-through  on  the  Somme  front.  But  the  German 
lines  steadied  sufficiently  to  stave  off  that  disaster. 

The  Allied  advance  toward  Bapaume  in  September 
and  October  left  the  Germans  who  were  holding  the 
Ancre  Valley,  in  a  dangerous  salient.  It  was  open  to 
attack  both  from  the  east  and  the  west.  The  sector 
south  of  the  Ancre  was  pinched  off  on  November  13th, 
by  an  operation  from  the  east.  The  sector  to  the  north 
held  out  until  the  18th  against  an  assault  from  the 
west.  Beaumont-Ham  el  fell  on  the  13th,  Beaucourt- 
sur- Ancre  on  the  14th  and  part  of  Grandcourt  on  the 
1 8th.  The  German  loss  in  prisoners  was  7200.  This 
easily  won  success  brought  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  to 
an  end,  although  some  supplementary  operations  were 


[i9i6]  The  Somme  199 

undertaken  in  January  and  February,  191 7,  before  the 
German  retreat  from  the  Noyon  salient  got  fairly 
under  way. 

The  German  General  Staff  professed  to  regard  the 
battle  as  a  draw.  It  had  apparently  failed  to  accom- 
plish anything  in  the  larger  strategical  sense.  There 
had  been  no  break-through.  And  German  operations 
on  the  Eastern  Front  had  not  been  interfered  with. 
While  the  Allies  were  advancing  painfully  toward 
Bapaume  and  Chaulnes,  Mackensen  and  Falkenhayn 
were  overrunning  Rumania. 

Appearances  seemed  to  justify  the  German  conten- 
tion. But  appearances  were  deceptive.  Hindenburg 
had  become  chief  of  the  German  General  Staff  while 
the  Battle  of  the  Somme  was  in  its  intermediate 
stage.  He  produced  the  necessary  reserves  to  check 
the  critical  attacks  in  September,  without  having  to 
strip  the  Russian  front  or  to  halt  the  projected  inva- 
sion of  Rumania.  But  no  one  knew  better  than 
he  in  what  precarious  condition  the  German  lines 
in  France  were  left  when  the  Battle  of  the  Somme 
ended. 

Field  Marshal  Haig  published  his  official  report  of 
the  battle  on  December  23,  191 6.  In  it  he  modestly 
disclaimed  having  had  any  purpose  of  effecting  a  general 
readjustment  of  the  Western  Front.  He  said  that  the 
three  objects  he  had  in  view  were  to  relieve  pressure 
on  Verdun,  to  hold  the  main  German  forces  in  the 
West  and  to  wear  down  the  enemy's  strength.  If  he 
had  been  less  cautious,  he  might  have  suggested  that 
the  Somme  operation  was  also  intended  to  make  the 
great  Noyon  salient  untenable.  For  while  he  was 
giving  his  summary  to  the  world  Hindenburg  was 
already  preparing  to  acknowledge  the  dislocation  of 


200  The  Great  War  [1916] 

his  positions  in  Picardy  by  drawing  back  his  armies  to 
the  newly  constructed  Hindenburg  Line. 

The  Somme,  terrible  as  it  was  as  an  experiment  in 
attrition,  marked  the  passing  of  the  attrition  theory. 
It  opened  the  way  to  a  return  to  the  warfare  of  move- 
ment. It  proved  that  the  strongest  fixed  positions 
could  be  carried,  with  a  reckless  expenditure  of  man- 
power. But  it  also  proved  that  man-power  could  be 
economized  in  carrying  them.  The  increased  power 
of  the  artillery  now  made  it  possible  to  do  on  a  small 
scale  in  the  West  what  had  been  done  continuously 
in  1 91 5  and  191 6  in  the  East.  The  tank  appeared  at 
the  Somme.  So  also  in  the  last  stages  of  the  battle 
the  defence  was  obliged  to  resort  more  and  more  to 
counter-attacks  in  order  to  maintain  its  positions. 

The  losses  at  the  Somme  were  staggering.  The 
British  alone  had  450,000  casualties.  The  French 
losses  were  not  published.  But  they  probably  were 
between  200,000  and  250,000.  The  German  loss  has 
been  estimated  as  high  as  700,000.  It  was  perhaps 
about  600,000,  including  more  than  65,000  prisoners. 
This  was  the  high  water  mark  of  the  warfare  of  usury. 
But  there  were  to  be  no  more  Sommes.  After  191 6 
the  character  of  warfare  on  the  Western  Front  changed 
rapidly.  Infantry  was  used  less  and  less  to  do  line 
breaking  work,  which  could  be  better  and  more  econo- 
mically done  by  tanks  and  artillery. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  TRENTINO  AND  GORIZIA.      MAY  14,  I916-NOVEMBER 

5>   1916 

The  handicaps  imposed  on  Italy  by  the  lack  of  a 
true  military  frontier  were  disclosed  to  some  extent 
by  the  Italian  campaign  of  191 5  for  Gorizia.  They 
were  strikingly  emphasized  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
counter-offensive  of  19 16  on  the  Trent ino  front.  The 
Trentino  was  a  deep,  rugged  salient  thrust  into  the 
northern  Italian  plain.  An  army  moving  out  of  it 
and  crossing  the  shallow  belt  of  Italian  foothills  would 
debouch  only  fifteen  miles  from  Vicenza,  on  the  main 
line  of  communications  between  the  Italian  forces  on 
the  Isonzo  and  their  chief  base  at  Milan. 

In  order  to  prosecute  his  campaign  for  Trieste  in 
safety  General  Cadorna  was  obliged  to  protect  the 
whole  mountain  front  from  Udine  west  to  Verona. 
A  break-through  anywhere  on  that  line  would  leave  the 
Isonzo  armies  in  a  closed  alley.  This  weakness  in  the 
Italian  position  was  obvious  to  the  Austrian  and  German 
High  Commands.  They  tried  to  take  advantage  of  it 
in  1 91 6  and  nearly  succeeded.  They  took  advantage 
of  it  in  November,  191 7,  when  the  Caporetto  disaster 
nearly  put  Italy  out  of  the  war. 

The  Austrian  front  in  the  Trentino  was  fed  by  the 
trunk  railroad  coming  down  the  Adige  Valley  from 

201 


202  The  Great  War 


[1916] 


Bozen.  Behind  Trent  the  Austrian  High  Command 
could  mass  troops  and  guns  entirely  safe  from  observa- 
tion. While  Falkenhayn  was  preparing  in  the  winter 
of  191 5  to  break  the  French  line  at  Verdun,  Hoetzen- 
dorfl: was  also  secretly  planning  an  irruption  toward 
Vicenza,  Padua,  and  Venice.  Owing  to  the  snows  he 
could  not  begin  as  early  as  February.  But  in  March 
and  April  he  assembled  below  Trent  a  powerful  artillery 
park,  greatly  exceeding  in  calibre  anything  the  Italians 
then  had  available.  Among  his  750  heavy  pieces  were 
12-inch  Skoda  howitzers,  15-inch  naval  guns,  and  17- 
inch  German  howitzers.  He  also  had  some  1600 
lighter  field  guns.  These  2350  cannon  were  massed 
on  a  front  of  about  thirty  miles,  extending  from  Rove- 
reto,  on  the  Adige,  below  Trent,  north-east  to  Borgo, 
in  the  Val  Sugana,  an  east-and-west  valley  which 
stretches  from  Trent  to  Cismon. 

An  army  of  from  350,000  to  400,000  men  was 
collected  under  the  nominal  command  of  the  Heir 
Apparent,  the  Archduke  Karl.  Hoetzendorfl,  how- 
ever, was  the  real  leader.  Although  Cadorna  had 
inspected  the  Trentino  front  in  April  and  made  a  change 
in  the  command  of  the  First  Army,  replacing  General 
Brusati  with  General  Pecori-Giraldi,  the  Italians  were 
poorly  prepared  to  meet  the  exceedingly  vigorous 
offensive  which  Hoetzendorfl  launched  on  May  14th. 

The  main  attack  was  made  in  the  centre,  the  Austrian 
columns  converging  toward  the  mountain  towns  of 
Arsiero  and  Asiago,  which  lie  in  a  valley  running  from 
south-west  to  north-east  through  the  district  known 
as  the  Sette  Comuni.  These  towns  are  about  ten 
miles  from  the  Venetian  Plain  and  are  separated  from 
it  only  by  the  Alpine  foothills. 

The  Austrian  centre  and  left  easily  reached  their 


[i9i6]         The  Trentino  and  Gorizia        203 

objectives.  The  centre  moved  down  from  its  positions 
north-east  of  Rovereto,  stormed  Monte  Maggio  on 
May  1 8th,  Monte  Toraro  and  Col  Santo  on  May  19th, 
and  crossed  into  the  upper  Posina  Valley,  leading  to 
Arsiero.  The  left  wing,  getting  a  start  a  little  later, 
crossed  the  Val  Sugana  at  Borgo,  stormed  Armentera 
Ridge,  cleared  the  Italian  frontier  on  May  26th, 
reached  Monte  Mosciagh,  five  miles  south  of  the 
border,  on  May  27th,  and  captured  Asiago  on  May  28th. 

Cadorna  had  hastened  to  the  Trentino  front  on  May 
20th  and  taken  personal  charge.  He  tried  to  hold  up 
the  Austro-Hungarian  advance  toward  Arsiero.  But 
the  enemy  pushed  down  the  Posina  Valley  and  took  the 
little  city.  On  May  29th  Pria  Fara,  a  commanding 
height  two  miles  south  of  Arsiero,  was  abandoned 
by  mistake  and  the  Italian  centre  was  obliged  to  make 
its  final  stand  in  the  mountain  section  on  a  lower  ridge, 
called  Monte  Ciove. 

Cadorna's  situation  was  critical.  It  was  saved  in 
part  by  the  failure  of  the  Austrian  right  wing  to  keep 
progress  with  the  centre  and  left.  This  wing  started 
from  Rovereto  up  the  valley  of  the  little  Leogra  River. 
It  encountered  a  heroic  resistance  at  Zugna,  Buole 
Pass,  and  Monte  Pasubio,  being  held  up  from  May 
24th  to  May  30th.  At  Monte  Pasubio  the  Austrians 
attacked  again  and  again,  but  without  results.  The 
Leogra  passage  remained  closed.  If  Hoetzendorff 
could  have  forced  it,  his  right  would  have  come  out  of 
the  foothills  at  Schio,  directly  south  of  Arsiero,  and 
taken  Cadorna's  line  below  Arsiero  and  Asiago  in  the 
rear. 

As  it  was,  Cadorna  was  able  to  hold  on  to  the  Ciove 
Ridge  through  the  first  two  weeks  of  June.  By  that 
time  BrusilofTs  sensational  victories  on  the  Eastern 


204  The  Great  War  [1916] 

Front  compelled  Hoetzendorff  to  send  guns  and  re- 
serves back  to  Galicia.  Though  in  sight  of  the  Vene- 
tian Plain  and  only  twenty  miles  from  Vicenza,  he 
was  obliged  to  break  off  an  offensive  which,  from  June 
1st  to  June  15th,  seemed  on  the  verge  of  a  tremendous 
success.  A  local  attack  was  made  by  the  Austrian 
left  wing  on  June  18th  on  the  Italian  positions  south 
of  Asiago.  It  failed  with  heavy  losses.  But  even  if 
it  had  succeeded,  Hoetzendorff  would  hardly  have 
been  able  to  follow  it  up. 

He  had  won  in  Italy  by  depleting  the  armies  in  Vol- 
hynia,  Galicia,  and  Bukowina.  He  had  staked  success 
on  Russian  inactivity.  His  miscalculation  was  costly, 
for  Austria  lost  on  the  Eastern  Front  ten  times  the 
guns  and  prisoners  she  had  made  in  the  Trentino.  She 
was  also  to  lose  a  part  of  the  territorial  gains  she  had 
made  at  Italy's  expense.  Realizing  that  Hoetzendorff 's 
reserves  were  being  rushed  east,  Cadorna  himself 
assumed  the  offensive  in  the  latter  half  of  June.  The 
Austro-Hungarians  accordingly  withdrew  to  a  new  line 
of  defence.  On  June  26th  the  Italians  reoccupied 
Asiago  and,  on  June  27th,  Arsiero  and  Posina.  On 
July  23d  they  recaptured  Monte  Cimone.  The  enemy's 
positions  extended  from  Rovereto  south-east  to  a  point 
just  north  of  Arsiero,  thence  north-east,  past  Asiago, 
to  the  Italian  frontier.  The  Italians  never  got  as  far 
north  as  Borgo  again  until  the  armistice  was  signed. 

Having  temporarily  secured  his  rear  and  flank, 
Cadorna  renewed  the  Isonzo  offensive.  For  more  than 
a  year  he  had  been  held  up  by  the  Austrian  bridge- 
head west  of  Gorizia.  Now  he  was  ready  to  storm  it. 
On  August  6th  the  entire  Austro-Hungarian  line  was 
bombarded  and  an  attack  in  the  nature  of  a  feint  was 
made  on  the  positions  just  east  of  Monfalcone,  near 


[i9i6]         The  Trentino  and  Gorizia        205 

the  shore  of  the  Adriatic.  On  the  same  day  the  main 
attack  was  delivered  on  an  eight-mile  front  west  of 
Gorizia.  Monte  Podgora  and  Monte  Calvario,  on 
the  west  bank  of  the  Isonzo,  were  carried  on  that  day. 
So  was  Monte  Sabotino,  on  the  west  bank,  command- 
ing Gorizia  from  the  north.  South  of  the  city,  on  the 
east  bank,  Monte  San  Michele,  was  stormed.  On 
August  7th  the  Italians  cleared  up  the  entire  bridge- 
head. On  the  8th  they  threw  pontoons  across  the 
Isonzo.  The  Austro-Hungarians  rapidly  evacuated 
Gorizia,  King  Victor  Emmanuel  entering  it  on  August 
9th.  From  August  8th  to  August  15th  Cadoma  de- 
livered a  series  of  attacks  on  the  western  rim  of  the 
Carso,  taking  five  outlying  spurs.  In  the  period  from 
August  4th  to  August  15th  the  Austro-Hungarians 
lost  18,758  prisoners  and  thirty  guns. 

But  the  way  was  not  open  yet  either  to  Trieste  or 
Laibach.  Boroevic,  the  Austro-Hungarian  commander, 
drew  back  to  the  Carso  and  Bainsizza  plateaus,  which 
flanked  the  eastern  passage-way  out  of  Gorizia.  There 
he  held  on,  though  occasionally  hard  pressed,  until  the 
Caporetto  counter-offensive  of  191 7. 

In  September  Cadorna  made  a  four-day  assault 
above  and  below  Gorizia,  using  150,000  men.  His 
gains  were  slight.  He  got  possession  of  Plava,  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  river,  at  the  northern  edge  of  the 
Bainsizza  Plateau,  and  advanced  his  lines  a  little  east 
of  Gorizia  and  on  the  Carso.  Seven  thousand  more 
prisoners  were  taken.  Again,  in  November,  a  five-day 
offensive  yielded  nine  thousand  prisoners,  but  did  not 
materially  improve  the  Italian  position. 

The  Italian  armies  on  the  Isonzo  had  shown  admirable 
courage  and  endurance.  Between  August  4th  and 
November  4th  they  had  taken  forty  thousand  prisoners 


206  The  Great  War  [1916] 

— as  many  as  the  British  had  taken  at  the  Somme. 
The  fall  of  Gorizia  had  raised  high  hopes.  Italy  was 
persuaded  and  was  anxious  to  persuade  her  Western 
Allies  that  the  most  promising  road  to  Berlin  lay 
through  Laibach  and  Vienna.  But  Italy's  confidence 
and  her  theory  were  alike  based  on  a  military  illusion. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  negative  effects  of  the 
Isonzo  campaign  in  the  way  of  weakening  Austria- 
Hungary,  it  could  lead  nowhere.  It,  too,  was  a  costly 
experiment  in  attrition.  Italy's  strength  was  being 
employed  lavishly  and  on  the  whole,  unprofitably,  in 
a  strategically  barren  enterprise. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE      SACRIFICE      OF      RUMANIA.      AUGUST      28,      I916- 
DECEMBER  31,    I916 

There  is  a  striking  analogy  between  Rumania's 
situation  in  191 6  and  Italy's  in  19 15.  Italy  was  a 
member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  although  her  interests 
clashed  violently  with  those  of  Austria-Hungary. 
Rumania  was  long  a  satellite  of  the  Teuton  Powers, 
looking  to  Berlin  for  protection  against  Russia,  although 
generally  on  uncomfortable  terms  with  Vienna. 

Russia  had  taken  Bessarabia  away  from  Rumania 
after  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-78,  thus  shabbily 
requiting  the  valuable  assistance  which  the  Rumanians 
gave  the  Russians  at  Plevna.  A  breach  was  created 
between  the  two  countries  which  lasted  for  a  genera- 
tion. Rumania  was  thrown  into  an  unnatural  alliance 
through  Russia's  action — approved  by  Bismarck — just 
as  Italy  had  been  through  the  French  occupation  of 
Tunis,  also  promoted  by  the  wily  German  Chancellor. 

The  Italo-Turkish  war  uncovered  the  real  antagon- 
isms existing  between  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary. 
The  Balkan  wars  did  the  same  service  for  Rumania. 
When  the  latter  joined  with  Serbia  and  Greece  to  defeat 
Bulgaria  in  the  Second  Balkan  War,  she  outraged 
Austro-Hungarian  sensibilities  and  prejudices,  for  she 
was   helping    to    create   a    stronger    Serbia.     Vienna 

207 


2o8  The  Great  War 


[1916] 


backed  Bulgaria,  and  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  so 
chagrined  when  Bulgaria  collapsed  that  it  tried  to 
get  Italian  consent  in  1913  to  attack  Serbia. 

In  Rumania,  as  in  Italy,  nationalistic  sentiment 
had  been  aroused  by  a  successful  war.  Rumania,  too, 
had  an  Irredenta.  Transylvania  was  largely  Ruma- 
nian in  speech  and  blood  and  Hungary  had  repressed 
the  Transylvanian  Rumanians  as  systematically  as 
Austria  had  repressed  the  Italians  of  the  Trentino  and 
Istria.  The  same  appeal  was  made  in  both  cases  to 
the  sense  of  racial  brotherhood  and  solidarity. 

Although  King  Carol  was  a  Hohenzollern  and  strongly 
pro-German  in  sympathy,  Rumania's  participation  in 
the  war  as  an  ally  of  Austria-Hungary  was  as  com- 
pletely foreclosed  as  Italy's.  Berlin  and  Vienna  both 
recognized  that  fact  from  the  beginning  and  both 
would  have  been  satisfied  to  see  Italy  and  Rumania 
remain  neutral. 

Rumania  had  good  reason  to  go  slow  in  casting  her 
lot  with  the  Entente.  Her  whole  northern  border  lay 
open  to  Teuton  attacks.  She  was  on  friendly  relations 
with  Serbia  and  Greece.  But  she  distrusted  Bulgaria, 
from  whom  she  had  just  taken  the  lower  portion  of  the 
Dobrudja.  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  were  possible  enemies 
in  her  rear  and  Allied  sea  power  was  helpless  to  protect 
her,  although  it  could  readily  protect  Greece. 

Until  the  Balkan  situation  cleared  it  would  have  been 
folly  for  Rumania  to  go  in.  But  the  Allies  were  un- 
equal to  mastering  the  Balkan  situation.  If  the 
Gallipoli  expedition  had  been  successful,  Greece  and 
Bulgaria  could  have  been  brought  into  line  in  the  sum- 
mer of  191 5  and  Rumania's  rear  would  have  been 
secured.  Then  Greek,  Bulgarian,  Rumanian,  Serbian, 
French,  and  British  armies  could  have  crossed  the 


[iqi6]         The  Sacrifice  of  Rumania        209 

Danube  and  connected  up  with  the  Russians  in  southern 
and  eastern  Hungary. 

But  the  Dardanelles  were  never  forced  and  Allied 
military  failures  and  diplomatic  bungling  allowed 
Bulgaria  to  gravitate  into  the  Teuton  alliance  and 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  to  be  conquered.  After  the 
Serbian  tragedy  and  the  great  Russian  retreat  of  19 15, 
Rumania  could  easily  have  justified  herself  in  sticking 
to  a  policy  of  neutrality.  In  1916  she  was  surrounded 
by  enemies  on  three  sides  and  the  only  Allied  support 
which  could  surely  reach  her  must  come  from  Russia, 
already  long  past  the  peak  of  her  military  strength. 

As  1916  wore  on,  however,  the  Rumanian  Govern- 
ment and  people  became  more  and  more  eager  to  enter 
the  war.  The  colossal  German  failure  at  Verdun 
impressed  them.  So  did  the  Brusiloff's  advance 
through  Bukowina  and  Galicia  to  the  Carpathians. 
Bukowina  and  Transylvania  had  been  promised  to  the 
Rumanians.  But  if  the  Russians  could  conquer  Buko- 
wina and,  moving  through  the  Carpathian  passes, 
overrun  Transylvania,  the  offer  to  Rumania  might  be- 
come outlawed.  The  Western  Allies  now  came  for- 
ward with  a  proposition  to  secure  Rumania's  rear  by 
an  offensive  from  Salonica,  which  would  fully  occupy 
Bulgaria. 

Hesitating  and  uneasy,  more  than  half  convinced 
that  belligerency  would  be  less  costly  than  continued 
neutrality,  and  greatly  overvaluing  the  possibilities 
of  an  Allied  campaign  from  Salonica,  the  Rumanian 
Government  decided  in  August,  191 6,  to  risk  a  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Austria-Hungary.  On  the  17th 
of  that  month  a  treaty  was  signed  between  Rumania, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and 

Russia,    on   the   other.     This   defined   the   territorial 
14 


210  The  Great  War  [1916] 

compensations  to  which  Rumania  should  be  entitled 
at  the  close  of  the  war.  They  included  Bukowina, 
Transylvania,  the  Banat,  and  some  small  portions  of 
Hungary  proper.  Rumania  was  to  attack  Austria- 
Hungary  on  August  28th.  The  Allied  offensive  from 
Salonica  was  to  begin  on  August  20th.  Russia  was 
to  co-operate  on  the  Bukowina  front  and  to  send  one 
cavalry  and  two  infantry  divisions  to  the  Dobrudja. 

Unaware  of  the  provisions  of  this  secret  compact 
and  at  a  loss  to  account  for  the  disaster  which  so  quickly 
overwhelmed  Rumania,  military  writers  have  spread 
the  impression  that  Rumania  acted  solely  in  her  own 
interest  and  disregarded  Allied  advice  in  employing 
her  main  forces  in  a  rash  invasion  of  Hungary.  This 
theory  is  imaginary  and  does  Rumania  a  great  injustice. 
The  military  convention  annexed  to  the  treaty  pro- 
vided explicitly  that  "the  principal  object  [objective?] 
af  Rumanian  action  will  be  in  the  direction  of  Buda- 
pest through  Transylvania."  The  Allied  staffs  ap- 
proved the  Transylvanian  campaign,  if  they  didn't 
originate  it.  Responsibility  for  the  Rumanian  fiasco 
rests  with  them  rather  than  with  the  Rumanian  High 
Command. 

Rumania's  declaration  of  war  on  August  27  took  the 
Teuton  Powers  somewhat  by  surprise.  Austria-Hun- 
gary was  not  prepared  to  defend  the  Transylvanian 
border.  Eastern  Transylvania  forms  a  salient  project- 
ing between  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  the  two  grand 
divisions  of  the  Rumanian  kingdom.  It  was,  therefore, 
open  to  invasion  on  two  sides — from  the  east  out  of 
Moldavia  and  from  the  south  out  of  Wallachia.  Ruma- 
nia had  an  army  of  about  six  hundred  thousand  men. 
Probably  two  thirds  of  her  active  forces  were  employed 
in  the  irruption  into  Transylvania. 


[i9i6j         The  Sacrifice  of  Rumania        211 

Rapid  progress  was  made  at  all  points  during  the 
first  two  weeks  of  September.  From  the  Moldavian 
side  Rumanian  columns  crossed  the  Carpathians 
through  Tolgyes,  Bekas,  Gyimes,  and  Ojtoz  passes. 
They  reached  the  valley  of  the  upper  Maros,  on  the 
north,  and  the  valley  of  the  upper  Alt,  on  the  south. 
By  the  end  of  September  they  had  penetrated  Tran- 
sylvania to  a  depth  of  fifty  miles.  But  this  advance, 
made  against  inferior  enemy  forces,  had  little  effect 
on  the  general  strategical  situation.  The  Rumanians 
in  this  region  remained  out  of  touch  with  the  Russians 
farther  north,  although  there  was  at  one  time  the 
prospect  of  a  real  junction  near  Bistritz,  in  eastern 
Hungary. 

The  armies  marching  north  from  Wallachia  also  met 
with  little  opposition.  On  the  extreme  left,  one  column, 
passing  the  "Iron  Gates"  of  the  Danube,  captured 
Orsova  and  advanced  to  Mehadia,  on  the  Orsova- 
Temesvar  railroad.  A  second  column,  more  to  the 
east,  crossed  the  Transylvanian  Alps  through  the 
Vulcan  and  Szurduk  passes,  took  Petroseny,  a  mining 
centre,  and  pushed  on  as  far  as  Hatzeg,  twenty-five 
miles  north  of  the  frontier.  A  third  detachment,  using 
the  Red  Tower  Pass,  seized  the  important  town  of 
Hermannstadt,  about  twenty  miles  from  the  border. 
A  fourth  detachment,  operating  farther  east,  captured 
Fogaras,  and  penetrated  Transylvania  to  a  distance 
of  nearly  fifty  miles.  Finally  a  fifth  detachment  took 
Kronstadt,  seventy  miles  east  of  Hermannstadt. 

The  Rumanians  had  now  overrun  about  a  quarter 
of  the  area  of  Transylvania.  They  had  made  a  good 
start  in  the  direction  of  Budapest.  But  their  easy 
successes  on  the  Hungarian  front  were  neutralized  by 
the  failure  of  the  Salonica  offensive  to  make  any  head- 


212  The  Great  War  [1916J 

way  into  Bulgaria.  Rumania  could  not  pursue  an 
offensive  in  Hungary  and  at  the  same  time  defend 
herself  on  the  Danube  and  in  the  Dobrudja,  unless 
Sarrail  kept  the  Bulgarians  fully  occupied. 

This  he  never  did.  Sarrail's  strength  was  probably 
greatly  exaggerated.  He  was  credited  in  191 6  with 
having  at  his  disposal  an  army  of  700,000  men.  Gen- 
eral Zur linden,  formerly  French  Minister  of  War,  says 
in  his  book,  La  Guerre  de  Liberation,  that  Sarrail  had 
only  80,000  French,  80,000  British,  100,000  Serbs,  and 
some  Italian  and  Russian  contingents — about  300,000 
men  in  all.  Moreover,  his  rear  was  threatened  by  the 
Greek  army,  which  Constantine  had  concentrated  in 
Thessaly.  He  was  in  no  condition  to  attempt  a  large- 
scale  invasion  of  Bulgaria  and,  apparently,  the  Bulga- 
rians and  Germans  knew  that  as  well  as  he  did. 

The  offensive  of  August  20th,  promised  by  the  Allies 
in  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  Rumania,  was  a  military 
fiction.  A  French  war  office  bulletin,  issued  on  August 
2 1st,  announced  that  on  August  20th  (according  to 
schedule)  "the  Allied  forces  at  Salonica  took  the 
offensive  on  the  entire  front." 

What  happened  was  that  the  Bulgars  anticipated 
Sarrail's  attack  and  made  one  themselves.  The  Allied 
left  wing  was  driven  back  at  Fiorina,  in  northern 
Greece;  at  Kastoria,  farther  west,  and  at  Koritza, 
just  across  the  Albanian  border.  These  actions  oc- 
curred between  August  18th  and  August  23d.  On 
Sarrail's  extreme  right  the  Bulgarians  advanced  in  the 
region  of  Drama  and  Seres,  between  August  20th  and 
25th,  and  occupied  the  Greek  port  of  Kavala  on 
September  12th. 

The  Sarrail  offensive  never  got  going  at  all  on  the 
right  and  central  sections  of  the  Salonica  front.     On 


[i9i6]         The  Sacrifice  of  Rumania       213 

the  left,  where  the  reorganized  Serbian  army  was 
stationed,  it  did  get  under  way  about  September  15th. 
Fiorina  was  outflanked  on  the  east  by  the  Serbians 
and  was  evacuated  by  the  Bulgars  on  September  18th. 
Then  the  Serbs,  supported  on  their  left  by  French  and 
Russian  detachments,  started  on  their  two  months 
drive  for  Monastir.  But  this  was  an  operation  de- 
signed primarily  to  recover  a  foothold  on  Serbian  terri- 
tory and  only  incidentally  to  relieve  Teuton  pressure 
on  Rumania. 

Having  shown  its  contempt  for  the  Salonica  offensive, 
the  Teuton  High  Command  in  Bulgaria  turned  north 
to  attack  Rumania  on  the  Danube.  Field  Marshal 
Mackensen,  who  was  in  general  charge  in  the  Balkans, 
gathered  together  Bulgarian,  German,  and  Turkish 
divisions  and  hurled  them  against  the  weak  enemy 
line  in  the  Dobrudja.  Mackensen  showed  remarkable 
expedition  and  vigour.  Bulgaria,  Germany,  and  Turkey 
declared  war  on  Rumania  on  August  29th.  On  Sep- 
tember 2d  Mackensen  invaded  southern  Dobrudja  at 
three  points.  His  easternmost  column,  operating  near 
the  Black  Sea,  took  the  fortress  of  Bajardjik,  on  the 
8th,  and  also  occupied  the  seaports  of  Baltchik  and 
Kavarna.  Mangalia,  another  seaport,  half-way  up 
to  Constanza,  fell  on  September  10th. 

The  central  column  marched  against  the  fortress  of 
Silistria,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  directly 
south  of  Bucharest.  Silistria  surrendered  on  Septem- 
ber 9th.  The  westernmost  column,  on  September 
6th,  took  by  storm  the  fortress  of  Turkutai,  on  the 
Danube,  thirty  miles  west  of  Silistria.  Twenty-five 
thousand  Rumanians  were  captured.  By  September 
15th,  Mackensen  had  cleared  the  Dobrudja  to  a  depth 
of  fifty  miles — up  to  within  ten  miles  of  the  Bucharest- 


214  The  Great  War  [1916] 

Constanza  railroad.  The  whole  southern  Rumanian 
front  had  begun  to  crumble. 

The  Rumanian  armies  in  Transylvania  now  found 
themselves  in  a  dangerous  position.  Their  offensive 
had  been  suddenly  superseded  by  a  Teuton  offensive 
far  more  formidable,  because  it  was  to  be  conducted 
simultaneously  on  three  fronts.  Hindenburg's  plan 
was  to  envelop  Wallachia  from  the  north,  west,  and 
south,  and  squeeze  out  a  highly  vulnerable  salient. 
The  northern  and  western  operations  were  entrusted 
to  Falkenhayn,  who  was,  however,  subordinated  to 
Mackensen  before  the  campaign  was  over.  The  two 
German  commanders  had  about  six  hundred  thousand 
seasoned  troops  and  enjoyed  a  vast  superiority  in 
artillery. 

Falkenhayn  began  the  counter-offensive  about  the 
middle  of  September.  He  struck  first  at  the  Rumanian 
column  north  of  Vulcan  Pass  and  drove  it  out  of 
Petroseny  and  back  into  the  mountains.  This  move- 
ment began  on  September  19th  and  ended  on  September 
23d.  On  September  26th-29th  he  enveloped  the  Ruma- 
nian forces  at  Hermannstadt  and  completely  routed 
them.  That  reverse  uncovered  the  flank  of  the  Ruma- 
nian army  in  the  Kronstadt  region.  It  retreated  hur- 
riedly on  October  8th.  The  forces  farther  north,  which 
had  come  from  Moldavia  through  the  Carpathian 
passes,  were  left  "in  the  air"  and  also  hastily  retired. 
By  October  16th  Transylvania  had  been  completely 
evacuated  and  the  Rumanians  on  the  northern  front 
were  trying  to  hold  the  passes  into  Wallachia. 

The  jaws  of  the  German  trap  were  now  beginning 
to  close  on  Rumania.  On  the  Danube  side  Mackensen 
had  brought  up  his  heavy  guns  and  was  ready  to  break 
the  Rumanian-Russian  line  covering  the  Bucharest- 


[i9i6]         The  Sacrifice  of  Rumania        215 

Constanza  railroad.  Russia  had  sent  three  cavalry 
divisions  to  the  Dobrudja,  instead  of  the  one  she  pro- 
mised to  send.  But  this  reinforcement  was  insufficient. 
Between  October  19th  and  October  22d  Mackensen 
penetrated  the  Russo-Rumanian  line  at  several  points 
and  won  a  decisive  victory  at  Mejidia,  half-way 
between  Constanza  and  Chernavoda.  The  latter 
town,  the  southern  terminus  of  the  great  Danube 
bridge,  was  abandoned.  So  was  the  port  of  Constanza, 
which  the  Bulgars  entered  on  October  226.. 

Mackensen  had  now  accomplished  his  main  strategic 
purpose  south  of  the  Danube.  He  had  cleared  the 
entire  southern  bank,  east  to  Chernavoda,  and  penned 
the  enemy  on  that  bank  into  the  angle  just  below  the 
Danube  Delta.  He  could  now  safely  turn  west  and  help 
Falkenhayn  pinch  out  the  Wallachian  salient.  The  Rus- 
sian High  Command  sent  General  Sakharoff  into  the 
Dobrudja  with  fresh  troops.  But  all  they  could  do  was 
to  push  Mackensen' s  advanced  guards  back  to  within 
fifteen  miles  of  the  Chernavoda-Constanza  railway. 

On  the  Transylvanian  front  Falkenhayn' s  Ninth 
German  Army  captured  Vulcan  Pass,  on  October  25th. 
Moving  south,  it  won  a  two-day  battle  (November 
15-17)  at  Turgu-Jiu,  twenty  miles  below  the  pass. 
The  Rumanian  resistance  in  this  sector  was  broken. 
Falkenhayn  reached  the  Orsova-Craiova  railroad, 
fifty  miles  south  of  the  pass,  on  November  19th,  and 
the  city  of  Craiova,  on  November  21st.  This  city  is 
the  key  to  Western,  or  Little,  Wallachia,  being  the 
junction  point  of  all  the  railroads  in  that  section.  The 
Germans  were  now  far  in  the  rear  of  the  Rumanian 
column  which  had  entered  Hungary  at  Orsova.  This 
force  was  completely  cut  off,  fled  into  the  mountains, 
and  presently  surrendered. 


2i 6  The  Great  War  [1916] 

Avarescu,  the  Rumanian  Commander-in-Chief,  now 
tried  to  form  a  new  north-and-south  line  along  the 
Alt  River,  east  of  Craiova.  But  this  line  was  exposed 
to  turning  movements  at  both  ends.  Another  German 
force  came  south  through  the  Rothenthurm  and  Torz- 
burg  passes,  and  got  in  Avarescu's  rear.  Mackensen 
crossed  the  Danube  at  two  points  east  of  the  mouth 
of  the  Alt  and  on  November  25th  reached  Alexandria, 
about  fifty  miles  south-west  of  Bucharest. 

The  Rumanians  retreated  hurriedly  to  the  line  of 
the  Argesu  River,  ten  miles  west  of  Bucharest.  Fal- 
kenhayn  struck  north-east  with  his  Ninth  Army  from 
Craiova  and  made  a  junction  with  the  German  columns 
which  had  marched  through  Rothenthurm  and  Torzburg 
passes,  at  Titu,  north-east  of  Bucharest  and  in  the 
rear  of  the  Argesu  line.  Mackensen  at  the  same  time 
crossed  the  Argesu  south  of  Bucharest.  There  was 
nothing  for  Avarescu  to  do  but  to  abandon  the  capital. 
If  he  had  tried  to  defend  it  he  would  have  lost  his 
army  as  well  as  the  city. 

Mackensen  entered  Bucharest  on  December  6th. 
On  the  same  day  the  Germans  captured  Ploesti,  an 
important  railroad  centre  thirty  miles  north  of  Bucha- 
rest, commanding  the  line  north  through  the  mountains 
to  Kronstadt.  From  this  point  the  Ninth  Army 
moved  eastward  to  Mizil  and  thence  to  Buzeu.  Buzeu 
was  reached  on  December  15th.  Ten  thousand  prison- 
ers were  taken  on  the  way.  Bulgarian  forces  now 
crossed  the  Danube  from  the  Dobrudja  and  cleared 
the  northern  bank  of  the  river.  Sakharoff  evacuated 
the  northern  angle  of  the  Dobrudja  and  joined  the 
Rumanian  and  Russian  forces  holding  the  line  from 
Braila,  past  Fokshani,  across  to  the  Transylvanian  Alps. 
Operations  slackened  after  Christmas,  the  Rumanians 


[i0i6]         The  Sacrifice  of  Rumania        217 

constructing  positions  which  they  were  able  to  hold, 
in  the  main,  through  191 7  and  up  to  the  time  of  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest. 

Mackensen  and  Falkenhayn  had  fought  a  sensation- 
ally successful  campaign.  They  had  conquered  for 
Germany  a  rich  granary  and  another  valuable  centre  of 
oil  production.  They  had  captured  nearly  one  hundred 
thousand  prisoners  and  almost  put  Rumania  out  of  the 
war.  They  had  opened  new  lines  of  communication 
with  Constantinople  and  in  four  months  had  reduced 
the  length  of  the  Teuton  eastern  front  by  about  seven 
hundred  miles.  This,  in  itself,  was  a  great  gain,  for 
Germany  needed  more  troops  in  the  West  and  could 
now  afford  to  use  units  of  inferior  quality  to  guard  her 
eastern  lines.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  German 
operation,  brilliant  as  it  was,  had  failed  to  produce  the 
envelopment  aimed  at.  It  squeezed  out  the  Rumanian 
salient.  But  the  Rumanians  had  escaped  through  the 
open  end. 

The  Salonica  offensive,  which  was  to  have  joined  up 
the  Allied  armies  in  Macedonia  with  those  in  the 
Dobrudja,  ended  just  before  Mackensen  made  his 
entry  into  Bucharest.  French  cavalry,  supporting 
the  Serbian  army,  occupied  Monastir  on  November 
19th.  A  tiny  strip  of  Serbian  soil  had  been  reclaimed 
while  the  Teuton  allies  were  overrunning  Wallachia. 
Italy  reinforced  her  Albanian  army  in  the  summer  and 
fall  of  19 1 6.  Italian  detachments  occupied  all  of 
southern  Albania  and  extended  their  lines  east  to  the 
Greek  border,  completing  a  junction  with  Sarrail's 
forces  on  October  25th.  This  extension  helped  to 
secure  Sarrail  against  hostilities  on  the  part  of  Greece. 
But  it  came  too  late  to  put  any  real  vitality  into  the 
Salonica  offensive. 


218  The  Great  War  [1916] 

Allied  relations  with  Greece  continued  unsatisfactory 
through  1 91 6.  In  May  the  Bulgars  seized  Fort 
Rupel  and  several  other  Greek  posts  north-east  of 
Salonica,  outside  the  Allied  sphere  of  operations.  But 
Constantine  ignored  this  affront  and  made  no  protest 
against  the  transfer  of  the  garrisons  to  Germany  as 
"prisoners."  He  was  equally  indifferent  when  the 
Bulgars  captured  the  port  of  Kavala  in  September. 
After  the  Fort  Rupel  incident  the  Allies  imposed  a 
blockade  on  Greece,  seized  Greek  ships,  and  took  other 
measures  to  root  out  pro-German  activities  and  compel 
a  demobilization  of  the  Greek  army.  On  June  2 1st  the 
British,  French,  and  Russian  ministers  presented  a  joint 
note  to  Constantine's  government,  demanding  demobil- 
ization, dismissal  of  the  Skouloudis  Ministry,  dissolution 
of  the  anti-Ally  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  the  removal  of 
pro-German  police  officials.  Two  days  later  Constantine 
promised  compliance  with  these  demands.  He  ap- 
pointed Zaimis  as  Premier  and  dissolved  the  Chamber; 
but  he  persistently  delayed  demobilization.  Venizelos 
went  to  Crete  and  organized  a  rival  provisional  govern- 
ment, controlling  the  Greek  Islands  and  a  part  of 
Macedonia.  This  government,  with  a  seat  at  Salonica, 
was  recognized  by  the  Allies.  It  then  declared  war 
on  Bulgaria. 

Lambros  succeeded  Zaimis  as  Premier  in  October. 
He  surrendered  the  Greek  navy  to  the  Allies.  British 
and  French  marines  were  landed  at  Piraeus  and  sent 
to  Athens.  Constantine  was  forced  to  transfer  his 
still  undemobilized  forces  to  the  Peloponnesus  and  to 
turn  over  a  part  of  his  artillery  and  munitions. 

On  December  ist  and  2d  small  Allied  detachments 
in  Athens  were  attacked  by  partisans  of  Constantine. 
Three  officers  and  twelve  men  were  killed  and  these 


[igx6]        The  Sacrifice  of  Rumania         219 

units  would  probably  have  been  massacred,  except  for 
the  fact  that  the  Allied  warships  at  Piraeus  began  to 
fire  shells  into  the  city.  The  Allies  now  made  new 
demands  for  reparations  and  guarantees,  which  Con- 
stantine  acceded  to  with  reluctance; 

The  Allied  procedure  in  Greece  was  lamentably 
feeble  and  hesitating.  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Russia,  being  the  guardians  of  the  Greek  State,  had  the 
right,  under  the  treaty  of  1863,  to  intervene  to  prevent 
the  overthrow  of  constitutional  government.  It  was 
easy  enough  to  make  out  a  case  against  Constantine 
and  dethrone  him,  as  the  Allies  finally  did  in  191 7. 
Greece  was  at  heart  pro- Ally,  but  she  had  been  allowed 
to  drift  toward  pro-Germanism  under  Constantine's 
malign  influence.  Military  as  well  as  political  consid- 
erations demanded  his  expulsion.  But  diplomatic  inde- 
cision left  him  for  two  years  in  a  post  where  he  could 
do  the  Allied  cause  immense  injury.  The  temporizing 
Greek  policy  of  the  Entente  was  one  of  the  least 
pardonable  political  blunders  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

ASIATIC  AND  COLONIAL  CAMPAIGNS.      JANUARY   II, 
I916-DECEMBER  31,    I916 

On  the  Asiatic  front  in  191 6  the  outstanding  events 
were  the  Russian  conquest  of  Armenia  and  the  British 
surrender  at  Kut-el-Amara. 

On  being  relieved  of  the  command  of  the  armies  on 
the  Russian  west  front  (September  6,  1915),  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas  was  ordered  to  the  Caucasus.  His 
military  talents  soon  began  to  make  themselves  felt 
in  this  region.  The  Turks  had  attempted  a  winter 
campaign  west  and  north  of  Kars  in  December,  1914, 
and  January,  191 5,  and  had  suffered  disaster.  The 
Grand  Duke  decided  to  make  one  in  January  and 
February,  191 6,  with  Erzerum  as  his  objective.  The 
Turks  had  reduced  their  forces  in  Armenia  in  order  to 
defend  the  Gallipoli  peninsula  and  were  not  prepared 
to  resist  a  vigorous  Russian  offensive.  They  were  also 
taken  by  surprise  by  Nicholas's  daring  tactics. 

A  Russian  army  about  170,000  strong,  under  General 
Yudenitch,  crossed  the  Turkish  frontier  west  of  Kars 
on  January  nth  and  made  its  way  in  three  columns 
across  the  snow-covered  mountains.  The  northern 
column  encountered  a  Turkish  detachment  north-east 
of  Erzerum  and  pushed  it  off  in  the  direction  of  the 
Olty  valley.     The  southern  column  cut  off  the  extreme 

220 


[i9i6]  Asiatic  and  Colonial  Campaigns  221 

Turkish  right  wing  and  drove  it  toward  Kurdistan. 
The  Russian  centre  met  the  main  Turkish  force  at 
Kuprikeui,  thirty-three  miles  east  of  Erzerum,  on 
January  16th,  and  defeated  it  in  a  three  days'  battle. 
The  Turks  retreated  in  disorder,  losing  many  guns. 

Yudenitch  advanced  rapidly  to  the  outer  defences 
of  Erzerum  and  stormed  them  without  much  difficulty. 
There  was  still  an  inner  circle  of  forts  to  be  battered 
down.  But  the  Turks  were  cowed.  They  fled  from 
the  city  before  it  had  been  actually  invested.  The 
Russians  entered  it  on  February  16th,  capturing  only 
a  rear-guard  of  thirteen  thousand  men.  More  than 
three  hundred  heavy  guns  and  large  quantities  of 
supplies  were  abandoned  to  the  victors. 

Erzerum  was  the  key  to  Armenia.  Its  loss  compelled 
the  Turks  to  retreat  west  to  a  new  base  at  Erzingan 
and  to  relax  their  hold  on  the  region  between  Erzerum 
and  the  Black  Sea.  Russian  forces  now  cleared  the  coast 
line  west  to  Trebizond,  which  fell  on  April  18th.  Its 
capture  gave  the  Grand  Duke  a  coast  base  as  well  as 
an  interior  one,  and  enabled  him  to  complete  the 
occupation  of  Armenia.  His  right  wing  reached 
Platana  on  May  nth.  The  left,  or  southern,  wing 
had  made  rapid  progress  after  the  fall  of  Erzerum. 
It  reached  Mush  on  February  18th  and  Bitlis  on  March 
2d,  the  latter  town  lying  to  the  west  of  Lake  Van. 

There  was  an  interruption  of  the  offensive  between 
May  and  July.  In  the  latter  month  the  Russian  centre 
pushed  the  Turks  back  steadily  from  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Erzerum  one  hundred  miles  west  to  Erzingan, 
which  was  occupied  on  July  25th.  Armenia  was  now 
practically  cleared,  except  on  the  south.  With  the 
capture  of  Erzingan  the  Russian  advance  west  toward 
Anatolia  was  suspended.     Turkish  reinforcements,  re- 


222  The  Great  War  [1916] 

leased  by  the  evacuation  of  Gallipoli,  began  to  arrive 
after  April  on  the  Armenian-Kurdistan  front.  But 
they  were  used  mainly  in  protecting  Turkish  communi- 
cations with  Bagdad.  These  communications  the 
Russians  were  never  able  to  disturb. 

In  order  to  relieve  Kut,  Russia  had  sent  an  ex- 
pedition, early  in  the  winter  of  191 5-1 6,  against 
the  Bagdad  railway.  It  came  through  Persia  and 
crossed  the  Turkish  frontier  about  150  miles  north-east 
of  Bagdad.  There  it  halted  until  summer,  when  it 
was  attacked  by  the  reinforced  Turks  and  driven 
back  some  distance  into  Persia,  beyond  Hama- 
dan.  Another  expedition,  aiming  at  Mosul,  crossed 
the  frontier  at  Rewanduz,  one  hundred  miles  east  of 
its  objective.  It  was  turned  back  in  July.  From 
Mush  and  Bitlis,  in  the  Lake  Van  region,  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas's  left  wing  made  a  demonstration  in 
August  against  Diarbekr,  on  the  Bagdad  railway, 
two  hundred  miles  north-west  of  Mosul.  This  move- 
ment was  halted  by  the  Turks  west  of  Bitlis.  The 
Russians,  retreating,  evacuated  both  Bitlis  and  Mush, 
but  regained  Mush  a  little  later.  From  the  fall  of 
191 6  on  there  was  little  fighting  of  importance  on  the 
Armenian  and  Kurdistan  fronts. 

General  Townshend's  British  army  was  surrounded 
in  Kut-el-Amara  on  December  7,  1915.  Kut  lies  in  a 
loop  of  the  Tigris.  The  narrow  neck  of  land  on  the 
north  was  strongly  fortified.  The  Turks  tried  to 
storm  it  on  December  23,  191 5,  but  failed.  Then 
they  sat  down  to  starve  the  garrison  out.  The  main 
body  of  the  Turkish  army  occupied  positions  on  both 
sides  of  the  river  several  miles  below  Kut,  where  it  was 
engaged  in  holding  off  a  British  expedition,  under 
General  Sir  Percy  Lake,  sent  to  Townshend's  relief. 


Ii9i6j   Asiatic  and  Colonial  Campaigns  223 

Lake  had  thirty  thousand  Indian  troops,  two  mixed 
Anglo-Indian  divisions,  and  the  communications  units 
of  Townshend's  army,  about  ninety  thousand  men  in 
all. 

This  force  started  north  on  January  6,  191 6,  and 
defeated  the  Turkish  advance  guard  at  Sheik  Saad 
on  January  8th.  It  arrived  on  January  22d  at  Umm- 
el-Henneh  and  Felhaie,  the  strong  Turkish  positions 
east  of  Kut.  Rains  and  floods  interfered  with  the 
British  operations.  On  March  7th  an  unsuccessful 
assault  was  made  on  the  Dujailah  Redoubt,  on  the 
enemy's  right.  On  April  4th  the  Umm-el-Henneh 
position  was  taken.  On  April  8th  an  attack  on  Sanna- 
i-Yat  failed.     Another  failed  on  April  20th-2ist. 

Townshend  was  only  sixteen  miles  away.  But  his 
supplies  were  exhausted,  and  on  April  28th  he  surren- 
dered. The  siege  had  lasted  147  days.  The  Turks 
claimed  thirteen  thousand  prisoners.  According  to 
the  British  statements,  Townshend  had  left  only  2970 
British  and  6000  Indian  troops.  Lake  lost  23,000  men 
attempting  to  raise  the  siege. 

The  surrender  of  Kut,  with  a  relief  force  pounding 
at  its  gates,  was  a  painful  blow  to  British  prestige  in 
the  East.  A  parliamentary  commission  was  appointed 
to  inquire  into  the  conditions  which  made  Townshend's 
failure  possible.  It  brought  in  a  report,  published  on 
June  26,  191 7,  which  described  the  Bagdad  campaign 
as  "an  offensive  movement  based  on  political  and 
military  miscalculations  and  attempted  with  tired  and 
insufficient  forces  and  inadequate  preparation."  The 
chief  responsibility  was  fixed  on  General  Sir  John 
Nixon,  who  was  accused  of  "confident  optimism." 
He  was  especially  blamed  for  not  providing  adequate 
river  transport  and  proper  medical  and  hospital  service. 


224  The  Great  War  [19163 

The  Viceroy  of  India  (Lord  Hardinge)  and  other 
Indian  military  officials,  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
India  (Austen  Chamberlain),  and  the  War  Committee 
of  the  British  Cabinet  were  also  censured.  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain resigned.  Lord  Hardinge  resigned,  but  the 
government  refused  to  accept  his  resignation,  and  that 
decision  was  approved  by  the  House  of  Commons. 

Late  in  May  the  British  captured  the  Dujailah 
Redoubt  and  approached  nearer  to  Kut,  which  no 
longer  had  any  particular  value.  In  August,  Lake  was 
succeeded  by  General  Sir  Frederick  Stanley  Maude, 
who  reorganized  the  Mesopotamian  army  and  spent 
the  rest  of  the  year  in  preparing  an  advance  on  Bagdad 
which  would  have  something  more  behind  it  than 
' *  confident  optimism. ' ' 

In  May  a  small  detachment  of  Cossacks  reached 
the  British  lines  below  Kut.  This  was  the  only  junc- 
tion ever  effected  on  the  Asiatic  front  between  the 
British  and  the  Russians. 

German  East  Africa  was  conquered  in  large  part  by 
the  Allies  in  1 916.  It  was  defended  by  a  well-trained 
and  organized  negro  army  of  thirty  thousand  men, 
under  German  officers.  This  force  had  practically 
held  its  own  in  1914  and  1915.  In  the  spring  of  1916 
an  army,  furnished  by  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  was 
transported  to  British  East  Africa  and  employed  in 
an  invasion  of  German  East  Africa  from  the  north. 
General  Smith-Dorrien  had  been  sent  from  Europe 
to  command  this  expedition.  He  fell  sick  and  resigned 
in  favour  of  General  Jan  C.  Smuts,  the  former  Boer 
leader.  Smuts  crossed  the  Kilimanjaro  Mountains 
and  seized  the  railway  running  up  from  Tanga,  on 
the  Indian  Ocean  coast.  Then  he  worked  his  way 
south  to  within  twenty-five  miles  of  the  main  east- 


dole]  Asiatic  and  Colonial  Campaigns  225 

and-west  railroad,  running  from  Dar-Es-Salaam  to 
Ujiji. 

Another  British  column,  coming  from  the  north, 
reached  Kilimatinde,  on  the  main  cross  line.  A  Belgian 
detachment,  coming  south-east  from  the  Belgian 
Congo,  captured  Tabora,  farther  west  on  the  main 
railroad.  Ujiji  was  also  occupied  by  the  Belgians. 
A  British  column  moved  north  into  German  East 
Africa  from  Nyassaland,  and  Portuguese  troops  crossed 
the  border  from  Portuguese  East  Africa.  Dar-es- 
Salaam  was  captured  by  naval  forces  on  September 
3d  and  by  the  end  of  the  year  all  the  coast  towns  were 
in  hands  of  the  Allies.  The  German  forces  were  driven 
into  the  mountainous  sector  south  of  the  central  east- 
and-west  railroad,  where  they  held  out  until  late  in 
1917. 

Portugal  had  nominally  entered  the  war  in  19 14 
under  the  terms  of  her  treaty  of  alliance  with  Great 
Britain.  She  was  bound  to  furnish  Great  Britain 
with  ten  thousand  troops,  if  called  on.  No  call  of 
any  sort  was  made  until  February,  1916,  when  the 
British  Government  asked  Portugal  to  commandeer 
forty  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  ships,  interned 
in  Portuguese  harbours.  This  was  done  and  on  March 
9th  Germany  declared  war  on  Portugal.  Austro- 
Hungary  issued  a  similar  declaration  on  March  15th. 
Portugal  had,  however,  previously  engaged  in  hostilities 
with  German  troops  on  the  Angola-German  South- 
west Africa  border. 

IS 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE  BATTLE  OF  JUTLAND — OTHER  NAVAL  OPERATIONS 

OF  1916 

The  battle  of  Jutland  (May  31-June  1,  1916)  was 
the  only  fleet  engagement  of  the  war.  It  was  the  first 
full  test  of  the  new  modes  and  appliances  of  warfare  at 
sea.  The  dreadnaught,  the  super-dreadnaught,  the 
battle  cruiser,  the  submarine,  the  enlarged  destroyer, 
the  long-range  torpedo,  the  scouting  seaplane,  and  the 
Zeppelin  had  all  come  in  since  the  battle  between 
the  Russian  and  Japanese  fleets  in  the  Sea  of  Japan. 
In  tonnage,  armour,  speed,  and  weight  of  broadside  the 
two  armadas  which  fought  off  Horn  Reef  were  incom- 
parably the  most  formidable  ever  assembled. 

Yet  Jutland  will  never  rank  as  one  of  the  crowning 
naval  battles  of  history.  It  was  indecisive.  It  ended 
in  confusion.  The  superior  British  fleet  drew  off  on 
June  1st,  not  knowing  whether  it  had  won  a  victory, 
fought  a  draw,  or  suffered  a  reverse.  The  inferior 
German  fleet  claimed  a  victory.  But  it  never  sought 
an  action  again. 

Possibly  when  it  left  its  bases  it  did  not  expect  to 
fight.  The  collision  was  accidental.  While  Admiral 
Scheer  was  cruising  along  the  Danish  coast,  the  British 
Grand  Fleet  happened  to  be  making  one  of  its  periodi- 
cal sweeps  through  the  North  Sea.     It  had  left  Scapa 

226 


[i9i6]  The  Battle  of  Jutland  227 

Flow  on  May  30th  and  was  coming  south  in  the  usual 
formation,  with  the  battle  cruiser  squadron,  accompanied 
by  scouts,  about  fifty  miles  ahead  of  the  battle  fleet. 

Sir  David  Beatty  was  in  command  of  this  advanced 
force,  to  which  was  also  attached  the  fifth  battle 
squadron.  He  didn't  anticipate  meeting  the  enemy 
and  had  orders,  when  he  reached  latitude  560  40',  to 
turn  north  again  and  get  into  visual  contact  with  the 
main  fleet.  At  2  p.m.  on  May  31st  he  had  turned 
north.  At  2.20  p.m.  the  light  cruiser  Galatea  sighted 
to  the  east  two  enemy  vessels,  apparently  holding  up 
a  neutral  merchant  steamer.  Fifteen  minutes  later, 
smoke,  indicating  the  presence  of  an  enemy  squadron, 
was  observed  in  the  same  direction.  Beatty  steered 
east  and  at  3.31  p.m.  made  out  five  German  battle 
cruisers,  accompanied  by  destroyers  and  light  cruisers. 

The  first  phase  of  the  battle  was  a  running  fight 
between  this  German  battle  cruiser  squadron,  under 
Admiral  Hipper,  and  the  British  battle  cruiser  squadron 
and  fifth  battle  squadron.  Beatty  was  much  stronger 
than  Hipper.  He  had  six  battle  cruisers,  four  of  the 
Lion  class  and  two  of  the  Indefatigable  class.  The 
former  were  rated  at  28.5  knots,  and  carried  eight  13.5- 
inch  guns.  The  latter  were  rated  at  25  knots  and 
carried  eight  12-inch  guns.  The  fifth  battle  squadron 
consisted  of  four  dreadnaughts  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth 
class,  rated  at  25  knots  and  carrying  eight  15-inch  guns. 

Hipper's  squadron  was  composed  of  three  ships  of 
the  Derfflinger  class,  of  27  knots'  speed  and  carrying 
eight  12-inch  guns,  and  two  of  the  Moltke  class,  of  28 
knots'  speed  and  carrying  ten  11 -inch  guns. 

The  fighting  began  at  3.48  p.m.,  at  a  range  of  18,500 
yards.  The  German  squadron  had  turned  south  so 
as  to  draw  the  British  toward  the  main  High  Sea  Fleet. 


228  The  Great  War  [1916] 

Shortly  after  4  p.m.  the  Indefatigable  was  hit  by  a  Ger- 
man salvo.  Her  magazine  exploded  and  she  sank  in 
a  few  minutes.  The  range  now  increased  and  the 
fighting  slackened.  Both  sides  began  to  develop  a 
torpedo  attack.  In  this  the  British  destroyers  Nestor 
and  Nomad  were  crippled  and  then  lost.  At  4.26  p.m. 
the  Queen  Mary  was  struck  by  a  salvo  and  exploded  as 
the  Indefatigable  had  done. 

About  ten  minutes  later  the  German  battle  fleet 
was  sighted  and  Admiral  Beatty  swung  his  ships 
around  and  started  back  north.  The  German  battle 
cruiser  squadron  turned  and  followed,  the  main  German 
fleet  bringing  up  the  rear. 

The  next  phase  of  the  battle  was  the  running  fight 
north  toward  the  British  main  fleet.  This  lasted  until 
6.15  p.m.,  when  the  German  battle  cruiser  squadron 
was  again  in  approximately  the  position  in  which  it 
was  when  the  fighting  began.  The  British  battle 
cruiser  fleet  was  north  of  the  German  and  the  main 
British  fleet,  under  Admiral  Jellicoe,  was  approaching 
on  a  course  which  would  carry  it  head  on  against  the 
van  of  the  enemy.  During  the  northward  run  the 
weather  thickened,  the  British  battle  cruisers  ceasing 
firing  for  thirty  minutes.  The  fifth  battle  squadron 
brought  up  the  rear  of  the  battle  cruiser  squadron  and 
engaged  the  German  battle  fleet  at  long  range.  Little 
damage  was  done,  however,  on  either  side  in  this 
return  movement. 

The  crisis  of  the  engagement  was  now  at  hand. 
Beatty  had  decoyed  Scherr  north  into  a  position  in 
which  he  would  find  it  difficult  to  avoid  engaging 
the  entire  British  fleet.  It  was  a  situation  which  he 
could  not  have  relished,  for  he  was  at  a  great  disad- 
vantage in  speed,  tonnage,  and  gun  power.     In  the 


Ii9i6]  The  Battle  of  Jutland  229 

main  fleet,  which  was  approaching  him,  were  twenty- 
four  modern  battleships,  nine  older  battleships,  and 
three  battle  cruisers.  He  had  himself  only  sixteen 
modern  battleships  and  five  battle  cruisers.  Of  Beatty 's 
squadron  four  battle  cruisers  and  four  battleships  re- 
mained available. 

In  his  admirable  book,  The  British  Navy  in  Battle, 
Mr.  Arthur  H.  Pollen  makes  this  succinct  comparison 
between  the  German  strength  at  Jutland  and  the 
British  strength: 

Against  sixteen  modern  battleships  he  himself 
[Admiral  Jellicoe]  commanded  twenty-four,  a  superi- 
ority of  three  to  two.  His  gun  power,  measured 
by  the  weight  and  striking  energy  of  his  broadsides, 
must  have  been  nearly  twice  that  of  the  enemy; 
measured  by  the  striking  energy  and  the  destructive 
power  of  its  heavier  shells,  it  was  greater  still.  Op- 
posed to  the  enemy's  five  battle  cruisers  there  were 
four  under  the  command  of  Sir  David  Beatty,  and 
three  led  by  Rear-Admiral  Hood.  Against  the  six 
18-knot  pre-dreadnaughts  that  formed  the  rear  of 
the  German  fleet,  with  their  twenty-four  u-inch 
guns,  firing  a  700-pound  shell,  there  were  Rear- 
Admiral  Evan  Thomas's  four  25-knot  ships,  carrying 
thirty-two  15-inch  guns,  whose  shells  were  three 
times  as  heavy  and  must  have  been  nine  times  as 
destructive.  This  force,  vastly  superior,  if  it  could 
be  concentrated  for  its  purpose,  had  to  be  deployed 
for  a  blow  which,  if  simultaneously  delivered  at  the 
range  at  which  the  guns  would  hit,  must  be  final  in 
a  very  brief  period. 

Scherr  had  no  guns  of  heavier  calibre  than  12-inch 
and  the  average  speed  of  his  fleet  was  three  or  four 


230  The  Great  War  [19161 

knots  less  than  that  of  the  British  fleet.  He  was  150 
miles  from  his  mine  fields  and  200  miles  from  his  bases. 
To  turn  and  run  precipitately  would  be  to  court  a 
great  disaster.  To  advance  farther  north  would  also 
be  fatal,  since  the  British  would  then  envelop  his 
van.  Nothing  apparently  could  save  him  but  good 
luck  and  shrewd  seamanship. 

Before  he  had  learned  of  Jellicoe's  approach  he  had 
begun  to  steer  off  to  the  east.  After  he  discovered 
what  was  ahead  of  him  he  decided  to  seize  the  first 
opportunity  to  turn  to  the  south-west  and  run  toward 
home. 

The  battle  cruiser  squadron  under  Beatty  was  rein- 
forced, about  6.10  p.m.,  by  the  Third  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron,  under  Rear-Admiral  Hood,  which  had 
been  with  the  main  fleet.  It  formed  ahead  of  the  Lion, 
Beatty's  flagship,  and  closed  in  on  the  German  battle 
cruisers  to  a  range  of  8600  yards.  In  this  brief  attack 
Hood's  flagship,  the  Invincible,  was  hit  by  a  shell  which 
caused  the  explosion  of  her  magazine.  His  other  two 
battle  cruisers,  the  Inflexible  and  Indomitable,  then  fell 
to  the  rear  of  Beatty's  squadron,  which  was  moving 
east-north-east  and  trying  to  get  across  the  bow  of 
the  German  battle  cruiser  squadron. 

The  British  Grand  Fleet  arrived  from  the  north- 
west at  a  little  after  six  o'clock.  It  came  up  in  six 
columns  and  found  the  van  of  the  German  fleet  on 
its  starboard  side.  Admiral  Jellicoe  had  now  to 
decide  whether  to  deploy  to  starboard  or  to  port. 
Deploying  to  starboard  would  bring  him  into  close 
quarters  with  the  enemy,  and  subject  him  to  the 
risk  not  only  of  damage  during  the  deployment  but 
also  of  torpedo  attack.  He  says,  in  his  book,  The 
Grand  Fleet,  IQ14-IQ16: 


[i9i6]  The  Battle  of  Jutland  231 

My  first  and  natural  impulse  was  to  form  on  the 
starboard  wing  column  in  order  to  bring  the  fleet 
into  action  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  but  it 
became  increasingly  apparent,  both  from  the  sound 
of  gun-fire  and  the  reports  from  the  Lion  and  the 
Barham,  that  the  High  Sea  Fleet  was  in  such  close 
proximity  and  on  such  a  bearing  as  to  create  obvious 
disadvantages  in  such  a  movement.  I  assumed 
that  the  German  destroyers  would  be  ahead  of  their 
Battle  Fleet,  and  it  was  clear  that,  owing  to  the  mist, 
the  operations  of  the  destroyers  attacking  from  such 
a  commanding  position  in  the  van  would  be  much 
facilitated;  it  would  be  suicidal  to  place  the  Battle 
Fleet  in  a  position  where  it  would  be  open  to  attack 
by  destroyers  during  such  a  deployment,  as  such 
an  event  would  throw  the  fleet  into  confusion  at  a 
critical  moment. 

Jellicoe,  therefore,  ordered  a  deployment  on  the 
port  column,  farthest  from  the  enemy.  After  deploy- 
ing, he  laid  a  course  to  the  east  parallel  to  Beatty's, 
but  some  distance  to  the  north.  This  manoeuvre 
gave  Scherr  his  chance.  He  utilized  smoke  screens, 
as  far  as  possible,  to  conceal  his  course  and  at  6.45  p.m. 
launched  a  torpedo  attack.  This  had  the  effect  of 
opening  the  range  between  himself  and  Jellicoe. 
Thereupon  he  turned  his  fleet  from  an  easterly  to  a 
south-westerly  course. 

The  last  phase  of  the  battle  now  began.  The  Grand 
Fleet  changed  its  course  to  the  south  at  7.33  P.M. 
The  battle  cruiser  squadron,  which  had  passed  away  to 
the  north-east  and  out  of  touch  with  the  enemy, 
hauled  around  and  pursued,  crossing  the  track  of  the 
main  fleet.     In  the  mist  it  was  difficult  to  maintain 


232  The  Great  War 


[1916] 


contact  with  the  enemy.  There  were  several  brief 
encounters,  between  isolated  ships,  but  the  Germans 
succeeded  in  evading  a  renewal  of  the  battle.  The 
Lion  finally  lost  track  of  the  enemy  at  7.45  p.m.  The 
last  ship  to  report  contact  was  the  Falmouth,  which 
sighted  one  German  vessel  at  8.38  p.m. 

Both  fleets  spent  the  night  somewhere  about  eighty 
miles  west  of  Horn  Reef.  There  was  a  good  deal  of 
sniping  by  light  craft  in  the  darkness.  At  dawn  there 
was  a  visibility  of  only  four  miles.  The  Grand  Fleet 
remained  in  the  vicinity  of  the  field  of  battle,  until  1 1 
a.m.  on  June  1st,  and  then  cruised  north,  collecting  the 
scattered  units.  At  1.15  p.m.  a  course  was  laid  for 
Scotland. 

The  German  fleet  limped  home  unmolested.  The 
German  Admiralty  claimed  a  victory  on  the  basis  of 
relative  losses.  The  showing  made  by  German  reports 
was  impressive.  The  British  admitted  the  loss  of 
three  battle  cruisers,  the  Indefatigable,  the  Queen  Mary, 
and  the  Invincible;  of  three  armoured  cruisers,  the 
Defence,  the  Black  Prince,  and  the  Warrior;  and  of 
eight  destroyers,  the  Tipperary,  Turbulent,  Fortune, 
Sparrow  Hawk,  Ardent,  Nomad,  Nestor,  and  Shark. 

The  Germans  acknowledged  the  loss  of  one  battle 
cruiser,  the  Liitzow;  one  pre-dreadnaught,  the  Pommern; 
four  light  cruisers,  the  Rostock,  Frauenlob,  Elbing,  and 
Wiesbaden;  and  five  destroyers.  The  tonnage  lost 
was,  according  to  these  announcements:  British, 
117,510;  German,  60,720.  The  British  lost  6105  men; 
the  Germans,  2414.  But  the  High  Sea  Fleet  was  badly 
battered  up.  The  German  vessels  had  heavier  armour 
than  the  British  had  and  many  of  them  were  thus 
enabled  to  make  port,  although  seriously  damaged. 
The  battle  cruiser  Seydlitz  was  saved  by  beaching. 


[i9i6]  The  Battle  of  Jutland  233 

After  the  armistice  Captain  Persius,  the  foremost 
German  naval  critic,  admitted  in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt 
that  the  German  fleet's  losses  were  "severe."  He 
also  said:  "On  June  I,  191 6,  it  was  clear  to  every 
thinking  person  that  this  battle  must  be  the  last  one." 

For  Great  Britain  the  result  of  the  engagement  was 
disappointing.  Failure  to  crush  the  inferior  German 
fleet  deprived  the  Allies  of  the  chance  to  enforce  a 
close  blockade  of  the  German  naval  bases  and  thus 
reduce  submarine  warfare  to  a  minimum.  Another 
Trafalgar  would  probably  have  saved,  within  the  fol- 
lowing two  years,  seven  or  eight  million  tons  of  Allied 
and  neutral  merchant  shipping.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  Trafalgar,  in  1916,  would  have  kept  the  United 
States  out  of  the  war.  And  it  is  an  open  question 
whether  the  Entente  Powers  could  ever  have  won  the 
war  on  land  without  the  assistance  of  the  United  States. 
The  escape  of  the  German  fleet  was,  therefore,  in  the 
end  a  dubious  piece  of  luck  for  Germany. 

Admiral  Jellicoe  has  been  severely  criticized  for  his 
failure  to  close  in  on  the  German  fleet  on  the  evening 
of  May  31st.  But  he  pursued  a  policy  reflecting  the 
fixed  views  of  the  British  Admiralty.  He  says  in  his 
book,  defending  his  own  caution: 

A  third  consideration  that  was  present  in  my  mind 
was  the  necessity  for  not  leaving  anything  to  chance 
in  a  fleet  action,  because  our  fleet  was  the  one  and  only 
factor  that  was  vital  to  the  existence  of  the  Empire, 
as,  indeed,  to  the  Allied  cause.  We  had  no  reserve 
outside  the  Battle  Fleet  which  could  in  any  way  have 
taken  its  place,  should  disaster  befall  it,  or  even 
should  its  margin  of  superiority  over  the  enemy  be 
eliminated. 


234  The  Great  War  [1916] 

This  echoes  the  principle  laid  down  by  Lord  Fisher 
in  19 1 5  in  his  memorandum  on  the  Dardanelles  expedi- 
tion, in  which  a  protest  was  made  against  risking 
even  obsolete  pre-dreadnaughts.  Lord  Fisher  wrote 
to  Premier  Asquith : 

As  long  as  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  possesses 
its  present  strength  and  splendid  gunnery  efficiency, 
so  long  it  is  imperative  that  no  operation  be  under- 
taken by  the  British  Fleet  calculated  to  impair  its 
superiority,  which  is  none  too  great,  in  view  of  the 
heavy  losses  already  experienced  in  ships  and  men, 
which  latter  cannot  be  filled  in  the  period  of  the  war, 
in  which  the  navy  differs  materially  from  the  army. 
Even  the  older  ships  should  not  be  risked,  for  they 
cannot  be  lost  without  losing  men  and  they  form  the 
only  reserve  behind  the  Great  Fleet. 

It  is  probable  that  a  different  policy,  producing  differ- 
ent results,  would  have  been  followed,  if  the  aggressive 
Beatty  had  commanded  at  Jutland,  instead  of  the 
conservative  Jellicoe. 

On  August  19th  a  part  of  the  German  fleet  came  out 
again.  Its  scouting  forces  encountered  British  scout- 
ing forces.  In  the  fighting  which  followed  the  British 
cruisers  Falmouth  and  Nottingham  were  sunk  by  tor- 
pedoes. The  German  battleship  Westfalen,  of  18,600 
tons,  was  damaged  by  a  torpedo,  but  did  not  sink. 

The  British  battleship  King  Edward  VII  was  sunk 
by  a  mine  off  the  east  coast  of  England  on  January 
9th.  On  February  26.  the  light  cruiser  Arethusa  was 
lost  in  a  similar  manner.  On  April  23d-24th  British 
monitors,  cruisers,  destroyers,  and  aircraft  bombarded 
the  German  base  at  Zeebrugge  and  German  batteries 


[i9i6]  Other  Naval  Operations  235 

in  its  neighbourhood.  On  April  25th  a  German  raiding 
squadron  bombarded  Lowestoft  and  Great  Yarmouth, 
on  the  east  coast  of  England.  The  British  armoured 
cruiser  Hampshire  struck  a  mine  near  Scapa  Flow  on 
June  6th  and  sank  in  a  few  minutes.  Earl  Kitchener, 
who  was  on  his  way  to  Russia  on  a  military  mission, 
went  down  with  the  ship. 

In  July  the  German  merchant  submarine  Deutsch- 
land  made  a  trip  to  the  United  States,  arriving  at  the 
port  of  Baltimore.  She  returned  in  August.  In  Octo- 
ber the  German  U-53  entered  the  harbour  of  Newport, 
R.  I.  Leaving  in  haste,  she  cruised  for  a  few  days  off 
Nantucket  Island,  destroying  several  merchant  vessels, 
two  of  them  neutrals. 

The  disguised  commerce  destroyer  Moewe  escaped 
from  a  German  port  in  January  and  returned  safely 
on  March  5th.  On  her  cruise  she  destroyed  one  French, 
one  Belgian,  and  twelve  British  merchantmen.  The 
British  battleship  Russell  was  sunk  in  the  Mediterranean 
on  April  27th. 

The  French  lost  by  submarine  attack  or  mines, 
during  1916,  the  cruiser  Admiral  Charner  (February 
13th),  the  transport  Provence,  with  3100  men  (Febru- 
ary 27th),  the  destroyer  Renaudin  (March  18th), 
and  the  battleship  Suffren,  with  700  men  (December 
8th). 

The  Italian  transport  Principe  Umberto  was  sunk 
on  June  9th  and  the  super-dreadnaught  Leonardo  da 
Vinci  on  August  2d.  The  Russian  battleship  Im- 
peratritsa  Maria  was  destroyed,  probably  by  an  ex- 
plosion, on  October  20th.  The  Allies  reported  the 
destruction  by  submarines  of  a  German  light  cruiser 
of  the  Kolberg  class  and  a  battleship  of  the  Nassau 
class. 


236  The  Great  War  [1916] 

From  August  1,  1914,  to  June  30,  1916,  German 
submarines  sank  about  690  enemy  merchant  ships, 
with  a  tonnage  of  about  1,600,000,  and  218  neutrals, 
with  a  tonnage  of  about  370,000. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

AMERICA   DRIFTS   TOWARD   WAR.      JANUARY    I,    I916- 
DECEMBER  31,    I916 

Friction  between  the  United  States  and  Germany 
over  the  illegal  use  of  the  submarine  continued  through 
1 91 6.  The  Lusitania  case  passed  into  oblivion,  un- 
settled. Other  cases  arose  which  challenged  the 
sincerity  of  the  pledge  with  regard  to  the  treatment  of 
"liners,"  which  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  had 
given  the  United  States  after  the  sinking  of  the  Arabic 
and  the  Ancona. 

The  passenger  steamer  Persia  was  destroyed  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean  on  January  2d,  one  of  the 
passengers  lost  being  an  American  consul.  No  satis- 
factory evidence  was  obtained,  however,  that  the  vessel 
had  been  torpedoed  by  a  submarine.  But  on  March 
24th  the  passenger  steamer  Sussex  was  sunk  in  the 
English  Channel.  Twenty-five  of  the  passengers  were 
American  citizens.  Four  other  steamers  on  which 
Americans  were  travelling  were  torpedoed  about  the 
same  time:  the  Englishman,  the  Manchester  Engineer, 
the  Berwindale,  and  the  Eagle.  Three  of  these  four,  the 
German  Foreign  Office  said,  had  attempted  to  escape. 
About  the  other  it  professed  a  lack  of  information. 
It  also  flatly  denied  responsibility  for  the  fate  of  the 
Sussex.    A  German  submarine  had  sunk  a  vessel  in 

237 


238  The  Great  War  [i»i6] 

the  English  Channel  on  March  24th,  it  was  admitted, 
but  the  commander  was  sure  that  it  was  a  war  vessel 
or  a  mine  layer,  and  not  the  Sussex. 

The  American  Government  easily  determined  the 
fact  that  the  Sussex  was  sunk  by  a  German  U-boat, 
for  pieces  of  a  German  torpedo  were  found  in  the  wreck. 
The  State  Department,  thereupon,  on  April  18th, 
sent  a  note  to  Berlin  citing  the  frequent  instances  of 
Germany's  disregard  of  her  pledge  not  to  attack  '  'liners ' ' 
(passenger  vessels)  without  warning  and  without  pro- 
viding for  the  safety  of  those  on  board.  Secretary  Lan- 
sing gave  notice  that  the  United  States  would  sever 
diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  "unless  the  Imperial 
Government  should  now  immediately  declare  and  effect 
an  abandonment  of  its  present  methods  of  submarine 
warfare  against  passenger  and  freight-carrying  vessels." 

The  note,  in  fact,  demanded  an  extension  of  the 
German  guarantee  in  the  Arabic  case  so  as  to  include 
freighters  as  well  as  "liners." 

Germany  was  reluctant,  in  the  spring  of  1916,  to 
drive  the  United  States  into  war.  Jagow,  therefore, 
began  to  hedge.  He  replied  on  May  4th  that  perhaps 
the  German  U-boat  commander  was  mistaken  about 
the  Sussex.  As  to  the  other  vessels  the  German  Govern- 
ment had  given  no  promise  not  to  attack  freighters. 
Nevertheless,  Germany  had  no  desire  to  raise  an  issue 
"threatening  the  maintenance  of  peace  between  the 
two  nations."  He  accordingly  renewed  and  enlarged 
the  Arabic  guarantee  by  informing  the  United  States 
that  the  following  orders  had  been  given  to  the  German 
naval  forces: 

In  accordance  with  the  general  principle  of  visit 
and    search    and    destruction    of  merchant  vessels, 


fi9i6]      America  Drifts  Toward  War     239 

recognized  by  international  law,  such  vessels,  both 
within  and  without  the  area  declared  as  a  naval 
war  zone,  shall  not  be  sunk  without  warning  and 
without  saving  human  lives,  unless  those  ships 
attempt  to  escape  or  offer  resistance. 

The  observance  of  this  pledge  was  made  conditional, 
however,  on  an  insistence  by  the  United  States  that 
Great  Britain  should  forthwith  observe  the  rules  of 
international  law  as  laid  down  in  the  American  notes 
to  Great  Britain  of  December  28,  19 14,  and  November 
5,  191 5,  which  had  protested  against  the  stringencies 
and  irregularities  of  the  Allied  blockade.  If  this  in- 
sistence produced  no  effect,  Germany  would  reserve  to 
herself  "complete  liberty  of  decision."  The  State  De- 
partment replied,  on  May  8th,  accepting  the  German 
assurance,  but  rejecting  the  theory  that  the  settlement 
of  questions  in  dispute  between  the  United  States  and 
Germany  could  be  made  dependent  on  the  outcome 
of  negotiations  between  this  country  and  other  bel- 
ligerents. On  the  same  day  Jagow  admitted  German 
responsibility  for  the  sinking  of  the  Sussex  and  offered 
reparation. 

Another  complication,  with  reverberations  in  domes- 
tic politics,  occurred  over  the  question  of  arming  Allied 
merchantmen.  On  February  10th  the  German  and 
Austro-Hungarian  representatives  in  Washington  an- 
nounced that  after  February  29th  their  governments 
would  treat  armed  merchantmen  as  auxiliary  cruisers. 
Secretary  Lansing  had  sent  a  note,  on  January  18th,  to 
the  Entente  ambassadors,  urging  that  their  governments 
agree  to  disarm  merchantmen.     He  ended  by  saying : 

I  may  add  that  my  government  is  impressed  with 
the  reasonableness  of  the  argument  that  a  merchant 


240  The  Great  War  [19161 

vessel  carrying  an  armament  of  any  sort,  in  view  of 
the  character  of  submarine  warfare  and  the  defensive 
character  of  under-sea  craft,  should  be  held  to  be 
an  auxiliary  cruiser,  and  so  treated  by  a  neutral  as 
well  as  by  a  belligerent  government,  and  is  seriously 
considering  instructing  its  officials  accordingly. 

This  came  dangerously  near  accepting  the  German 
argument  in  favour  of  a  modification  of  the  rules  of 
sea  warfare,  in  order  to  lift  the  disabilities  imposed  on 
the  submarine  as  a  commerce  destroyer.  Was  the 
United  States  suddenly  going  to  weaken  in  its  demand 
for  a  strict  observance  of  the  existing  international 
code?  But  suddenly,  on  February  15th,  the  Adminis- 
tration reversed  itself  and  announced  that  it  would 
make  no  change  in  existing  rules  of  warfare  at  sea 
without  the  consent  of  all  the  belligerents. 

The  pacifist  elements  in  Congress  now  grew  excited, 
fearing  that  a  new  cause  of  conflict  with  Germany  had 
been  found.  They  introduced  resolutions  forbidding 
Americans  to  travel  on  armed  merchantmen  and  for- 
bidding such  merchantmen  the  use  of  American  ports. 

A  sharp  controversy  ensued  between  the  President 
and  the  pacifist  leaders — most  of  them  of  his  own  party. 
But  the  President  had  public  opinion  behind  him  in 
his  stand.  The  pacifist  resolutions  were  shelved.  Then 
on  February  29th  the  President  wrote  a  letter  to  Mr. 
Pou,  of  the  House  Committee  on  Rules,  asking  that 
the  Committee  report  out  the  resolutions  in  question 
for  the  purpose  of  affording  "full  public  discussion 
and  action  upon  them." 

Both  houses  of  Congress  shrank  from  such  a  test. 
To  avoid  it  they  went  through  the  barren  parliamentary 
ceremony  of  laying  on  the  table  the  propositions  carry- 


rn>i6i       America  Drifts  Toward  War     241 

ing  the  names  of  Senator  Gore  and  Representative 
McLemore,  thus  suppressing  "full  public  discussion 
and  action."  The  Senate,  having  little  knowledge  of 
what  it  was  doing,  actually  laid  on  the  table  a  resolu- 
tion upholding  the  President  and  saying  that  "the 
sinking  by  a  German  submarine,  without  notice  or 
warning,  of  an  armed  merchant  vessel  of  her  public 
enemy,  resulting  in  the  death  of  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  would  constitute  a  just  and  sufficient  cause  of 
war  between  the  United  States  and  the  German 
Empire. " 

That  is  what,  in  the  end,  constituted  the  "just  and 
sufficient  cause"  of  our  declaration  of  war  against 
Germany.  But  neither  the  Administration  nor  Con- 
gress was  as  yet  willing  to  visualize  war  as  the  inevi- 
table outcome  of  the  American  "war  zone"  note  of 
February  10,  1915.  All  through  1915  the  President 
deprecated  military  preparation.  Early  in  191 6  he 
made  some  preparedness  speeches.  But  no  adequate 
preparedness  measure  appeared.  The  Naval  Appro- 
priation act  of  1 916  contained  provisions  for  a  material 
increase  of  the  navy.  But  the  Hay  Army  Reorganiza- 
tion act  of  191 6  was  a  shabby  makeshift.  Secretary 
Garrison  resigned  from  the  Cabinet  on  February  10th 
as  a  protest  against  the  Administration's  acquiescence 
in  the  anaemic  military  programme  which  finally  took 
shape  in  the  Hay  law. 

The  summer  passed  without  any  further  diplomatic 
clashes  with  Germany.  On  the  contrary,  there  were 
some  differences  with  the  Allies.  The  latter  protested 
against  the  extension  of  merchantman  rights  to  the 
submarine  Deutschland,  which  had  arrived  at  Baltimore 
with  a  cargo  on  July  8th.  But  our  government  re- 
fused to  intern  the  U-boat  or  to  admit  that  submarines 
16 


242  The  Great  War  [1916] 

ought  to  be  exempted  from  the  rules  applying  to  surface 
ships. 

On  July  1 8th  Great  Britain  published  a  blacklist 
of  eighty-three  firms  and  individuals  of  enemy  nation- 
ality, or  associations,  resident  in  the  United  States. 
Some  of  the  proscribed  firms  were  American.  The 
State  Department  made  a  vigorous  protest  at  this 
novel  extension  of  the  right  of  blockade.  Nothing 
came  of  the  negotiations  which  followed  except  the 
removal  of  seven  names  from  the  British  list. 

The  German  Government  had  its  gaze  fixed  on  the 
European  battlefields.  When  the  Russian  offensive 
in  Galicia  and  Bukowina  died  down,  the  Franco-British 
attack  on  the  Somme  was  checked,  and  Rumania  was 
invaded  by  Mackensen  and  Falkenhayn,  the  fit  of 
caution  which  had  inspired  the  Sussex  note  was  over. 
The  submarine  commanders  again  grew  reckless.  The 
British  steamer  Marina  was  sunk  off  the  coast  of  Ire- 
land on  November  1st,  and  six  American  passengers 
were  drowned.  A  few  days  earlier  the  Rowanmore, 
with  American  passengers  aboard,  was  torpedoed. 
Then  the  British  steamer  Arabia,  with  one  American 
passenger,  was  sunk  off  Malta  and  the  American  steamer 
Columbian  was  destroyed  off  the  Mediterranean  coast 
of  Spain.  On  December  4th  the  Italian  steamer 
Palermo,  with  twenty-five  Americans  aboard,  was  tor- 
pedoed in  the  Mediterranean  on  her  way  from  New 
York  to  Genoa. 

The  German  Government  gave  evasive  excuses  in 
all  these  cases.  Feeling  confident  that  the  war  was 
going  Germany's  way,  Berlin  on  December  12th 
patronizingly  invited  the  Allies  to  enter  into  peace 
negotiations.  President  Wilson  was  invited  to  transmit 
the  offer  to  France  and  Great  Britain.     This  he  did. 


[i9i6]      America  Drifts  Toward  War     243 

He  went  farther.  In  a  note  addressed  to  all  the  bel- 
ligerents on  December  18th  he  asked  them  to  state  the 
terms  on  which,  in  their  view,  the  war  could  be  brought 
to  an  end. 

In  explaining  his  purpose  in  making  this  suggestion 
Mr.  Wilson  said: 

He  [the  President]  takes  the  liberty  of  calling 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  objects  which  the 
statesmen  of  the  belligerents  on  both  sides  have  in 
mind  in  this  war  are  virtually  the  same,  as  stated  in 
general  terms  to  their  own  people  and  to  the  world. 
Each  side  desires  to  make  the  rights  and  privileges 
of  weak  peoples  and  small  states  as  secure  against 
aggression  or  denial  in  the  future  as  the  rights  of  the 
great  and  powerful  states  now  at  war. 

In  a  recent  volume,  The  Peace  President:  a  Brief 
Appreciation,  Mr.  William  Archer  remarks:  "Surely 
the  irony  of  this  passage  ought  to  have  been  understood 
from  the  first."  Irony  is  easily  misunderstood  in  the 
heat  of  a  great  war.  The  country  was  greatly  puzzled 
by  the  President's  request  for  terms  and  at  a  loss  to 
understand  the  motives  for  it.  Secretary  Lansing 
may  have  let  out  the  truth  in  a  blunt  statement  which 
he  made  about  the  note.     He  said : 

More  and  more  our  own  rights  are  becoming  in- 
volved by  the  belligerents  on  both  sides,  so  that  the 
situation  is  becoming  critical.  I  mean  by  that  that 
we  are  drawing  nearer  the  verge  of  war  ourselves, 
and,  therefore,  we  are  entitled  to  know  exactly  what 
each  belligerent  seeks  in  order  that  we  may  negotiate 
our  conduct  in   the  future.  .  .  .     The  sending  of 


244  The  Great  War 


[19161 


this  note  will  indicate  the  possibility  of  our  being 
forced  into  war.  .  .  .  Neither  the  President  nor 
myself  regards  the  note  as  a  peace  note. 

This  apparently  indiscreet  admission  was  recalled 
a  few  hours  later.  Mr.  Lansing  reversed  himself  by 
announcing  that  he  "did  not  intend  to  intimate  that 
the  government  was  considering  any  change  in  its 
policy  of  neutrality."  But  the  preservation  of  the 
policy  of  neutrality  was  no  longer  a  matter  within 
the  control  of  the  American  Government.  So  long  as 
the  note  of  February  10,  191 5,  remained  uncancelled 
and  the  correspondence  in  the  Sussex  case  remained 
unmodified,  the  power  to  draw  the  United  States  into 
war  or  keep  her  out  of  it  rested  with  Germany.  And 
Germany  was  about  to  make  her  decision. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

GERMANY    DEFIES    AMERICA.        JANUARY    31,     I917- 
JUNE  30,    I917 

The  winter  months  of  191 7  marked  the  turning- 
point  of  the  war.  Mittel-Europa  was  a  reality.  On 
the  face  of  the  war  map  Germany  had  assured  her 
continental  position.  She  had  defeated  Russia,  seized 
Poland,  the  Baltic  Provinces,  Lithuania,  and  parts  of 
White  Russia,  conquered  the  Balkans  and  annexed 
Turkey  in  Asia.  She  held  practically  all  of  Belgium 
and  a  large  area  in  Northern  France.  Russia  was 
about  to  collapse  and  become  a  prey  to  revolution. 
All  the  Germans  needed  to  do  was  to  tire  out  the  re- 
maining Allies  by  maintaining  the  deadlock  on  the 
Western  Front. 

But  German  military  policy  remained  emotional 
and  confused.  The  old  illusion  of  overseas  and  world 
power  still  haunted  the  Kaiser  and  the  clique  which 
controlled  him.  This  clique  now  found  in  Ludendorff, 
a  "plunger"  in  strategy  and  politics,  the  agent  whom 
it  needed.  Hindenburg  was  too  conservative  and 
unimaginative  to  suit  the  Pan-German  extremists. 
Besides,  he  was  an  Easterner  by  instinct  and  conviction. 
So  they  displaced  him  in  the  supreme  command 
(though  not  outwardly)  by  his  junior  associate,  who 
was  willing  to  try  to  conquer  France  and  bring  Great 

245 


246  The  Great  War  [1917] 

Britain  to  her  knees,  whatever  risks  might  be  involved 
in  such  an  enterprise. 

Great  Britain  could  be  attacked  only  through  the 
submarine.  An  unrestricted  use  of  the  U-boat  would 
mean  war  with  the  United  States.  But  Ludendorff, 
with  the  narrow  vision  imbued  into  the  German  General 
Staff  by  years  of  self -worship,  held  America's  military 
power  as  cheaply  as  the  Kaiser  had  held  Great  Britain's 
in  1 914.  He  therefore  cheerfully  paid  the  price  of 
the  military  dictatorship  offered  him  by  supporting 
the  demand  for  a  withdrawal  of  the  Sussex  pledges  and 
a  renewal  of  indiscriminate  submarine  warfare.  Once 
installed  in  the  dictatorship,  he  forced  the  removal  of 
Chancellor  Bethmann-Hollweg,  who  was  dispassionate 
enough  to  see  that  Germany  had  vastly  more  to  lose 
than  to  gain  by  running  amuck  with  her  U-boats  and 
thus  forcing  war  with  the  United  States. 

The  German  peace  offer  of  December  12,  191 6,  was 
probably  intended  in  part  as  a  flourish  with  which  to 
cover  the  decision,  already  reached,  to  extend  and 
intensify  the  U-boat  "blockade."  The  Allied  answer 
to  the  German  proposal,  delivered  in  Berlin  on  January 
4,  191 7,  was  what  might  have  been  expected.  The 
Entente  refused  to  consider  the  German  offer  because 
it  was  "empty  and  insincere."  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  answered  President  Wilson's  request  for  terms, 
made  on  December  18,  191 6,  by  again  suggesting  the 
calling  of  a  peace  conference.  The  Entente  Powers 
replied  on  January  12th,  giving  a  general  outline  of 
their  war  aims,  which  included  restoration  of  con- 
quered Allied  territory,  reparation,  the  reorganization 
of  Europe,  the  dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary, 
and  the  partition  of  Turkey. 

On  January  18th  President  Wilson  delivered  before 


[X9i7]         Germany  Defies  America         247 

the  Senate  his  "peace  without  victory"  address. 
Taking  the  communications  from  the  two  sets  of  bel- 
ligerents as  a  groundwork  to  build  on,  he  outlined  his 
own  views  of  a  proper  peace  and  of  the  terms  on  which 
our  government  would  enter  any  "Concert  of  Powers" 
or  "League  for  Peace,"  to  be  established  at  the  close 
of  the  war.  Among  the  conditions  which  he  empha- 
sized were  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  an  independent 
Poland,  reduction  of  armaments,  equality  of  nations, 
and  security  of  life,  worship,  and  industrial  develop- 
ment everywhere.  But  the  peace  must  first  of  all  be 
"a  peace  without  victory." 

The  purpose  of  this  address  was  mystifying,  since 
neither  set  of  belligerents  had  asked  the  United  States 
for  a  peace  formula.  If  it  was  intended  to  mollify 
Germany  and  secure  a  postponement  of  the  renewal 
of  submarine  warfare,  now  known  to  be  imminent,  it 
failed  of  its  object.  For  on  January  31st,  Count 
Bernstorfl  presented  a  note  announcing  that  from  the 
following  day  all  ships,  enemy  as  well  as  neutral,  would 
be  sunk  inside  zones  drawn  about  the  British  Isles  and 
France,  and  in  the  Mediterranean,  a  narrow  area  east 
of  Spain  excepted.  Germany  added  insult  to  injury 
by  offering  to  guarantee  the  safety  of  one  American 
passenger  steamer  a  week  each  way  from  Falmouth, 
England,  if  the  United  States  would  give  it  highly  dis- 
tinctive markings  and  forbid  it  to  carry  contraband. 

This  cancellation  of  the  Sussex  pledges  was  defended 
on  the  ground  that  the  Entente  Powers  had  refused  to 
entertain  Germany's  peace  offer.  Since  the  American 
Government,  on  April  19,  191 6,  had  threatened  to 
break  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  unless 
the  latter  should  renounce  illegal  submarine  warfare, 
the    document    transmitted    through    Bernstorfl    was 


248  The  Great  War  [1917] 

a  brusque  notice  that  Berlin  didn't  care  how  soon 
relations  were  severed. 

The  rupture  came  on  February  3d,  when  passports 
were  sent  to  Bernstorff.  By  greatly  enlarging  her  war 
zones  and  threatening  destruction  to  all  vessels  enter- 
ing them,  Germany  virtually  established  a  partial  block- 
ade of  American  ports.  American  merchantmen  were 
not  armed  to  resist  illegal  attack.  The  President  on 
February  26th  asked  Congress  for  authority  to  arm 
them  and  "to  employ  other  instrumentalities  or  meth- 
ods" necessary  to  protect  Americans  in  their  rightful 
pursuits  on  the  sea.  A  bill  granting  this  authority 
passed  the  House  of  Representatives  on  March  1st, 
although  it  had  encountered  considerable  opposition 
at  first  both  from  the  pacifists  and  from  those  who 
thought  the  President's  policy  of  "armed  neutral- 
ity" a  weak  substitute  for  war.  Its  passage  in  the 
Senate  was  prevented  by  a  pacifist  filibuster  which 
lasted  until  noon  of  March  4th. 

Meanwhile  Germany  continued  to  commit  construc- 
tive acts  of  war.  On  February  25th  the  Cunard  liner 
Laconia  was  torpedoed  without  warning  in  the  Irish 
Sea.  Three  American  passengers,  two  of  them  women, 
perished  of  exposure  after  taking  to  the  boats.  On 
March  17th  an  American  ship,  the  City  of  Memphis, 
homeward  bound  from  Cardiff,  in  ballast,  was  destroyed 
by  a  submarine.  On  March  19th  the  Illinois  and  the 
Vigilancia  were  sunk  without  warning  in  British  waters. 
The  overt  challenge  was  unmistakable.  It  had  to  be 
met  by  the  United  States. 

The  President  had  called  an  extra  session  of  the  new 
Congress  for  April  16th.  On  March  21st  he  advanced 
the  date  of  assembling  to  April  2d.  On  the  evening 
of  that  day  the  President  delivered  a  message  advising 


[19X71        Germany  Defies  America         249 

Congress  to  declare  war  against  Germany.  War  had 
come  on  the  specific  issue  of  Germany's  invasion  of 
American  rights  at  sea  by  the  illegitimate  use  of  the 
submarine.  But  in  the  message  the  reasons  for  making 
war  on  Germany  were  greatly  broadened.  Said  the 
President : 

We  shall  fight  for  the  things  which  we  have  always 
carried  nearest  our  hearts — for  democracy,  for  the 
right  of  those  who  submit  to  authority  to  have  a 
voice  in  their  own  government,  for  the  rights  and 
liberties  of  small  nations,  for  a  universal  dominion 
of  right  by  such  a  concert  of  free  peoples  as  shall 
bring  peace  and  safety  to  all  nations  and  make  the 
world  itself  at  last  free. 

These  justifications  and  causes  of  war  against  Ger- 
many had  existed  since  August,  19 14,  when  Germany 
violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  They  were  equally 
justifications  and  causes  of  war  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Turkey,  and  Bulgaria.  But  the  President  did 
not  recommend  a  declaration  of  war  against  Austria- 
Hungary  until  December,  191 7,  and  to  the  end  he  re- 
strained Congress  from  declaring  war  against  Turkey 
or  Bulgaria. 

A  resolution  declaring  the  existence  of  a  state  of 
war  with  Germany  was  passed  by  the  Senate  on  April 
3d,  and  by  the  House  of  Representatives  on  the  legis- 
lative day  of  April  5th,  actually  early  in  the  morning 
of  April  6th.  It  merely  recited  that  recent  acts  of 
Germany  were  acts  of  war  and  that  a  state  of  war  had 
been  thrust  by  those  acts  upon  the  United  States. 
No  reference  was  made  in  it  to  the  existence  of  other 
war  aims  and  causes.     Legally,  and  on  the  face  of  a 


250  The  Great  War  [tm\ 

record  extending  from  the  drafting  of  the  "war  zone" 
note  of  February  10,  191 5,  to  the  sinking  without 
warning  of  the  Vigilancia  on  March  19,  191 7,  the 
United  States  went  to  war  with  Germany  as  a  matter 
of  self-defence  and  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  national 
interests.  The  war  arose  out  of  a  controversy  over 
sea  rights,  paralleling  the  controversy  with  Great 
Britain  which  preceded  the  war  of  18 12.  When,  in  his 
oral  message  to  Congress  on  April  2d,  he  came  to  deal 
with  the  allies  of  Germany,  the  President  himself 
admitted  the  limited  and  nationalistic  character  of 
American  war  aims.     He  remarked : 

I  have  said  nothing  of  the  governments  allied  with 
the  Imperial  Government  of  Germany,  because  they 
have  not  made  war  upon  us  or  challenged  us  to  de- 
fend our  right  and  our  honour.  .  .  .  We  enter  this 
war  only  when  we  are  clearly  forced  into  it,  because 
there  are  no  other  means  of  defending  our  rights. 

And  when  war  was  declared  against  Austria-Hungary, 
on  December  7,  191 7,  Congress  again  based  its  action  ex- 
clusively on  the  fact  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment had  ' '  committed  repeated  acts  of  war  against 
the  government  and  people  of  the  United  States." 

The  existence  of  a  state  of  war  against  Germany 
having  been  proclaimed  by  the  President  on  April  6th, 
the  country  found  itself  compelled  to  take  up  hurriedly, 
in  April,  191 7,  the  work  of  military  preparation  the 
necessity  for  which  had  been  obvious  from  the  day  in 
May,  1 91 5,  when  the  Lusitania  was  sunk.  For  those 
two  years  of  neglect  the  United  States  and  the  world 
were  now  to  pay  an  enormous  penalty.  Had  America 
armed  in  1915,  she  could  either  have  kept  out  of  the 


[X9X7]         Germany  Defies  America         251 

war  (Germany  recognizing  the  folly  of  driving  us  in) 
or  she  could  have  begun  to  make  war  in  191 7  with  an 
energy  which  would  have  minimized  costs  and  losses. 
Had  we  been  able  to  send  a  trained  expeditionary  force 
of  1,500,000  men  to  France  in  the  spring  and  summer 
of  191 7,  the  war  might  easily  have  been  brought  to  an 
end  that  year. 

Unready  as  they  were,  the  American  people  entered 
the  war  with  a  sense  of  relief.  They  were  clearer- 
sighted  than  their  government.  Under  the  pressure 
of  public  sentiment  a  conscription  act,  which  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  refused  to  recommend  or  support 
up  to  March  4,  191 7,  was  passed  by  Congress  and 
signed  on  May  18th.  It  was  carried  swiftly  into 
effect  by  the  volunteer  labours  of  local  boards.  No 
war  in  which  the  United  States  had  ever  engaged  so 
solidified  the  nation  as  did  the  war  with  Germany.  The 
Great  General  Staff  at  Berlin  had  put  the  United  States 
as  a  belligerent  into  the  same  class  with  Rumania,  Ser- 
bia, Belgium,  or  Portugal.  It  conceded  the  ability  of 
the  Allies  to  draw  upon  America's  economic  resources, 
whether  she  became  a  belligerent  or  remained  a  neutral. 
But  it  smiled  at  the  idea  of  American  troops  turning 
the  scale  on  the  battlefields  of  France. 

That  was  Germany's  fatal  error  of  judgment.  She 
had  practically  disposed  of  the  Russian  colossus.  But 
she  had  taken  on  a  new  enemy  many  times  more  dan- 
gerous than  Russia.  For  America  was  in  the  war  to 
stay  and  her  military  power,  when  developed,  would 
overtop  German  military  power. 

More  than  that,  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
the  war  was  certain  to  draw  in  other  American  nations. 
Brazil  severed  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  on 
April  nth  and  seized  forty-six  interned  German  ships. 


252  The  Great  War  [1917] 

She  declared  war  on  October  26,  191 7.  Cuba  and 
Panama  declared  war  on  April  7th.  Other  Latin  Amer- 
ican states  severed  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany : 
Bolivia,  on  April  14th;  Guatemala,  on  April  27th;  Hon- 
duras, on  May  17th;  Nicaragua,  on  May  18th;  Haiti,  on 
June  17th;  Costa  Rica,  on  September  21st;  Peru,  on 
October  6th ;  Uruguay,  on  October  7th.  War  was  de- 
clared by  Guatemala,  on  April  21,  1918;  by  Nicaragua, 
on  May  6,  1918;  by  Costa  Rica,  on  May  23,  1918;  by 
Haiti,  on  July  12,  1918,;  and  by  Honduras,  on  July 
19,  191 8.  Liberia  declared  war  against  Germany  on 
August  4,  19 1 7. 

After  the  United  States  entered  the  struggle  practi- 
cally all  the  shipping  of  the  world  passed  under  Allied 
control.  The  material  resources  of  America,  Asia, 
Africa,  and  the  most  of  Europe  were  put  at  the  disposal 
of  the  anti-Teuton  Powers. 

In  the  latter  part  of  April,  British  and  French  mis- 
sions visited  the  United  States.  The  British  mission  was 
headed  by  Arthur  J.  Balfour,  the  British  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Heading  the  French  mission 
were  Marshal  Joffre  and  former  Prime  Minister  Viviani. 
Under  Marshal  Joffre's  urgings  the  military  plans  of 
the  government  were  modified.  It  had  not  been  in- 
tended to  send  American  troops  to  France  on  any 
considerable  scale  before  the  end  of  19 18.  But  Joffre 
advised  training  them  in  France,  instead  of  at  home. 
His  suggestion  was  sound.  It  started  that  small  but 
steady  flow  of  American  reinforcements  to  France 
which  materially  heartened  the  French  in  the  period 
of  depression  which  set  in  in  the  summer  of  191 7. 
It  also  produced,  eventually,  the  strategic  reserve 
which  enabled  Foch  to  end  the  war  in  the  autumn  of 
1918. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

RUSSIA  IN  REVOLUTION.      MARCH  II,  1 91 7-DECEMBER  3 1 , 

1917 

In  two  senses  Russia  took  herself  out  of  the  war 
before  the  United  States  got  in.  The  Russian  Revolu- 
tion antedated  our  declaration  of  April  6th  and  the 
Russian  armies  ceased  to  fight  long  before  our  first 
troops  reached  the  front  lines  in  France. 

The  revolution  came  suddenly,  almost  unpremed- 
itatedly.  The  body  of  Rasputin,  the  monk  who  had 
obtained  a  sort  of  hypnotic  control  over  the  Czarina 
and  who  was  in  league  with  the  extreme  reactionary 
and  pro-German  elements  in  the  government,  was  found 
in  the  Neva  River  on  New  Year's  Day,  191 7.  His 
murder  was  a  symptom  of  the  general  revulsion  against 
the  court  and  its  policies.  But  the  royal  family  and 
Protopopoff,  its  spokesman  in  the  administration,  re- 
mained blind  to  the  signs  of  the  times.  In  his  book, 
Russian  Revolution  Aspects,  Mr.  Robert  Crozier  Long 
tells  of  an  interview  which  he  had  with  Protopopoff 
in  March,  191 7,  in  the  fortress  of  St.  Peter  and  St.  Paul. 
Protopopoff  was  a  prisoner  there,  undergoing  examina- 
tion by  a  revolutionary  prosecutor.  In  the  presence 
of  the  latter  he  said  to  his  American  visitor:  "I  am 
guilty  of  the  most  awful  crime  that  a  man  can  commit, 
the  crime  of  failing  to  understand  the  spirit  of  my  age." 

253 


254  The  Great  War  [1917] 

He,  the  Czar,  the  Czarina,  and  the  imperial  coterie  were 
all  guilty  of  the  same  crime. 

Protopopoff  wanted  to  make  peace  with  Germany 
in  order  to  save  the  dynasty  and  absolutism.  He  took 
little  trouble  to  conceal  his  purpose  to  get  rid  of  the 
Duma.  He  brought  about  a  food  shortage  in  Petrograd 
so  as  to  incite  riots  and  thus  create  an  excuse  for  pro- 
roguing indefinitely  the  body  which  had  come  to  stand 
in  the  public  mind  for  a  larger  measure  of  popular  gov- 
ernment. The  assembling  of  the  Duma  was  postponed 
from  January  25th  to  February  27th.  On  the  day 
the  session  opened,  one  hundred  thousand  working- 
men  in  Petrograd  went  on  strike  as  a  protest  against 
the  repressive  measures  of  the  government.  Early  in 
March,  food  riots  began  and  the  Duma  tried  to  have 
the  regulation  of  the  food  supply  transferred  to  the 
city  authorities.  On  March  nth  the  Czar  issued  a 
ukase  dissolving  the  Duma. 

But  the  Duma  refused  to  dissolve.  Finding  itself 
backed  up  by  the  population  of  the  capital  and  a  large 
part  of  the  garrison,  the  Duma  constituted  itself  a 
provisional  government  and  sent  representatives  to 
meet  the  Czar,  who  was  returning  to  Petrograd  from 
general  staff  headquarters.  They  were  to  demand 
his  abdication.  At  Pskov,  on  March  15th,  he  yielded 
to  this  ultimatum  and  signed  a  manifesto  renouncing 
his  rights  and  those  of  his  son  in  favour  of  his  brother, 
the  Grand  Duke  Michael.  The  latter  declined  to 
accept  the  throne.  The  members  of  the  imperial 
family  and  of  the  former  government  were  then  put 
under  arrest.  The  provisional  Duma  revolutionary 
committee  gave  way  to  a  coalition  cabinet,  elected 
jointly  by  the  Duma  and  a  newly  formed  committee 
representing  the  workmen  and  soldiers.     Prince  Lvoff 


[i9i7i  Russia  in  Revolution  255 

was  chosen  head  of  the  Cabinet.  The  workmen  and 
soldiers  were  represented  in  it  by  Alexander  Kerensky, 
the  Minister  of  Justice. 

The  major  Allied  Powers  recognized  the  new  govern- 
ment on  March  23d.  The  United  States  had  already 
recognized  it  on  March  226..  But  the  new  government 
was  only  a  political  fiction.  It  had  no  power  of  its 
own.  Power  in  Petrograd  had  already  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Delegates.  Control  of  the  army  and  navy  was  assumed 
by  local  councils  of  soldiers  and  sailors,  loosely  asso- 
ciated with  the  Petrograd  Council. 

The  Lvoff  Cabinet  was  loyal  to  the  Entente  Alliance. 
But  its  foreign  policy  and  war  policy  were  both  subject 
to  reversal  by  the  radical  socialistic  elements  which 
were  becoming  more  and  more  active  in  the  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  organization.  The  latter  favoured  peace 
on  the  basis  of  "no  annexations  and  no  indemnities." 
They  renounced  the  idea  of  acquiring  Constantinople 
and  were  insistent  that  the  Entente  should  revise  the 
war  aims  to  which  Russia  had  subscribed  in  the  answer 
to  Germany's  recent  peace  offer.  They  also  favoured 
the  calling  of  an  international  Socialist  conference,  at 
which  the  representatives  of  the  proletariats  of  all  the 
belligerent  nations  could  get  together  and  discuss  peace 
terms. 

When  the  provisional  government  informed  the  other 
Allied  nations,  on  May  2d,  that  Russia  would  continue 
the  war  to  a  complete  victory,  it  obtained  a  vote  of 
confidence  from  the  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Delegates.  But  when  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  M.  Milyukoff,  expressed  himself  on  May  9th 
as  still  desirous  of  obtaining  Constantinople,  a  crisis 
arose  which  ended  with  his  ejection  from  the  Cabinet 


256  The  Great  War  [1917] 

and  the  transfer  of  Kerensky,  the  spokesman  of  the 
radicals,  to  the  more  important  post  of  Minister  of  War. 

Kerensky  was  now  the  sole  prop  of  the  Lvoff  regime. 
He  was  against  a  separate  peace  with  Germany  and 
wanted  to  continue  the  war  and  recover  the  Russian 
territory  seized  by  Germany.  Yet  at  the  same  time 
he  wanted  to  make  a  peace  which  would  not  penalize 
Germany.  He  carried  the  Council  of  Workmen  and 
Soldiers  with  him  for  a  time  in  spite  of  the  attacks  of 
the  Maximalist  faction,  headed  by  Lenine.  But  in 
order  to  hold  his  ground  in  the  Council  he  was  obliged 
to  disembarrass  himself  of  Lvoff  and  the  other  moder- 
ates, who  had  originally  taken  charge  of  the  revolution. 
The  Duma  was  abolished  in  June  and  on  July  226. 
Lvoff  resigned  as  Prime  Minister  of  the  provisional 
government.     Kerensky  took  his  place. 

The  Kerensky  government  lasted  until  November 
7th.  After  September  16th  it  became  a  dictatorship, 
with  all  power  lodged  in  Kerensky's  hands.  But  the 
latter  pursued  a  suicidal  policy.  Disorganization  in 
the  army,  started  by  his  own  orders,  destroying  dis- 
cipline, became  more  and  more  flagrant.  It  was  im- 
possible to  continue  the  war  against  Germany  without 
a  dependable  army.  Kerensky,  essentially  a  talker  and 
trimmer,  vacillated  between  measures  for  restoring  dis- 
cipline and  order  with  a  strong  hand,  and  counter 
measures  which  quickly  alienated  the  support  of  those 
elements  in  the  army  and  the  nation  which  might  have 
enabled  him  to  continue  as  a  pro- war  dictator. 

His  most  dangerous  enemies  were  the  Bolshevists, 
whose  chief  leaders  were  anti-war,  anti-Nationalist, 
anti-Slav,  and  more  or  less  openly  pro-German.  He 
could  never  compete  with  them  in  bidding  for  the 
support  of  the  extremists  who  favoured  class  war  and 


[1917]  Russia  in  Revolution  257 

anarchy.  Kerensky  seemed,  at  one  time,  to  be  aiming 
at  setting  up  a  strong,  nationalistic  government  with 
the  aid  of  General  Korniloff,  who  had  some  of  the 
qualifications  of  a  Carnot.  But  after  encouraging 
Korniloff  he  quarrelled  with  him  and  precipitated  the 
fiasco  of  the  Korniloff  revolt. 

Korniloff,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  armies  by 
Kerensky 's  appointment,  marched  on  Petrograd,  in- 
tending to  oust  the  Kerensky  government.  His  forces 
got  to  within  thirty  miles  of  the  city  and  then  disbanded. 
Korniloff  surrendered  to  General  Alexieff,  his  successor 
in  the  chief  command.  But  Korniloff's  failure  cut 
the  ground  from  under  Kerensky's  feet.  He  was  left 
at  the  mercy  of  the  Bolshevists,  who  accused  him  of 
having  encouraged  a  military  counter-revolution. 

Lenine  and  Trotzky  organized  a  revolt  of  their  own 
on  November  7th,  acting  through  the  Military  Coun- 
cil of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates.  Kerensky 
fled  for  safety  and  his  government  vanished  overnight. 
Lenine  nominated  himself  Prime  Minister  and  Trotzky 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Russia  now  ceased  to  be  either  a  belligerent  or  a 
nation.  Lenine  was  determined  to  make  a  peace  at 
any  price  with  Germany.  He  didn't  care  what  out- 
lying portions  of  the  ancient  Romanoff  Empire  the 
Germans  might  appropriate,  so  long  as  they  left  him 
the  heart  of  it  in  which  to  set  up  his  Soviet  state  and 
to  work  out  his  formulas  of  terrorism  and  absolutism. 
He  besought  Germany  for  a  truce,  which  was  granted 
by  Ludendorff.  An  armistice  was  signed  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  on  December  14th  and  the  ground  was  cleared 
for  the  dismemberment  of  Russia  in  the  grotesque 
" peace  negotiations"  which  were  to  follow. 

The  revolution  destroyed  the  Russian  armies  by 
17 


258  The  Great  War 


[1917] 


Sovietizing  them.  The  Petrograd  Council  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Delegates  controlled  the  revolutionary 
government  and  was  strong  for  introducing  its  own 
system  of  self-regulation  everywhere.  Kerensky  was 
in  favour  of  righting  Germany  to  the  end.  But  one 
of  his  first  acts  as  Minister  of  Justice  under  the  Lvoff 
regime  was  to  abolish  capital  punishment,  the  only 
means  of  maintaining  discipline  in  the  field.  A  little 
later,  as  minister  of  war,  he  issued  a  Declaration  of 
Soldiers'  Rights,  by  which  the  administration  of  regi- 
ments and  warships  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  elected 
committees,  four  fifths  of  the  members  of  which  were 
to  belong  to  the  rank  and  file. 

General  Gourko  relates  many  amusing  incidents 
which  occurred  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  new  military 
dispensation.  The  armies  took  their  privileges  of 
"self-determination"  in  a  fairly  sober  spirit  at  the 
outset.  But  the  position  of  the  officers  became  ridicu- 
lous, and  then  tragic.  Insubordination  got  the 
upper  hand  nearly  everywhere.  It  could  not  be  other- 
wise when  the  ultimate  authority  rested  with  the 
soldiers  and  their  agents  in  the  military  Soviets. 

In  January,  191 7,  the  Russian  General  Staff  ordered 
a  second  winter  offensive  on  the  Dvina  front,  south- 
west of  Riga.  It  merely  duplicated  the  unsuccessful 
effort  made  the  year  before  by  General  Kuropatkin. 
The  Russians  gained  ground  at  first  along  the  Dvina 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Dvinsk.  But  they  were 
quickly  thrown  back  to  their  original  lines  by  a  German 
counter-offensive.  For  some  months  after  the  revolu- 
tion, both  sides  remained  inactive.  The  Russian 
armies  were  experimenting  with  their  new  liberties 
and  were  not  in  a  mood  to  fight.  The  Germans  looked 
to  the  revolution  to  do  their  work  for  them  at  little 


rigi7i  Russia  in  Revolution  259 

cost.  It  was  more  economical  to  foment  Bolshevism 
than  to  seize  Riga  and  Petrograd  by  force.  Moreover, 
a  German  offensive  would  have  operated  to  keep  alive 
that  national  feeling  which  the  more  radical  revolu- 
tionists were  eager  to  extinguish. 

The  Duma  Provisional  Government  advocated  a 
continuation  of  the  war,  but  lacked  the  power  and 
energy  to  continue  it.  The  generals  in  the  field  were 
also  too  much  upset  by  the  new  conditions  to  recom- 
mend action.  After  Kerensky  became  Minister  of  War 
in  Lvoff 's  Cabinet  he  visited  all  the  fronts,  haranguing 
the  troops  and  urging  them  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
Russian  soil.  At  the  same  time  he  was  unwilling  to 
restore  authority  to  the  generals  or  to  revive  discipline. 

He  committed  himself,  however,  to  a  summer  offen- 
sive on  the  easiest  of  the  fronts — that  held  by  the 
Austro-Hungarians  in  Galicia.  General  Brusiloff  had 
been  made  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  western  armies. 
The  offensive  was  entrusted  to  General  Korniloff, 
noted  before  the  war  for  his  revolutionary  sentiments. 
Under  him  were  some  Cossack  and  Siberian  troops 
who  had  retained  their  military  organization.  It 
was  thought  that  the  other  units  would  accept  his 
leadership  because  he  was  a  Cossack  and  a  man  who 
had  made  his  way  to  the  top  by  his  own  ability  and 
exertions. 

Korniloff  was  well  supplied  with  munitions,  for  it 
was  only  in  191 7,  as  General  Gourko  says,  that  "the 
different  armies  were  made  happy  by  being  able  to 
reckon  on  having  several  tens  of  thousands  of  shells 
for  the  6-inch  guns  and  about  one  hundred  thousand 
4.8-inch  trench  mortar  bombs."  His  attack  opened 
auspiciously.  He  struck  first  in  the  upper  valley  of 
the  Zlota  Lipa  River,  at  the  enemy  line  guarding  Lem- 


260  The  Great  War  [i*i7] 

berg.  On  July  ist  he  captured  the  village  of  Koniuchy 
and  took  ten  thousand  prisoners.  Failing  to  break 
through  the  main  lines  farther  back,  he  shifted  the 
assault  south  to  Brzezany  and  then  south-west  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  Stanislau.  Here  the  enemy  front 
was  broken  and  the  town  of  Kalucz  was  occupied.  The 
Russians  then  pushed  west  toward  Stryj.  Farther 
east,  along  the  Dniester  River,  the  city  of  Halicz  was 
stormed.  Up  to  this  time  Korniloff  had  taken  fifty 
thousand  prisoners  and  driven  a  wedge  twenty  miles 
wide  and  ten  miles  deep  into  the  Austro-German 
positions. 

The  weakened  discipline  of  the  revolutionary  regime 
now  began  to  tell.  Many  units  refused  to  fight  any 
longer  and  made  for  the  rear.  German  reinforcements, 
coming  from  the  north,  had  little  trouble  in  regaining 
all  the  ground  lost.  After  July  19th  the  whole  Russian 
line  was  forced  back  in  disorder.  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops  recovered  Stanislau,  Kolomea,  Czer- 
nowitz,  and  Tarnopol.  Galicia  and  Bukowina  were 
cleared,  and  the  Russians  were  thrust  again  beyond 
their  own  border. 

In  August,  Kerensky  removed  Brusiloff  from  the 
chief  command  because  he  failed  to  meet  the  dictator's 
car  at  the  railroad  station  at  grand  headquarters. 
Korniloff  succeeded  and  retained  the  post  until  his 
attempted  coup  d'etat,  when  Alexieff  was  nominated. 
But  with  the  failure  of  the  Korniloff  revolt  the  possi- 
bility of  saving  the  army  from  dissolution  vanished. 

Meanwhile  Ludendorff  decided  to  occupy  Riga  and 
make  a  demonstration  toward  Petrograd.  The  advance 
began  on  August  226..  On  September  26.  a  crossing 
of  the  Dvina  River  was  effected  at  Uxkul,  ten  miles 
south-east  of  Riga.     General  Lechitsky,  commanding 


[igi7i  Russia  in  Revolution  261 

on  the  northern  front,  immediately  withdrew  toward 
the  east  and  German  outposts  entered  the  city.  Push- 
ing after  the  Russians,  who  made  an  unexpectedly 
stiff  defence,  the  Germans  captured  Jacobstadt. 

In  October  the  German  navy,  co-operating  with  a 
military  expedition,  seized  the  Oesel,  Dago,  and  Moon 
islands,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Gulf  of  Riga.  The  Rus- 
sian garrisons  fled  to  the  mainland.  The  Russian 
Baltic  fleet  came  near  being  trapped  in  Moon  Sound 
but  escaped  north  after  losing  the  battleship  Slaw 
and  several  smaller  units. 

Possession  of  the  islands  and  a  base  opposite  them 
on  the  mainland  brought  the  Germans  close  to  Reval, 
the  Russian  naval  station  on  the  south  shore  of  the  Gulf 
of  Finland,  and  made  a  march  to  Petrograd  practicable. 
But  the  Kerensky  government  fell  early  in  November 
and  the  Germans  saw  no  advantage  in  making  war  on 
Lenine.  They  drew  in  their  lines  to  the  east  of  Riga. 
Ludendorff  needed  troops  elsewhere  and  transferred 
General  Otto  Below's  Fourteenth  Army  from  the 
Baltic  to  Italy. 

On  the  central  and  southern  fronts  an  informal  truce 
had  existed  for  several  months.  By  asking  for  an  armi- 
stice Lenine  merely  proclaimed  in  a  formal  way  that 
Russia  was  out  of  the  war.  She  had  been  practically 
out  of  it  ever  since  the  first  weeks  of  the  revolution. 

Finland  declared  her  independence  in  the  summer 
of  191 7.  The  Ukraine  also  set  up  a  government  of 
its  own.  After  Lenine  came  into  power,  Siberia  sepa- 
rated from  Russia  and  General  Kaledin,  the  Hetman 
of  the  Don  Cossacks,  declared  war  on  the  Bolshevist 
regime.  By  the  end  of  the  year  what  was  left  of  Russia 
was  ripe  for  reduction  to  the  status  of  a  German 
dependency. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

WEST    FRONT    OPERATIONS,    I917.     JANUARY    5,     I917- 
DECEMBER  5,    I917 

When  Hindenburg  displaced  Falkenhayn,  on  August 
28,  1 91 6,  he  wisely  elected  to  follow  a  strictly  defensive 
policy  on  the  Western  Front.  Results  justified  his 
judgment.  The  complete  German  defeat  at  Verdun 
was  followed  by  a  drawn  battle  on  the  Somme  and  a 
brilliant  triumph  in  Rumania.  Hindenburg  fell  into 
the  background,  however,  in  the  winter  of  191 7,  when 
LudendorfT  made  his  bargain  with  the  U-boat  extre- 
mists, challenged  the  United  States  to  enter  the  war, 
and  thus  introduced  a  new  and  dangerously  disturbing 
factor  into  Germany's  military  problem. 

If  the  U-boat  failed  and  America  sent  to  France  the 
armies  she  was  capable  of  raising,  then  Germany's 
greatest  need  might  be  to  dispose  of  France  and  Great 
Britain  before  the  American  reinforcement  arrived. 
But  the  German  High  Command  shut  its  eyes  to  that 
contingency.  It  preferred  to  think  that  the  U-boats 
would  starve  out  Great  Britain  and  that  America 
could  not  make  her  power  felt  on  the  battlefield  within 
three  years — if  ever.  LudendorfT  therefore  decided  to 
watch  events  on  the  Eastern  Front,  where  Russia  was 
in  dissolution,  and  to  continue  Hindenburg 's  waiting 
policy  in  the  West — at  least  through  191 7.  Accept- 
ance of  the  defensive  in  France  for  a  long  period  in- 

262 


(Kurt    West  Front  Operations,  191 7      263 

volved  a  rectification  of  the  German  position  there, 
made  insecure  by  the  results  of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme. 
In  the  winter  of  191 6-17  the  German  High  Command 
made  preparations  for  drawing  out  of  the  weakened 
Noyon  salient  and  establishing  the  armies  on  the  newly 
constructed  Hindenburg  Line. 

This  retirement  was  planned  for  the  early  spring 
and  was  probably  hastened  a  little  by  a  reopening  of 
the  Battle  of  the  Somme.  When  Field  Marshal  Haig 
broke  off  the  Somme  operations  on  November  18,  191 6, 
he  had  forced  the  enemy  into  a  pronounced  salient  in 
the  area  north  of  the  Ancre  River.  The  German  posi- 
tions between  Arras  and  Bapaume  formed  the  base 
and  one  leg  of  an  isosceles  triangle,  the  other  leg  being 
the  high  road  from  Bapaume  to  Arras.  The  British 
had  enveloped  the  triangle  on  its  western  and  southern 
sides.  If  they  should  take  Bapaume  they  would 
roll  up  its  third  side. 

The  south-western  corner  of  the  triangle  was  open 
to  converging  attack  and  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief  determined  to  utilize  the  winter  months  in  pinch- 
ing the  Germans  out  of  it.  These  operations,  lasting 
from  the  first  week  of  January  to  the  second  week  in 
March,  were  entirely  successful.  The  original  German 
line  to  the  west  of  Bapaume,  running  from  the  Ancre 
north-east  to  Arras,  was  gradually  taken  in  the  rear  and 
had  to  be  abandoned.  By  March  13th  the  whole  area 
west  of  Bapaume  was  cleared,  and  the  city  was  brought 
under  short-range  artillery  fire  from  the  west  and  north- 
west, as  well  as  from  the  south-west  and  south.  But 
by  March  15th  the  German  retirement  was  already 
under  way.  In  its  last  stages  the  German  defence  west 
of  Bapaume  was  only  a  cover  for  Hindenburg's  "strate- 
gic" retreat. 


264  The  Great  War  U917] 

In  the  fighting  on  the  Ancre  the  Germans  used  for 
the  first  time  a  new  form  of  defensive  tactics.  This 
consisted  in  a  marked  thinning  out  of  the  front  line 
and  the  substitution  of  scattered  centres  of  resistance 
for  the  continuous,  strongly  held  trench.  In  the 
later  stages  of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  the  enemy  had 
suffered  heavy  losses  in  prisoners  trapped  in  their  dug- 
outs by  artillery  barrages.  The  German  High  Com- 
mand therefore  developed  the  " pill-box"  first  line  and 
established  the  main  line  of  defence,  or  battle  front,  a 
mile  or  two  farther  back. 

The  "pill  boxes,"  small  concrete  forts  level  with  the 
surface  and  holding  garrisons  armed  with  machine 
guns,  were  hardly  worth  a  "drum  fire"  bombardment. 
As  targets  they  were  too  tiny  and  too  dispersed.  Their 
function  was  to  retard  an  attack  and  throw  it  into 
confusion.  If  the  assailants  penetrated  toward  the 
battle  position,  they  were  to  be  met  with  a  vigorous 
counter-attack.  This  latter  manoeuvre  was  not  empha- 
sized in  the  British  winter  operation  west  of  Bapaume, 
because  Hindenburg  had  decided  to  yield  all  his  ad- 
vanced positions  in  Picardy.  But  it  became  prominent 
in  the  battle  of  Arras  and  in  all  the  succeeding  battles 
on  the  Western  Front  during  191 7.  It  succeeded  in 
preventing  an  Allied  break-through  on  anything  but 
a  local  scale.  But  it  also  imposed  a  new  burden  on 
the  defensive  and  thus  led  rapidly  to  the  equaliza- 
tion of  the  offensive  and  the  defensive  and  constituted 
the  first  stage  of  a  return  to  semi-open  warfare. 

Early  in  the  winter  the  British  had  extended  their 
line  south  of  the  Somme  as  far  as  Roye.  It  fell  to  them, 
therefore,,  to  occupy  Bapaume,  Peronne,  and  Chaulnes 
— the  three  objectives  of  the  Somme  battle — when 
Hindenburg  drew  back  out  of  the  Noyon  salient.     The 


figir)     West  Front  Operations,  191 7      265 

retirement  began  about  March  15th.  On  March  17th 
Bapaume  and  Chaulnes  were  evacuated.  Peronne 
was  delivered  on  March  18th.  On  that  day  the  French 
reached  Noyon.  Only  rear-guard  actions  were  fought 
while  the  Germans  were  retiring  and  settling  into  then- 
new  positions.  The  greatest  depth  of  the  retirement 
was  about  twenty-five  miles,  from  Chaulnes  and  Roye 
east  to  the  Oise  Valley,  between  St.  Quentin  and  La 
Fere.  Above  Peronne  the  Germans  retreated  about 
ten  miles;  above  Bapaume  only  about  five  or  six  miles. 

The  Hindenburg  Line  or  Zone  joined  the  old  German 
line,  on  the  south,  along  the  Ailette  River.  It  ran 
north  to  La  Fere  and  up  the  Oise  Valley  to  Moy. 
Thence  it  turned  north-west  toward  St.  Quentin,  which 
was  enveloped  on  the  south  and  south-east  by  the 
French.  From  St.  Quentin  it  passed  north  and  north- 
west, skirting  Le  Catelet,  leaving  Cambrai  about  five 
miles  in  the  rear,  and  connecting  with  the  old  German 
line  just  below  Arras. 

The  territory  evacuated  contained  about  one  thou- 
sand square  miles  and,  before  the  war,  had  supported 
a  population  of  about  two  hundred  thousand.  It  was 
systematically  and  brutally  devastated.  Cities  and 
towns  were  razed,  roads  and  bridges  destroyed,  trees 
cut  down,  farms  ruined,  and  houses  pillaged.  Hinden- 
burg made  the  salient  he  abandoned  a  desolate  waste, 
not  alone  for  military  reasons  but  as  a  manifestation 
of  the  German  policy  of  cold-blooded  malice  and 
terrorism. 

The  German  communiques  described  the  retreat  as 
a  purely  voluntary  one,  planned  with  a  definite  strategic 
object  in  view  and  conducted  with  masterly  precision. 
It  was  voluntary,  however,  only  in  the  sense  of  antici- 
pating the  inevitable.     Hindenburg  could  not  have 


266  The  Great  War  [1917] 

held  the  Noyon  salient  any  longer,  without  running 
useless  risks.  It  had  become  a  trap.  If  he  had  not 
withdrawn  from  it  without  a  fight  in  March,  he  would 
have  been  obliged  to  evacuate  it  in  April  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  British  advance  east  of  Arras. 

The  British  offensive  east  of  Arras  was  part  of  a 
joint  operation,  projected,  in  co-operation  with  the 
French,  as  far  back  as  November,  191 6.  Having 
shaken  the  hold  of  the  Germans  on  the  apex  of  the 
Noyon  salient,  it  was  agreed  by  the  two  high  commands 
to  attack  next  at  the  two  extremities — at  Arras,  on  the 
north,  and  on  the  Aisne,  above  Soissons  and  Rheims, 
on  the  south.  The  Hindenburg  retreat  did  not  inter- 
fere with  Franco-British  plans  except  in  so  far  as  it 
limited  their  strategic  scope,  their  original  object 
— that  of  compelling  a  German  recoil  on  a  large  scale — 
having  already  been  attained. 

The  British  opened  the  Arras  offensive  on  April  9th. 
The  battle  line  was  forty-five  miles  long,  extending 
from  Lens  down  to  St.  Quentin.  But  the  main  effort 
was  made  at  the  northern  end,  on  a  thirteen-mile  front 
from  Henin-sur-Cojeul,  south-east  of  Arras,  to  Givenchy- 
en-Gohelle,  a  short  distance  south-west  of  Lens.  The 
artillery  preparation  had  lasted  four  days  and  pulver- 
ized the  old-style  German  front- trench  system.  On 
the  first  day  the  Canadian  divisions  of  the  First  Army 
took  Vimy  Ridge,  which  had  defied  Foch  in  the  two 
battles  of  Artois  in  191 5.  Vimy  Ridge  was  the  strong- 
est position  in  Northern  France.  Its  possession  was  of 
enormous  value  to  the  British  a  year  later,  when  Luden- 
dorff's  first  great  drive  overran  the  Noyon  salient  once 
more  and  gravely  threatened  Amiens.  Ludendorff 
would  probably  have  reached  Amiens  if  he  had  been 
able  to  batter  down  the  British  bastion  about  Arras. 


[i9i7]    West  Front  Operations,  191 7      267 

But  the  British  First  Army  held  fast  there,  thus  saving 
the  day  for  the  retreating  Third  and  Fifth  armies. 

On  April  9th  the  British  broke  through  the  German 
positions  in  the  Arras-Lens  sector  for  a  gain  of  between 
two  and  three  miles,  and  took  six  thousand  prisoners. 
On  April  10th  they  enlarged  their  gains  east  of  Arras, 
reaching  the  edge  of  Monchy-le-Preux,  and  taking 
five  thousand  more  prisoners.  The  next  day  they 
captured  Monchy,  and  on  April  12th  Wancourt  and 
Heninel,  north-east  of  Henin.  On  April  13th  they 
struck  on  a  twelve-mile  front,  north  and  south  of  Lens, 
and  gained  a  mile.  Lievin,  a  suburb  of  Lens  to  the 
south-west,  was  entered,  as  was  Cite  St.  Pierre,  to  the 
north-west.  But  Lens  remained  unconquerable.  Al- 
though pocketed  for  a  year  and  a  half,  it  was  not 
abandoned  by  the  Germans  until  the  final  retreat 
from  France  began. 

On  the  line  from  Queant  down  to  St.  Quentin  little 
progress  was  made,  although  the  British  captured 
Fayet,  just  north  of  St.  Quentin,  which  was  now  closely 
enveloped  on  three  sides.  Between  April  9th  and  15th 
Haig's  armies  took  fifteen  thousand  prisoners  and 
about  two  hundred  guns. 

The  battle  now  passed  into  the  second  stage.  Hin- 
denburg  brought  up  reserves  and  used  them  lavishly 
in  counter-attacks.  The  old  German  trench  line  of 
1914-17  east  of  Arras  had  been  broken.  The  northern- 
most sector  of  the  new  Hindenburg  Line  had  also  been 
shattered.  But  behind  those  lines  others  had  been 
constructed.  The  Oppy  line  ran  north  and  south 
behind  the  original  German  positions  and  still  farther 
back  was  the  Queant- Drocourt  line,  cutting  north 
from  the  Hindenburg  Line  at  Queant  and  ending  south- 
east of  Lens. 


268  The  Great  War 


[1917] 


Field-Marshal  Haig  made  a  desperate  effort,  after 
April  23d,  to  break  through  the  Oppy  line.  In  six 
days  of  extremely  bloody  fighting  he  did  break  it,  the 
British  taking  Roeux,  Oppy,  and  Arleux-en-Gohelle. 
Then  the  new  German  method  of  persistent  counter- 
attack was  employed  to  bring  on  a  deadlock  somewhat 
similar  to  the  old  deadlock  of  rigid  positional  warfare. 
From  April  30th  to  June  1st  there  was  continuous  semi- 
open  fighting  on  the  Oppy  front — between  Queant  and 
Fresnoy.  Gradually  the  fierceness  of  the  German 
counter-assaults  wore  down  the  British  offensive. 
The  Germans  retook  all  the  villages  on  the  Oppy  line 
— Fresnoy,  Oppy,  Roeux,  Pelves,  and  Cherisy.  The 
British  retained  Bullecourt,  west  of  Queant. 

The  battle  ended  in  a  stand-off.  Haig  had  had  a 
brilliant  initial  success,  but  was  unable  to  exploit  it. 
He  had  been  turned  back  on  the  Oppy  line.  Both 
sides  suffered  enormous  losses.  But  the  German  losses 
were  probably  greater,  because  of  the  costly  burden  of 
local  counter-attacks  which  had  now  been  thrust  on 
armies  maintaining  the  defensive.  Haig  had,  more- 
over, made  territorial  gains  of  considerable  value. 
And  to  the  Germans,  the  loss  of  Vimy  Ridge  was  a 
genuine  disaster.  The  British  now  turned  away  from 
Artois  and  Picardy  to  experiment  with  a  series  of  local 
offensives  in  Flanders. 

The  French  operation  on  the  Aisne  sector  began  on 
April  1 6th,  a  week  later  than  Haig's  east  and  north 
of  Arras.  The  battle  line  ran  for  twenty-five  miles 
from  a  point  north  of  Soissons  to  a  point  north  of 
Rheims.  In  this  region  there  had  been  no  fighting  on 
a  large  scale  since  the  fall  of  19 14.  The  attack,  carried 
out  under  the  direction  of  General  Nivelle,  opened 
vigorously.     All  the  German  first  line  and  a  part  of 


[i9i7]     West  Front  Operations,  191 7      269 

the  second  line  were  carried.  Ten  thousand  Germans 
were  captured  on  the  first  day. 

Hindenburg  pursued  here  also  his  new  policy  of 
tremendous  counter-attacks.  These  held  the  French 
up  after  a  time.  But,  on  April  17th,  a  new  gain  was 
made  east  of  Rheims,  where  the  village  of  Auberive 
was  captured,  with  2500  prisoners.  On  the  18th  an 
attack  was  launched  on  the  whole  line  from  Soissons 
to  Auberive.  Vailly,  on  the  Aisne,  was  taken,  with 
several  other  villages.  Hindenburg  countered  again 
with  violence,  but  could  only  stop  the  French  momen- 
tarily. By  the  end  of  April,  Nivelle  had  captured 
175  guns  and  21,000  prisoners. 

The  French  were  now  approaching  the  famous 
Chemin  des  Dames,  the  highway  built  by  Louis  XV 
as  a  promenade  for  his  daughters.  On  May  4th  they 
stormed  Craonne,  at  the  eastern  end  of  the  highway. 
The  next  day  they  made  progress  at  its  western  end 
and  also  seized  the  eastern  portion  of  the  ridge  along 
which  the  Chemin  des  Dames  runs,  giving  them  com- 
mand of  the  part  of  the  Ailette  Valley  extending  to- 
ward Laon.  Five  thousand  more  prisoners  were  taken. 
But  at  this  moment  Nivelle's  offensive  was  broken  off. 
It  had  been  much  too  costly.  M.  Painleve,  Minister 
of  War  at  the  time,  admitted  in  191 9  that  the  French 
loss  in  killed,  up  to  April  26,  was  34,000. 

In  order  to  quiet  unpleasant  criticism,  General  P6tain 
had  been  named  on  April  29th  Chief  of  Staff  and 
attached  to  the  Ministry  of  War.  His  appointment 
foreshadowed  Nivelle's  retirement,  which  was  accom- 
plished, on  May  15th,  by  the  nomination  of  P6tain 
to  the  command  of  the  armies  in  Northern  France  and 
of  Foch  as  P6tain's  successor  as  Chief  of  Staff  and 
adviser  to  the  War  Ministry. 


270  The  Great  War  [1917] 

The  period  following  Nivelle's  offensive  on  the  Aisne 
was  one  of  singular  depression  in  France,  both  in  the 
armies  and  among  the  civilian  population.  There  was 
a  marked  reaction  from  the  fervour  of  19 14,  1915,  and 
191 6.  Verdun  and  the  Somme  had  imposed  terrible 
sacrifices,  the  extent  of  which  was  just  beginning  to 
be  felt.  The  reaction  was  psychological,  in  the  main. 
It  was  not  based  on  the  economic  or  the  military  situa- 
tion, for,  now  that  Germany  had  forced  the  United  States 
into  the  war,  France's  financial  worries  were  banished 
and  a  military  victory  for  the  Entente  seemed  assured. 
Whatever  the  reasons,  French  morale  suffered  a  decline. 
General  Zurlinden,  in  his  La  Guerre  de  Liberation, 
speaking  of  the  situation  after  Petain's  appointment, 
says: 

Unfortunately  General  Petain  had  to  face  at  once 
serious  difficulties  in  the  way  of  discipline.  Some 
of  our  troops — though  a  very  small  number — 
showed  weariness,  discouragement,  and  even  insub- 
ordination. At  Soissons,  toward  the  end  of  May,  two 
regiments,  displaying  the  red  flag,  marched  on  the 
railroad  station,  with  the  intention  of  seizing  trains 
and  going  to  Paris  to  make  a  protest  to  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies.  The  manifestation  was  stopped  in 
time.  The  leaders  were  arrested  and  received  exem- 
plary punishment.  The  regiments  were  disbanded, 
and  the  men  scattered  throughout  the  army.  Good 
order  was  rapidly  established,  thanks  to  the  excellent 
measures,  displaying  both  tact  and  authority,  which 
were  taken  by  General  Petain,  who  knew  how  to 
talk  to  the  men  in  a  language  full  of  cordiality,  viril- 
ity, and  clarity,  and  to  reawaken  in  their  hearts 
confidence,  enthusiasm,  and  the  will  to  conquer. 


[i9i7i     West  Front  Operations,  191 7     271 

The  year  191 7  was  one  of  instability  in  government 
in  France  and  of  injurious  defeatist  intrigues.  On 
March  14th,  General  Lyautey,  the  Minister  of  War, 
came  into  collision  with  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  by 
declaring  that  answers  to  interpellations  were  a  source 
of  danger  to  the  national  defence,  even  when  they 
were  made  in  secret  session.  As  a  result  of  violent 
protest  from  the  Deputies  he  offered  his  resignation. 
The  Briand  Ministry  thereupon  fell.  Alexandre 
Ribot  formed  a  new  ministry  on  March  19th.  This 
ministry  succumbed  on  September  10th,  after  many 
of  its  members  had  indicated  their  unwillingness  to 
serve  longer  under  M.  Ribot.  M.  Painlev6,  the  Min- 
ister of  War,  then  assumed  the  Premiership,  retaining 
Ribot  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  But  dissatisfac- 
tion and  factionalism  continued.  The  defeatist  scandal 
had  become  flagrant  and  M.  Painleve  showed  weakness 
in  dealing  with  it.  His  ministry  fell  on  November 
13th.  Clemenceau  then  came  forward  with  a  pro- 
gramme of  drastic  punishment  for  all  pacifist,  defeatist, 
and  pro-German  propagandists.  He  became  Premier 
on  November  16th.  His  virile  personality  put  new  force 
into  the  government  and  reunited  the  country.  His 
policy  was  condensed  into  a  single  sentence:  "I  make 
war." 

The  defeatist  agitation,  which  aimed  at  a  peace  of 
surrender  with  Germany,  was  conducted,  on  the  one 
side,  by  the  extreme  Socialists,  who  wished  to  restore 
the  power  of  the  Socialist  international  organization 
by  working  in  harmony  with  the  Russian  and  German 
groups,  and,  on  the  other,  by  politicians  who  expected 
to  come  into  control  in  a  "peace-without-victory" 
government. 

M.  Malvy,  who  had  been  Minister  of  the  Interior 


272  The  Great  War 


[1917] 


in  the  Ribot  and  preceding  ministries,  was  charged 
with  having  tolerated  and  encouraged  commerce  with 
the  enemy,  and  with  having  had  relations  with  the 
managers  of  the  Bonnet  Rouge,  a  defeatist  newspaper, 
supposed  to  have  been  supported  by  German  funds. 
Malvy's  subordinate,  M.  Leymarie,  was  implicated  in 
an  attempt  to  hush  up  the  fact  that  Duval,  the  manager 
of  the  Bonnet  Rouge,  had  been  caught  returning  from 
Switzerland  with  a  check  for  125,000  francs  in  his 
possession.  Almereyda,  the  editor  of  the  paper,  was 
arrested  and  either  committed  suicide  or  was  murdered 
in  prison. 

The  most  unblushing  trafficker  with  Germany  was 
Bolo  Pasha.  He  received  large  sums  from  the  German 
Government  to  be  used  in  getting  control  of  the  French 
press.  He  furnished  Senator  Humbert  with  part  of 
the  money  with  which  the  latter  bought  Le  Journal. 
But  behind  Malvy  and  behind  the  group  which  ex- 
pected to  turn  defeat  to  political  account  was  the  sinister 
figure  of  Joseph  Caillaux.  He  had  long  been  recognized 
as  friendly  to  Germany  and  opposed  to  the  alliance 
with  Great  Britain,  and  he  apparently  held  himself 
in  reserve  as  the  one  man  available  to  form  a  ministry 
when  France  should  again,  as  in  1871,  seek  terms  from 
a  victorious  enemy. 

Caillaux  had  great  influence  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.  But  when  Clemenceau  came  into  power  the 
government  resolutely  uncovered  all  the  defeatist 
scandals  and  prosecuted  those  involved  in  them. 
France  cleaned  house  and  turned  with  fresh  energy 
to  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

The  German  High  Command  was,  of  course,  fully 
aware  of  the  propaganda  carried  on  to  break  down 
the  French  fighting  spirit.     It  began,  early  in  May,  a 


[i9i7i     West  Front  Operations,  191 7      273 

series  of  violent  counter-attacks  on  the  French  posi- 
tions north-east  of  Soissons,  and  continued  them 
through  June,  July,  and  August.  But  all  of  these 
broke  down  with  insignificant  gains.  Germany  chal- 
lenged France  once  more  to  a  duel  of  attrition,  some- 
thing like  that  at  Verdun  in  191 6.  The  result  was 
the  same.  According  to  French  figures  Ludendorff  used 
up  forty-nine  divisions  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames  front 
alone.  But  at  the  end  of  August  the  lines  on  that  front 
were  practically  unchanged. 

On  August  20th  Petain  launched  an  offensive  at 
Verdun,  on  both  sides  of  the  Meuse.  In  four  days  the 
French  recovered  all  the  ground  they  had  lost  on  the 
west  bank  the  year  before.  They  re- took  Dead  Man's 
Hill,  Corbeaux,  and  Cumieres  Woods,  Goose  Hill,  Re- 
gnecourt,  and  Hill  304,  and  reached  Forges  Brook.  On 
the  east  side  of  the  river  Talou  Hill,  Champneuville, 
Hills  344  and  240,  and  Samogneux  were  stormed. 
Early  in  September  Caurieres  Wood  was  retaken  and 
the  line  of  February  21,  191 6,  on  the  east  bank  was 
nearly  re-established.  More  than  ten  thousand  pris- 
oners were  captured. 

Petain,  who  was  wisely  building  up  the  armies  under 
him  for  the  critical  tests  of  191 8,  ended  the  campaign 
of  1 91 7  with  one  more  brilliant  but  carefully  limited 
offensive.  This  began  on  October  23d,  on  a  six-mile 
front  north-east  of  Soissons.  It  was  preceded  by  a 
heavy  four-day  bombardment  and  achieved  its  objec- 
tives with  surprising  ease.  The  attack,  made  by  the 
army  of  General  Maitre,  extended  from  Laffaux,  near 
Vauxaillon,  to  Fort  de  la  Malmaison.  The  German 
fore  positions  were  penetrated  all  along  the  line  and 
Fort  de  la  Malmaison  was  captured.  The  enemy's 
hold  on  the  Chemin  des  Dames  now  became  precarious 
is 


274  The  Great  War  [1917] 

and  he  withdrew  to  the  north  side  of  the  Ailette 
River.  In  this  operation  the  French  captured  nearly 
twelve  thousand  prisoners  and  two  hundred  guns,  their 
own  losses  being  very  moderate.  About  forty  square 
miles  of  French  territory  were  liberated. 

After  the  battle  of  Arras  and  until  November  the 
British  High  Command  devoted  itself  to  an  ambitious 
and  stubborn  effort  to  shatter  the  German  line  in  Flan- 
ders and  compel  a  German  retirement  from  the  Belgian 
coast.  Field-Marshal  Haig  carried  through  a  number 
of  carefully  prepared  attacks,  with  limited  objectives. 
But  the  larger  aim  behind  all  of  them  was  to  reach 
Menin  and  Roulers  and  turn  the  German  positions 
from  Dixmude  to  Nieuport,  which  covered  the  enemy's 
sea  bases  at  Ostend  and  Zeebrugge. 

As  a  preliminary  step  it  was  necessary  to  eject  the 
Germans  from  Messines  Ridge,  south  of  Ypres.  This 
ridge  commanded  the  city  and  a  large  part  of  the  Ypres 
salient,  as  reduced  after  the  successful  German  attack 
of  April,  191 5.  The  Flanders  sector  was  held  by  the 
British  Second  Army,  under  General  Sir  Herbert  C.  O. 
Plumer.  He  had  been  planning  an  attack  on  Messines 
Ridge  for  many  months  and  his  sappers  had  mined  the 
range  at  many  points.  On  the  morning  of  June  7, 
191 7,  the  mines  were  set  off.  The  German  defences 
were  blown  to  pieces  and  the  British  infantry  swept 
forward  in  a  few  minutes  over  the  wreckage  of  the 
first  line.  Within  three  hours  the  top  of  the  ridge  was 
cleared  and  later  in  the  afternoon  the  German  rear 
lines  along  the  southern  base  were  stormed.  The 
battle  lasted  only  one  day,  and  was  a  clean-cut  British 
victory.  Seven  thousand  prisoners  were  captured. 
The  German  casualties  were  about  thirty  thousand. 
Plumer's  were  about  ten  thousand. 


[19X71     West  Front  Operations,  191 7      275 

On  June  nth  the  Germans  attacked  some  exposed 
British  front  positions  east  of  the  Yser  River,  near  the 
Belgian  coast.  The  bridges  across  the  river  were 
destroyed  by  artillery  fire  and  the  trenches  were  rushed. 
The  British  lost  about  three  thousand  men,  twelve 
hundred  of  whom  were  taken  prisoners. 

The  capture  of  Messines  Ridge  opened  the  way  for 
a  vigorous  Allied  offensive  in  the  Ypres  sector.  The 
immediate  objective  was  the  Passchendaele  Ridge,  the 
name  given  to  a  series  of  heights  stretching  north-east 
and  south-west,  at  a  distance  of  two  or  three  miles  east 
of  Ypres.  The  ultimate  objectives  were  Menin  and 
Roulers  and  the  railroad  lines  from  Lille  north  to  Bruges. 

Three  armies  were  concentrated  on  an  eighteen- 
mile  front  from  Dixmude  down  to  the  neighbourhood 
of  Warneton.  On  the  left  was  a  French  army,  under 
General  Antoine;  in  the  centre,  the  British  Second 
Army,  under  Plumer;  on  the  right,  the  newly  created 
British  Fifth  Army,  under  Gough.  In  a  part  of  this 
operation  the  Belgian  army,  north  of  Antoine's,  was 
also  engaged. 

The  attack  began  on  July  31st,  after  a  tremendous 
artillery  preparation.  The  British  and  French  infantry 
carried  the  first  and  second  German  lines,  and,  in  some 
cases,  the  third  line.  An  average  advance  of  about  two 
miles  was  made  and  five  thousand  prisoners  were  cap- 
tured. A  two-day  rain  intervened.  When  the  ground 
had  dried  out  the  assault  was  resumed.  On  August 
10th  the  British  took  Westhoek  village,  three  miles 
east  of  Ypres,  and  the  French  stormed  Bixschoote. 
On  the  17th  the  British  entered  Langemarck,  on  the 
extreme  left  of  their  line,  and  the  French  seized  the 
bridgehead  of  Drie  Grachten.  More  heavy  rains  now 
turned  Flanders  into  a  marsh. 


276  The  Great  War  [1917] 

Between  September  20th  and  October  14th  the  Allied 
armies  delivered  five  successive  assaults  east  and 
north-east  of  Ypres.  That  of  September  20th  was  made 
on  an  eight-mile  front,  north  and  south  of  the  Ypres- 
Menin  highroad.  It  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Glen- 
course  Wood,  Inverness  Cope,  Nonne  Boshen,  Gallipoli, 
Iberian  Farm,  and  Potsdam  Vampire,  names  invented 
by  the  British  "Tommies"  and  unknown  to  the  maps. 
In  the  centre  Veldhoek,  on  the  Ypres-Menin  road, 
was  taken,  with  part  of  Polygon  Wood.  In  the  second 
drive,  on  September  6th,  Tower  Hamlet  crest,  the  rest 
of  Polygon  Wood,  and  Zonnebeke,  near  the  Ypres- 
Roulers  railroad,  fell  to  the  British. 

On  October  4th  the  attack  shifted  farther  to  the 
north.  The  Broodseinde  crest  of  Passchendaele  Ridge 
was  occupied.  Forty-five  hundred  Germans  were 
made  prisoners.  On  the  9th  Plumer  and  Antoine  con- 
ducted a  joint  operation  still  farther  north.  The  Brit- 
ish took  Poelcapelle  and  advanced  toward  Passchen- 
daele village  and  the  Forest  of  Houthhulst.  The  French 
carried  several  villages  and  brought  up  on  the  southern 
edge  of  the  forest. 

Without  giving  the  enemy  a  breathing  space,  Plumer 
struck  again  on  the  12th,  in  a  driving  rain,  on  a  six- 
mile  line  between  the  Ypres-Roulers  railroad  and 
Houthhulst.  He  got  to  within  five  hundred  yards  of 
Passchendaele.  On  the  22d  the  French  occupied  the 
southern  part  of  Houthhulst  Forest,  the  British  gained 
ground  toward  Passchendaele,  and  the  Belgian  army 
captured  the  Merckem  peninsula,  south  of  Dixmude. 
The  British  got  into  Passchendaele  village  on  October 
30th,  but  were  driven  out  again.  A  Canadian  division, 
however,  recaptured  it  on  November  7th  and  stormed 
the  German  defences  eight  hundred  yards  east  of  it. 


[igi7]     West  Front  Operations,  191 7      277 

With  that  brilliant  success  the  second  battle  of  Flanders 
ended. 

It,  too,  like  the  battle  of  Arras,  had  degenerated 
into  a  deadlock  of  attrition.  The  losses  on  both  sides 
were  severe,  the  Germans  suffering  more  than  the 
Allies.  But  the  strategical  results  of  the  Allied  offensive 
were  disappointing.  Haig  had  failed  to  reach  the 
plain  east  of  the  Passchendaele  heights,  although  his 
guns  now  commanded  Roulers  and  Menin.  He  had 
not  broken  the  German  grip  on  the  Belgian  coast,  or 
on  Lille. 

The  positions  he  had  won  were  of  some  local  value, 
but  they  were  dearly  bought.  They  had  all  to  be  aban- 
doned, without  a  fight,  in  the  spring  of  191 8,  when 
Ludendorff's  second  great  drive — up  the  Lys  Valley — 
threatened  the  envelopment  of  Ypres  from  the  south 
and  south-west.  Even  Messines  Ridge  could  not  hold 
out,  as  Vimy  Ridge  had  held  out  against  the  first 
Ludendorff  drive.  Yet  the  Flanders  operation  had 
shown  that  the  offensive,  under  the  changed  conditions 
of  warfare,  had  got  beyond  the  capacity  of  the  defence 
to  stop  it  dead  within  certain  limits.  The  only  ques- 
tion now  was  to  develop  an  offensive  which  would 
eventually  become  unstoppable. 

The  battle  of  Cambrai  proved  that  such  an  offensive 
was  already  taking  form.  It  resulted  in  the  first  com- 
plete break-through  of  a  deep  trench  system  effected 
on  the  Western  Front.  It  was  notable  for  two  things 
— a  complete  absence  of  artillery  preparation  and  the 
use  of  tanks  on  a  large  scale  and  as  the  principal  arm 
of  attack.  With  Cambrai  the  era  of  rigid  positional 
warfare  vanished  and  the  era  of  semi-open  and  nearly 
open  warfare  arrived. 

Cambrai  was  in  every  sense  a  surprise  operation. 


278  The  Great  War  [1917] 

It  took  the  Germans  unawares.  On  the  other  hand, 
its  success  was  so  far  beyond  reasonable  anticipations 
that  no  adequate  provision  had  been  made  for  following 
it  up. 

The  task  of  breaking  the  formidable  Hindenburg 
Line  in  one  of  its  vital  sectors  was  entrusted  by  Field- 
Marshal  Haig  to  the  British  Third  Army,  in  command 
of  which  General  Allenby  had  been  replaced  by  General 
Sir  Julian  H.  G.  Byng.  Allenby  was  sent  to  Palestine, 
where  he  was  to  win  later  one  of  the  completest  victo- 
ries of  the  war.  Byng's  objective  was  Cambrai,  one  of 
the  principal  anchors  of  the  German  defence  system  in 
Northern  France.  The  British  got  to  within  two  miles 
of  that  important  railroad  centre  and  military  base. 
But  lack  of  reserves  prevented  them  from  advancing 
farther,  or  even  holding  the  ground  they  had  gained. 

The  battle  line  extended  for  thirty-five  miles,  from 
the  Scarpe  River,  on  the  north-west,  to  St.  Quentin, 
on  the  south-east.  But  the  main  and  successful  thrust 
occurred  on  a  front  of  about  six  miles,  south-west  of 
Cambrai,  between  the  Cambrai-Bapaume  and  Cam- 
brai-Peronne  highroads.  The  north-western  end  of 
this  front  was  at  Hermies  and  the  south-eastern  at 
Gonnelieu. 

The  engagement  began  at  sunrise  on  November  20th, 
when  four  hundred  tanks  crawled  forward  in  the  haze 
towards  the  front  positions  of  the  Hindenburg  Zone. 
The  British  also  used  screening  smoke  clouds.  But  they 
were  hardly  needed,  since  the  visibility  was  extremely 
low  Within  a  few  minutes  the  tanks,  followed  by 
infantry,  were  through  the  obstructions  and  over  the 
first  line,  the  troops  holding  it  surrendering  without 
a  fight.  The  tanks  pushed  on  for  the  German  second 
and  third  lines  and  crossed  them  both.     The  German 


[i9i7]     West  Front  Operations,  191 7      279 

front  was  lightly  held,  owing  to  the  diversion  of  many 
troops  to  Flanders.  The  defenders  hastily  retired 
toward  Cambrai  and  the  valley  of  the  Scheldt  River. 
The  maximum  British  advance  on  November  20th 
was  five  miles.     Ten  thousand  prisoners  were  taken. 

The  British  left  pushed  north-east  to  the  Cambrai- 
Bapaume  highroad  and  reached  the  neighbourhood  of 
Mceuvres  and  Bourlon  Wood,  the  latter  overlooking 
Cambrai.  The  centre  crossed  the  Scheldt  Canal  at 
Marcoing  and  Masnieres.  The  right  drove  still  farther 
east  toward  Crevecceur,  on  the  Scheldt,  due  south  of 
Cambrai,  from  which  side  Field- Marshal  Haig  had 
hoped  to  strike  at  the  German  railroad  connections 
centring  in  the  city. 

On  November  21st  the  advance  was  resumed.  The 
British  left  wing  took  Mceuvres,  to  the  north  of  the 
Cambrai-Bapaume  road,  and  progressed  to  the  south- 
ern edge  of  Bourlon  Wood.  Farther  east,  Cantaing, 
two  miles  south-west  of  Cambrai,  was  captured. 
Between  Bourlon  Wood  and  Cantaing,  the  village  of 
Fontaine-N6tre  Dame  was  stormed.  South  of  Cam- 
brai and  south-east  of  Marcoing  the  offensive  was 
held  up  a  short  distance  east  of  Crevecceur,  the  apex 
of  the  salient  which  Byng  had  driven  through  and 
behind  the  Hindenburg  Line. 

The  idea  of  getting  across  the  Scheldt  and  turning 
Cambrai  from  the  south  was  now  abandoned  in  favour 
of  an  attempt  to  seize  and  hold  Bourlon  Wood.  On 
November  23d  Welsh  troops,  who  had  been  specially 
trained  in  wood  fighting,  carried  the  whole  of  the  wood, 
about  six  hundred  acres  in  extent,  and  also  reached  the 
western  edge  of  Bourlon  village.  For  the  next  four 
or  five  days  the  British  were  violently  counter-attacked 
on  this  front  and  hardly  held  their  own,  losing  a  part 


280  The  Great  War  [i^] 

of  Bourlon  Wood  and  the  village  of  Fontaine-N6tre 
Dame. 

Ludendorff  had  gathered  reserves  from  all  directions. 
Since  the  British  attack  seemed  spent,  he  decided 
to  take  the  offensive  himself.  Byng's  forces  had  not 
been  materially  strengthened  and  now  held  a  vulner- 
able salient,  which  they  were  unable  to  widen  out.  On 
November  30th  six  German  divisions  tried  to  break 
the  northern  side  of  the  British  triangle  and  six  more 
the  eastern  side.  The  attempt  failed  on  the  north. 
But  on  the  east  and  south-east,  where  righting  had  died 
away  for  a  week,  the  British  were  taken  by  surprise 
and  their  whole  line  was  pierced  and  crumpled  up. 

The  southern  attack  was  made  on  a  ten-mile  line 
from  Masnieres  down  to  Vendhuille.  Within  a  couple 
of  hours  the  storming  columns  were  three  miles  inside 
the  British  positions.  At  the  extreme  south  they 
reached  Gouzeaiicourt,  on  the  line  from  which  Byng's 
offensive  had  started  on  November  20th.  They  were 
now  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  British  in  the  apex  of 
the  salient  towards  Crevecceur  and  Masnieres.  At 
Gouzeaucourt  they  nearly  captured  General  de  Lisle, 
commanding  the  29th  Division,  and  his  staff;  at  Gon- 
nelieu  they  just  missed  taking  General  Vincent,  of 
the  37th  Brigade  of  the  29th  Division,  who  found 
himself  cut  off  from  his  troops,  fighting  farther  east. 

The  British  right  wing  was  badly  smashed  and 
retreated  in  disorder.  But  the  centre  about  Masnieres 
held  on  desperately.  Masnieres  and  Marcoing  were 
not  evacuated  until  December  2d,  when  the  British 
withdrew  out  of  the  Masnieres-Crevecceur  salient.  On 
the  north  the  British  left  wing  lost  a  little  ground, 
but  administered  a  severe  check  to  the  enemy. 

The  southern  line  was  re-established  by  December  3d, 


[i9i7i     West  Front  Operations,  191 7      281 

following  the  surrender  of  about  half  the  territory 
originally  gained.  The  Germans  captured  one  hundred 
guns  and  six  thousand  prisoners.  But  they  had  lost 
145  guns  and  eleven  thousand  prisoners.  They  occu- 
pied a  small  sector  of  the  original  British  line,  between 
Vendhuille  and  Gonnelieu.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
British  retained  a  firm  grip  on  eleven  thousand  yards 
of  the  original  Hindenburg  Line,  and  were  still  within 
striking  distance  of  Cambrai. 

Byng's  offensive  was  not  supported  properly  because 
Field-Marshal  Haig's  army  was  worn  down  by  the  long 
and  bloody  fighting  in  Flanders  and  because,  in  addi- 
tion, Haig  had  been  obliged  to  send  several  divisions  to 
Italy  to  help  stabilize  the  Piave  front.  But  the  Cam- 
brai experiment  was  worth  while.  It  showed  that  the 
Hindenburg  Line  could  be  broken  and  that  infantry 
and  tanks  could  go  through  the  zones  on  which  the 
defensive  was  now  obliged  to  rely.  It  prefigured  the 
new  mode  of  warfare  which  was  to  play  so  dramatic 
a  r61e  in  the  decisive  campaigns  of  191 8. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THE  ISONZO-CAPORETTO.      MAY    12,    I917-DECEMBER 
31,    1917 

The  Italian  High  Command  continued  through 
191 7  its  patient  and  unavailing  effort  to  break  through 
the  Isonzo  barrier  and  reach  Laibach  and  Trieste. 
A  continuation  of  the  Isonzo  campaign  was  made  more 
hazardous  by  the  fact  that  Russia  had  virtually  drawn 
out  of  the  war  and  thus  released  large  Austro-Hungarian 
farces  from  the  Galician  and  Bukowinan  front.  But 
Italy  still  aimed  at  the  recovery  of  her  unredeemed 
districts,  and  it  was  only  a  choice  of  evils  whether  she 
should  renew  the  offensive  towards  Trieste  or  engage  in 
an  equally  unpromising  offensive  up  the  Adige  or  down 
the  Val  Sugano  for  Trent. 

General  Cadorna  expected  another  Austro-Hungarian 
attack  out  of  the  Trentino  in  the  early  spring  of  191 7. 
He  prepared  to  meet  it;  but  it  didn't  come.  So  in 
May  and  June  the  Second  and  Third  Italian  armies 
renewed  the  exhausting  warfare  of  the  rigid  positional 
type  which  they  had  been  carrying  on  for  two  years 
past  in  the  mountain  strongholds  about  Gorizia. 

The  first  operation  began  on  May  12th,  with  a  heavy 
artillery  preparation,  lasting  two  days.  On  May  14th 
the  infantry  advanced  from  Gorizia  and  Plava  to  estab- 
lish a  foothold  on  the  rim  of  the  Bainsizza  Plateau,  on 

282 


[1917]  The  Isonzo-Caporetto  283 

the  east  bank  of  the  Isonzo.  North  of  Gorizia,  Monte 
Cucco  and  a  part  of  Monte  Santo,  on  the  south-western 
side  of  the  plateau,  were  stormed  on  the  14th  and  15th. 
The  Italians  took  71 13  prisoners. 

On  May  23d  the  Third  Army  attacked  on  the  Carso 
front,  the  battle  continuing  until  May  27th.  Many 
local  gains  were  made  and  16,568  prisoners  and  twenty 
guns  were  captured.  But  on  June  1st  the  Austro- 
Hungarians,  strongly  reinforced,  started  a  counter- 
offensive  on  the  sector  from  Gorizia  to  the  Adriatic. 
It  was  partially  successful  and  brought  Cadorna's 
effort  to  an  end. 

From  May  19th  to  May  22d  the  Austro-Hungarians 
made  a  feint  at  an  offensive  in  the  Adige  sector. 
Cadorna  retorted  in  June  with  minor  attacks  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Asiago.  But  this  front  remained 
tranquil,  for  the  most  part,  until  after  Caporetto. 

Cadorna  made  his  final  Isonzo  campaign  in  the  period 
between  August  and  October.  It  was  as  spirited  and 
stubborn  as  the  others.  But,  like  the  others,  it  pro- 
duced nothing  substantial.  The  Austrians  called  this 
last  effort  somewhat  derogatively  ''the  Eleventh  Battle 
of  the  Isonzo";  and  in  the  same  vein  the  German 
General  Staff  issued,  after  Caporetto,  a  pamphlet 
describing  the  great  Italian  defeat  as  "the  Twelfth 
Battle  of  the  Isonzo. " 

The  Italian  operation  began  on  August  19th  with 
great  promise.  After  five  days  of  bitter  fighting  the 
Second  Army,  under  General  Capello,  cleared  the  north- 
ern part  of  the  Bainsizza  Plateau.  On  the  24th  the 
rest  of  Monte  Santo  was  stormed  and  the  Austro-Hun- 
garians retired  to  the  eastern  edge  of  the  Bainsizza 
stronghold.  At  last  the  way  toward  Laibach  seemed 
about  to  be  opened. 


284  The  Great  War  [1^7] 

By  September,  Capello  had  penetrated  the  plateau 
to  a  depth  of  seven  and  a  half  miles,  on  a  front  of  eleven 
miles.  On  September  14th  he  occupied  Monte  San 
Gabriele,  which  dominated  Monte  San  Daniele,  still 
held  by  the  Austrians,  in  the  south-eastern  section  of 
Bainsizza.  Beyond  Bainsizza  lay  the  Chiapovano 
Valley  and  beyond  the  valley  the  Ternovano  Plateau, 
in  many  respects  a  duplicate  of  the  Bainsizza  and  the 
Carso.  But  this  plateau  could  be  turned  by  way  of 
the  Chiapovano  Valley  on  the  north  and  the  road  to 
Laibach  on  the  south. 

Below  Gorizia,  however,  the  Duke  of  Aosta,  com- 
manding the  Third  Army,  was  less  successful  in  the 
final  thrust  at  the  Carso.  He  tried  to  take  Mount 
Hermada  and  to  penetrate  into  the  Vippaco  Valley. 
But  he  made  little  progress,  meeting  powerful  counter- 
attacks. By  October  the  situation  on  the  Russian 
front,  disturbed  in  July  by  the  Korniloff  offensive, 
had  simmered  down  to  an  informal  truce,  which  freed 
Austria-Hungary  of  all  apprehension.  She  now  rushed 
eastern  troops  to  the  west  and  began  to  plan,  with 
German  aid,  to  put  an  end  to  the  Italian  menace  to 
Trieste. 

It  was  time.  The  defence  of  the  Gorizia  front  had 
been  arduous  and  costly.  In  the  last  battle  of  the 
Isonzo  Austria  had  lost  thirty  thousand  prisoners. 
Her  total  losses  were  well  over  one  hundred  thousand. 

The  German  General  Staff  assumed  direction  of 
the  great  counter-stroke  against  Italy.  Otto  Below's 
Fourteenth  Army  was  transferred  from  the  Riga  front 
and  was  used  as  the  battering-ram  with  which  to  break 
through  the  Italian  line  on  the  upper  Isonzo.  The 
Teuton  forces  were  grouped  in  this  order,  from  west 
to  east,  on  the  Italian  front:  Hoetzendorff,  with  one 


ii9i7i  The  Isonzo-Caporetto  285 

army,  in  the  Trentino;  Krobatin,  with  one,  in  the  Car- 
nic  Alps;  then  Below,  above  the  Bainsizza  Plateau; 
then  the  Archduke  Eugene,  with  two  armies,  from 
Bainsizza  down  to  Trieste. 

Below  had  chosen  the  weakest  spot  in  Cadorna's 
defence.  From  Tolmino  north  the  Isonzo  Valley- 
makes  a  sharp  bend  to  the  north-west,  so  that  a  passage 
of  the  river  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Caporetto  would 
bring  the  enemy  directly  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the 
Italian  armies  which  were  fighting  in  the  mountains 
east  of  Gorizia.  From  Caporetto  it  was  only  a  short 
march  south-west  to  the  Natisone  Valley,  which  emerges 
from  the  Friuli  foothills  at  Cividale,  an  important 
military  base,  only  ten  miles  east  of  Italian  Grand 
Headquarters  at  Udine. 

The  Tolmino-Plezzo  line,  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
upper  Isonzo,  was  held  by  the  left  wing  of  Capello's 
Second  Army.  But  as  there  had  been  no  active  fight- 
ing on  it  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  its  defence 
was  naturally  assigned  to  the  second  class  divisions. 
There  were  many  charges  after  Caporetto  that  certain 
Italian  units  had  become  demoralized  through  com- 
munications with  the  enemy  and  pacifist  propaganda 
conducted  by  Teuton  agents.  General  Cadorna,  in 
one  of  his  communiques,  explicitly  charged  a  part  of 
the  Second  Army  with  cowardice.  But  this  accusa- 
tion was  afterwards  softened. 

It  was  not  necessary  to  offer  excuses  of  that  sort  for 
the  Italian  defeat.  Better  troops  would  probably 
have  been  equally  unable  to  stop  Below's  veterans. 
The  true  cause  of  the  disaster  was  Cadorna's  willing- 
ness to  risk  an  offensive  beyond  the  Isonzo  while  his 
flank  was  insufficiently  protected  against  attacks  com- 
ing out  of  the  upper  Julian  Alps,  the  Carnic  Alps,  or 


286  The  Great  War 


[1917] 


the  Trentino.  Below  simply  did  what  Hoetzendorff 
came  near  doing  in  191 6,  when  his  Trentino  offensive 
was  cut  short  by  Brusiloff's  sensational  successes  in 
Volhynia,  Bukowina,  and  Galicia. 

Below's  troops  were  secretly  deployed  on  the  Tol- 
mino-Plezzo  front.  The  offensive  was  set  in  advance 
for  October  24th  and  began  promptly  on  that  day 
with  a  violent  bombardment.  This  included  the  use 
of  gas  waves  and  liquid  fire,  which  made  a  powerful 
impression  on  troops  quite  unaccustomed  to  them. 
The  Italian  line  yielded  at  many  points.  German 
infantry  crossed  the  Isonzo  at  Tolmino  and  also  at 
Plezzo  and  converged  toward  Caporetto,  thus  isolating 
the  Italians  holding  Monte  Nero  and  other  advanced 
points  in  the  centre,  to  the  east  of  the  Isonzo. 

By  October  26th  Below  had  reached  the  upper 
Natisone  Valley.  From  Tolmino  also  he  had  pushed 
south-west  beyond  Ronzina,  on  the  Isonzo,  capturing 
many  thousands  of  non-combatants  attached  to  the 
services  in  the  Italian  rear.  On  the  2  7th  the  Fourteenth 
German  Army  took  Monte  Matajur,  the  chief  defence 
of  the  upper  Natisone  Valley.  The  next  day  it  reached 
Cividale.     On  October  30th  it  occupied  Udine. 

The  break-through  at  Tolmino  imperilled  the  centre 
and  right  of  the  Second  Italian  army,  occupying  the 
Bainsizza  Plateau  and  the  region  east  of  Gorizia.  It 
retreated  in  disorder,  pressed  by  the  Archduke  Eugene. 
A  temporary  stand  by  its  rear  guards  on  Vippaco 
Ridge  enabled  it  to  get  clear.  The  Third  Army  had 
ample  time  to  retreat  west  in  the  coast  region.  It 
suffered  relatively  small  losses. 

But  the  rout  of  the  Second  Army  had  uncovered  the 
right  flank  of  the  Fourth  Army,  guarding  the  line  in 
the  Carnic  Alps.     Krobatin  pushed  down  the  upper 


1x9x7]  The  Isonzo-Caporetto  287 

valley  of  the  Tagliamento  River  to  Gemona  and, 
farther  west,  down  the  little  valleys  of  the  streams 
which  enter  the  Piave.  Three  Italian  armies  were 
thus  retreating  south  and  west  toward  a  new  defensive 
line,  which  should  stretch  north  across  the  Venetian 
Plain  and  then  bend  west  to  link  up  with  the  First 
Army's  positions  facing  the  Trentino. 

The  first  halting  place  was  the  Tagliamento  River. 
By  the  time  they  got  to  it  the  Italians  had  lost  180,000 
prisoners  and  1500  guns.  A  line  along  the  Tagliamento 
— at  least  along  its  middle  course — had  been  partially 
prepared  to  cover  a  retreat.  But  it  had  the  disad- 
vantage of  being  open  to  a  turning  movement  from  the 
north.  The  much  shorter  line  of  the  Livenza  River 
was  then  chosen  as  a  barrier.  In  the  retreat  to  it, 
ending  November  8th,  the  Italian  loss  in  prisoners 
had  mounted  to  250,000  and  in  guns  to  2300. 

The  Livenza  line  was  also  untenable  on  the  north. 
It  was  occupied  for  a  few  days  only  while  the  Piave 
line,  twenty  miles  farther  back,  was  being  prepared. 
Here  the  broken  Italian  armies  rallied  effectively  in 
the  middle  of  November.  General  Cadorna  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  supreme  command  to  a  place  on  the 
new  Inter- Allied  War  Council,  and  General  Diaz  was 
nominated  as  his  successor.  Diaz  wisely  decided  to 
fight  it  out  with  the  invaders  on  the  Piave. 

The  Piave  line  was  not  inherently  strong.  It  was 
not  as  well  secured  against  a  turning  movement  as 
was  the  line  of  the  Adige.  But  a  retreat  to  the  Adige 
would  have  involved  the  surrender  of  Venice,  Padua, 
and  Vicenza  and  practically  all  of  the  province  of 
Venetia.  It  would  have  been  an  exaggerated  confes- 
sion of  Italian  weakness.  If  Venetia  was  to  be  defended, 
the  defence  would  have  to  be  made  on  the  Piave. 


288  The  Great  War  iwr] 

And  the  Piave  line  possessed  certain  obvious  advan- 
tages. It  could  be  flooded  for  a  considerable  distance 
in  the  Adriatic  sector,  thus  sheltering  Venice.  It 
ran  north-west  to  the  mountains,  instead  of  north, 
and  from  its  upper  course  the  Italian  front  could  be 
easily  extended  west  to  the  headwaters  of  the  Brenta, 
thence  to  the  Asiago-Arsiero  region  and  on  to  the 
Adige.  Such  a  readjustment  compelled  a  retirement 
of  the  right  wing  of  the  First  Army,  which  had  been 
holding  the  district  west  of  the  Piave.  It  left  the 
Italians  clinging  precariously  to  the  last  ridges  of  the 
Alps  above  the  Venetian  Plain.  And  it  also  trans- 
ferred the  shock  of  the  Teuton  attack  from  the  east 
to  the  north. 

From  the  middle  of  November  till  the  end  of  De- 
cember the  Austro-German  effort  centred  on  the 
mountain  line  between  the  Piave  and  the  Brenta  and 
thence  west  across  the  Asiago  Plateau.  HoetzendorfT 
and  Krobatin  threw  masses  of  troops  against  the 
Italian  positions  from  Monte  Tomba,  near  the  Piave, 
across  to  Monte  Grappa  and  the  Brenta,  and  from 
the  Brenta  west  to  the  Astico.  The  Italian  armies  on 
this  front  were  reinforced  by  three  British  divisions 
and  a  small  French  army  under  General  Fayolle.  It 
was  able  to  hold  its  own,  though  pressed  back  close  to 
the  plain  in  the  region  west  of  the  Brenta. 

In  an  offensive  lasting  from  December  5th  to  Decem- 
ber 8th  HoetzendorfT  captured  fifteen  thousand  prison- 
ers west  of  the  Brenta.  On  December  1 5th  Col  Caprille 
was  stormed  and,  on  December  19th,  Monte  Assolone. 
Five  thousand  prisoners  were  taken  in  these  two  opera- 
tions. The  Austrians  were  now  within  four  miles  of 
the  plain.  But  the  Italians  made  a  timely  counter- 
attack and  retook  Monte  Assolone. 


[i9i7i  The  Isonzo-Caporetto  289 

In  the  last  week  of  December,  Hoetzendorff  captured 
Col  del  Rosso  and  Monte  Valbella,  at  the  head  of  the 
Frenzela  Valley,  running  north-west  from  the  Brenta. 
Nine  thousand  prisoners  were  taken.  But  at  last  the 
winter  snows  intervened  and  operations  ceased.  Just 
before  New  Year's  the  French  had  a  brilliant  local 
success  at  Monte  Tomba. 

The  Teuton  offensive  yielded  in  all  2700  guns  and 
nearly  300,000  prisoners.  About  four  thousand  square 
miles  of  Italian  territory  were  overrun.  The  Caporetto 
campaign  was  another  terrific  indictment  of  the  feeble- 
ness of  Allied  strategy.  An  immediate  outcome  was 
the  Rapallo  Conference,  at  which  the  French,  British, 
and  Italian  governments  agreed  to  create  an  Inter- 
Allied  General  Staff,  consisting  of  General  Foch,  General 
Wilson,  and  General  Cadorna.  This  staff  was  to  act 
as  advisers  to  a  supreme  war  council,  composed  of  the 
Prime  Minister  and  one  other  member  of  the  govern- 
ment of  each  of  the  three  Powers. 

This  was  a  step — but  only  a  halting  one — toward 
unity  of  military  control.  The  Supreme  War  Council 
functioned  without  effect  so  far  as  introducing  a  cen- 
tralized direction  of  the  war  was  concerned.  Another 
great  Allied  disaster — the  defeat  of  the  British  Fifth 
Army  west  of  St.  Quentin — was  needed  to  prod  the 
Allied  governments  into  selecting  a  generalissimo  and 
entrusting  him  with  command  on  all  the  fronts. 
19 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

BALKAN  AND  ASIATIC    CAMPAIGNS    OF    I917.      JANUARY 
I,    I917-DECEMBER    31,    I917 

On  the  Balkan  front  the  war  languished  all  through 
191 7.  Early  in  the  year  the  Germans  completed  their 
operations  in  Eastern  Wallachia.  The  Dobrudja  was 
cleared  entirely  and  the  Russian-Rumanian  line  from 
Braila  to  Fokshani  was  forced.  Braila  was  captured 
on  January  5th,  the  defenders  retiring  toward  Galatz. 
After  February  15th  the  Teuton  line  ran  north-west 
from  Braila  across  to  the  Carpathians.  It  became 
practically  stationary.  The  Germans  pursued  the 
same  policy  toward  Rumania  as  they  did  toward  Russia. 
It  wasn't  necessary  to  fight,  because  the  Russian  revolu- 
tion was  steadily  dragging  both  countries  toward  the 
brink  of  a  peace  at  any  price. 

On  the  Macedonian  front  a  long  period  of  inaction 
set  in  after  the  capture  of  Monastir  by  the  Allies  in 
November,  191 6.  Only  petty  local  operations  were 
indulged  in  up  to  the  fall  of  19 18.  The  Allied  garrison 
in  the  Salonica  entrenched  camp  constituted  a  threat 
against  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  and  protected  Greece. 
Otherwise  it  served  no  strategic  purpose.  In  December, 
1 91 7,  General  Sarrail  was  recalled  to  France.  General 
Guillaumat  succeeded  him  in  command  of  the  Allied 
armies  on  the  Salonica  front. 

290 


[i9i7i     Balkan  and  Asiatic  Campaigns    291 

The  situation  was  greatly  improved,  however,  by 
the  tardy  deposition  of  Constantine.  What  the  Allies 
should  have  done  in  191 5 — certainly  in  1916 — they 
plucked  up  courage  to  do  on  June  12,  19 17.  M.  Jon- 
nart,  former  Governor  General  of  Algeria,  was  sent  to 
Athens  by  the  governments  of  France  and  Great 
Britain  (Italy  also  giving  her  approval),  to  demand 
Constantine's  abdication.  The  latter  capitulated  at 
once.  He  designated  his  second  son,  Prince  Alexander, 
as  his  successor,  and  retired  to  Switzerland. 

The  new  king  summoned  Venizelos  to  form  a  ministry. 
The  Venizelos  Assembly,  which  Constantine  had  ille- 
gally dissolved,  was  again  called  into  being.  Greece 
broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  and  pre- 
pared to  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  Her 
accession  strengthened  the  army  on  the  Macedonian 
front  and  made  possible  the  success  of  the  final  attack 
on  Bulgaria  a  year  later. 

The  British  Government  had  long  hesitated  to 
participate  in  the  dethronement  of  Constantine,  balk- 
ing at  coercion  on  the  part  of  the  three  guardian  Powers 
— France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia.  But  coercion 
had  at  last  to  be  resorted  to,  and  by  that  time  the 
Russian  Government  (Kerensky's),  having  fallen  out 
of  sympathy  with  the  Western  Powers,  refused  to 
concur  in  the  intervention  and  even  protested  against 
it.  Down  to  the  day  of  his  ejection,  Constantine  had 
never  ceased  to  act  as  an  enemy  of  the  Entente  and  a 
friend  of  Germany. 

British  prestige  on  the  Asiatic  front  was  restored  by 
the  capture  of  Bagdad  in  May  and  of  Jerusalem  in 
December. 

The  Bagdad  expedition,  under  General  Sir  Stanley 
Maude,  was  organized  in  the  latter  half  of  19 16.     The 


292  The  Great  War  [1917J 

Turks  were  still  defending  Kut-el-Amara,  whose  forti- 
fied lines  had  proved  too  strong  for  the  army  under 
Lake,  which  had  tried  to  relieve  Townshend.  General 
Maude  began  operations  on  January  6,  191 7.  It  took 
him  nearly  two  months  to  reduce  the  Turkish  positions 
east  of  Kut.  But  late  in  February  he  cleared  the  south- 
ern bank  of  the  Tigris  and  threw  a  bridge  across  the 
river  to  the  northern  bank,  near  Kut.  At  the  same 
time  he  forced  the  formidable  Sannaiyat  lines,  on  the 
northern  bank.  The  Turks  retreated  north  on  Febru- 
ary 24th,  pursued  by  the  British  cavalry  on  land  and 
by  the  British  flotilla  in  the  river.  The  latter  recap- 
tured the  vessels  lost  in  the  Townshend  surrender  and 
destroyed  all  the  other  Turkish  river  craft. 

The  pursuit  was  halted  at  Azizyeh,  fifty  miles  from 
Kut  and  half  way  to  Bagdad,  in  order  to  reorganize 
the  communication  lines.  It  was  resumed  on  March 
5th.  The  infantry  advanced  to  Zeur,  eighteen  miles 
up  the  river,  the  cavalry  going  seven  miles  farther. 
On  March  7th  the  British  head  columns  came  in  contact 
with  the  Turks,  who  had  abandoned  Ctesiphon,  on 
the  line  of  the  Diala  River,  eight  miles  below  Bagdad. 
British  troops  were  now  transferred  to  the  west  bank 
of  the  river,  to  take  the  Diala  positions  in  flank.  They 
made  rapid  progress  north  and  on  March  10th  engaged 
the  Turks  two  or  three  miles  south  and  west  of  Bagdad. 
The  city  was  entered  on  March  nth.  On  the  10th 
the  Diala  lines,  on  the  east  bank,  were  forced.  The 
next  day  General  Marshall,  commanding  on  that  side, 
moved  up  to  Bagdad,  completing  its  occupation. 

The  Turks  retired  twenty  miles  up  the  Tigris  Valley 
and  entrenched  themselves  at  Mushaidie  Station,  on 
the  Bagdad-Mosul  railroad.  General  Cobbe's  column 
stormed  these  positions  on  March  14th.     The  Turks 


[i9i7i    Balkan  and  Asiatic  Campaigns    293 

then  fled  another  twenty-five  miles  north  toward  Mosul. 
On  March  14th,  also,  a  British  post  was  established  on 
the  Diala,  thirty  miles  north-east  of  Bagdad.  Five 
days  later  General  Maude  sent  troops  thirty-five  miles 
west  of  the  city  to  the  Euphrates  River,  where  they 
drove  the  Turkish  garrison  out  of  Feluja.  This  opera- 
tion gave  the  British  control  of  both  the  Euphrates 
and  the  Tigris  and  established  their  position  securely 
in  Upper  Mesopotamia.  From  December  13,  191 6, 
to  March  31,  19 17,  General  Maude's  army  took  7921 
Turkish  prisoners. 

Operations  were  suspended  for  a  time,  awaiting  the 
result  of  a  Russian  offensive  out  of  Persia.  This  drove 
the  Turks  from  Hamadan  and  across  the  Turkish  fron- 
tier. But  the  Russian  revolution  intervened  and  ended 
all  serious  plans  for  military  co-operation.  The  best 
the  Russians  could  do  was  to  capture  Nereman  in 
October.  This  town  lies  fifty  miles  north  of  Mosul. 
But  Maude's  army  didn't  reach  Mosul  until  the  closing 
days  of  the  war.  He  was  left  therefore  to  depend  on 
his  own  resources,  in  his  campaign  beyond  Bagdad. 
On  April  23d  he  took  Samara,  securing  control  of  the 
railroad  to  that  point.  Then  the  summer  heats  inter- 
rupted active  operations. 

On  September  30th  the  British,  pushing  up  the 
Euphrates,  captured  Ramadie,  with  the  whole  of  Ahmed 
Bey's  small  army  in  that  sector.  In  the  Tigris  Valley 
they  advanced  to  Tekrit,  fifteen  miles  north  of  Samara. 
But  dubious  conditions  on  the  Russian  front  made 
it  advisable  to  limit  progress  toward  Mosul.  General 
Maude  died  on  November  18th,  and  was  succeeded 
in  command  of  the  Mesopotamian  army  by  General 
Marshall. 

General  Allenby  had  been  sent  to  Egypt  in  the 


294  The  Great  War  [1917] 

summer  of  191 7  to  organize  an  advance  into  Palestine. 
The  British  had  crossed  the  Sinai  Peninsula  in  January 
and  February,  heading  for  Gaza  and  Beersheba.  They 
were  held  up  south  of  those  two  points  all  summer. 
In  October  Allenby  took  charge.  He  captured  Beer- 
sheba on  October  31st  and  Gaza  on  November  6th. 
He  then  advanced  north,  against  unexpectedly  feeble 
resistance,  and  cut  the  Jerusalem- Jopp a  (Jaffa)  railroad 
at  Ludd  and  El  Ramie,  a  short  distance  from  the 
Mediterranean  coast.  Joppa  was  then  evacuated  by 
the  Turks. 

Allenby  now  began  an  encircling  movement  directed 
at  Jerusalem.  He  moved  south-east  along  the  rail- 
road from  Joppa  and  north  along  the  railroad  from 
Beersheba.  The  Turkish  positions  west,  north,  and 
south  of  the  Holy  City  were  carried.  The  Turks 
avoided  envelopment  by  hurriedly  retiring  east  toward 
the  Jordan  River.  Jerusalem  fell  on  December  10th 
— its  redemption  from  Turkish  rule  sending  a  thrill 
through  Christendom,  Teuton  Christendom  excepted. 

The  British  then  extended  their  positions  east  of  the 
city  and  secured  their  hold  on  Joppa  by  occupying 
high  ground  four  miles  to  the  north  of  that  port.  The 
Turks  held  the  northern  half  of  Palestine  and  also 
retained  their  grip  on  the  Jordan  Valley  and  the  Hedjaz 
railroad,  to  the  west  of  it,  connecting  Damascus  with 
Medina. 

The  conquest  of  German  East  Africa  was  completed 
in  191 7.  The  German  forces  were  gradually  broken 
up  into  small  guerilla  bands.  On  December  3d  the 
British  War  Office  announced  that  the  last  of  the  Ger- 
man colonies  had  passed  into  the  possession  of  the 
Allies. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 

SUBMARINE  AND  NAVAL  OPERATIONS,   I917 

Germany  staked  everything  she  had  on  the  success 
of  her  U-boat  campaign  against  Allied  and  neutral 
shipping.  She  forced  the  United  States  into  the  war 
by  her  reversion  to  the  policy  of  unrestricted  submarine 
warfare.  If  she  couldn't  blockade  Great  Britain  and 
France  and  couldn't  prevent  the  transportation  of 
American  troops  to  Europe,  the  man-power  of  America 
would  eventually  overwhelm  her. 

The  submarine  was  a  powerful  weapon.  But  Ger- 
many never  came  near  doing  with  it  what  she  expected 
to  do.  Tirpitz's  dream  of  German  sea  power  could  not 
be  realized  by  German  U-boats  any  more  than  it  could 
be  by  German  battle- ships  and  battle  cruisers. 

The  German  Government  didn't  proclaim  its  policy 
of  unrestricted  attack  until  February,  191 7.  But  it 
had  already  begun  to  speed  up  its  campaign  against 
merchant  shipping  in  the  last  months  of  191 6.  In 
the  fourth  quarter  of  191 6  the  tonnage  sunk  amounted 
to  1,159,343,  which  was  nearly  twice  the  total  for  the 
third  quarter  of  19 16.  Possibly  this  startling  increase 
in  destruction,  generally  under  the  restrictions  laid 
down  in  the  Sussex  note,  misled  Tirpitz  and  Ludendorff 
into  thinking  that  the  rate  could  be  easily  tripled  or 
quadrupled  by  warfare  freed  from  such  restrictions. 

295 


296  The  Great  War  [1917] 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  world's  ocean-going 
merchant  tonnage  (German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
excluded)  was  about  45,000,000.  The  Germans  sank 
or  interned  in  191 4  681,363  tons,  according  to  British 
Admiralty  figures.  In  1915,  they  sank  1,724,720  tons, 
and  in  1916  2,797,866  tons.  All  these  deductions  were 
practically  neutralized  by  new  construction.  Ger- 
many's task  in  191 7  was  therefore  not  only  to  offset 
new  building,  but  to  cut  into  the  outstanding  total  at 
a  rate  which  would  soon  drive  shipping  from  the  seas. 

The  German  Admiralty  seems  to  have  set  for  the 
destructive  activities  of  its  U-boats  a  mark  of  some- 
thing like  1,000,000  tons  of  shipping  a  month.  That 
was  a  minimum,  if  Germany  expected  to  make  substan- 
tial inroads  into  the  world's  merchant  fleet.  For  after 
the  United  States  entered  the  war  the  world's  capacity 
for  new  construction  would  be  pretty  certain  to  be 
increased  to  at  least  5,000,000  tons  annually.  Accord- 
ing to  British  figures,  the  Germans  destroyed  in  191 7 
shipping  aggregating  7,613,623  tons.  That  was  the 
maximum  accomplishment  of  the  U-boats.  But  it 
was  not  enough.  Including  the  disastrous  year  191 7, 
when  the  submarine  was  at  the  peak  of  its  destructive 
power,  the  world's  loss  in  tonnage  since  August  1,  1914, 
was  1 1 ,827,572.  But  in  those  four  years  new  construc- 
tion had  amounted  to  6,606,275  tons  and  German  ton- 
nage of  2,589,000  had  been  taken  into  Allied  service. 
The  net  loss  for  the  four  years  was  only  2,632,297  tons. 

The  unrestricted  U-boat  campaign,  in  fact,  petered 
out  quickly.  It  reached  the  height  of  its  effectiveness 
in  April,  191 7.  In  February  the  tonnage  sunk  was 
540,000;  in  March,  600,000;  in  April,  875,000.  But 
in  May  it  fell  below  600,000.  In  June  it  was  690,000 ; 
in  July  540,000;  in  August,  500,000.     In  September 


[1917]  Submarine  and  Naval  Operations  297 

it  declined  to  320,000.  In  October  it  was  450,000; 
in  November,  300,000;  in  December,  390,000  and  in 
January,  191 8,  300,000. 

By  July,  191 7,  it  was  evident  that  the  submarine 
had  failed.  The  introduction  of  the  depth  bomb,  the 
large  increase  in  the  force  of  destroyers  and  other  sub- 
marine chasers,  the  arming  of  merchant  vessels,  and  the 
use  of  convoys  greatly  restricted  U-boat  operations. 
More  and  more  the  submarine  commanders  were  limited 
to  the  pursuit  of  smaller  and  slower  vessels.  They 
seldom  ventured  to  attack  convoyed  ships.  They  let 
most  of  the  American  transports  severely  alone.  Only 
one  large  steamer  carrying  American  soldiers  to  Europe 
was  torpedoed.  And  if  the  submarines  could  not 
interrupt  the  flow  of  American  reinforcements  to 
Europe,  what  were  they  really  worth  to  Germany,  in 
the  broad  military  sense? 

The  naval  operations  of  19 17  were  of  minor  impor- 
tance. There  were  no  engagements  between  major 
vessels  except  in  the  Gulf  of  Riga,  at  the  time  of  the 
German  occupation  of  Oesel  Island.  (See  Chapter 
XXVIII,  "Russia  in  Revolution.")  On  January  9th 
the  British  battle-ship  Cornwallis  (14,000  tons)  was 
torpedoed  in  the  Mediterranean.  In  February  the 
French  dreadnaught  Danton  (18,000  tons)  was  torpe- 
doed in  the  Mediterranean.  Other  major  vessels  lost 
by  the  Allies  were  the  French  armoured  cruiser  Kleber, 
sunk  by  a  mine  in  the  Atlantic ;  the  British  dreadnaught 
Vanguard,  destroyed  by  an  explosion  while  at  anchor; 
and  the  French  armoured  cruiser  Chdteau  Renault, 
torpedoed  in  the  Ionian  Sea. 

The  German  raiding  cruiser  Moewe  made  another 
excursion  in  191 7,  sinking  twenty- two  steamers  and 
five  sailing  vessels,  with  a  total  tonnage  of  123,000. 


298  The  Great  War  [1917] 

Another  raider,  the  Seeadler,  ran  the  blockade  and 
operated  in  the  South  Atlantic  and  South  Pacific. 
She  sank  sixteen  vessels  and  was  then  wrecked  on  one 
of  the  Society  Islands.  On  April  20th  British  and 
German  destroyer  squadrons  had  an  engagement  in 
the  North  Sea.  Two  German  destroyers  were  sunk. 
On  December  6th  the  American  destroyer,  Jacob  Jones, 
was  torpedoed  in  the  Atlantic  by  a  submarine  and  sixty 
lives  were  lost.  On  November  20th  the  American 
destroyer  Chauncey  was  accidentally  rammed  and  sunk 
by  a  merchantman  which  she  was  convoying.  Twenty- 
one  lives  were  lost. 

The  enforced  inactivity  of  the  German  navy  led  to 
two  mutinies — one  at  Kiel  and  one  at  Wilhelmshaven. 
They  were  suppressed,  however,  without  great  difficulty. 
Bad  food,  socialistic  propaganda,  and  opposition  to 
being  drafted  for  submarine  service  were  given  as  the 
causes  of  these  outbreaks. 

After  the  United  States  came  into  the  war  the  naval 
strength  of  the  Allies  was  so  materially  increased  as 
to  make  further  use  of  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet 
hopeless.  American  destroyers  were  sent  to  British 
waters  in  May  and  later  an  American  battle- ship  squad- 
ron joined  the  British  Grand  Fleet  at  Scapa  Flow. 

The  American  naval  forces  in  European  waters  were 
under  the  command  of  Admiral  William  S.  Sims. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 

THE  DISMEMBERMENT  OF  RUSSIA.      JANUARY    I,    I918- 
DECEMBER  31,    I918 

The  revolutionary  government  of  Russia  entered 
into  peace  negotiations  with  the  Central  Powers  in 
the  winter  of  191 7-1 8.  The  latter  had  announced 
through  Count  Czernin,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Prime 
Minister,  that  peace  would  be  made  on  the  basis  of 
"no  annexations  and  no  indemnities."  The  Ger- 
man Reichstag  had  also  passed  a  resolution  in  the 
summer  of  19 17,  favouring  a  peace  "with  no  forcible 
annexations." 

The  peace  conference  met  at  Brest-Litovsk  on  De- 
cember 23,  191 7.  Czernin  had  artfully  suggested  that 
the  other  Entente  Powers  participate  in  it  along  with 
Russia.  When  they  declined  to  do  so,  he  announced 
that  the  Teuton  principle  of  "no  annexations  and  no 
indemnities"  was  meant  to  apply  only  in  case  a  general 
peace  conference  assembled.  He  had  also  commended 
the  theory  of  "self-determination"  of  peoples,  which 
at  that  time  was  popular  with  the  Bolshevist  regime. 
But  he  and  the  German  conferees  (all  acting  under  in- 
structions from  Ludendorff  through  General  Hoffmann) 
cynically  interpreted  this  theory  so  as  to  detach  from 
Russia  all  her  western  provinces,  on  the  plea  that  the 
latter  were  entitled  to  seek  "self-determination"  under 
Teuton  guardianship. 

299 


300  The  Great  War  [i918] 

The  negotiations  were  a  travesty  in  which  the  tragic 
mingled  with  the  grotesque.  The  Soviet  delegates 
counted  on  the  influence  of  the  socialistic  proletariats 
of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  to  temper  the  con- 
ditions of  peace.  So  far  as  Russian  nationalistic  and 
territorial  claims  were  concerned,  Lenine  and  Trotzky 
were  disposed  to  make  liberal  concessions.  They  had 
recognized  the  independence  of  Finland.  They  were 
not  opposed  in  principle  to  recognizing  the  independ- 
ence of  Poland,  Lithuania,  Courland,  and  the  Ukraine. 
Under  Bolshevist  rule  Russia  had  ceased  to  be  a  nation. 
Lenine  and  Trotzky  were  willing  to  squander  the  Rus- 
sian patrimony  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  a  free  hand 
in  working  out,  within  narrower  limits,  their  sinis- 
ter experiment  with  Marxianism  and  terroism.  But 
they  expected  the  German  diplomats  to  manifest  a 
certain  amount  of  gratitude  for  the  service  which  the 
Bolshevists  had  done  the  Teuton  Allies  by  taking  Russia 
out  of  the  war. 

The  Soviet  delegates  were,  therefore,  deeply  chagrined 
when  Kuhlmann  and  Hoffmann  abandoned  their  origi- 
nal attitude  of  friendly  patronage  and  insisted  on 
treating  Russia  as  a  conquered  foe.  The  German 
demands  amounted  to  practical  annexation  of  Finland, 
the  Baltic  provinces,  Poland,  Lithuania,  and  the  Uk- 
raine, and  economic  control  of  what  was  left  of  Russia 
in  Europe.  Wrangling  over  these  exorbitant  terms 
continued  until  February  ioth,  when  the  Bolshevist  re- 
presentatives left  Brest- Litovsk  in  disgust.  With  char- 
acteristic naivete  Lenine  and  Trotzky  refused  to  sign 
a  treaty  of  dismemberment.  But  at  the  same  time 
they  declared  the  war  ended  and  issued  orders  de- 
mobilizing the  Russian  armies  still  in  existence. 

With  a  military  power  like  Germany  comedy  of  this 


n9i8]    The  Dismemberment  of  Russia    301 

sort  wouldn't  work.  Berlin  terminated  the  truce  and 
on  February  18th  German  armies  began  an  advance 
toward  Petrograd.  Trotzky  favoured  unorganized 
resistance.  But  Lenine  overruled  him.  The  latter 
held  rightly  that  there  was  no  fight  left  in  the  Russian 
Revolution,  except  against  the  bourgeoisie  and  the 
counter-revolutionists.  He  advocated  unconditional 
surrender.     He  had  his  way. 

The  Soviet  delegates  returned  to  Brest-Litovsk  and 
signed  there,  on  March  3d,  a  treaty  which  Germany 
dictated.  Kuhlmann  and  Hoffmann  had  already  con- 
cluded a  treaty  with  Ukrania,  establishing  a  Teuton 
protectorate  over  that  still  undefined  state. 

By  the  convention  of  March  3d  Russia  surrendered 
Courland,  Poland,  Finland,  the  territory  which  might 
hereafter  be  converted  into  a  kingdom  of  Lithuania, 
the  western  halves  of  Livonia  and  Esthonia,  and  the 
Ukraine,  the  eastern  boundary  of  which  was  left  un- 
drawn. She  also  ceded  three  Russian  trans-Caucasian 
districts — Erivan,  Batum,  and  Kars — to  the  Turks. 

But  the  dismemberment  didn't  end  with  the  stipu- 
lations written  into  the  treaty.  Under  it  Germany 
was  also  to  occupy  and  police  the  eastern  halves  of 
Livonia  and  Esthonia.  But  without  any  warrant  except 
that  of  force,  her  troops  overran  the  Crimea  and  the 
northern  shores  of  the  Black  Sea,  as  far  east  as  the 
mouth  of  the  Don.  She  seized  the  Russian  Black  Sea 
fleet,  she  compelled  Lenine  to  cede  Carelia  to  the  Finns, 
and  assumed  authority  to  turn  Bessarabia  over  to 
the  Rumanians,  as  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the 
Dobrudja.  She  set  up  a  satrapy  in  Ukrania  and  estab- 
lished an  ambassador  in  Moscow  with  almost  pro- 
consular powers. 

As  a  result  of  these  aggressions  the  Lenine  govern- 


302  The  Great  War  [1918] 

ment  was  coerced  into  signing  early  in  August,  three 
supplementary  agreements  with  Germany.  These  pro- 
vided for  the  payment  to  Germany  of  an  indemnity 
of  6,000,000,000  marks  ($1,500,000,000);  the  renun- 
ciation of  Russian  rights  in  eastern  Esthonia  and 
Livonia;  free  trade  with  Germany;  the  recognition 
of  the  independence  of  the  Georgian  republic  and  the 
retention  by  Germany  of  the  Black  Sea  fleet  until  the 
end  of  the  war  with  the  Entente.  Maxim  Gorky  has 
calculated  that  by  seeking  and  accepting  peace  from 
Germany  Russia  lost  four  per  cent,  of  her  area,  twenty- 
six  per  cent,  of  her  population,  thirty-seven  per  cent, 
of  her  foodstuffs  production,  twenty-seven  per  cent,  of 
her  land  normally  cultivated,  twenty-six  per  cent,  of 
her  railways,  thirty-three  per  cent,  of  her  manufacturing 
industries,  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  her  coal,  and  seventy 
three  per  cent,  of  her  iron. 

After  Brest- Litovsk  and  up  to  the  time  of  Luden- 
dorrFs  reverses  on  the  Western  Front  it  looked  as  if 
Germany  had  entered  upon  a  receivership  of  the  former 
Muscovite  Empire.  She  assumed  a  protectorate  over 
the  sounder  parts.  Finland  was  converted  into  an 
active  ally  and  induced  to  elect  a  Hessian  Grand  Duke 
as  king.  Another  German  ruler  was  picked  out  for 
Lithuania,  which  Ludendorff  intended  to  consolidate 
eventually  with  Courland,  Esthonia,  and  Livonia. 
Berlin  and  Vienna  were  in  deadlock  for  many  months 
over  the  selection  of  a  monarch  for  Poland,  and  the 
war  ended  before  a  choice  was  made. 

In  the  Ukraine  the  situation  was  more  unsatisfactory. 
Ukrania  lacked  a  sense  of  national  unity.  Its  people 
were  only  the  raw  materials  of  a  state.  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  promised  to  give  them  independence. 
But  that  independence  was  a  shadowy  fiction.    The 


[igi8]    The  Dismemberment  of  Russia    303 

Teuton  Allies  needed  the  Ukraine's  food  supplies  and 
proceeded  to  seize  them.  This  spoliation  led  to  revolts 
against  the  patrons  and  liberators  of  the  new  state. 
General  Eichhorn,  the  German  military  governor, 
ousted  the  government  which  had  signed  the  Brest  - 
Litovsk  treaty  and  substituted  military  rule.  He  was 
assassinated  in  the  summer  of  191 8.  But  long  before 
that  it  was  evident  that  German  policy  had  failed  to 
create  in  the  Ukraine  the  groundwork  for  a  relation 
of  dependency  such  as  had  been  created  in  Finland, 
Poland,  and  Lithuania. 

In  March  and  April,  191 8,  Germany  had  reached 
the  height  of  her  empire-building  venture.  She  had 
completely  consolidated  her  position  in  continental 
Europe  and  extended  her  power  toward  Central  Asia. 
What  was  left  of  Russia  west  of  the  Urals  had  become 
economically  as  well  as  politically  a  helpless  tributary 
state.  The  Black  Sea  was  hers.  Rumania  was  com- 
pelled to  sue  for  peace  when  Russia  sued  for  it.  And 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  were  as  harsh  as 
those  of  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk.  Rumania  sur- 
rendered the  Dobrudja.  She  also  yielded  up  her  eco- 
nomic independence.  Germany  took  over  her  railroads, 
her  oil  and  grain,  and  her  port  of  Constanza. 

At  the  opposite  end  of  the  Black  Sea  Batum  had 
been  awarded  nominally  to  Turkey.  But  the  Batum- 
Baku  oil  district  lay  open  to  German  exploitation.  And 
by  way  of  the  Caspian  Germany  could  hope  to  pene- 
trate into  Turkestan,  Persia,  and  Afghanistan.  German 
eyes  were  now  fixed  on  Bokhara,  Teheran,  and  Herat. 

Yet  these  enormous  vistas  of  expansion  opened  too 
late.  The  Russia  which  survived,  having  ceased  to 
be  a  nation,  also  ceased  to  be  exploitable  as  a  depend- 
ency, in  either  the  economic  or  military  sense.     On 


304  The  Great  War  [1918] 

January  ioth  the  Cossacks  had  seceded  and  proclaimed 
an  anti-Bolshevist  Republic  of  the  Don,  with  General 
Kaledin,  their  hetman,  as  president.  The  Russian 
Constituent  Assembly,  elected  in  191 7,  met  in  Petro- 
grad  on  January  18,  191 8.  It  was  the  only  link  left 
between  the  Russia  of  Lvoff  and  Kerensky  and  the 
Russia  of  Lenine  and  Trotzky.  Lenine  dissolved  it 
by  violence  before  it  had  a  chance  to  organize.  On 
March  9th  the  seat  of  the  Soviet  government  was 
transferred  to  Moscow.  It  was  there  that  a  packed 
Congress  of  Soviets  ratified  the  Brest-Litovsk  treaty 
on  March  14th. 

But  the  Soviet  regime  was  not  powerful  enough  to 
impose  its  authority  on  the  remnant  of  the  empire. 
It  had  broken  up  the  army  and  proscribed  the  officer 
class.  One  part  of  the  army  which  had  retained  its 
discipline  was  the  body  of  Czecho-Slovak  prisoners  of 
war,  who  had  enlisted  to  fight  Austria-Hungary.  This 
numbered  between  80,000  and  100,000  men.  Lenine 
could  not  force  it  to  return  under  the  Brest-Litovsk 
convention,  which  bound  Russia  to  surrender  Teuton 
prisoners  of  war,  while  allowing  Germany  to  keep 
Russian  prisoners.  The  Czecho-Slovaks  were  anx- 
ious to  go  to  France  and  report  to  the  provisional 
government  of  Czecho-Slovakia  established  there. 
Since  they  were  a  menace  to  the  weak  Soviet  power, 
Lenine  readily  agreed  to  give  them  transportation  to 
Vladivostok. 

The  advance  guard  reached  the  Pacific  unmolested. 
But  German  influence  was  exerted  to  hold  up  this 
Allied  reinforcement.  By  Lenine' s  instructions  Czecho- 
slovak troop  trains  in  Western  Siberia  were  attacked 
by  Red  guards.  The  Czecho-Slovaks,  who  had  nothing 
but  rifles,  were  obliged  to  detrain  and  fight  for  their 


[ipx8]    The  Dismemberment  of  Russia  305 

lives.  They  disarmed  the  Red  guards,  seized  the 
machine  guns  and  artillery  used  against  them,  and 
quickly  took  possession  of  long  stretches  of  the  Siberian 
railroad.  The  Bolshevists,  whose  main  strength  was 
in  Eastern  Siberia,  where  many  released  criminals  and 
German,  Austrian,  and  Hungarian  ex-prisoners  joined 
their  ranks,  held  Irkutsk  and  the  Lake  Baikal  region. 
The  Czecho-Slovaks  found  themselves  marooned  in 
Western  Siberia,  where  they  had  to  improvise  their 
own  subsistence  and  war  material. 

Thus  began  the  most  romantic  adventure  of  the  war 
— the  occupation  of  Siberia  by  an  Allied  force  dropped 
down  there,  as  if  from  the  clouds.  Western  Siberia 
was,  fortunately,  little  inclined  to  Bolshevism,  having 
no  industrial  centres  and  no  organized  proletariat. 
The  Czecho-Slovaks  introduced  order  and  refrained 
from  interfering  in  the  local  concerns  of  the  Siberians. 
They  furnished,  however,  a  powerful  support  to  a 
Siberian  anti-Bolshevist  government,  which  was  formed 
at  Omsk  and  which  declared  Siberian  independence. 
The  Czecho-Slovak  commands  moved  west  as  well  as 
east  along  the  railroad.  They  cleared  the  trans-conti- 
nental line  to  the  Urals  and  beyond  them.  They  also 
worked  east  toward  Irkutsk.  Other  republics,  which 
repudiated  the  Moscow  regime,  were  proclaimed  in 
Turkestan  and  in  the  Caucasus.  By  the  middle  of 
the  summer  the  Czecho-Slovaks  had  recrossed  the 
Urals  and  constituted  a  front  along  the  Volga  River, 
well  inside  Great  Russia. 

The  Allied  Powers  now  recognized  the  state  of  Czecho- 
slovakia as  a  co-belligerent.  An  expedition  to  relieve 
the  forces  cut  off  in  Western  Siberia  was  organized, 
after  many  hesitations  and  delays.  Japan  agreed  to 
furnish  the  bulk  of  the  Siberian  force,  which  was  to 


306  The  Great  War  [1918] 

land  at  Vladivostok.  There  were  also  small  American, 
Canadian,  British,  French,  and  Italian  detachments. 
The  difficulties  of  a  relief  expedition  had  been  greatly- 
exaggerated.  The  Allied  troops,  about  twenty-five 
thousand  strong,  landed  in  Vladivostok  in  August. 
Their  task  was  to  clear  the  Siberian  railroad  west  to 
the  Chinese  border,  and  then  to  move  north  along  the 
branch  line  following  the  Ussuri  River  to  Khabarovsk, 
where  a  junction  is  made  with  the  Amur  River  branch 
line,  coming  north-east  through  Blagoveschensk,  the 
capital  of  the  Amur  Province.  The  Japanese  con- 
tingent undertook  the  Amur  operation.  It  reached 
Khabarovsk  on  September  6th  and  Blagoveschensk  a 
few  weeks  later,  extinguishing  the  Red  government 
there  and  capturing  many  former  Teuton  and  Hun- 
garian prisoners. 

Another  Allied  force,  supported  by  anti-Bolshevist 
Russians,  moved  from  the  western  border  of  Manchuria 
along  the  line  of  the  Siberian  railroad,  toward  Chita, 
east  of  Lake  Baikal,  where  the  Amur  branch  separates 
from  the  main  stem.  But  before  it  reached  its  object- 
ive, Chita  had  been  captured  by  the  Czecho-Slovaks. 
After  seizing  Irkutsk,  they  had  moved  around  the 
southern  end  of  Lake  Baikal,  routed  the  Red  guards, 
and  passed  beyond  Chita.  By  the  middle  of  November 
Siberia  had  been  freed  of  Bolshevism  and  the  Siberian 
railroad  opened  from  Vladivostok  to  the  Volga  region. 

In  the  course  of  the  summer  a  small  British  expedition 
reached  Bokhara,  coming  from  India  through  Balu- 
chistan and  Persia.  Another  expeditionary  force  ar- 
rived at  Baku,  on  the  western  shore  of  the  Caspian 
Sea,  which  Turkish  forces  were  trying  to  seize.  This 
force  was  withdrawn,  however,  shortly  before  the  end 
of  the  war  and  Baku  was  abandoned  to  the  Turks. 


[i9i8]    The  Dismemberment  of  Russia   307 

Germany  had  aided  the  anti-Bolshevist  forces  in 
Finland  to  defeat  and  expel  the  Red  Guards,  who,  with 
aid  from  Lenine,  were  trying  to  seize  the  government. 
In  return  for  this  service  Berlin  urged  the  conservative 
leaders  to  participate  in  a  campaign  for  the  capture  of 
Kola,  the  Allied  military  base  on  the  ice-free  Arctic. 
Finland  hesitated,  however,  to  engage  in  war  with  the 
Allies.  She  passively  supported  the  German  project, 
which,  however,  came  to  nothing.  After  Ludendorffs 
defeat  in  the  Marne  salient  the  Finns  lost  all  interest 
in  the  recovery  of  Lapland  and  the  annexation  of  the 
Murman  peninsula. 

On  August  2d,  the  danger  of  an  attack  on  Kola 
having  passed,  Allied  troops  landed  at  Archangel, 
where  a  provisional  anti-Bolshevist  government  was 
organized.  These  forces  then  moved  south  in  two 
columns,  one  following  the  Dwina  River,  the  other 
along  the  Archangel- Vologda  railroad.  The  ultimate 
purpose  of  this  expedition  was  to  form  a  junction  with 
the  Omsk  government  armies  coming  west  from  the 
Volga.  Its  numbers  were  too  small,  however,  to  make 
headway  against  the  Soviet  forces  in  Northern  Russia. 
It  was  held  up  a  hundred  miles  or  more  south  of  Arch- 
angel and  was  forced  to  retreat  by  a  Soviet  offensive 
in  the  winter  of  191 8-19. 

Germany  extorted  some  partial  payments  on  the 
6,000,000,000-mark  indemnity  from  the  Lenine  govern- 
ment and -received  numerous  trade  concessions.  But 
under  Lenine' s  savage  and  vindictive  rule  Russian 
industry  was  prostrated  and  German  relations  with 
Moscow  became  more  and  more  profitless.  Count 
Mirbach,  the  German  Ambassador,  was  assassinated 
on  July  6th,  and  his  place  was  never  filled. 

By  August    1st    the    whole    structure   of   German 


308  The  Great  War  [1918] 

empire  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  had  begun  to 
totter.  The  Russian  front  was  stripped  of  troops. 
All  the  newly  acquired  dependencies  assumed  an  atti- 
tude of  passive  insubordination  and  commenced  to 
plan  for  independent  national  existence.  ,  The  Pan- 
German  dream  was  over.  Germany  had  sacrificed  her 
grandiose  conquests  in  the  East  by  running  amuck  with 
the  U-boat  and  thus  throwing  two  million  Americans 
into  the  balance  against  her  on  the  Western  Front. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 
ludendorff's    channel    port    OFFENSIVES — ST. 

QUENTIN,  MARCH  21,  I918;  LYS  VALLEY, 
APRIL  9,  I918 

Caporetto  was  a  warning  to  the  Allies  that  Ger- 
many would  try  to  make  a  finish  campaign  in  191 8  on 
the  Franco-Belgian  front.  Ludendorff's  only  chance 
to  win  the  war  lay  in  crushing  the  British  and  French 
armies  before  the  main  body  of  the  American  reinforce- 
ment arrived. 

There  was  an  alternative  policy.  That  was  to  try 
for  a  draw  in  the  West,  ending  the  war  in  a  stalemate 
of  exhaustion.  If  Ludendorff  had  stood  on  the  defen- 
sive through  19 1 8,  the  French  and  British  armies 
would  probably  have  continued  to  operate  under  sepa- 
rate and  independent  commands.  Foch  would  not 
have  been  chosen  generalissimo  in  191 8.  The  Ameri- 
can troop  movement  would  not  have  been  speeded  up. 
The  war  in  the  West  would  probably  have  lagged  in 
191 8,  as  it  did  in  191 7,  and  Germany  could  have  entered 
19 19  with  her  reserves  unimpaired.  This  respite  of  a 
year  would  have  allowed  Ludendorff  to  experiment 
with  any  schemes  he  may  have  had  in  view  for  a  mili- 
tary organization  of  the  new  Eastern  dependencies 
— Finland,  the  Baltic  provinces,  Lithuania,  Poland, 
and  the  Ukraine. 

But   Ludendorff  had   the   gambler's   temperament, 

309 


310  The  Great  War  [1918] 

He  wanted  to  push  his  luck.  He  preferred  risking 
everything  on  a  single  throw.  So  he  overbore  the 
counsels  of  caution  and  the  hesitations  attributed 
(though,  perhaps,  mistakenly)  to  Hindenburg  and  the 
Kaiser,  but  undoubtedly  advanced  by  a  certain  element 
in  the  General  Staff. 

The  Allied  leaders  in  France  sensed  the  situation  and 
prepared  to  shift  from  the  offensive  to  the  defensive. 
Field  Marshal  Haig  says  that  these  preparations  began 
early  in  December,  191 7.  But  they  were  far  from 
adequate.  The  Inter-Allied  Military  Council  had 
been  organized.  But  no  steps  were  taken  to  secure 
unity  of  command. 

The  British  armies  had  suffered  very  heavy  losses  in 
191 7.  Those  losses  were  not  made  good.  To  cover  the 
deficit  the  Army  Council  in  London  ordered  the  British 
divisions  to  be  reduced  in  strength  from  thirteen  bat- 
talions to  ten  battalions.  Field  Marshal  Haig  naturally 
opposed  this  change.  He  says  that,  apart  from  the 
reduction  in  fighting  strength  involved,  the  fighting 
efficiency  of  the  units  was  reduced  by  new  groupings 
and  altered  tactical  methods. 

Weakened  as  they  were,  the  British  armies  were 
also  required  to  extend  their  front.  Negotiations  for 
this  extension  had  been  under  way  since  September, 
191 7.  It  was  agreed  finally  that  Haig  should  prolong 
his  lines  twenty-eight  miles  to  the  south,  from  the 
neighbourhood  of  St.  Quentin  to  the  village  of  Barisis. 
This  village  lies  on  the  edge  of  the  Forest  of  St.  Gobain, 
a  few  miles  south  of  La  Fere. 

The  French  thought  that  Ludendorff's  primary 
objective  would  be  Paris  and  that  he  would  try  to  reach 
the  capital  by  striking  between  Rheims  and  Soissons 
and  pushing  down  to  the  Marne  and  the  Ourcq.     Most 


[i9i8]     The  Channel  Port  Offensives      31 1 

of  the  French  reserves  were  concentrated  behind  this 
front. 

LudendorfTs  original  objective,  however,  was  not 
Paris.  It  was  Amiens.  His  idea  was  to  break  the 
connection  between  the  British  and  French  armies. 
If  he  could  put  the  broad  estuary  of  the  lower  Somme 
between  the  two  Allied  contingents,  he  could  roll  up 
the  British  right  wing  and  drive  Haig's  forces  back  on 
the  Channel  ports.  His  attack  was  wisely  directed 
at  the  weakest  point  of  any  Allied  defence — that  at 
which  the  jurisdiction  of  one  command  ends  and  the 
jurisdiction  of  another  begins. 

Reinforcements  from  the  Eastern  Front  had  brought 
LudendorfTs  strength  up  to  about  3,000,000  men. 
He  is  generally  credited  with  having  at  the  end  of 
March  210  divisions  of  infantry,  no  in  the  front  line 
and  100  in  reserve,  the  latter  forming  what  are  known 
as  masses  of  manoeuvre.  Field  Marshal  Haig,  however, 
estimated  the  German  strength  at  only  192  divisions. 

Under  LudendorfTs  regime  the  armies  on  the  active 
front — from  the  North  Sea  to  Verdun — were  separated 
into  two  main  groups. 

The  northern  one,  extending  as  far  down  as  the  Oise, 
was  under  the  command  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria. 
The  southern  one,  from  the  Oise  to  the  Meuse,  was 
commanded  (nominally)  by  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Prussia.  As  military  dictator  Ludendorff  thus  shel- 
tered himself  behind  the  heirs  apparent  of  the  two 
largest  German  states.  East  of  Verdun  General  Gall- 
witz  commanded  a  holding  army.  The  Grand  Duke 
of  Wurttemberg  commanded  a  similar  force  in  southern 
Lorraine  and  Alsace. 

To  meet  the  German  offensive  the  Allies  had  about 
2,500,000  men — 2,000,000  in  the  front  line  and  500,000 


312  The  Great  War  [1918] 

in  reserve,  as  General  Zurlinden  states  in  his  La  Guerre 
de  Liberation.  Field  Marshal  Haig  had,  on  his  front, 
from  north  to  south,  the  Second,  First,  Third,  and  Fifth 
British  armies.  They  were  commanded  by  Plumer, 
Home,  Byng,  and  Gough,  respectively.  The  French 
armies  were  disposed  in  three  groups — under  de  Castel- 
nau,  Franchet  d'Esperey,  and  Fayolle.  Petain  was  in 
supreme  command,  with  General  Antoine  as  his 
assistant. 

The  extension  of  the  British  lines  was  to  have  occurred 
in  December,  191 7.  It  was  delayed,  however,  and  the 
operation  was  not  completed  until  the  end  of  January, 
1918.  The  British  had  adopted  the  German  zone  sys- 
tem of  defence.  On  the  front  of  the  Third  and  Fifth 
armies  three  defensive  belts  were  constructed,  corre- 
sponding to  the  German  fore  zones,  intermediate  zones, 
and  battle  zones.  Behind  the  Fifth  Army  a  bridgehead, 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  Somme,  was  prepared  against 
the  eventuality  of  a  forced  retreat  west  of  that  river. 

The  German  offensive  west  of  St.  Quentin  on  March 
2 1st  was  a  surprise  only  in  the  manner  in  which  it 
was  conducted.  Its  probability  had  been  taken  into 
account.  And  the  Fifth  Army  front  was  held  more 
lightly  than  the  other  parts  of  the  British  line,  because, 
from  the  strategical  point  of  view,  Haig  felt  that  he 
could  better  afford  to  lose  ground  there  than  elsewhere. 
Between  St.  Quentin  and  La  Fere  the  British  were 
farther  east  than  on  any  other  sector  and  more  in 
advance  of  the  positions  in  which  they  would  have  to 
stand  in  order  to  protect  their  main  bases  and  the 
Channel  ports.  Behind  them  was  the  waste  made  by 
Hindenburg  in  the  German  "strategic  retirement" 
of  191 7.  Haig  would  not  have  been  greatly  disturbed 
if  the  Germans  had  pushed  him  back  to  the  Somme 


[i9i8i     The  Channel  Port  Offensives      3*3 

line.  The  situation  became  dangerous  only  when  the 
Somme  line  was  lost  and  the  enemy  pressed  on  twenty 
miles  farther  to  within  easy  gun  range  of  Amiens. 

The  relative  depletion  of  the  Fifth  Army  front  was 
therefore  intentional.  For  ten  miles,  between  Amigny- 
Rouy  and  Alaincourt,  the  marshes  of  the  Oise  offered 
a  natural  protection.  The  lines  there  were  very  thinly 
held.  But  it  happened,  unfortunately,  that  an  excep- 
tionally dry  winter  had  made  the  marshes  passable. 
So  the  enemy  was  enabled  to  employ  large  forces — at 
least  six  divisions — to  break  through  the  weak  British 
positions  north  and  south  of  La  Fere. 

The  British  Fifth  Army  consisted  of  fourteen  in- 
fantry and  three  cavalry  divisions.  The  three  cavalry 
divisions  and  three  of  the  infantry  divisions  were  in 
reserve.  This  army  occupied  a  front  of  forty-two  miles 
from  Barisis  north  to  Gouzeaucourt.  That  made  one 
division  to  6750  yards  of  front.  The  Third  Army, 
adjoining  the  Fifth  on  the  left,  consisted  of  fifteen 
divisions,  eight  in  the  first  line  and  seven  in  reserve. 
It  occupied  a  twenty-seven-mile  stretch  from  Gouzeau- 
court north-west  to  Gavrelle.  One  division  was 
assigned  to  every  4700  yards  of  front. 

The  total  British  force  available  in  the  positions 
attacked  on  March  21st  was  therefore  twenty-nine 
infantry  divisions  and  three  cavalry  divisions.  But 
Ludendorff  employed  on  that  day  sixty-four  divisions, 
giving  him  a  superiority  of  two  to  one.  In  the  follow- 
ing days,  when  the  battle  extended  north  and  involved 
the  right  wing  of  the  British  First  Army,  seventy-three 
German  divisions  were  engaged  against  thirty-seven 
British  divisions. 

On  March  21st,  at  5  a.m.,  a  violent  artillery  fire  broke 
out  on  the  entire  front  held  by  the  Fifth  and  Third 


314  The  Great  War  [z9z8] 

British  armies;  also  on  the  French  sector  north-east 
of  Rheims  and  on  the  British  sectors  from  Lens  north 
to  Ypres.  The  infantry  attack  began  about  four  hours 
later.  By  9.45  a.m.  it  had  developed  on  a  battle  front 
of  fifty-four  miles,  from  below  the  Oise  River  north  to 
the  valley  of  the  Sensee. 

Ludendorff  had  made  some  innovations  in  offensive 
tactics.  He  depended  now,  more  than  ever,  on  highly 
specialized  shock  formations  trained  in  a  wave  method 
of  assault,  with  which  General  Hutier  had  experimented 
in  the  fall  of  191 7  in  the  Riga  campaign.  By  the  wave 
method  one  series  of  units  made  a  definite  advance. 
It  then  halted  and  was  passed  through  or  over  by 
a  closely  succeeding  second  series,  so  that  fresh  troops 
continually  renewed  the  impetus  of  the  attack.  Provi- 
sion was  also  made  for  the  rapid  movement  of  light 
guns  to  the  fighting  front.  The  Germans  had  few 
tanks.  Almost  until  the  end  of  the  war  they  remained 
sceptical  of  the  value  of  the  tank,  preferring  to  depend, 
for  breaking  an  enemy  line,  on  gas  waves  and  shells 
and  new  variants  of  the  old  mass  attack. 

For  his  first  offensive  Ludendorff  had  created  three 
picked  armies.  The  northernmost,  operating  between 
Cambrai  and  the  Sensee  River,  was  under  Otto  Below, 
the  victor  of  Caporetto.  The  central  one,  stationed 
between  Cambrai  and  St.  Quentin,  was  commanded  by 
Marwitz,  transferred  from  the  Lorraine  front.  The 
southern  one,  between  St.  Quentin  and  La  F&re,  was 
under  Hutier,  who,  like  Below,  had  been  a  successful 
Eastern  Front  leader. 

Ludendorff  was  favoured  on  March  21st  by  a  thick 
fog  which  limited  visibility  to  about  fifty  yards.  The 
British  front  line  was  thus  practically  cut  off  from  the 
supporting   second  line.     Signals  from   the  outposts 


[iqi8]     The  Channel  Port  Offensives      315 

were  not  seen,  and  the  machine  guns  and  field  guns, 
which  had  been  disposed  so  as  to  cover  the  first  zone 
with  their  fire,  after  its  penetration  by  the  Germans, 
had  to  be  trained  on  an  invisible  enemy.  German 
numbers  were  so  enormous  that  the  attacking  mass 
couldn't  well  lose  direction.  So  the  British  second 
zone  was  soon  put  in  as  great  peril  as  the  forezone  by 
conditions  which  made  infiltration  unusually  easy. 

The  fog  didn't  thin  out  until  after  i  p.m.  By  that 
time  the  Germans  had  penetrated  the  second  British 
defensive  zone  at  various  points.  But  both  the  Fifth 
and  Third  armies  were  holding,  in  the  main,  their 
battle  positions,  with  units  here  and  there  still  in  ad- 
vance of  these.  On  the  extreme  left  of  the  Fifth  Army 
the  most  serious  breach  made  was  at  Ronssoy,  which 
the  Germans  captured  about  noon.  But  they  were 
held  in  the  rear  of  the  battle  positions  by  counter- 
attacks on  the  flanks,  especially  on  the  northern  flank 
at  Epehy,  the  enemy  being  driven  out  of  that  village. 

The  more  dangerous  penetrations  were  made  farther 
south,  on  the  right  centre  and  right  of  the  Fifth  Army's 
lines.  Quessy,  north-west  of  La  F&re,  was  taken  late 
in  the  afternoon.  Benay,  west  of  Moy,  was  also  cap- 
tured by  evening  and  the  Germans  made  considerable 
progress  toward  Savy  and  Roupy,  south-west  of  St. 
Quentin,  on  the  northern  side  of  the  St.  Quentin-Ham 
highroad.  Maissemy,  north  of  St.  Quentin,  in  the 
battle  zone,  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  early  on  the 
2 1  st. 

The  most  threatening  wedge  driven  into  the  front 
of  the  Third  Army,  holding  the  line  from  Gouzeaucourt 
north-west  to  the  Sensee  River,  was  in  the  sector 
about  Qu6ant.  Here  the  Germans  broke  into  the 
British  battle  positions,  taking  Lagnicourt,  south  of 


316  The  Great  War  [i9i8j 

Queant,  and,  to  the  west,  reaching  the  neighbourhood 
of  Mory,  St.  Leger,  and  Croisilles.  At  this  end,  however, 
the  British  lines  were  more  strongly  held  and  reinforce- 
ments could  easily  be  drawn  from  the  First  and  Second 
armies.  In  the  south,  along  the  Oise,  the  right  wing 
of  the  Fifth  Army  was  far  away  from  the  British  bases 
and  the  local  reserves  were  insufficient. 

General  Gough  drew  back  his  right  wing,  on  the  night 
of  the  2  ist,  behind  the  Crozat  and  Somme  canals. 
The  bridges  over  these  waterways  were  not  completely 
destroyed,  however.  On  the  morning  of  the  226.  the 
enemy  made  a  crossing  opposite  Quessy  and  in  the 
evening  captured  Tergnier,  an  important  communica- 
tions centre,  four  miles  south-west  of  La  Fere. 

The  real  break-through,  however,  was  effected  on 
Gough's  left,  west  and  north-west  of  St.  Quentin. 
Here  Ludendorff  exploited  the  substantial  gains  made 
on  the  2 1  st.  The  Germans  took  Le  Verguier  at  10 
A.M.  and  threatened  to  roll  up  the  British  line  north 
through  Roisel  to  Epehy.  These  towns  were  evacuated 
in  the  afternoon.  A  new  line  was  formed  in  this  sector, 
running  north  and  south  from  Bernes  to  Boucly,  about 
five  miles  east  of  Peronne,  and  thence  to  Nurlu  and 
Equancourt. 

The  right  of  the  Third  Army  was  affected  by  the 
retirement  of  the  left  wing  of  the  Fifth  Army.  It  was 
now  drawn  back  two  or  three  miles,  in  order  to  preserve 
a  junction  with  Gough's  army  at  Equancourt.  The 
Flesquieres  salient,  south-west  of  Cambrai,  created 
by  Byng's  Cambrai  drive  of  November,  191 7,  had 
been  evacuated  in  part  on  the  21st.  It  was  now 
entirely  abandoned.  Farther  west,  the  British  were 
forced  to  retire  on  both  sides  of  the  Cambrai-Ba- 
paume  highroad.     Above    the    Sensee    River    Byng's 


Ii9i8]     The  Channel  Port  Offensives      3*7 

left  was  thrust  back  to  the  road  between  Croisilles 
and  Henin-sur-Cojeul. 

These  losses  of  territory  were  not  especially  damaging. 
The  disaster  came  on  the  left  centre  and  centre  of  the 
Fifth  Army,  west  of  St.  Quentin.  Here  the  British 
were  expelled  from  all  their  battle  positions.  Late  in 
the  afternoon,  while  fighting  in  the  last  defensive  zone, 
the  British  Fiftieth  Division,  about  Pceuilly,  lost  touch 
with  the  Sixty-first  and  Twentieth  divisions,  on  its 
right.  A  gap  was  opened  and  the  Germans  poured 
through  in  dense  masses,  penetrating  the  British  rear 
zone. 

Gough  had  no  reserves  left  with  which  to  close  the 
gap.  He,  therefore,  on  the  night  of  the  22d,  ordered  a 
retreat  to  the  line  of  the  Somme.  But  once  in  retreat, 
with  his  line  shattered,  he  was  unable  to  stop  at  the 
Somme.  His  army  was  exhausted.  The  Somme 
bridgehead  positions,  east  of  Peronne,  were  only  half 
constructed.  And  Gough  saw  that  to  try  to  hold  them 
would  involve  him  in  another  general  engagement,  to 
which  his  weakened  divisions  were  not  equal. 

It  was  apparently  a  sound  decision,  made  in  con- 
formity with  Haig's  general  policy  of  defence.  But  it 
represented  merely  a  choice  of  evils.  To  continue  the 
retreat  would  necessarily  increase  the  disorganization 
of  the  Fifth  Army,  compel  a  parallel  retirement  of  the 
Third  Army,  and  impose  extraordinary  burdens  on  the 
Allied  High  Commands,  which  were  not  prepared  to 
organize  a  new  defence  line  west  of  the  Somme. 

On  the  morning  of  March  23d  Gough  ordered  the 
abandonment  of  the  P6ronne  bridgehead.  The  retire- 
ment was  made  without  serious  interference  in  the 
Peronne  sector.  But  on  the  evening  of  the  22 d  another 
gap   had    developed   in    the  British  line   near  Ham. 


3i8  The  Great  War 


[1918] 


Taking  advantage  of  it,  the  Germans  entered  Ham 
early  on  March  23d  and  crossed  the  Somme  on  both 
sides  of  that  city,  thus  threatening  the  British  still 
fighting,  to  the  south-east,  on  the  line  of  the  Crozat 
Canal. 

The  Third  Army  held  the  enemy  in  check  all  through 
the  23d.  But  at  the  junction  point  of  the  Third  and 
Fifth  armies  another  gap  in  the  line  was  opened — this 
time  by  a  confusion  of  orders.  The  Fifth  Corps  of 
the  Third  Army,  on  Byng's  right,  had  fallen  back  to 
the  third  British  defence  positions,  about  Ytres.  The 
Seventh  Corps  of  the  Fifth  Army,  on  Gough's  left, 
had  been  directed  to  retire  more  in  a  south-westerly 
direction  toward  Moislains.  The  two  corps  lost  con- 
tact and  the  Germans  again  took  quick  advantage  of 
the  opening  offered  them.  The  Fifth  Corps  was  thrust 
off  toward  the  north-west  and  the  Seventh  toward  the 
south-west,  across  the  Tortille  River  to  Bouchavesnes. 
This  additional  mishap  ended  all  chance  of  a  stabiliza- 
tion of  the  British  lines  in  the  region  south  and  west 
of  the  Somme. 

Field  Marshal  Haig  had  made  plans  for  checking 
a  German  drive  west  from  the  Oise  to  the  Somme. 
But  he  had  anticipated  no  such  disaster  as  had  over- 
taken the  Fifth  Army.  He  called  on  the  French  for 
assistance.  At  an  interview  with  General  Petain,  on 
March  23d,  it  was  decided  that  the  French  should 
take  over,  as  rapidly  as  possible,  the  whole  front  south 
of  Peronne.  French  cavalry  had  already  covered  the 
retirement  to  the  south  of  the  British  divisions  west  of 
La  Fere.  Now  Petain  sent  in  the  French  Third  Army 
— first  under  General  Pelle,  and  then  under  General 
Humbert — to  take  over  the  southern  side  of  the  big 
wedge  which  the  Germans  were  driving  west  toward 


[i9i8j     The  Channel  Port  Offensives      319 

Montdidier  and  Amiens.  This  army  was  near  at  hand. 
But  another  army  was  needed  in  order  to  prolong  the 
line  around  the  apex  of  the  new  salient.  The  First 
Army,  under  General  Debeney,  was  recalled  from 
Lorraine  and  ordered  to  extend  Humbert's  left  far 
enough  to  make  a  junction  with  what  remained  of  the 
British  Fifth  Army,  and  with  the  British  Third  Army, 
in  the  region  south-east  of  Amiens. 

It  would  take  several  days  for  Debeney's  reinforce- 
ment to  arrive.  Meanwhile  Haig  called  on  the  British 
First  and  Second  armies  to  supply  reserves  for  the 
Somme  front.  Ten  divisions  were  contributed  by 
Generals  Home  and  Plumer,  the  majority  of  them  by 
the  latter,  who  received  in  return  some  of  the  broken 
divisions  of  the  Fifth  Army  when  they  could  be  drawn 
out  of  the  battle. 

On  March  24th,  as  a  result  of  the  snapping  of  the 
British  line  at  the  junction  of  the  Third  and  Fifth 
armies,  the  Third  Army's  right  and  centre  were  forced 
westward  to  a  line  running  north  and  south  across 
the  old  Somme  battlefield  of  191 6.  Bapaume  fell  to 
the  Germans,  who  had  also  passed  to  the  west  of 
Combles.  Farther  south,  the  wearied  Fifth  Army 
tried  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing  the  Somme 
between  Peronne  and  Ham.  The  Germans  got  over 
to  the  west  bank  at  Pargny,  about  nine  miles  east  of 
Chaulnes.  In  the  Oise  sector  the  British  lost  Chauny, 
retiring  south  on  the  French  Third  Army. 

On  March  25th  the  British  Third  Army  lost  ground 
very  rapidly.  The  line  it  was  trying  to  hold,  west  of 
Bapaume,  was  broken  and  a  gap  was  widened  out 
between  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  corps.  The  Germans 
reached  Courcellete  in  the  afternoon  and  were  close 
up  to  the  Ancre  River  by  evening.     West  of  Bapaume 


320  The  Great  War  [1918] 

the  British  were  almost  on  the  line  which  they  had 
occupied  in  191 6  before  the  battle  of  the  Somme. 

The  Third  Army  was  now  farther  west  than  the 
Fifth  Army,  whose  position  south  of  the  Somme  had 
become  critical.  General  Byng  took  over  the  command 
of  all  the  remnants  of  the  Fifth  Army  north  of  the 
Somme.  The  other  corps  were  directed  to  retreat  west 
until  they  could  be  relieved  by  the  French,  who  now 
assumed  control  of  all  the  forces  in  the  region  south 
of  the  Somme.  The  situation  of  the  British  troops 
here  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  no  reserves  were 
yet  available.  The  only  support  Gough  had  for 
several  days  was  an  improvised  force  under  General 
Grant,  afterwards  under  General  Carey,  consisting  of 
stragglers,  details,  school  personnel,  tunnelling  com- 
panies, field-survey  companies,  and  Canadian  and 
American  engineers.  This  was  organized  on  the  line 
of  the  old  eastern  defences  of  Amiens. 

The  chief  enemy  advance  south  of  the  Somme  on 
March  26th  was  made  by  Hutier's  army  west  of  Nesle. 
Here  the  right  of  Gough' s  southernmost  division  was 
separated  from  the  left  of  Humbert's  supporting  army 
and  a  gap  was  opened  about  Roye.  That  evening, 
however,  contact  was  re-established  with  the  French 
west  of  Roye  and  the  worst  of  the  retreat  was  over. 

March  26th  marked  in  another  way  the  turn  of  the 
tide  for  the  Allies.  On  that  day  Foch  was  appointed 
Allied  generalissimo.  In  the  shadow  of  another  great 
German  victory  the  Allies  at  last  took  that  step  which 
for  nearly  four  years  they  had  refused  to  take,  thus 
defying  the  fundamental  axioms  of  military  science 
and  prudence.  An  enormous  handicap  on  the  proper 
employment  of  Allied  military  strength  was  lifted. 
Ludendorff  had  tried  to  disjoin  and  sever  the  two 


[i9i8]      The  Channel  Port  Offensives      321 

Allied  armies  in  France.  The  net  result  of  his  effort 
was  to  unify  them. 

Assured  of  a  free  hand,  Foch  could  stop  the  first 
Ludendorff  offensive  or  any  succeeding  Ludendorff  of- 
fensive. But  he  could  not  be  certain  of  stopping  any 
of  them  unless  he  had  as  complete  control  of  the  Allied 
forces  in  the  field  as  his  opponent  had  of  the  German. 

Between  March  26th  and  March  28th  the  British 
south  of  the  Somme  retired  under  pressure  to  and 
beyond  the  old  line  of  the  defences  of  Amiens.  Gough 
had  been  ordered  to  hold,  if  possible,  a  line  farther 
east,  north  and  south  through  Rosi£res.  From  this 
front  Amiens  could  not  have  been  bombarded  by  the 
enemy.  But  the  Third  Army  had  retired  four  miles 
to  the  west  of  Bray,  on  the  north  side  of  the  Somme, 
through  which  point  the  Rosi&res  line  would  have  run, 
if  carried  farther  north.  The  Germans  were,  therefore, 
able  to  cross  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  and  take 
the  Rosieres-Proyart  positions  in  the  rear.  There  was 
nothing  to  do  but  to  extricate  the  troops  on  this  line, 
bringing  them  back  to  the  front  covered  by  Carey's 
"scratch"  division. 

The  enemy  had  now  entered  Montdidier,  extending 
some  ten  miles  to  the  west  the  apex  of  the  old  Noyon 
salient.  He  was  hardly  ten  miles  east  of  Amiens  and, 
north  of  the  Somme,  had  occupied  Albert.  But  he 
needed  more  elbow  room  on  the  north,  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Arras,  where  the  British  First  Army  had  made 
only  a  very  slight  retirement  in  order  to  conform  its 
right  wing  to  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  Army. 

Ludendorff  therefore  shifted  his  attack  on  March 
28th  to  the  Arras  front.  He  expected  to  carry  Vimy 
Ridge,  Arras,  and  the  strong  positions  to  the  west  of 
that  city.     Eleven  German  divisions  were  engaged  in 


322  The  Great  War 


[1918] 


a  battle  which  lasted  all  through  the  day.  But  no 
impression  was  made  anywhere  on  the  British  lines. 
The  assault,  conducted  with  the  same  methods  as  were 
used  on  March  21st,  was  a  complete  failure.  There 
was  no  covering  fog,  and  the  Hutier  wave  attacks 
broke  down  with  enormous  losses. 

The  first  stage  of  the  Amiens  or  St.  Quentin  offensive 
ended  with  this  repulse.  The  German  advance  did 
not  stop  entirely  until  April  5th.  Local  gains  were 
made  after  March  28th,  in  the  Avre-Luce  sector  and 
about  Moreuil.  But  the  operation  as  a  whole  was 
terminated  when  General  Fayolle,  commanding  the 
western  French  sector,  got  Debeney's  First  Army  into 
position  on  this  front  and  Haig's  reinforcements  from 
the  Second  and  First  armies  prolonged  the  Allied  line 
north  across  the  Somme  to  the  Ancre. 

The  results  of  the  German  offensive  were  imposing. 
Ludendorff  had  carried  his  front  forward  about  thirty- 
seven  miles— from  Moy,  on  the  Oise,  to  the  junction 
of  the  Avre  and  Luce  rivers.  He  had  recovered  more 
than  all  the  territory  lost  in  the  battle  of  the  Somme, 
in  1 91 6,  and  the  Hindenburg  strategic  retirement,  in 
191 7.  He  was  within  easy  gun  range  of  Amiens,  the 
chief  anchor  of  the  Allied  positions  in  Northern  France. 
He  had  nearly  destroyed  the  British  Fifth  Army,  cap- 
turing 1300  guns  and  nearly  100,000  prisoners. 

Having  fallen  short  of  success  in  his  drive  for  Amiens, 
Ludendorff  decided  to  deliver  an  alternative  blow  far- 
ther north,  with  Dunkirk  and  Calais  as  his  objectives. 
This  second  offensive  was  launched  on  a  narrower 
front,  not  exceeding  twenty  miles.  Its  immediate 
purpose  was  to  drive  a  wedge  up  the  Lys  Valley  toward 
Hazebrouck.  Ypres  could  then  be  enveloped  from  the 
south  and  west  and  an  advance  to  the  coast  would 


Ii9i8]     The  Channel  Port  Offensives      323 

follow  from  Hazebrouck  and  Poperinghe.  By  widening 
out  the  salient  on  the  south  side,  B6thune,  an  impor- 
tant coal-mining  centre,  would  be  enveloped  and  the 
British  line  south  to  Lens  and  Arras  would  be  taken 
in  reverse. 

The  offensive  began  on  April  9th  on  a  front  extend- 
ing north  from  La  Bassee  to  a  point  east  of  Armenti&res. 
It  was  prolonged  on  the  10th  to  the  Ypres-Comines 
Canal.  Fortune  again  favoured  the  Germans.  Two 
Portuguese  divisions  were  stationed  on  the  lower  part 
of  this  line.  They  had  been  at  the  front  for  a  long 
time  and  were  to  be  relieved  on  April  10th.  The  line 
to  the  north  of  the  Portuguese  sector  was  held  by  five 
British  divisions  which  had  been  withdrawn  from  the 
battle  in  Picardy  and  whose  ranks  had  been  refilled 
with  drafts  from  England.  The  most  southerly  stretch 
of  the  front  was  defended  by  the  left  wing  of  Home's 
First  Army. 

The  attack  was  made  in  a  dense  fog,  like  that  in  the 
St.  Quentin  area  on  March  21st.  The  enemy's  masses 
got  almost  unobserved  into  the  first  lines  of  the  Second 
Portuguese  Division.  The  onset  was  so  powerful  that 
it  penetrated  through  the  entire  Portuguese  zone. 
British  reinforcements  could  not  be  rushed  up  in  time 
to  contest  the  rear  positions.  The  enemy  drove  north- 
west to  the  Lawe  and  Lys  rivers  and  crossed  the  Lys 
at  two  points  south-west  of  Armentieres.  Fortunately, 
on  the  extreme  right  the  Fifty-fifth  Division  of  the  First 
Army  held  fast  about  Festubert  and  extended  its  line 
north-west  covering  the  approaches  to  Bethune. 

On  April  10th  the  Germans  broadened  their  attack 
northward  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Messines,  occupy- 
ing that  village  for  a  time  and  getting  a  hold  on  Ploeg- 
steert  Wood.     They  also  pushed  north  of  the  Lys  to 


324  The  Great  War  ^l8J 

Steenwerck,  thus  almost  isolating  Armenti&res,  which 
was  evacuated  by  the  British.  On  the  1 1  th  the  German 
advance  west  reached  Merville,  about  four  miles  west 
of  Estaires.  On  the  north  side  of  the  growing  salient 
the  British  abandoned  Nieppe  and  drew  back  to  Wul- 
verghem  and  Neuve  Eglise. 

The  southern  side  of  the  salient  was  now  sufficiently- 
reinforced  and  the  lines  north  of  Bethune  were  stabilized. 
The  main  German  effort  was  directed  thereafter  to 
extending  the  Lys  Valley  wedge  to  the  north  behind 
Ypres.  On  the  12th  the  Germans  pushed  as  far  toward 
Hazebrouck  as  Vieux  Berquin.  But  the  First  Austra- 
lian Division  appeared  in  the  afternoon  and,  taking 
position  east  of  the  Forest  of  Nieppe,  ended  all  progress 
in  that  direction. 

From  the  12th  to  the  15th  Arnim's  army  steadily 
enlarged  the  northern  side  of  the  salient.  Neuve 
Eglise  and  Bailleul  were  taken.  It  was  on  the  12th 
that  Field  Marshal  Haig  issued  the  famous  "backs  to 
the  wall"  appeal  to  his  tired  troops  in  Flanders.  A 
few  days  later  General  Maurice,  then  Director  of  Mili- 
tary Information,  posed  his  famous  query:  "What  is 
happening  to  Blucher?" 

But  aid  arrived  on  April  16th,  a  French  army  corps, 
under  General  de  Mitry,  coming  into  line  on  the  Mount 
Kemmel  sector,  the  whole  of  which  was  taken  over  by 
the  French  on  April  21st.  Field  Marshal  Haig  had 
also  ordered  the  evacuation  of  the  eastern  part  of  the 
salient  east  of  Ypres  in  order  to  shorten  his  lines. 

Mount  Kemmel  now  became  Arnim's  chief  local 
objective.  General  Bernhardi,  commanding  on  the 
south  side,  had  failed  completely  on  April  18th  in  an 
attack  extending  from  Givenchy  to  Merville.  This 
was  the  end  of  the  German  effort  to  reach  Bethune. 


[i9x8]     The  Channel  Port  Offensives      325 

Arnim  had  tried  to  envelop  Kemmel  on  April  16th  and 
17th.  He  renewed  his  operation  on  April  25th,  using 
nine  divisions  on  a  front  extending  from  Kemmel  Hill 
east  to  the  Ypres-Comines  Canal.  Kemmel  was  sur- 
rounded and  taken,  and  a  French  regiment,  holding 
the  summit,  was  cut  off.  Wytschaete  was  captured 
and  the  Allied  line  was  pushed  back  a  mile  or  more. 
Thereupon  Haig  evacuated  another  section  of  the 
salient  east  of  Ypres,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  extrication 
of  his  forces,  if  Ypres  should  fall. 

Ypres  was  gravely  threatened.  But  it  didn't  fall. 
On  April  29th  Arnim  made  a  general  assault  on  the  line 
south-west  of  the  city  and  met  with  a  bloody  repulse. 
That  reverse  practically  ended  the  second  German 
offensive.  Arnim  and  Bernhardi  had  driven  a  salient 
about  nine  miles  deep  up  the  Lys  Valley.  They  had 
re- won  all  the  ground  lost  in  the  summer  of  191 7  and 
had  cleared  a  broad  though  uncomfortably  exposed 
expanse  of  territory  in  the  Lys  Valley.  But  they  had 
not  taken  Bethune,  or  Hazebrouck,  or  Ypres.  They 
had  not  opened  a  road  to  the  Channel  ports.  The 
gains  of  the  operation  hardly  balanced  its  losses. 

The  British  front  had  yielded,  but  it  had  not  been 
dislocated.  And  the  British,  with  the  aid  of  the  two 
French  divisions  under  de  Mitry,  had  fought  against 
great  odds.  Ludendorfl  employed  in  the  Lys  Valley 
up  to  April  30th  forty-two  divisions,  of  which  thirty- 
three  were  fresh  and  only  nine  had  been  used  in  the 
Picardy  drive.  Against  these  Haig  had  twenty-five  divi- 
sions, of  which  eight  were  fresh  and  seventeen  had  fought 
in  Picardy.  According  to  the  British  Field  Marshal's 
figures  109  German  divisions  had  been  engaged,  between 
March  21st  and  April  30th,  against  fifty-five  British 
infantry  and  three  British  cavalry  divisions. 


326  The  Great  War  [iqisi 

On  April  23d  a  heavy  attack  was  made  on  the  British 
positions  east  of  Amiens.  Four  German  divisions 
participated  in  it.  The  village  of  Villers-Bretonneux 
was  taken  and  the  British  front  thrown  back.  That 
night,  however,  a  counter-attack  was  made  by  one 
British  and  two  Australian  brigades.  They  recovered 
Villers-Bretonneux,  and  captured  one  thousand  prison- 
ers. This  and  Arnim's  futile  attack  south-west  of 
Ypres  were  the  last  flare-ups  in  the  German  effort 
to  reach  the  Channel  ports. 

In  his  book,  My  Thoughts  and  Actions,  published  in 
the  summer  of  191 9,  Ludendorff  indicates  that  he 
originally  planned  to  make  the  more  northern  of  his 
two  Channel  Port  offensives  the  principal  one.  He 
intended,  he  says,  to  effect  a  break-through  well  to 
the  north  of  the  Somme,  so  that  he  could  operate 
against  the  British  armies  in  the  unravaged  territory 
west  of  the  lines  held  by  the  Germans  in  19 16.  In  the 
first  offensive  the  Seventeenth  Army  was  expected  to 
smash  Byng's  left  centre  and  left,  and  then  drive 
north-westward  behind  Arras.  The  Seventeenth  Army 
failed  signally,  on  March  21st,  against  the  northern  end 
of  Byng's  line,  and  failed  again,  on  March  28th,  opposite 
Arras,  against  Byng's  left  and  Home's  right.  Luden- 
dorff attributes  the  defeat  of  March  21st  to  defective 
artillery  preparation  and  bad  tactics.  Yet  it  is  note- 
worthy that  he  used  his  best  artillery  expert,  Colonel 
Bruchmuller,  on  Hutier's  front,  between  St.  Quentin 
and  La  Fere,  where  the  real  break-through  was  ac- 
complished. And  this  break-through  determined  the 
line  of  the  German  advance  toward  Amiens,  instead  of 
Arras. 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

LUDENDORFF'S  PARIS  OFFENSIVES.      AISNE-MARNE,  MAY 
2J,  I918.      LASSIGNY,  JUNE  9,  I918 

Having  failed  to  break  the  liaison  between  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  armies  by  seizing  Amiens,  and  having 
failed  again  to  turn  the  British  left  wing  by  capturing 
Dunkirk  and  Calais,  Ludendorff  decided  to  shift  his 
objectives.  His  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  offensives 
were  directed  at  Paris.  General  Foch  was  apparently 
persuaded  that  Ludendorff  would  make  another  try 
for  Amiens,  since  that  was  the  chief  danger  spot  from 
the  Allied  point  of  view.  Most  of  the  French  reserves 
were  massed  toward  the  Picardy  front,  and  extraordinary 
efforts  were  made  to  stop  a  third  German  effort  on  the 
general  line  of  Arras-Amiens-Montdidier.  Alarmed 
by  the  experiences  of  March  and  April,  the  British 
Government  sent  to  France  about  300,000  troops, 
which  had  been  held  in  England  since  the  beginning 
of  the  year.  Arrangements  were  also  made  to  speed 
up  the  transportation  of  American  troops.  The 
monthly  average  of  American  arrivals  in  France  had 
been  under  fifty  thousand.  It  was  raised  to  two  hun- 
dred thousand. 

Ludendorff  turned  away,  however,  from  Amiens. 
He  chose  an  easier  front,  which  Foch  had  left  scantily 
defended.    The  third  drive  was  prepared  with  great 

327 


328  The  Great  War  [ipi«3 

secrecy.  It  came  as  a  complete  surprise.  For  it  was 
directed  at  a  sector — that  north  of  the  Aisne  River, 
between  Soissons  and  Rheims — on  which  Foch  could 
still  yield  a  good  deal  of  ground  without  strategical 
embarrassment. 

The  line  along  the  Ailette  River,  just  north  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames,  had  been  held  by  the  French 
Sixth  Army.  Early  in  May,  General  Foch  transferred 
a  large  part  of  this  army  to  the  Amiens  sector.  By 
way  of  replacements  he  borrowed  five  British  divisions, 
which  were  waiting  for  an  assignment  to  some  inactive 
section.  Of  these  divisions  three  had  taken  part  in 
both  the  St.  Quentin  battle  and  the  Lys  Valley  battle. 
One  had  fought  in  the  former  operation,  but  not  in 
the  latter.  All  four  had  been  badly  battered  up.  Their 
depleted  ranks  were  filled  up  with  new  levies.  Two  of 
them,  the  Twenty-first  and  Eighth,  with  the  Fiftieth, 
which  was  fresh,  were  put  in  position  on  a  fifteen-mile 
front  north-west  of  Rheims.  The  rest  of  the  Ailette 
line,  west  to  Pinon  Forest,  was  held  by  a  single  corps  of 
the  French  Sixth  Army. 

These  troops  had  no  warning,  until  May  26th,  of 
the  imminence  of  a  German  attack.  The  next  morning 
it  broke  with  extraordinary  violence  on  a  thirty-five- 
mile  line,  from  Pinon  Forest,  on  the  west,  nearly  to 
Bermericourt.  Twenty-eight  German  divisions  over- 
powered the  five  Allied  divisions  opposed  to  them.  A 
gap  was  made  in  the  centre  and  the  Germans  poured 
across  the  Chemin  des  Dames  plateau,  converging  on 
the  crossings  of  the  Aisne.  This  river  was  crossed  by 
the  enemy  at  Vailly  before  nightfall.  The  British 
divisions,  holding  on  their  right,  swung  back  on  their 
left  and  centre  to  a  position  facing  west  and  north- 
west between  the  Aisne  and  the  Vesle.     The  French 


[x9i8j     Ludendorffs  Paris  Offensives     329 

Sixth  Army  Corps  fell  back  to  the  Aisne,  facing  north- 
east and  covering  Soissons. 

On  May  28th  the  Germans  pushed  rapidly  south, 
crossing  the  Vesle  at  Fismes,  and  also  widening  out 
their  salient  on  both  sides.  On  the  west  Soissons 
was  captured.  On  the  east  the  British  withdrew 
across  the  Vesle  and  were  then  pressed  back  in  a  south- 
easterly direction  in  the  region  between  the  Vesle  and 
the  Ardre  rivers.  The  two  reserve  divisions,  the 
Twenty-fifth  and  Nineteenth,  were  brought  up,  and 
the  German  advance  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Rheims 
slackened.  Ludendorff  preferred,  for  the  moment,  to 
develop  his  attack  to  the  south  and  west,  threatening 
Paris  by  working  down  to  the  Marne  and  the  Ourcq, 
and  then  following  the  valleys  of  those  rivers  west  and 
south-west,  around  the  southern  edge  of  the  great 
bastion  of  the  Forest  of  Villers-Cotterets. 

Foch  had  no  reserves  at  hand  with  which  to  stop  the 
German  advance  south  to  the  Marne.  Nor  was  he 
particularly  eager  to  stop  it.  For  if  the  Germans  were 
held  on  the  west  side  of  the  Aisne-Marne  salient  which 
they  were  developing,  they  would  find  themselves  in- 
side a  deep  pocket,  difficult  to  hold  and  uncomfortable 
to  draw  out  of.  Only  a  cavalry  screen  opposed  the 
march  of  the  enemy  across  the  territory  separating  the 
Vesle  from  the  Marne.  F&re-en-Tardenois  and  Ville- 
en-Tardenois  were  abandoned,  and  on  May  31st  the 
German  advance  guards  reached  the  borders  of  the 
latter  river  at  Le  Charmel,  two  miles  north-west  of 
Dormans. 

The  nominal  character  of  the  French  defence  between 
the  Aisne  and  the  Marne  was  emphasized  by  the  rapid 
head-on  progress  of  the  Third  Ludendorff  drive.  On 
May  27th  a  gain  of  five  miles  was  made;  on  May  28th, 


33<>  The  Great  War  [1918] 

one  of  seven  miles;  on  May  29th,  one  of  seven  miles; 
on  May  30th,  one  of  three  miles;  on  May  31st,  one  of 
nine  miles.  On  June  1st  the  enemy  occupied  the  north 
bank  of  the  Marne  for  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles,  from 
Chateau-Thierry  east  to  Verneuil.  On  this  sector  the 
French  were  reinforced  by  the  Third  and  Twenty- 
eighth  American  divisions — the  former  of  regulars,  the 
latter  of  Pennsylvania  National  Guard  troops.  The 
Second  Division,  regulars,  with  a  marine  corps  brigade, 
was  thrown  in  on  the  line  north-west  of  Chateau- 
Thierry. 

Foch's  reserves,  coming  from  the  west,  were  used 
sparingly  to  check  the  German  advance  on  the  west 
side  of  the  salient,  between  Chateau-Thierry  and  the 
Aisne.  Here  the  true  direction  of  the  Third  offensive, 
now  reaching  its  last  stage,  was  made  manifest.  Violent 
German  attacks  were  launched  on  June  1st  and  26.  all 
along  the  front  north  and  south  of  the  Ourcq  River, 
the  Germans  trying  to  push  down  the  Ourcq  Valley 
to  the  rear  of  Villers-Cotterets  Forest,  and  to  infil- 
trate into  the  region  along  its  northern  border.  Above 
Soissons  equally  violent  attempts  were  made  to  break 
the  French  lines  north  and  south  of  the  Aisne,  and  to 
flatten  out  the  apex  of  the  French  re-entrant  angle  with 
its  apex  above  Carlepont  Wood.  In  the  Ourcq  Valley 
region  the  Germans  made  an  advance  on  June  1st  and 
2d  of  about  six  miles. 

On  June  3d  the  enemy  again  gained  ground  on  the 
southern  end  of  the  western  side  of  the  Aisne-Marne 
salient,  just  north-west  of  Chateau-Thierry.  Here 
they  reached  Bouresches  and  a  line  running  north- 
west, below  Torcy  and  Belleau  Wood,  to  Bussieres.  On 
this  line  the  American  Second  Division  co-operated,  on 
June  6th,  in  a  brilliant  counter-attack.   It  broke  through 


[i9i8i     Ludendorffs  Paris  Offensives      331 

the  German  positions  on  a  two-and-a-half-mile  front 
for  a  gain  of  two  miles.  On  the  right,  Bouresches  was 
taken.  On  the  left,  Bussieres  and  Torcy  were  stormed 
and  Belleau  Village  was  reached.  In  a  subsequent 
operation  the  Second  Division  cleared  out  Belleau 
Wood.  The  Germans  were  thrown  completely  on  the 
defensive  in  this  region. 

In  fact,  by  June  6th  the  Aisne-Marne  offensive  was 
over.  The  lines  were  stabilized  all  the  way  round  the 
elliptical  salient  from  behind  Soissons  to  a  point  just 
north-west  of  Rheims.  Rheims  lay  at  the  apex  of  a 
small  loop,  almost  encircled,  but  strongly  defended 
on  all  sides.  The  east  side  of  the  salient  had  been 
slightly  enlarged.  But  the  Allied  forces  held  all  the 
approaches  to  the  Forest  of  the  Mountain  of  Rheims, 
the  main  bastion  in  the  region  south  of  the  city.  The 
five  British  divisions  in  this  sector  were  now  attached 
to  the  French  Fifth  Army. 

The  Germans  had  achieved  a  spectacular  success 
south  of  the  Aisne.  It  was  of  greater  moral  than 
material  value,  however.  The  German  bulletins  an- 
nounced the  capture  of  45,000  prisoners  and  400  guns. 
An  area  of  650  square  miles  was  overrun.  But  from  a 
broad  strategical  point  of  view  Ludendorff  had  weak- 
ened rather  than  strengthened  his  position  by  commit- 
ting himself  to  holding  and  exploiting  the  dangerous 
Aisne-Marne  pocket. 

It  was  now  necessary  for  the  Germans  to  reduce  the 
inconvenient  Allied  re-entrant  angle  which  projected 
northward,  west  of  Soissons,  almost  to  the  Oise,  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Noyon.  In  this  angle  were  the 
great  forests  which  protect  Paris  on  the  north-east 
— Compiegne,  Villers-Cotterets,  Laigue,  and  Ourscamp. 
Ludendorff  had  enveloped  them  on  the  east  by  pushing 


332  The  Great  War  [1918] 

down  to  the  Ourcq  and  Marne  valleys.  Now  he  sought 
to  envelop  them  on  the  west  by  driving  down  the  west 
side  of  the  Oise,  with  the  city  of  Compiegne  and  the 
Oise  crossings  south  of  it  as  his  objectives. 

The  Fourth  German  offensive  of  191 8  (the  second 
against  Paris)  began  on  June  9th  on  a  front  of  twenty- 
two  or  twenty- three  miles,  from  a  point  just  south  of 
Noyon  west  to  a  point  south  of  Montdidier.  The 
armies  under  Hutier  were  engaged  in  it.  It  was  the 
least  successful  test,  up  to  that  time,  of  the  new  Hutier 
offensive  tactics. 

The  brunt  of  the  attack  fell  on  the  French  positions 
in  the  centre,  south  of  Lassigny.  The  first  line  yielded 
and  the  Germans  pushed  through  for  two  miles  in  a 
south-westerly  direction.  Following  the  Matz  River 
valley  they  reached  the  town  of  Ressons-sur-Matz. 
A  little  faxther  east  they  reached  Mareuil .  The  French 
right  and  left  wings  were  driven  in  about  a  mile. 

On  the  night  of  the  9th  and  on  the  10th  further  pro- 
gress was  made  in  the  centre.  Hutier  realized  a  three- 
mile  gain  to  the  south-west  of  Ressons-sur-Matz,  and  a 
two-mile  gain  to  the  south  and  south-east  of  that  town. 
The  following  day  the  drive  in  the  centre  collapsed 
prematurely.  The  Germans  in  the  morning  advanced 
two  more  miles  south,  to  the  valley  of  the  Aronde. 
But  Foch  was  now  ready  to  counter-attack.  The 
German  centre  was  thrust  back  and  at  the  same  time 
a  counter-blow  on  the  west  side  of  the  Matz  salient 
threw  the  German  right  wing  into  disorder.  This 
brilliant  operation  was  directed  by  General  Mangin. 
The  German  right  wing  retreated  a  mile  or  more  and 
lost  one  thousand  prisoners.  On  his  left,  however, 
below  Noyon,  Hutier  gained  a  little  more  ground  along 
the  Oise. 


[I9l8]     Ludendorffs  Paris  Offensives      333 

The  drive  had  been  smothered  in  three  days.  That 
was  because  Foch  had  ample  reserves  in  the  section 
between  Montdidier  and  the  Oise,  and  had  used  a 
violent  counter-offensive  at  the  psychological  moment 
as  a  stopper  for  the  Hutier  tactics.  The  French  were 
obliged,  however,  to  yield  some  territory  east  of  the 
Oise  as  a  result  of  the  German  penetration  down  the 
west  bank  of  that  river  as  far  as  Ribecourt  and  Bethan- 
court.  In  the  night  of  June  nth  they  abandoned  the 
tip  of  their  salient  pointing  toward  Noyon.  Carlepont 
Wood  was  evacuated.  So  was  Ourscamp  Forest.  The 
new  French  line  ran  east  from  the  Oise  River,  in  the 
space  between  the  Ourscamp  Forest  and  the  Laigue 
Forest  to  Tracy-le-Val,  and  then  joined  the  old  line 
north-west  of  Soissons  at  Nampoel. 

The  close  connection  between  the  Lassigny  drive 
and  the  Aisne-Marne  drive  was  emphasized  by  a  re- 
newal on  June  nth  of  the  German  effort  on  the  west 
side  of  the  Aisne-Marne  salient.  This  effort  lasted 
three  days  and  was  directed  at  the  French  positions 
south-west  of  Soissons,  covering  the  approaches  to 
Villers-Cotterets  Forest.  The  German  front  was 
pushed  forward  two  miles  in  the  region  north  of  the 
forest,  the  Germans  reaching  Laversine,  Cceuvres,  and 
St.  Pierre  Aigle.  The  last  named  town  is  on  the 
north-eastern  edge  of  the  big  forest  barrier.  To  the 
east  and  south  of  that  barrier  the  gains  made  were 
inconsequential. 

LudendorfFs  fourth  attempt  to  rupture  the  Allied 
front  had  resulted  in  slight  local  advances.  But  in 
any  larger  sense,  it  had  been  a  conspicuous  failure. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 

THE     TURN     OF     THE     TIDE.      LUDENDORFF's     FIFTH 
OFFENSIVE,   JULY     5,    I918.      FOCH's  COUNTER- 
OFFENSIVE,   JULY    18,    I918 

Committed,  as  he  was,  to  a  finish  offensive,  there 
was  nothing  for  Ludendorff  to  do  but  to  go  ahead. 
Though  his  reserves  were  shrinking  and  Allied  reserves 
were  mounting  with  the  arrival  of  every  American  troop- 
ship, he  was  bound  to  carry  his  gamble  through.  So 
he  laboriously  collected  his  strength  for  his  Fifth  and 
final  offensive,  consuming  thirty-three  precious  days 
in  doing  so. 

Foch  had  little  difficulty  in  guessing  where  that 
offensive  would  break.  The  drive  from  Lassigny  had 
shown  where  the  French  forces  were  concentrated. 
They  were  defending  Paris  and  Amiens.  Ludendorff 's 
natural  inclination  would  therefore  be  to  attack  farther 
east  with  the  idea  of  breaking  the  connection  between 
the  French  armies  east  of  the  Aisne^Marne  salient  and 
those  west  of  it.  Possession  of  the  salient  offered 
advantages  for  such  an  attack.  Offensively  it  was  an 
asset.     Defensively  it  was  a  liability. 

Foch  made  preparations  both  for  meeting  an  attack 
east  and  west  of  Rheims  and  for  attacking  himself  on 
that  front,  if  Ludendorff  should  hold  off  beyond  the 
middle  of  July.  He  withdrew  the  French  forces  in 
Flanders — eight  divisions  in  all — for  use  in  Champagne. 

334 


[X9i8]  The  Turn  of  the  Tide  335 

He  requested  Field  Marshal  Haig  to  send  four  British 
divisions  to  the  Somme  sector,  so  as  to  enable  him  to 
move  four  French  divisions  from  that  front  to  the 
sector  east  of  Rheims.  On  July  13th  he  asked  that 
these  four  replacement  divisions  on  the  Somme  be  put 
unreservedly  at  his  disposal.  Two  of  them  were  sent 
eventually  to  the  east  side  of  the  Aisne-Marne  salient, 
participating  in  the  fighting  there  on  and  after  July 
20th.  The  other  two  were  employed  on  the  west  side 
of  the  salient  on  and  after  July  23d.  Two  Italian  divi- 
sions were  put  in  line  in  the  Rheims  sector.  The 
First  American  Division  was  brought  down  from  Can- 
tigny,  on  the  Montdidier  front,  where  it  had  distin- 
guished itself,  and  was  stationed  on  the  west  side  of 
the  salient.  The  American  forces  which  had  been  in 
training  in  France  were  called  on  without  stint.  Alto- 
gether nine  American  divisions — the  First,  Second, 
Third,  Fourth,  Twenty-sixth,  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty- 
second,  Forty-second,  and  Seventy-seventh — were  en- 
gaged in  repelling  the  Fifth  Ludendorff  offensive  and 
in  the  Foch  counter-offensive  which  merged  into  it. 

In  the  interval  between  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Ger- 
man offensives,  Foch  had  conducted  a  succession  of 
local  operations  on  the  front  between  Soissons  and 
Chateau-Thierry.  These  should  have  awakened  Lu- 
dendorfFs  suspicions.  The  French  lines  there  were 
advanced  at  many  points  and  the  way  was  cleared  for 
a  general  attack  on  the  west  side  of  the  Aisne-Marne 
salient. 

But  Ludendorff  remained  absorbed  in  his  own  gran- 
diose designs.  He  still  thought  that  the  Allies  were 
too  weak  and  too  discouraged  to  strike  back.  His  own 
plans  involved  an  enlargement  of  the  salient  to  the 
south  and  the  east,  and  a  drive  on  the  front  east  of 


336  The  Great  War  [1918] 

Rheims,  which  would  push  the  French  there  back  to 
and  beyond  CMlons-sur-Marne,  pinch  out  the  Rheims 
loop,  envelop  the  Forest  of  the  Mountain  of  Rheims, 
clear  the  Marne  Valley  east  through  Epernay,  and 
compel  a  general  Allied  withdrawal  on  the  line  east 
from  Chalons  to  Verdun.  Once  the  French  front  was 
bent  back  below  the  Marne,  Ludendorff  expected  to 
turn  west  and  envelop  Paris,  already  under  the  fire  of 
his  "Big  Bertha"  super-guns. 

The  Fifth  offensive  began  on  the  morning  of  July 
15th  on  a  winding  front  of  fifty-five  miles,  running  from 
Chateau-Thierry  around  the  southern  and  eastern  sides 
of  the  Aisne-Marne  salient,  encircling  Rheims,  and  then 
stretching  east  through  "Dusty"  Champagne  to  the 
Main  de  Massiges,  on  the  edge  of  the  Argonne.  Every- 
where the  Allies  were  ready  for  it.  The  main  attack 
was  east  of  Rheims.  Here  General  Gouraud  had 
drawn  back  his  forces  a  couple  of  miles  to  battle-posi- 
tions, drenching  his  outpost  lines  with  gas  after  aban- 
doning them.  The  Hutier  wave  system  broke  down 
before  it  got  fairly  started.  The  German  impact  made 
practically  no  impression. 

On  this  front  the  offensive  was  smothered  on  the 
first  day.  West  of  Rheims  and  down  to  the  Marne 
the  Germans  made  a  gain  averaging  about  two  miles 
on  July  15th  and  continued  to  progress  irregularly 
until  July  18th,  especially  in  the  region  near  the  Marne. 
Foch  was  willing  to  yield  ground  there  and  also  below 
the  Marne,  since  a  German  advance  south  of  the  river 
played  into  his  hands.  It  would  make  the  Aisne-Marne 
salient  more  difficult  to  draw  out  of  in  case  its  west 
side  were  broken  through  by  a  counter-offensive  such 
as  he  had  already  organized. 

General   de   Mitry  commanded  the  French  forces 


[i9i8]  The  Turn  of  the  Tide  337 

south  of  the  Marne — mostly  divisions  transferred  from 
Flanders — with  the  Third  American  Division  on  his 
left.  On  July  15th  he  retired  in  the  centre,  between 
Dormans  and  Fossoy,  the  Germans  crossing  the  Marne 
and  pushing  up  the  east  side  of  the  little  Surmelin 
River  about  four  miles,  almost  to  Cond6.  The  Ameri 
can  Third  Division,  however,  held  fast  on  the  river  to 
the  east  of  Chateau-Thierry.  On  the  16th  and  17th 
General  Boehn,  who  was  in  command  of  the  German 
forces  in  the  southern  end  of  the  salient,  widened  out 
the  wedge  below  the  Marne  toward  the  east,  crossing 
the  river  at  Mareuil  and  working  up  the  Marne  Valley 
toward  Epernay.  In  the  meantime  the  Germans  near 
Cond6  were  pushed  back  toward  the  river. 

On  the  east  side  of  the  Aisne-Marne  salient,  held  by 
the  Fourth  French  Army,  under  General  Berthelot, 
reinforced  by  British,  Italian,  and  American  divisions, 
the  German  attack  was  intensified  on  July  16th  and 
17th.  The  pressure  was  strongest  on  the  southern 
sector,  between  the  Marne  and  Ardre.  Here  the  Ger- 
mans gained  about  two  miles,  approaching  the  Forest 
of  the  Mountain  of  Rheims  on  the  east  and  south-east. 
They  also  gained  a  little  ground  on  both  sides  of  the 
Marne,  toward  Epernay.  But  the  Allied  positions 
remained  practically  intact  after  three  days  of  fighting. 
The  German  offensive  was  dying  away  to  a  mere  local 
advance  in  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the  Aisne- 
Marne  pocket.  It  would  probably  have  stopped  of 
itself,  if  Foch  hadn't  paralyzed  it  with  his  counter- 
offensive  of  July  1 8th. 

The  Allied  commander-in-chief  had  brought  two 
armies  into  line  on  the  west  side  of  the  salient.  General 
Mangin's — the  Tenth — had  been  transferred  from  the 
Lassigny  sector  to  the  front  opposite  Soissons.     Mangin 


338  The  Great  War  [1918] 

took  position  between  the  Aisne  and  the  Ourcq.  An- 
other army,  under  Degoutte,  occupied  the  front  from 
the  Ourcq  down  to  Chateau-Thierry.  The  First  and 
Second  American  divisions  were  with  Mangin.  The 
Twenty-sixth  was  with  Degoutte.  Twelve  French 
divisions  and  three  American — the  latter  equivalent 
to  six  French  divisions — were  lined  up  against  nine 
German  divisions. 

Foch's  concentration  had  been  effected  under  the 
cover  of  the  forests  between  the  Soissons-Chateau- 
Thierry  line  and  the  Oise.  The  Germans  were  com- 
pletely unaware  of  it.  Their  armies  on  the  west  side  of 
the  salient,  also  under  Boehn's  command,  were  caught 
off  their  guard  when  the  Allied  offense  developed  on  the 
morning  of  July  18th.  With  almost  no  artillery  pre- 
paration Mangin  and  Degoutte  attacked  on  a  thirty- 
mile  front,  north  and  south,  from  the  Aisne  to  the 
Maine.  The  German  lines  broke  everywhere  at  the 
first  shock.  The  Allied  forces  advanced  from  three 
to  nine  miles,  the  greatest  progress  being  made  in  the 
region  west  and  north-west  of  Soissons.  On  July  18th 
and  19th  the  highroad  from  Soissons  to  Chateau- 
Thierry  was  reached  and  the  railroad  between  those 
two  cities  was  cut.  Mangin  and  Degoutte,  between 
them,  captured  360  guns  and  seventeen  thousand 
prisoners. 

In  the  days  following  Boehn  persistently  counter- 
attacked on  the  upper  half  of  the  west  side  of  the 
salient,  holding  the  Allies  away  from  Soissons.  But 
he  yielded  ground  in  the  southern  half  and  in  the 
south-western  corner  of  the  salient.  Ludendorff  had, 
in  fact,  begun  to  draw  out  of  the  sack.  The  German 
divisions  below  the  Marne  recrossed  that  river  on  July 
19th  and  20th.     On  July  21st,  the  Americans  and 


[i9i8]  The  Turn  of  the  Tide  339 

French,  under  de  Mitry,  followed  them,  entering 
Chateau-Thierry  and  occupying  bridgeheads  farther 
east.  In  the  Ourcq  sector  the  Allied  forces  advanced 
four  miles,  reaching  the  neighbourhood  of  Oulchy-le- 
Chateau,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Ourcq,  two  miles 
north-west  of  Nanteuil-N6tre  Dame.  This  town  is 
the  junction  point  of  a  railroad  coming  down  from 
Fismes,  on  the  Vesle,  with  the  Soissons-Chateau- 
Thierry  railroad. 

LudendorfFs  problem  now  was  to  extricate  his 
armies  from  the  quadrilateral,  whose  west  side  had  been 
broken  in,  and  whose  east  side  was  also  under  strong 
pressure.  The  salient  he  had  driven  to  the  Marne 
was  no  longer  of  any  use  to  him.  It  had  become  a 
trap.  But  he  was  reluctant  to  confess  defeat.  For 
political  and  personal  reasons  he  tried  to  camouflage 
the  situation.  The  German  communiques  of  this  pe- 
riod stoutly  repudiated  any  intention  of  withdraw- 
ing, announced  German  victories,  and  said  that  Boehn 
would  hold  fast  on  a  "new  line"  running  across  the 
lower  half  of  the  salient  and  based  on  the  Ourcq  River. 
The  quadrangle  was  full  of  German  troops  and  Boehn 
used  them  lavishly  in  counter-attacking  on  the  Soissons 
front,  on  the  Ourcq  front,  and  even  in  the  sector  north 
of  the  Marne  Valley. 

From  a  strategical  point  of  view,  however,  it  was 
folly  to  think  of  making  a  real  stand  either  in  the  lower 
half  of  the  salient  or  across  the  middle  of  it.  To  do 
this  successfully  Fere-en-Tardenois  would  have  to  be 
held;  and  Fere-en-Tardenois  was  already  in  danger. 
It  was  the  highroad  centre  for  the  middle  and  western 
sections  of  the  quadrilateral.  If  it  should  fall,  the 
German  retreat  would  have  to  be  made  up  the  eastern 
side,  where  communications  would  be  uncomfortably 


340  The  Great  War  [i9i8j 

congested.  But  Ludendorff  tried  to  hold  Fere-en- 
Tardenois  and  refused  for  many  days  to  evacuate  the 
south-eastern  corner  of  the  salient. 

Stubborn  fighting  continued  on  the  west  front  above 
the  Ourcq,  though  the  Germans  gradually  relaxed 
their  grip  on  the  district  between  the  Ourcq  and 
the  Marne,  north-east  of  Chateau-Thierry.  Degoutte 
took  Oulchy-le-Ville  on  July  23d.  On  July  24th  he 
reached  Armentieres,  a  little  over  a  mile  west  of  Nan- 
teuil-Ndtre  Dame,  and  only  seven  and  a  half  miles 
west  of  Fere-en-Tardenois.  On  July  25th,  the  Franco- 
American  forces,  under  de  Mitry,  moving  north  from 
the  Marne,  arrived  within  six  miles  of  Fere-en-Tarde- 
nois. On  the  26th  Oulchy-le-Chateau  fell.  Three 
days  later  Fere-en-Tardenois  fell.  French  and  Ameri- 
can troops  crossed  the  Ourcq*  from  the  south  and  the 
Ourcq  line  was  a  memory. 

On  the  east  side  of  the  salient  Berthelot's  army  had 
been  gradually  pushing  the  Germans  back  beyond  the 
lines  which  they  held  prior  to  July  15th.  This  move- 
ment was  accentuated  when  the  western  line  yielded. 
Ville-en-Tardenois  was  occupied  on  August  1st,  and 
more  than  half  of  the  Vesle-Marne  salient  of  July  18th 
was  cleared  of  the  enemy. 

The  German  bulletins  of  the  first  days  of  August 
again  assured  the  German  public  that  Ludendorff 
would  hold  "new  positions"  to  which  he  had  vol- 
untarily withdrawn,  north  of  the  Ourcq.  But  on 
August  1st  and  2d  Mangin's  army  began  a  new  drive 
for  Soissons.  Strong  positions  which  Boehn  had 
organized  in  the  angle  south-west  of  Soissons  were 
stormed.  French  and  American  forces  crossed  the 
Crise  River  on  August  2d,  enveloping  Soissons  from 
the  south  and  south-east.     Soissons  was  then  evacu- 


[i9i8]  The  Turn  of  the  Tide  341 

ated.  On  August  4th  Fismes,  on  the  Vesle,  was  taken 
by  American  troops  and  the  German  armies  withdrew 
behind  that  river,  except  on  a  small  sector  east  of 
Fismes. 

Thereafter,  the  front  became  more  or  less  stabilized. 
The  Allied  armies  crossed  the  Vesle  at  many  points 
and  also  crossed  the  Aisne  to  the  north-east  of  Soissons. 
But  the  German  retreat  out  of  the  Aisne-Marne  salient 
and  Foch's  first  counter-offensive  were  over.  Luden- 
dorfl  held  most  of  the  enclave  between  the  Aisne  and 
the  Vesle  until  October.  Foch  now  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  the  elimination  of  the  salients  created  by  the 
other  German  offensives.  In  his  first  counter-blow 
he  had  taken  forty  thousand  prisoners  and  several 
hundred  guns.  More  than  that,  he  had  wrecked 
LudendorfTs  over-blown  reputation,  and  permanently 
recovered  the  offensive  on  the  Western  Front. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 

THE     DECISION      IN      THE      WEST.      AUGUST      8,      I918- 
NOVEMBER    II,    I918 

Foch  was  made  a  Marshal  of  France  on  August  6th. 
No  French  soldier  had  better  deserved  that  honour. 
Yet  Foch's  Victory  Offensive  was  just  beginning.  His 
next  task  was  to  pinch  out  the  big  Montdidier  salient. 
This  operation  had  been  foreshadowed  by  a  series  of 
local  "nibbles"  on  the  west  side  of  the  Avre  River. 
Debeney's  army  had  made  advances  there  similar  to 
the  advances  made  in  the  Villers-Cotterets  region  in 
the  weeks  preceding  July  18th.  Hutier  had  seemed 
to  take  alarm  at  these,  for  he  voluntarily  withdrew 
across  the  Avre,  after  having  lost  considerable  ground 
on  the  west  bank  and  nearly  two  thousand  prisoners. 

Yet  the  Allied  offensive  against  the  salient  he  was 
holding  found  him  asleep.  It  began  with  a  joint  attack 
by  Debeney's  French  First  Army  and  Rawlinson's 
British  Fourth  Army  (both  under  the  command  of 
Field  Marshal  Haig)  on  a  front  of  twenty  miles  from 
Morlancourt,  just  north  of  the  Somme,  south  to 
Braches,  below  Moreuil.  North  of  the  Somme  and 
south  of  Moreuil  the  operation  was  of  a  holding  char- 
acter. The  main  lines  of  penetration  were  along  the 
south  bank  of  the  Somme,  up  the  Luce  River  valley, 
and  north-eastward  from  Moreuil.  In  this  area, 
where  the  Australian  and  the  Canadian  corps  were 

342 


[19x8]        The  Decision  in  the  West         343 

employed,  there  was  a  maximum  advance  on  the  first 
day  of  eight  and  a  half  miles — from  the  Villers-Bretton- 
eux  plateau  east  to  Framerville,  which  lies  about  two 
miles  north-northeast  of  the  important  railroad  junction 
of  Rosi&res-en-Santerre. 

The  German  lines  crumpled  up.  Their  defenders 
took  to  flight.  One  hundred  guns  and  seven  thousand 
prisoners  were  captured.  Ludendorff  said  after  the 
war  that  he  lost  hope  of  a  military  victory  after  the 
first  day's  fighting  in  the  Montdidier  salient,  not 
because  the  German  lines  were  broken  (which  was 
unavoidable),  but  because  they  were  broken  so  easily. 
Yet  his  own  policy  of  organizing  shock  divisions  on  a 
large  scale  for  special  offensive  uses  had  greatly  weak- 
ened the  other  divisions  from  which  shock  material 
had  been  sifted  out. 

The  Allied  advance  continued  on  August  9th.  The 
British  progressed  four  miles  east  from  Caix  to  a  point 
beyond  Rosieres  and  only  three  miles  west  of  Chaulnes. 
The  French  progressed  the  same  distance  along  the 
highroad  from  Amiens  to  Roye.  In  these  two  days 
two  hundred  guns  and  seventeen  thousand  prisoners 
were  taken.  The  Allies  had  already  cut  the  railroad 
coming  down  from  Albert  through  Bray  to  Montdidier. 
They  were  close  up  to  the  railroad  coming  down  from 
P6ronne  to  Chaulnes  Junction  and  thence  to  Roye. 
North  of  the  Somme,  on  August  9th,  the  American 
Thirty-third  Division  co-operated  with  British  troops 
in  an  advance  to  the  east  of  Chipilly  and  Morlancourt. 

The  wedge  driven  toward  Roye  put  the  Germans 
about  Montdidier  in  a  dangerous  position.  Hutier 
hurriedly  evacuated  that  city  on  August  10th.  On 
the  same  day  the  Allied  attack  was  extended  to  the 
south-east,  on  a  front  of  fifteen  miles.     The  French 


344  The  Great  War 


[1918] 


Third  Army,  under  Humbert,  advanced  north-east, 
toward  Roye,  for  a  gain  of  six  miles.  The  total  of 
prisoners  taken  rose  on  August  nth  to  forty  thousand, 
and  the  total  of  guns  to  three  hundred.  Humbert's 
army  held  the  front  around  the  bend  of  the  Montdidier 
salient,  east  to  the  Oise  River.  Its  task  was  to  wipe 
out  the  small  Lassigny  salient,  created  by  Ludendorff  's 
fourth  drive.  To  do  so  Humbert  pushed  forward 
his  left  wing  so  as  to  threaten  Roye  and  to  envelop 
Lassigny  from  the  west,  while  reducing  the  difficult 
Lassigny  massif  with  his  centre,  and  working  up  the 
valley  of  the  Oise  toward  Noyon,  with  his  right.  By 
August  14th  he  had  recaptured  Ribecourt,  on  the 
Oise,  and  had  made  considerable  progress  across  the 
massif. 

On  August  1 2th  and  13th  the  British  Fourth  Army 
and  the  French  First  Army  reached,  south  of  the 
Somme,  the  defences  of  the  main  line  of  the  old  Noyon 
salient,  occupied  by  the  Germans  from  the  fall  of  1914 
until  the  Hindenburg  retreat  in  the  spring  of  191 7. 
These  positions  covered  Chaulnes  and  Roye.  The 
Germans  had  managed  to  keep  them  intact  all  through 
the  Somme  battle  of  191 6.  Ludendorff  decided  to 
make  a  fight  in  them  now,  concentrating  reserves 
behind  them  and  holding  up  Allied  progress  by  violent 
counter-attacks.  In  so  doing  he  showed  poor  judg- 
ment, for  his  only  real  hope  of  maintaining  a  successful 
defensive  lay  in  reaching  the  strongest  defence  line 
available — the  Hindenburg  Line — without  involving 
his  reserves  too  deeply.  He  needed  all  his  reserves  to 
maintain  himself  behind  the  great  Hindenburg  barrier. 

As  soon  as  the  German  defence  on  the  Chaulnes- 
Roye  front  stiffened,  Foch  carried  his  attack  elsewhere. 
His  purpose  was  to  spread  the  attack,  not  to  concentrate 


[i9i8]        The  Decision  in  the  West         345 

it.  For  by  applying  pressure  on  all  parts  of  the  line 
he  could  most  easily  wear  down  Ludendorff  's  resources, 
compelling  the  latter  to  shift  his  reserves  again  and 
again  and  always  to  fight  at  a  disadvantage.  About 
August  15th  all  the  German  armies  in  the  Montdidier 
salient  were  put  under  the  command  of  General  Boehn. 

On  August  1 8th  Foch  began  an  offensive  in  the 
sector  between  the  Oise  River  and  Soissons.  That 
evening,  and  on  August  19th,  20th,  and  21st,  General 
Mangin's  Tenth  Army  broke  through  the  German 
lines  on  a  front  of  sixteen  miles,  gaining  about  nine 
miles  and  bringing  up  on  the  Oise  River,  east  of  Noyon. 
Still  farther  east,  it  advanced  to  the  neighbourhood  of 
Coucy-le-Chateau.  From  this  latter  position  Mangin 
threatened  the  flank  of  the  Germans  in  the  region  south 
of  the  Chemin  des  Dames  and  in  the  strip  between  the 
Aisne  and  the  Vesle.  At  the  other  end  of  the  line  he 
enveloped  Noyon  from  the  east  and  south-east,  while 
Humbert  threatened  it  from  the  south.  Mangin  cap- 
tured two  hundred  guns  and  ten  thousand  prisoners. 
Humbert  took  Lassigny  on  the  21st,  thus  demolishing 
the  southern  anchor-hold  of  the  Chaulnes-Roye  line. 

On  the  2 1st,  too,  Haig  began  an  attack  north  of  the 
Somme,  using  Byng's  Third  Army.  This  blow  was 
delivered  on  a  nine-mile  front,  against  Below' s  Seven- 
teenth German  Army,  from  Miraumont,  on  the  Ancre 
River,  north  to  Moyenville,  about  nine  miles  south  of 
Arras.  The  objective  was  the  railroad  line  from  Arras 
to  Albert.  This  was  reached.  Achiet-le-Grand,  about 
three  and  a  half  miles  north-west  of  Bapaume,  was 
captured.  The  next  day  the  left  wing  of  the  Fourth 
Army  took  Albert  and  advanced  to  the  east  of  that 
city.  Forty-five  hundred  prisoners  were  made  in 
these  two  preliminary  operations. 


346  The  Great  War 


[19x8] 


The  main  drive  began  on  August  23d.  It  covered  a 
front  of  thirty- three  miles,  from  Lihons,  west  of  Chaulnes, 
where  the  British  and  French  lines  joined,  up  to  Mer- 
catel,  a  few  miles  south-east  of  Arras.  This  offensive, 
which  lasted  about  ten  days,  was  everywhere  successful. 
Twenty-three  British  divisions,  by  obstinate  fighting, 
drove  about  thirty-five  German  divisions  from  one 
side  of  the  old  Somme  battlefield  to  the  other.  Ba- 
paume  and  Combles  fell  on  August  29th;  Peronne,  on 
September  1st.  The  line  of  the  Somme,  south  of 
Peronne,  was  turned.  The  Germans  evacuated  Roye 
on  August  26th,  Chaulnes  on  August  28th,  and  Noyon 
on  August  29th.  In  the  south  Ludendorff  was  in  full 
retreat  toward  the  Hindenburg  Line.  He  had  lost 
to  the  British  Fourth  and  Third  armies,  in  the  battle 
of  Bapaume,  270  guns  and  34,000  prisoners. 

By  August  25th  conditions  were  ripe  for  an  attack 
by  the  British  First  Army,  east  of  Arras.  This  offen- 
sive lasted  from  August  26th  to  September  3d.  It 
carried  the  right  wing  of  the  First  Army  forward, 
below  the  Scarpe  River  to  the  Queant-Drocourt  line. 
That  line  was  broken  on  September  2d,  about  Queant 
(where  it  joined  the  Hindenburg  system),  by  two 
Canadian  and  four  British  divisions,  three  of  the  lat- 
ter belonging  to  the  Third  Army.  Farther  north  the 
First  Army  pushed  forward  three  miles  along  the 
Arras-Cambrai  highroad,  bringing  the  troops  well  to 
the  rear  of  the  Queant-Drocourt  belt. 

This  great  victory  forced  a  general  German  retreat 
north  of  the  Somme.  By  September  8th  Ludendorff 's 
armies  in  this  section  were  back  to  a  line  running  north 
from  Vermand,  through  Epehy,  to  Havrincourt,  and 
thence  north  along  the  Canal  du  Nord  toward  Douai. 
Ten  British  divisions  had  defeated  thirteen  German 


[i9i8]        The  Decision  in  the  West         347 

divisions  in  the  battle  of  the  Scarpe,  taking  two  hundred 
guns  and  sixteen  thousand  prisoners.  This  result  re- 
emphasized  the  failing  morale  of  the  German  rank 
and  file. 

The  battle  of  the  Scarpe  was  followed  on  September 
I2th-i7th  by  the  battle  of  Havrincourt-Epehy,  in 
which  the  Germans  were  thrust  back  between  those 
points  to  the  edge  of  the  Hindenburg  zone.  On  Septem- 
ber 1 8th  and  19th  an  attack  was  made  on  a  seventeen- 
mile  front,  from  Holnon,  west  of  St.  Quentin,  to 
Gouzeaucourt,  above  Epehy.  The  Third  and  Fourth 
British  armies  and  the  French  First  Army  took  part  in 
it.  The  Germans  were  pressed  back  into  the  Hinden- 
burg positions.  In  this  joint  operation  sixty  guns  and 
ten  thousand  prisoners  were  taken.  The  French  en- 
veloped St.  Quentin  on  the  south  and  reached  the 
Oise  Valley,  occupying  Vendeuil,  about  four  miles  north 
of  La  Fere.  In  the  operations  from  September  12th 
to  September  19th  the  British  captured  one  hundred 
guns  and  twelve  thousand  prisoners. 

The  Aisne-Marne,  Montdidier,  and  Lassigny  salients 
had  now  been  completely  eliminated,  except  for  a 
small  area  between  the  Vesle  and  the  Chemin  des  Dames. 
Ludendorff  meanwhile  had  chosen  to  abandon  the  Lys 
Valley  salient  without  a  fight.  Its  evacuation,  carried 
on  with  little  interference  from  the  British,  was  com- 
pleted on  September  6th. 

One  ancient  salient  was  left  on  the  Meuse  front — 
that  of  St.  Mihiel,  created  in  the  fall  of  19 14.  Foch 
now  decided  to  reduce  it.  The  operation  was  entrusted 
to  an  American  force,  under  the  direct  command  of 
General  Pershing,  a  French  force,  under  General 
Hirschauer,  co-operating.  The  First  American  Army 
was  organized  on  August  10th  and  on  August  30th 


348  The  Great  War  [191*1 

took  over  a  line  stretching  from  Pont  sur  Settle,  in 
the  Nancy  sector,  west  to  St.  Mihiel  and  then  north  to 
a  point  east  of  Verdun.  This  line  was  subsequently 
extended  west  across  the  Meuse  to  the  western  edge 
of  the  Argonne. 

The  two  sides  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient — from  Les 
Eparges  south  to  the  town  of  St.  Mihiel  and  thence 
east  across  to  the  Moselle — constituted  a  front  of  about 
forty  miles.  The  German  positions  were  strongly  for- 
tified. The  main  attack  was  made  on  the  southern 
face  of  the  salient,  with  an  auxiliary  holding  attack  on 
the  western  face.  Between  the  Moselle  and  Xivray 
the  First  and  Fourth  American  Corps  were  massed 
on  September  ioth  and  nth.  They  comprised  the 
Second,  Fifth,  Eighty-second,  and  Ninetieth  divisions 
(in  the  First  Corps)  and  the  First,  Forty-second,  and 
Eighty -ninth  (in  the  Fourth).  Major  General  Hunter 
Liggett  commanded  the  First  Corps  and  Major  General 
Joseph  T.  Dickman  the  Fourth.  The  centre,  on  both 
sides  of  the  apex  of  the  salient,  was  held  by  the  French 
Second  Colonial  Corps.  On  the  western  side  the  Ameri- 
can Fifth  Corps,  under  Major  General  George  H. 
Cameron,  reinforced  by  a  French  division  and  the 
American  Twenty-sixth  Division,  was  to  take  the  three 
difficult  positions  of  Les  Eparges,  Combres,  and 
Amaranthe.  Six  American  divisions — the  Third,  the 
Seventy-eighth,  the  Thirty-fifth,  the  Ninety-first,  the 
Thirty-third,  and  the  Eightieth — were  in  reserve. 

After  a  four-hour  artillery  preparation  the  seven 
American  divisions  on  the  south  face  of  the  salient 
advanced  at  5  a.m.,  September  12th.  They  were 
helped  by  a  fog.  The  whole  enemy  front  yielded. 
The  First  Corps,  to  the  east,  progressed  to  Thiaucourt. 
The  Fourth   Corps,   on   the  left,   pushed  north-west 


[iqi8]        The  Decision  in  the  West         349 

toward  Vigneulles,  in  the  middle  of  the  salient.  There 
it  joined  up  on  the  morning  of  September  13th  with 
units  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  which  had  broken  through 
the  western  side  of  the  salient  the  day  before.  St. 
Mihiel  was  occupied  by  the  French  Colonials  on  Sep- 
tember 1 2th.  In  twenty-four  hours  the  pocket  had 
been  emptied.  The  American  loss  was  seven  thousand. 
But  sixteen  thousand  Germans  and  Austro-Hungarians 
had  been  captured,  with  443  guns. 

A  new  line  was  formed  running  straight  across  from 
the  Moselle  through  Thiaucourt  and  Vigneulles  to 
Fresnes-en-Woevre.  Metz  was  brought  under  the 
fire  of  the  Allied  guns.  The  moral  effect  of  this  Ameri- 
can victory  was  enormous.  It  proved  that  the  new 
American  armies  were  already  fit  to  undertake  large- 
scale  offensives  under  American  leadership. 

With  St.  Mihiel  gone,  the  Germans  were  back  on 
their  primary  lines  of  defence  in  France  and  Belgium. 
Foch's  problem  was  to  oust  them  from  these  in  such  a 
manner  as  would  make  a  retreat  to  the  Rhine  hazardous, 
if  not  impossible.  He  decided  that  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  St.  Mihiel  operation  these  four  offensives 
should  be  undertaken  simultaneously  by  the  Allied 
forces: 

(1)  By  the  Americans,  west  of  the  Meuse,  in  the 
direction  of  Mezieres; 

(2)  By  the  French,  west  of  the  Argonne,  in  co-opera- 
tion with  the  American  attack  and  with  the  same 
general  objective; 

(3)  By  the  British,  on  the  St.  Quentin-Cambrai 
front,  in  the  direction  of  Maubeuge. 

(4)  By  the  Belgian  and  Allied  forces  in  Flanders,  in 
the  direction  of  Ghent. 

The  purpose  of  the  first  three  of  these  operations  was 


35°  The  Great  War  [1918] 

to  push  the  German  forces  in  the  Argonne  and  in  Cham- 
pagne back  upon  the  Ardennes,  meanwhile  cutting 
their  direct  lateral  communications  with  the  German 
forces  in  Flanders.  The  Flanders  offensive  aimed  at 
clearing  the  Belgian  seacoast. 

German  resources  had  been  cut  into  severely  by  the 
fighting  since  July  15th.  At  the  end  of  August  the 
number  of  prisoners  lost  to  the  Allies  was  128,302. 
The  number  of  guns  lost  was  2069.  By  the  end  of 
September  the  toll  of  prisoners  was  254,012  and  of 
guns  about  3700. 

The  Belgian  operation,  in  charge  of  King  Albert, 
was  conducted  by  the  Belgian  army,  a  French  army 
under  General  Degoutte,  and  portions  of  the  British 
Second  Army,  under  General  Plumer.  The  front  of 
the  attack,  which  began  on  September  28th,  ran  from 
Dixmude  to  a  point  south-east  of  Ypres.  The  German 
forces  on  this  line  had  been  reduced  to  five  or  six  di- 
visions. They  gave  way  rapidly.  By  the  evening  of 
October  1st,  Plumer's  army  had  cleared  the  left  bank 
of  the  Lys  River  as  far  down  as  Comines  and  was 
close  up  to  Menin.  The  Belgians  had  advanced  to 
the  neighbourhood  of  Roulers  and  the  French,  on  their 
left,  had  taken  Staden.  The  direct  railroad  route 
from  Lille  north  to  Ostend  and  Bruges  was  brought 
under  Allied  fire.  Three  hundred  and  fifty  guns  and 
10,500  prisoners  were  captured.  This  advance  to  the 
east  menaced  the  German  positions  in  the  Lens  sector. 
Armentieres  and  Lens  were  evacuated  and  the  reor- 
ganized British  Fifth  Army,  under  General  Bird  wood, 
which  had  been  interposed  between  the  Second  and 
First  armies,  advanced  on  this  sector  to  within  striking 
distance  of  Lille. 
Field  Marshal  Haig's  final  assault  on  the  Hindenburg 


[i9i8]        The  Decision  in  the  West         35 l 

positions  began  on  September  27th  and  ended  on 
October  5th.  The  First,  Third,  and  Fourth  armies 
took  part  in  it,  striking  on  a  front  from  the  Sensee 
River  south  to  St.  Quentin.  Below  St.  Quentin  the 
French  First  Army  was  also  drawn  in.  Two  American 
divisions — the  Twenty-seventh  and  Thirtieth,  consti- 
tuting the  Second  Army  Corps,  under  Major  General 
G.  W.  Read — were  attached  to  the  Fourth  Army  and 
helped  to  break  the  Hindenburg  Line  in  the  sector 
about  Le  Catelet. 

The  First  and  Third  armies  opened  the  offensive. 
The  Canal  du  Nord  was  crossed  that  day  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Mceuvres  and  then  cleared  for  several 
miles  to  the  north.  The  British  advance  by  September 
28th  had  passed  the  limits  of  Byng's  movement  in 
November,  191 7,  and  was  close  in  to  Cambrai,  on  the 
west,  south,  and  north.  Two  hundred  guns  and  ten 
thousand  prisoners  were  captured.  On  September 
29th  the  Fourth  Army  assaulted  the  powerful  sector 
of  the  Hindenburg  zone  below  Cambrai.  The  line 
of  battle  extended  twelve  miles,  from  Holnon,  just 
west  of  St.  Quentin,  on  the  south,  to  Vendhuille,  above 
Le  Catelet,  on  the  north. 

The  Hindenburg  zone  was  completely  perforated, 
the  Thirtieth  American  Division  reaching  Nauroy, 
well  to  its  rear.  On  September  30th  the  gap  was 
widened  out.  Directly  back  of  the  Hindenburg  zone, 
about  Le  Catelet,  lay  the  subsidiary  Beaurevoir  line. 
This  was  shattered  between  October  1st  and  October 
5th  and  the  British  grip  on  Cambrai  was  tightened. 
Debeney's  First  Army  entered  St.  Quentin  on  October 
1st,  the  enemy  retiring  in  the  direction  of  Guise.  In 
the  operations  above  St.  Quentin,  in  which  thirty 
British  and  two  American  divisions  were  engaged  with 


352  The  Great  War  iw$ 

thirty-nine  German  divisions,  36,000  prisoners  and 
380  guns  were  captured. 

The  Champagne  and  the  Argonne  offensives  were 
launched  on  September  26th.  Gouraud  made  an  attack 
on  a  front  of  twenty-three  miles,  between  Rheims 
and  the  Argonne.  He  advanced,  up  to  September 
29th,  three  and  a  half  miles  and  took  16,000  prisoners. 
From  October  2d  to  October  9th  Berthelot's  right 
wing  and  Gouraud's  left  wing,  reinforced  by  the  Second 
and  Thirty -sixth  American  divisions,  carried  through  a 
forward  movement1  on  both  sides  of  Rheims.  Here  the 
Germans  were  still  in  positions  which  they  had  occu- 
pied since  September,  19 14.  The  troops  holding  them 
were  swept  north  on  a  thirty-mile  front,  retiring  to  the 
Suippe  and  Arnes  rivers  and  losing  Berry-au-Bac  and 
Conde-sur-Aisne.  Mangin's  Tenth  Army  continued 
all  through  September  to  make  progress  in  the  region 
of  the  Chemin  des  Dames. 

The  American  offensive  west  of  the  Meuse  opened 
on  September  26th.  Its  first  phase  lasted  until  October 
4th.  The  front  from  the  Meuse  west  was  organized  as 
follows:  Third  Corps,  from  the  river  to  Malancourt, 
made  famous  in  the  battle  of  Verdun;  Fifth  Corps, 
from  Malancourt  to  Vauquois;  First  Corps,  from 
Vauquois  to  Vienne-le-Chateau.  The  Third  Corps 
comprised  the  Fourth,  Thirty-third,  and  Eightieth 
divisions,  in  the  line,  with  the  Third  Division  in 
reserve.  The  Fifth  Corps  included  the  Seventy-ninth, 
Eighty-seventh,  and  Ninety-first  divisions,  in  the  line, 
with  the  Thirty-second  in  reserve.  The  First  Corps 
included  the  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty -fifth,  and  Seventy - 
seventh  divisions,  in  the  line,  with  the  Ninety-second 
in  reserve.  The  general  reserve  consisted  of  the  First, 
Twenty-ninth,    and   Eighty-second    divisions.     These 


runs]        The  Decision  in  the  West         353 

fifteen  divisions  had  a  strength  of  about  450,000  men. 

The  attack  caught  the  enemy  napping.  In  the  first 
three  days  an  advance  was  made  ranging  from  three  to 
seven  miles.  The  country  north-west  of  Verdun  was 
the  roughest  on  the  entire  fighting  line,  embracing  the 
Argonne  Forest  and  the  wooded  ridges  west  of  the 
Meuse.  After  Pershing's  drive  started  the  German 
High  Command  rushed  its  best  troops  to  this  sector, 
since  an  advance  north  here  to  Sedan  and  Mezieres 
would  practically  break  the  German  line  into  two 
parts.  Up  to  September  28th  the  American  forces 
took  ten  thousand  prisoners.  Then  for  five  days  they 
consolidated  their  lines  in  preparation  for  a  further 
advance. 

The  second  stage  of  Foch's  final  offensive  was  entered 
on  early  in  October.  It  consisted  of  a  continuation  of 
the  attacks  in  the  four  principal  sectors. 

In  the  north  the  British  operation  against  Maubeuge 
was  renewed  first.  On  October  8th  the  British  Third 
and  Fourth  armies  began  the  second  battle  of  Le 
Cateau.  Field  Marshal  Haig's  object  was  to  envelop 
Cambrai  by  advancing  to  the  east  and  south-east  of  it, 
and  at  the  same  time,  in  conjunction  with  the  French 
First  Army,  to  envelop  Guise  from  the  north.  The 
attack  was  made  on  a  front  stretching  from  Sequehart 
south  to  St.  Quentin.  On  the  first  day  a  gain  of  from 
three  to  four  miles  was  made,  and  on  the  evening  of 
October  9th  the  British  were  within  two  miles  of  Le 
Cateau.  Cambrai  was  entered  on  the  same  day.  On 
the  10th  the  British  brought  up  against  new  German 
positions  on  the  line  of  the  Selle  River. 

In  this  fighting  twenty  British  divisions  and  one 
American  division  (the  Thirtieth)  defeated  twenty- 
four  German  divisions,  capturing  twelve  thousand 
23 


354  The  Great  War  [1918] 

prisoners  and  250  guns.  Farther  north,  the  British 
First  Army  pressed  forward  toward  Douai,  reaching  its 
western  suburbs  on  October  13th,  the  day  on  which 
Laon  fell. 

The  Belgian  offensive  was  revived  on  October  14th, 
on  the  front  from  Comines  north  to  Dixmude.  Menin 
and  Roulers  were  taken  on  the  first  day  and  Thourout 
on  the  second.  Ostend  fell  on  the  17th  and  by  the 
20th  the  left  flank  of  the  Allied  armies  rested  on  the 
Dutch  frontier,  the  enemy  hastily  evacuating  Zeebrugge 
and  Bruges. 

The  advance  to  Menin  and  toward  Courtrai  threat- 
ened to  cut  off  Lille  from  the  north-east.  The  Germans 
abandoned  Lille  on  the  18th.  Douai  had  been  given 
up  on  the  17th.  The  British  Second,  Fifth,  and  First 
armies  pushed  east  after  the  retreating  Germans  and  by 
the  evening  of  October  22d  reached  the  general  line 
of  the  Scheldt  River  from  Valenciennes  north  to  a 
point  east  of  Roubaix  and  Tourcoing.  Two  American 
divisions — the  Thirty-seventh  and  the  Ninety-first — 
were  sent  north  from  the  Meuse,  near  the  end  of  Octo- 
ber, to  assist  in  the  Flanders  offensive.  They  joined 
the  French  forces  under  Degoutte  and  engaged  in  the 
advance  made  by  the  Belgian  and  French  forces,  from 
October  31st  to  November  4th,  to  the  Scheldt  line 
about  Audenarde.  In  the  Belgian  operations  of  October 
I4th-I7th,  twelve  thousand  prisoners  and  one  hundred 
guns  were  captured. 

After  the  fall  of  Lille  and  Douai  Ludendorff  tried 
to  hold  the  line  of  the  Scheldt  from  Ghent  to  below 
Valenciennes,  and  a  line  cutting  across  from  the  Scheldt 
to  the  Sambre,  to  the  west  of  the  Forest  of  Mormal. 
Haig's  attack  on  these  positions  began  with  the  battle 
of  the  Selle  River.     This  lasted  from  October  17th  to 


Ii9i8]        The  Decision  in  the  West         355 

October  25th.  The  life  line  of  the  German  front  in 
Northern  France  and  Belgium  was  the  railroad  running 
from  Valenciennes  south-east  to  Hirson.  It  passed 
through  the  Forest  of  Mormal  and  intersected,  at  Aul- 
noye,  the  railroad  running  north-east  from  Le  Ca- 
teau  to  Maubeuge.  The  Selle  positions  were  stormed 
in  four  days,  two  American  divisions — the  Thirtieth 
and  the  Twenty-seventh — fighting  with  the  British 
Fourth  Army  on  the  southern  end  of  the  line.  In 
the  next  five  days  Haig  succeeded  in  reaching  the  edge 
of  Mormal  Forest  and  enveloping  Valenciennes  from 
the  south-east.  In  this  battle  twenty-four  British 
and  two  American  divisions  worsted  thirty-one  Ger- 
man divisions  and  captured  twenty  thousand  prison- 
ers and  475  guns.  German  morale  was  running  low 
and  many  units  avoided  fighting  either  by  surrender- 
ing or  by  hurrying  to  the  rear. 

The  final  struggle  on  this  front  goes  by  the  name  of 
the  battle  of  the  Sambre.  It  covered  the  period  from 
November  1st  to  November  nth.  On  November 
ist-2d  the  British  First  and  Third  armies  defeated  the 
Germans  to  the  south  of  Valenciennes.  This  city  was 
captured  on  November  2d,  by  Canadian  troops. 
LudendorfT  drew  back,  pivoting  on  Le  Quesnoy,  about 
fifteen  miles  south-east  of  Valenciennes. 

The  decisive  attack  was  now  delivered  on  November 
4th,  on  a  thirty-mile  front  from  the  Sambre  River 
north.  In  one  day  the  German  armies  were  routed. 
They  lost  to  the  British  nineteen  thousand  prisoners 
and  450  guns,  and  to  the  French  First  Army,  operat- 
ing south  of  the  Sambre,  five  thousand  prisoners  and 
sixty  guns.  Guise  was  captured  on  November  5th. 
On  that  day  a  German  retreat  began  which  ended  only 
with  the  signing  of  the  armistice.     Bavai  was  reached 


356  The  Great  War  [1918] 

on  November  7th;  Maubeuge,  on  November  9th.  On 
the  morning  of  November  nth  the  Third  Canadian 
Division  stormed  Mons. 

Between  August  8th  and  November  nth  the  British 
armies  in  France  and  Belgium  captured  187,000  prison- 
ers and  2850  guns.  Fifty-nine  divisions  in  all  were 
engaged  in  these  operations. 

On  the  Aisne  front  Debeney  and  Mangin,  aided  by 
Berthelot,  succeeded,  about  the  middle  of  October,  in 
reducing  the  great  La  Fere-Laon  bastion.  La  Fere 
and  Laon  fell  on  October  13th.  Farther  east,  Berthe- 
lot 's  army  reached  Sissonne  and  Gouraud  captured 
Vouziers  and  got  across  the  line  of  the  Aisne  at  nearly 
every  point  except  "Re thel.  In  this  sector  the  Germans 
next  made  a  stand  on  the  so-called  Hunding  Line. 
This  was  not  broken  until  November  5th,  Debeney, 
Mangin,  and  Guillaumat  (the  last-named  having 
succeeded  Berthelot)  all  contributing  to  the  result. 

Gouraud's  army  advanced  meanwhile  to  west  rof  the 
Argonne,  in  touch  with  the  American  offensive.  v  This 
entered  its  second  phase  on  October  4th.  By  the 
/hardest  kind  of  fighting,  the  three  American  corps 
forced  their  way  through  the  Argonne  and  the  woods 
on  the  west  bank  of  the  Meuse.  By  October  10th  the 
Argonne  was  cleared  of  the  enemy  up  to  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Grand  Pre. 

On  October  9th  the  command  of  the  American  First 
Army  was  given  to  Major  General  Hunter  Liggett. 
An  American  Second  Army  was  created,  under  Major 
General  Robert  L.  Bullard.  The  First  Army  had 
now  reached  the  Kriemhilde  Line,  on  which  Ludendorff 
hoped  to  make  a  successful  stand.  A  most  trying 
period  of  warfare  ensued.  The  enemy  had  to  be  worn 
down  by  constant  pressure.     On  October  17th  Grand 


[iqis]        The  Decision  in  the  West         357 

Pre  was  taken.  On  October  23d  the  Third  and  Fifth 
corps  reached  a  line  running  east  and  west  through 
I   Banthevilte. 

A  week  was  now  allowed  for  reorganization.  On 
November  1st  the  First  Army  started  on  the  last 
stage  of  its  progress  toward  Sedan.  On  the  2d  Busancy 
was  taken.  By  the  3d  an  advance  of  twelve  miles 
had  been  accomplished  and  the  enemy  was  in  headlong 
retreat.  On  November  6th  a  divison  of  the  First  Corps 
reached  a  point  on  the  Meuse  opposite  Sedan,  twenty- 
five  miles  from  the  starting  line.  Between  the  8th 
and  the  nth  American  troops  fought  a  final  engagement 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Meuse. 

Summarizing  the  Meuse  offensive  General  Pershing 
said  in  his  report  of  November  20,  191 8: 

In  all  forty  enemy  divisions  had  been  used  against 
us  in  the  Meuse-Argonne  battle.  Between  September 
26th  and  November  6th  we  took  26,059  prisoners 
and  468  guns  on  this  front.  Our  divisions  engaged 
were  the  First,  Second,  Third,  Fourth,  Fifth,  Twenty- 
sixth,  Twenty-eighth,  Twenty-ninth,  Thirty-second, 
Thirty-third,  Thirty-fifth,  Thirty-seventh,  Forty- 
second,  Seventy-seventh,  Seventy-eighth,  Seventy- 
ninth,  Eightieth,  Eighty-second,  Eighty-ninth,  Nine- 
tieth, and  Ninety-first.  Many  of  our  divisions  re- 
mained in  line  for  a  length  of  time  that  required 
nerves  of  steel,  while  others  were  sent  in  again 
after  only  a  few  days  of  rest.  The  First,  Fifth, 
Twenty-sixth,  Forty-second,  Seventy-seventh,  Eighti- 
eth, Eighty-ninth,  and  Ninetieth  were  in  the  line 
twice.  Although  some  of  the  divisions  were  fighting 
their  first  battle,  they  soon  became  equal  to  the 
best. 


358  The  Great  War  [1918] 

Ludendorff  and  the  German  General  Staff  knew  in 
September  that  the  war  was  lost.  They  compelled 
the  civil  government  to  ask  for  terms  and  they  fomented 
the  German  revolution,  when  it  became  necessary  to 
stage  an  apparent  repudiation  of  the  autocracy  and  of 
Hohenzollernism.  Prince  Max  of  Baden  was  Luden- 
dorff's  decoy.  The  appeal  to  the  United  States,  which 
resulted  in  Germany's  offer  to  surrender  and  the  Allied 
promise  to  make  peace  on  the  basis  of  President  Wilson's 
Fourteen  Points,  only  camouflaged  the  admission  of 
complete  defeat  by  the  German  High  Command.  By 
November  i,  191 8,  Germany  was  on  the  edge  of  a 
great  military  disaster.  Her  armies  avoided  it  only  by 
throwing  down  their  arms. 


CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

Italy's     inspiring     recovery,    june     15,     1918- 
november  5,  i918 

Italy's  fortunes  were  at  their  lowest  point  after 
Caporetto.  Up  to  the  time  the  winter  snows  ended 
active  campaigning  Diaz's  armies  had  held  on  with 
the  greatest  difficulty  to  the  Piave-Brenta  line,  covering 
Venetia.  For  a  while  it  seemed  probable  that  they 
would  have  to  fall  back  to  the  line  of  the  Adige. 

But  Italy  rallied  with  splendid  energy  in  the  winter 
and  spring  of  191 8.  The  armies  were  reorganized  and 
refitted.  The  insidious  defeatist  propaganda  of  191 7 
was  checked.  The  northern  defences  were  strength- 
ened. All  thought  of  a  further  retirement  was  put 
aside. 

The  reorganization  involved  the  creation  of  two 
new  armies — the  Sixth  and  the  Eighth — to  take  the 
place  of  the  Second,  practically  disrupted  after  Capo- 
retto. The  First  Army  occupied  the  extreme  left  of 
the  active  Italian  line,  defending  the  Adige  sector 
below  Rovereto,  from  the  Val  d'Assa,  on  the  east,  to 
Lake  Garda,  on  the  west.  The  Sixth  Army  took  posi- 
tion on  the  right  of  the  First,  its  front  running  from 
Val  d'Assa  east  to  the  Brenta.  The  Fourth  Army  held 
the  line  between  the  Brenta  and  the  Piave.  The  Eighth 
covered  the  upper  course  of  the  Piave  and  the  Third 
the  lower  course.     The  Seventh  Army  was  stationed 

359 


360  The  Great  War  [iqisi 

along  the  western  face  of  the  Trentino  salient.  This 
army,  however,  took  no  share  in  the  grand  scale  fight- 
ing in  Northern  Italy.  Its  function  was  almost  ex- 
clusively one  of  observation. 

The  Italian  High  Command  had  planned  in  March 
an  offensive  which  was  to  begin  late  in  May.  Its 
objective  was  to  clear  the  Asiago  Plateau  and  secure 
a  hold  on  the  Val  Sugana,  the  enemy's  main  east  and 
west  line  of  communication  between  Trent  and  Feltre, 
the  two  chief  Austro-Hungarian  bases  in  the  mountain 
region.  But  toward  the  end  of  May  there  were  un- 
mistakable signs  of  a  renewal  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
offensive.  Diaz  therefore  decided  to  wait  and  meet 
this  threat.  The  preparations  which  he  had  made  to 
attack  stood  him  in  good  stead;  for  he  was  able  to 
use  his  accumulations  of  reserves,  guns,  and  material 
in  a  series  of  counter-attacks  which  quickly  broke 
down  the  final  Austro-Hungarian  drive. 

Austria-Hungary,  in  191 8,  was  becoming  war-weary. 
There  is  little  likelihood  that  the  Emperor  Karl  would 
have  risked  another  offensive  in  Italy,  if  he  had  been 
able  to  control  the  Empire's  military  policy.  But 
Ludendorff  now  controlled  it.  He  insisted  that  Austria 
should  send  him  reinforcements  for  use  in  France,  in 
case  her  armies  in  Italy  remained  inactive*  As  a  choice 
of  evils  Vienna  decided  to  make  one  more  effort  to  break 
through  into  the  northern  Italian  plain. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  offensive  was  sandwiched  in 
between  Ludendorff's  Fourth  and  Fifth  offensives. 
It  was  conducted  by  Field  Marshal  Boroevic,  a  Croatian 
general,  who  had  succeeded  Hoetzendorff  in  supreme 
command.  Boroevic  used  three  armies — the  Eleventh, 
under  Scheuchenstuel,  which  formed  the  left  wing  of 
the   Trentino    group,    under    Hoetzendorff;  and    the 


[igi8]        Italy's  Inspiring  Recovery         361 

Sixth  and  the  Fifth,  both  belonging  to  the  Isonzo  group, 
the  former  under  General  Wurm,  and  the  latter  under 
the  Archduke  Joseph.  According  to  the  Vienna  bul- 
letins, General  Kuchbach  commanded  the  six  divisions 
of  the  Sixth  Army  which  tried  to  break  through  the 
Upper  Piave  front  by  storming  the  massif  of  Montello. 
The  Italian  official  reports  credit  Boroevic  with  em- 
ploying seventy- three  divisions  in  his  offensive — fifty- 
four  in  the  front  line  and  nineteen  in  reserve.  They 
say  that  the  Italian  and  Allied  forces  were  somewhat 
below  seventy- three  divisions.  Hoetzendorff  had  an- 
other army — the  Tenth — in  the  western  Trent  sector, 
but  it  did  not  come  into  action. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  offensive  started  on  June 
15th.  It  was  badly  conceived  in  that  the  attack  was 
not  concentrated.  Boroevic's  operative  front  was 
nearly  one  hundred  miles  in  length,  from  the  Astico  to 
the  Adriatic.  The  energy  of  the  assault  was  necessarily 
dispersed  and  dissipated.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
armies  were  fighting  on  exterior  lines,  with  insufficient 
lateral  communications  in  their  rear.  The  Italians 
were  fighting  on  interior  lines,  with  ample  cross- 
communications.  In  such  a  situation  an  intensive 
attack  should  have  been  made  on  a  short  front,  as  at 
Caporetto.  If  Boroevic  could  break  through  at  a 
single  point — either  in  the  mountains  or  in  the  Piave 
Valley — his  object  would  be  attained;  for  the  whole 
Italian  position  would  have  collapsed.  But  he  pursued 
the  unpromising  policy  of  diffused  pressure  at  all 
points  on  a  vastly  over-extended  front. 

The  Austro-Hungarians  made  practically  no  gains 
in  the  mountain  sector,  where  their  effort  was  completely 
checked  after  two  days.  On  the  Upper  and  Lower 
Piave  the  gains  were  more  considerable.     The  Lower 


362  The  Great  War  [1918] 

Piave  was  crossed  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Fifth 
Army,  and  an  advance  of  from  four  to  six  miles  was 
effected  in  the  coast  region  toward  Venice.  This  did 
not  seriously  threaten  the  Italian  positions.  The 
danger  point  on  that  side  was  the  elbow  on  the  Upper 
Piave,  where  the  Italian  front  turned  west  toward  the 
Brenta.  There  a  formidable  plateau  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  river,  called  the  Montello,  was  seized  by  Kuch- 
bach's  six  divisions.  If  they  could  clear  it,  they  would 
drive  a  wedge  in  behind  the  Italian  positions  from  the 
Piave  to  the  Brenta,  and  also  break  the  Italian  connec- 
tions between  Treviso  and  the  northern  front. 

The  severest  fighting  of  the  Piave  campaign  took 
place  on  the  Montello.  Kuchbach  occupied  the  eastern 
and  middle  sections,  but  couldn't  drive  the  Italians 
off  the  western  slopes.  By  June  18th  the  Austrian 
offensive  had  reached  its  climax.  The  Italians  now 
began  to  counter-attack  fiercely  on  the  Montello,  in 
the  Piave  section,  east  of  Treviso,  where  four  and  a  half 
divisions  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Sixth  Army  were 
operating,  and  in  the  lower  Capo  Sile  sector.  By  June 
20th  the  initiative  had  passed  out  of  Boroevic's  hands 
and  into  Diaz's.  In  the  first  phase  of  the  battle  Vienna 
had  claimed  thirty  thousand  prisoners.  By  June  20th 
the  Italian  toll  of  prisoners  had  risen  to  eleven  thousand. 

Kuchbach 's  position  on  the  Montello  now  became 
difficult.  He  couldn't  advance ;  and  a  rise  in  the  Piave, 
which  swept  away  many  pontoon  bridges,  prevented 
him  from  retreating.  Pushed  back  to  the  river  bank, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  forces  struggled  to  maintain 
their  bridgeheads.  A  hurried  retirement  began  on 
June  23d.  It  ended  on  June  25th,  when  the  whole 
west  bank  was  cleared  of  the  enemy.  In  the  operations 
from  June  15th  to  July  6th,    Italian  and  other  Allied 


[i9x8]        Italy's  Inspiring  Recovery         363 

troops  captured  24,500  prisoners  and  seventy  guns. 
The  total  Italian  losses  were  about  ninety  thousand. 
The  enemy,  according  to  the  Italian  official  reports, 
lost  more  than  eighty  thousand  in  killed  and  prisoners 
alone. 

On  July  2d  General  Diaz  conducted  a  local  operation 
intended  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  irregular  quad- 
rangle between  the  old  Piave  and  the  new  Piave,  from 
Santa  Dona  de  Piave  south  to  the  sea.  It  lasted  four 
days  and  was  completely  successful.  But  the  Italian 
counter-attack  was  not  carried  beyond  the  line  of  the 
Piave. 

The  battle  of  the  Piave  was  Italy's  Gettysburg.  It 
ended  for  ever  the  Austrian  threat  against  Venetia. 
Diaz  had  destroyed  the  offensive  power  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies.  It  was  only  a  question  of  time 
when  he  would  himself  turn  and  overwhelm  an  enemy 
becoming,  through  internal  demoralization,  more  and 
more  incapable  of  resistance.  The  Italian  Victory 
Offensive  was  delayed  until  October  24th,  when  the 
Dual  Monarchy  was  in  its  death  throes.  Vienna  was 
keen  at  that  time  for  peace  at  any  price  and  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies  had  no  longer  anything  to  fight  for. 
They  merely  defended  themselves  with  a  certain  stub- 
bornness as  they  recoiled  out  of  Italy. 

Diaz  had  again  reorganized  his  line.  Three  more 
armies  were  constituted — the  Ninth,  the  Tenth,  and 
the  Twelfth.  The  Twelfth,  put  under  the  command 
of  the  French  General  Graziani,  was  interposed  between 
the  Fourth  and  the  Eighth  armies.  It  occupied  a  front 
from  Pederobba,  on  the  east,  to  Monte  Grappa,  on 
the  west,  in  the  sector  between  the  Piave  and  the 
Brenta.  The  Tenth  Army,  commanded  by  a  British 
General,  the  Earl  of  Cavan,  was  posted  between  the 


364  The  Great  War  [19x8] 

Eighth  and  the  Third  armies,  on  the  Piave  front.  The 
Ninth  Army  and  the  cavalry  corps  were  stationed,  in 
reserve,  in  the  rear  of  the  Fourth  and  Twelfth  armies. 

General  Diaz  employed  in  his  main  offensive  the 
Fourth,  Twelfth,  Eighth,  and  Tenth  armies.  The 
Fourth  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  General  Giar- 
dino,  the  Eighth  by  Lieutenant  General  Caviglia. 
These  four  armies  comprised  twenty-two  infantry 
divisions — one  French,  two  British,  and  nineteen  Italian. 
(The  Italian  army  was  represented  on  the  front  in 
France  by  three  divisions,  totalling  48,000  men.)  Diaz 
had  altogether  fifty-one  Italian,  one  Czecho-Slovak, 
two  French,  and  three  British  divisions,  and  the  332d 
American  infantry  regiment.  According  to  Italian 
figures,  the  Allied  combatant  forces  in  the  Victory 
Offensive  in  Northern  Italy  numbered  912,000,  with 
8929  guns.  The  Italian  General  Staff  estimated  Bo- 
roevic's  strength  at  sixty-three  divisions  and  a  half, 
with  1,070,000  combatants  and  7000  guns. 

Italian  strategy  aimed  at  breaking  the  enemy's  line 
at  the  junction  point  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Fifth 
and  Sixth  armies,  east  of  the  Piave.  The  Sixth  Army's 
lines  of  communications  ran  back  along  its  left  flank 
to  Vittorio  and  Sacile.  If  Diaz  could  reach  Vittorio, 
he  would  cut  off  the  northern  half  of  the  Sixth  Army, 
which  stretched  west  from  the  Piave  to  the  Alano  basin, 
and  disrupt  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces  in  eastern 
Venetia. 

He  first  attacked,  on  the  morning  of  October  24th, 
in  the  Monte  Grappa  sector,  thus  misleading  the 
enemy  into  thinking  that  the  main  blow  would  fall 
there.  The  Fourth  Army  and  the  left  wing  of  the 
Twelfth  Army  fought  through  the  24th  and  25th  with- 
out making  material  gains.    Another  feint  was  made 


[i9i8]        Italy's  Inspiring  Recovery        365 

by  the  Sixth  Army,  in  the  Asiago  region.  The  decisive 
operation  began  on  the  27th.  The  Eighth  and  the 
Tenth  armies  crossed  the  Piave,  driving  east-north-east 
at  the  communications  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Sixth 
Army.  The  Twelfth  Army,  on  the  left  wing,  attacked 
in  a  northerly  direction  astride  the  Piave. 

The  enemy  resisted  stoutly.  The  Allied  forces  were 
unable  to  get  a  firm  hold  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the 
Piave  until  the  evening  of  the  28th.  But  on  the  29th 
the  break-through  was  completed.  Italian  advance 
guards  entered  Vittorio  late  that  afternoon.  The 
Eighth  Army,  swinging  north  and  north-west,  pushed 
toward  Belluno,  well  in  the  rear  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
forces  west  of  the  Piave.  The  Twelfth  Army,  working 
north,  enveloped  from  the  east  the  Feltre  basin  positions, 
attacked  from  the  south  by  the  Fourth  Army. 

The  Grappa  front  now  collapsed,  as  well  as  the 
Piave  front.  The  Third  Army  advanced  along  the 
coast  and  the  Sixth  Army  in  the  Asiago  region.  By 
October  30th  Boroevic's  forces  were  in  full  retreat  all 
along  the  line  from  the  Adige  to  the  sea.  The  Italian 
pursuit  quickened.  The  Livenza  River  was  crossed 
on  October  30th  and  the  Tagliamento  on  November  2d. 
Udine  and  Trieste  were  occupied  on  November  3d. 
The  same  day  the  Italian  First  Army  reached  Trent. 

Vienna  had  already  sought  an  armistice,  practically 
equivalent  to  unconditional  surrender.  It  was  granted 
on  November  3d,  and  took  effect  on  November  4th. 

Revolutions  broke  out  in  Austria  and  Hungary. 
The  latter  state  became  an  independent  republic. 
Emperor  Karl  fled  from  the  former.  The  Dual  Mon- 
archy was  dissolved.  Italy  had  fought  in  the  last 
days  against  armies  without  a  country. 

Between  October  25th  and  November  4th  the  Allied 


366  The  Great  War  [i9m 

forces  in  Italy  took  more  than  one  hundred  thousand 
prisoners  and  about  twenty-five  hundred  guns.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  armies  ceased  to  exist.  Caporetto 
was  avenged.  Italy's  century-long  score  against  the 
Austrian  oppressor  was  settled  in  full. 


CHAPTER  XXXIX 

THE  END  IN  THE  BALKANS.      JULY   7,    I918-SEPTEMBER 

30.  1918 

After  long  delays  and  bitter  disappointments  the 
Allied  policy  of  maintaining  an  army  in  the  entrenched 
camp  of  Salonica  vindicated  itself.  In  September, 
191 8,  this  army  came  into  play  in  Foch's  general 
strategic  scheme.  Within  two  weeks  thereafter  Bulga- 
ria was  pleading  for  an  armistice. 

General  Sarrail  was  recalled  from  Macedonia,  in 
December,  191 7.  General  Guillaumat  succeeded  him 
in  command  of  the  Allied  forces  there — called  by  the 
French  the  Army  of  the  Orient.  Guillaumat  remained 
in  charge  until  June  8,  191 8,  when  he  was  summoned 
home  and  made  Military  Governor  of  Paris.  Foch 
now  selected  Franchet  d'Esperey,  who  had  fought 
alongside  him  in  the  First  Battle  of  the  Marne  and  as 
a  leader  had  survived  all  the  tests  of  subsequent  cam- 
paigns in  France,  to  prepare  a  finishing  blow  at  Bulgaria. 
The  Allies  had  promised  to  deliver  such  a  blow  in  the 
summer  of  191 6,  when  Rumania  entered  the  war.  But 
in  191 6  the  Army  of  the  Orient  was  unequal  to  anything 
like  a  real  offensive. 

D'Esperey' s  campaign  against  the  Bulgars  was 
preceded  by  a  demonstration  on  the  Albanian  front. 
Early  in  July  Italian  troops,  supported  on  their  right 
by  French   units,    cleared   the  region   north-east   of 

367 


368  The  Great  War  [i9i8] 

Valona.  They  were  aiming  at  El  Basan,  on  the  Via 
Egnatia,  the  key  to  southern  Albania.  The  drive 
started  on  July  7th.  The  Italians  made  rapid  progress 
along  the  seacoast,  reaching  the  Semeni  River  on  July 
10th.  Farther  east,  they  enveloped  the  mountain 
town  of  Berat,  which  the  Austro-Hungarians  evacuated 
on  July  nth.  Still  farther  east,  French  and  Alban- 
ian troops  advanced  down  the  valley  of  the  Devoli 
River,  which  empties  into  the  Semeni.  By  July 
15th,  however,  the  offensive  had  come  nearly  to 
a  halt.  El  Basan  was  not  reached.  The  Austro- 
Hungarians  organized  a  counter-offensive  in  August, 
recovered  Berat,  and  drove  the  Allies  back  to  their  old 
lines. 

General  d'Esperey  started  in  the  last  week  in  July 
to  organize  his  operation  in  Macedonia.  After  mature 
consideration  he  had  decided  to  attack  on  one  of  the 
most  difficult  of  all  the  sectors  there — that  in  the  area 
between  the  Cerna  and  Vardar  rivers.  In  the  region 
east  of  Monastir  the  Cerna  changes  its  course  and  flows 
north-east  to  join  the  Vardar  at  a  point  just  south  of 
Veles.  The  triangle  between  the  two  streams  contains 
the  rugged  massif  of  Dobropolje.  Its  southern  base 
was  strongly  fortified  by  the  Bulgarians,  who  con- 
sidered their  mountain  positions  impregnable.  Yet  a 
break-through  on  this  sector  would  yield  decisive  results, 
since  an  Allied  army,  emerging  at  the  apex  of  the  tri- 
angle, would  cut  the  Bulgarian  forces  in  two,  severing 
the  connection  between  the  Second  Bulgarian  Army, 
east  of  the  Vardar,  and  the  First  Bulgarian  Army, 
west  of  the  Cerna. 

D'Esperey  had  on  the  Dobropolje  front  the  reor- 
ganized Serbian  army,  reinforced  by  Jugo-Slav  units. 
He  also  used,  for  the  initial  assault  two  French  divi- 


Ii9i8]  The  End  in  the  Balkans  369 

sions,  the  One  Hundred  Twenty-second  regular  and 
the  Seventeenth  colonial.  These  troops  were  all  under 
the  command  of  Voivode  Michitch,  one  of  the  Serbian 
field  marshals.  On  September  15th  the  offensive  open- 
ed with  an  assault  on  the  Bulgarian  positions  from  Sokol 
to  Vetrenik.  By  evening  a  breach  seven  and  a  half 
miles  wide  had  been  made  in  the  Bulgaxian  lines.  This 
was  widened  out  on  the  following  day  to  sixteen 
miles. 

The  Allied  troops  now  crossed  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Cerna,  threatening  Prilep,  to  the  north  of  Monastir. 
They  also  pushed  rapidly  north  across  the  Dobropolje 
massif  to  the  confluence  of  the  Cerna  and  the  Vardar. 
At  Grodsko  (fifteen  miles  south  of  Veles),  which  they 
reached  on  September  21st,  they  cut  the  Salonica-Nish 
railroad  and  also  the  branch  railroad  running  south- 
west to  Prilep.  The  retreat  of  the  Second  Bulgarian 
Army  up  the  Vardar  from  the  Lake  Doiran  region  was 
now  blocked.  The  First  Army  was  also  isolated, 
having  no  recourse  but  to  try  to  retire  over  rough 
mountain  roads  north  to  Uskub. 

The  whole  Bulgarian  front  immediately  collapsed. 
Veles  was  captured  on  September  25th.  Prilep  was 
abandoned  by  the  First  Army.  This  army  was  thrust 
west  toward  the  Albanian  border  by  Italian  forces,  which 
had  advanced  north  from  Monastir.  East  of  Veles 
Ishtip  was  occupied,  cutting  the  highroad  north  from 
Strumnitza,  over  which  the  Second  Army  might  have 
retreated. 

The  Allied  front  directly  east  and  west  of  the  Vardar 
was  held  by  Greek,  French,  and  British  troops,  under 
General  Sir  George  Milne.  General  Milne  had  at 
least  four  British  divisions — the  Twenty-second,  Twenty- 
sixth,  Twenty-seventh,  and  Twenty-eighth.  The  at- 
24 


370  The  Great  War  [19181 

tack  in  this  sector — a  holding  demonstration  at  first — 
was  begun  on  September  18th,  on  both  sides  of  Lake 
Doiran.  Here,  too,  the  Bulgarian  positions  were  im- 
mensely strong.  The  assaults  on  the  18th  and  19th 
won  considerable  ground,  but  did  not  break  the  enemy 
line.  On  the  21st,  however,  the  Bulgarian  Second 
Army  began  a  precipitate  retirement,  its  communica- 
tions down  the  Vardar  Valley  having  been  cut  at 
Grodsko. 

Milne's  forces  followed,  passing  the  Bulgarian  border 
on  September  25th.  The  next  day  Bulgaria  asked  for 
an  armistice.  Two  days  later  plenipotentiaries  came 
through  the  British  lines  on  their  way  to  treat  with 
General  d'Esperey  at  Salonica.  Operations  were  sus- 
pended on  September  30th  by  the  signing  of  an  armis- 
tice, which  amounted  to  unconditional  surrender  on 
Bulgaria's  part.  Meanwhile  the  Allied  forces  under 
Milne  had  captured  Strumnitza  and,  turning  to  the 
east,  were  on  the  point  of  seizing  the  Rupel  Pass,  in 
the  Struma  Valley,  closing  the  main  line  of  retreat  for 
the  Bulgarian  troops  still  left  on  the  eastern  Macedonian 
front. 

Before  the  armistice  went  into  effect  the  Allied  ar- 
mies in  the  Vardar  section  had  reached  Uskub  and 
regained  complete  control  of  southern  Serbia. 

Bulgaria  took  herself  completely  out  of  the  war. 
The  armies  west  of  the  Vardar  surrendered.  Those 
east  of  it  were  disarmed  and  demobilized.  Czar  Fer- 
dinand abdicated.  A  new  government,  under  Allied 
control,  was  established. 

Only  a  few  Austro-Hungarian  divisions  were  left 
to  contest  the  redemption  of  Serbia.  Within  a  few 
weeks  the  Allied  armies  were  on  the  Danube.  Bel- 
grade was  reoccupied  and  Albania  was  evacuated  by 


[i9x8]         The  End  in  the  Balkans  37 1 

the   enemy.    The   southern   Slav   provinces   rose   in 
rebellion  against  Austria-Hungary. 

D'Esperey's  armies  took  one  hundred  thousand 
prisoners  and  two  thousand  guns  in  the  final  Balkan 
offensive. 


CHAPTER  XL 

TURKEY    GOES    TO    THE    WALL.       FEBRUARY    28,     1918- 
OCTOBER  31,    I918 

General  Allenby  took  Jerusalem  in  December, 
191 7.  In  the  following  months  he  extended  his  front 
north  of  the  city  and  east  into  the  Jordan  region.  On 
February  28,  19 18,  Jericho  was  captured,  and  the  Turks 
in  that  sector  were  forced  to  retire  to  the  east  bank  of 
the  Jordan.  On  May  1st  an  Anglo-Egyptian  force 
raided  Es  Salt,  about  twenty  miles  north-east  of  Jericho 
and  about  the  same  distance  north-west  of  Amman, 
the  latter  an  important  Turkish  base  on  the  Hedjaz 
Railroad.  The  British  found  it  difficult,  however,  to 
operate  against  the  railroad — the  vital  artery  between 
Damascus  and  Medina — so  long  as  the  Turks  controlled 
the  upper  crossings  of  the  Jordan  and  could  shift 
troops  from  the  west  bank  to  the  east  bank  to  harass 
the  flank  and  rear  of  British  columns  advancing  through 
the  hills  of  the  Land  of  Moab. 

General  Allenby,  therefore,  turned  his  attention 
early  in  the  summer  to  another  plan  for  breaking  the 
Hedjaz  line,  rolling  up  the  Turkish  front,  and  opening 
the  way  to  Damascus.  In  March  he  had  attacked  the 
enemy's  positions  directly  north  of  Jerusalem,  on  both 
sides  of  the  Jerusalem-Nablus  highroad,  and  had  found 
the  terrain  unsuited  to  a  quick  break-through.  He  de- 
cided eventually  to  try  to  effect  his  break-through 

372 


[iyxg]        Turkey  Goes  to  the  Wall         373 

in  the  sector  above  Joppa,  between  the  hills  and  the 
coast. 

Practically  all  the  Turkish  forces  west  of  the  Jordan 
were  concentrated  in  a  rectangle  forty-five  miles  wide 
and  only  about  twelve  miles  deep.  The  southern  side 
of  it  ran  east  from  a  point  a  little  north  of  Joppa, 
passing  Jerusalem  on  the  north,  to  a  point  on  the  Jordan, 
north  of  Jericho.  The  northern  side  ran  from  Jisr 
ed  Damieh,  on  the  Jordan,  west,  through  Nablus,  to 
Tul  Keram  and  thence  to  the  Mediterranean.  The 
Turkish  communications  from  this  rectangle  to  Da- 
mascus converged  on  El  Afule  and  Beisan,  twenty-five 
miles  to  the  north,  which  were  connected  by  a  rail- 
road with  Deraa,  east  of  the  Jordan,  on  the  Hedjaz 
Railroad.  Allenby's  plan — a  bold  and  sound  one — 
was  to  smash  the  enemy's  line  near  the  coast,  rush 
cavalry  north  and  cut  the  Turkish  communications 
with  El  Afule  and  Beisan.  Then  by  pushing  with  his 
centre  north  from  Jerusalem  and  with  his  right  up  the 
Jordan  Valley,  he  would  completely  envelop  the  Turk- 
ish armies  west  of  the  Jordan. 

The  Allied  armies  in  Palestine  largely  outnumbered 
the  Turkish  armies.  Allenby  estimated  that  the  Turks 
had  on  both  sides  the  river,  including  the  garrison  of 
Maan,  104,000  men  of  all  services — only  36,000  (4000 
cavalry  and  32,000  infantry),  however,  in  the  fighting 
line.  He  himself  had  57,000  infantry  and  12,000 
cavalry,  with  a  total  strength  in  all  services  of  about 
200,000.     He  had  540  guns.     The  Turks  had  400. 

Allenby's  marked  superiority  in  cavalry  contributed 
decisively  to  the  success  of  his  envelopment  movement. 
He  had  two  cavalry  divisions  and  two  mounted  in- 
fantry divisions,  while  the  Turks  had  only  a  single 
cavalry  division.     General  Limari  Sanders,  the  Teuton 


374  The  Great  War  [iqisj 

Commander-in-Chief  in  Palestine  and  Syria,  was  in 
charge  of  three  armies.  The  Fourth  held  the  Jordan 
Valley,  north  of  Jericho.  It  consisted  of  6000  infantry 
and  2000  cavalry,  with  74  guns.  The  Seventh  held 
a  twenty-mile  line  north  of  Jerusalem,  on  both  sides  of 
the  Jerusalem-Nablus  highroad.  It  mustered  7000 
infantry,  with  in  guns.  The  Eighth,  with  10,000 
infantry  and  1 57  guns,  occupied  a  front  of  about  twenty- 
five  miles,  from  Furkah  to  the  coast. 

Allenby  commanded  a  variegated  force,  including 
seven  infantry  divisions,  in  addition  to  the  four 
mounted  divisions  mentioned  above,  two  separate 
brigades,  and  four  separate  battalions.  In  his  army 
were  Australians  and  New  Zealanders,  British,  Egyp- 
tians, the  Lahore  and  Meerut  East  Indian  divisions, 
two  British  West  Indian  battalions,  a  French  colonial 
brigade,  two  Jewish  battalions,  and  an  Armenian  unit. 
Co-operating  with  him  to  the  east  of  the  Hedjaz  Rail- 
road was  an  Arab  army  from  the  new  kingdom  of 
Hedjaz. 

The  attack  on  the  Turkish  coast  front  was  made  by 
a  force ,  under  Lieutenant  General  Sir  Edward  Bulfin. 
He  had  at  his  disposal  five  divisions,  the  French  brigade, 
and  an  Australian  light  horse  brigade.  The  Desert 
Mounted  Corps,  under  Lieutenant  General  Sir  Harry 
Chauvel,  was  concentrated  in  Bulfin' s  rear,  ready  to 
dash  north  through  the  first  opening  in  the  Turkish 
lines. 

The  infantry  assault  on  the  morning  of  September 
19th  (preceded  by  a  fifteen-minute  bombardment) 
was  a  complete  success.  The  Turkish  Eighth  Army 
was  taken  unawares,  and  overwhelmed.  Its  remnants 
were  driven  east  and  north-east  to  the  Samarian  hills. 
A  clear  path  along  the  coast  was  offered  to  the  Allied 


[i9i8]        Turkey  Goes  to  the  Wall         375 

horsemen.  The  Desert  Mounted  Corps  rushed  at  full 
speed  up  the  coastal  plain.  Before  dark  on  September 
19th  it  had  reached  El  Afule,  on  the  lateral  railroad 
from  Haifa  to  Deraa.  A  detachment  swooped  down 
on  Liman  Sanders's  headquarters  at  Nazareth,  still 
farther  north.  Sanders  barely  escaped;  but  some 
members  of  his  staff  were  captured,  together  with 
two  thousand  other  prisoners.  The  cavalry  then 
pushed  east  from  El  Afule  to  Beisan,  closing  all  the 
Turkish  lines  of  retreat  on  the  west  side  of  the  Jordan. 
A  forced  march  of  eighty  miles  had  been  accomplished 
in  thirty-four  hours. 

The  Seventh  Turkish  Army  and  the  remains  of  the 
Eighth  Army  were  now  in  a  trap.  They  were  sur- 
rounded on  three  sides.  Allenby's  right  wing  in  the 
Jordan  Valley  pressed  north  to  bar  the  lower  crossing 
of  the  Jordan  at  Jisr  ed  Damieh.  The  cavalry,  turn- 
ing south  from  Beisan,  barred  the  upper  crossings. 
The  Allied  centre  and  left,  converging  on  Nablus, 
drove  the  disorganized  Turks  into  the  arms  of  the 
cavalry  divisions,  waiting  in  their  rear.  All  organized 
resistance  ended  on  September  21  st.  By  that  time  the 
Eighth  and  Seventh  Turkish  armies  had  ceased  to 
exist. 

The  Fourth  Army,  east  of  the  Jordan,  and  the  garri- 
son of  Maan,  east  of  the  Dead  Sea,  remained  to  be 
dealt  with.  On  September  23d  the  Fourth  Army 
retreated  toward  Es  Salt  and  Amman,  pursued  by  the 
Australian  and  New  Zealand  Mounted  Division,  which 
was  operating  with  Allenby's  right  wing.  Amman 
was  captured  on  September  25th.  Then  the  enemy 
retreated  north  along  the  Hedjaz  Railroad,  after  losing 
five  thousand  men  and  twenty-eight  guns.  A  part  of 
Allenby's  right  wing  remained  at  Amman  to  intercept 


37^  The  Great  War  *■#■*] 

the  Second  Turkish  Army  Corps  which  was  retreating 
from  Arabia.  Maan  had  been  evacuated  on  Septem- 
ber 23d.  The  Turkish  forces  which  abandoned  it  sur- 
rendered south  of  Amman,  on  September  29th. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  coastal  sector,  the  Desert  Mounted 
Corps  had  occupied  Haifa,  thus  giving  Allenby  a  new 
sea  base  and  a  railroad  running  east  from  it  to  Lake 
Tiberias  and  Deraa.  Acre  was  captured  along  with 
Haifa. 

Palestine  was  now  freed.  The  next  Allied  objective 
was  Damascus.  Three  cavalry  divisions  were  on  their 
way  toward  it  by  September  28th.  The  Arab  army 
east  of  the  Hedjaz  Railroad  had  raided  Deraa,  Sep- 
tember i6th-i8th.  It  then  lay  in  wait  for  the  retreat- 
ing Fourth  Turkish  Army.  The  Turkish  columns 
were  broken  up  north  of  Deraa  and  the  Arabs  then 
seized  that  important  railroad  centre  and  made  a  junc- 
tion with  the  eastern  wing  of  the  Desert  Mounted 
Corps.  The  Mounted  Corps  and  the  Arabs  reached  the 
outskirts  of  Damascus  on  September  30th  and  entered 
the  city  on  October  1st.  In  this  operation  twenty 
thousand  prisoners  were  taken.  After  that  the  Turkish 
forces  left  in  Syria  amounted  to  only  seventeen  thousand 
men,  of  whom  only  four  thousand  were  effectives. 

There  was  nothing  to  hinder  a  further  advance  to 
Aleppo.  Beirut  was  occupied  by  the  Allies  on  October 
8th,  thus  opening  another  port  and  a  lateral  railroad 
line  leading  east  to  Damascus.  The  Desert  Mounted 
Corps  started  from  Damascus  for  Aleppo  on  October 
5th.  It  reached  Horns,  on  the  Damascus-Aleppo 
railroad,  on  October  12th,  and  was  joined  there  by  a 
cavalry  division  coming  from  Beirut.  This  latter 
division,  reinforced  by  armoured  cars,  continued  on 
alone.     But  near  Aleppo  it  was  joined  by  another 


[i9i8]        Turkey  Goes  to  the  Wall         377 

cavalry  brigade  and  by  units  of  the  Arab  army.  The 
city  was  entered  by  the  Arabs  on  October  25th.  North 
of  Aleppo  the  British  advance  halted.  On  October 
31st  the  armistice  which  Turkey,  following  Bulgaria's 
example,  had  solicited,  went  into  effect. 

Between  September  19th  and  October  26th  Allenby 
had  driven  the  enemy  back  more  than  three  hundred 
miles.  His  fifth  cavalry  division  had  covered  five 
hundred  miles  and  taken  1 1 ,000  prisoners  and  fifty-two 
guns.  In  all  75,000  prisoners  were  captured.  Of  these 
200  officers  and  3500  of  other  ranks  were  Germans  or 
Austrians.  The  Turks  lost  360  guns  and  the  transport 
and  equipment  of  three  armies.  Allenby's  was  the 
most  completely  successful  envelopment  operation  of 
the  war. 

On  the  Mesopotamian  front  General  Marshall  made 
a  spring  campaign  up  the  Euphrates,  taking  Hit  on 
March  10th  and  Khan-Bagdadi  on  March  26th.  He 
also  continued  to  make  progress  up  the  Tigris  toward 
Mosul.  A  final  offensive  against  that  city  was  begun 
in  October.  It  was  on  the  point  of  succeeding  when, 
on  October  30th,  the  Turkish  army  on  the  Tigris — 
seven  thousand  strong — capitulated. 

The  Turkish  Government  survived  the  armistice. 
There  was  no  revolution  against  the  Sultan,  who  had, 
in  fact,  never  been  much  in  sympathy  with  the  Young 
Turk  triumvirate.  Enver  Pasha,  Talaat  Pasha,  and 
Djemal  Pasha  fled  and  the  Sultan,  restored  to  a  sem- 
blance of  authority,  threw  himself  and  his  people  on 
the  mercy  of  the  Allies. 


CHAPTER  XLI 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS,  1918.   GERMAN  NAVAL  LOSSES 

The  most  striking  naval  operation  of  191 8  was  the 
attempt  of  a  British  raiding  party  to  block  the  exits 
of  the  ship  canals  at  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend.  These 
two  ports  were  connected  by  waterways  with  Bruges, 
the  chief  base  of  German  U-boat  operations  in  the 
English  Channel  region. 

The  expedition  was  in  charge  of  Vice-Admiral  Sir 
Roger  Keyes.  On  the  night  of  April  26th,  six  obsolete 
British  cruisers  approached  the  mole  at  Zeebrugge. 
One  of  them,  the  Vindictive,  carried  storming  parties 
directed  to  land  on  the  mole.  The  other  five — the 
Brilliant,  Iphigenia,  Sirius,  Intrepid,  and  Thetis — 
were  rilled  with  concrete  and  were  to  be  sunk  across 
the  channel  inside  the  mole.  Monitors  and  fast  small 
craft  accompanied  the  cruisers. 

The  storming  parties  on  the  Vindictive  made  a  land- 
ing on  the  mole,  but  found  it  deserted.  The  Germans 
had  withdrawn  to  the  shore  end  and  put  up  only  a 
machine  gun  and  artillery  defence.  In  the  confusion 
the  Iphigenia  and  the  Intrepid  were  sunk  across  the 
mouth  of  the  canal,  in  a  V-position.  It  was  a  daring  and 
successful  exploit,  accomplished  at  relatively  small  cost. 

The  attempt  on  Ostend  was  a  failure.  But  on  the 
night  of  May  9th  the  Vindictive  was  sunk  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Ostend  canal,  partially  obstructing  it. 

378 


[i9i8]  Naval  Operations  379 

The  German  submarine  campaign  against  merchant 
shipping  decreased  in  effectiveness  during  191 8.  A 
mine  barrage  across  the  North  Sea,  from  the  Orkneys 
to  Norway,  was  established  by  the  Allied  fleets  (June 
8th-October  26th).  An  American  flotilla  under  Rear 
Admiral  Joseph  Strauss  laid  56,611  mines.  The 
British  navy  laid  13,652.  By  October  the  U-boat  had 
ceased  to  be  a  serious  military  menace. 

In  the  quarter  ending  March  31,  1918,  German  sub- 
marines destroyed  1,143,336  tons  of  Allied  and  neutral 
shipping.  In  the  next  quarter  the  tonnage  sunk  de- 
clined to  962,007.  In  the  third  quarter  the  total  was 
915,513.  In  October,  1918,  only  177,534  tons  were 
destroyed. 

The  complete  failure  of  the  German  submarine  cam- 
paign as  the  decisive  offensive  factor  in  the  war  (and 
German  military  policy  after  January,  191 7,  was  based 
on  the  assumption  that  it  could  be  made  such  a  factor) 
is  demonstrated  by  a  comparison  of  the  world's  steam 
ocean-going  tonnage  in  existence  on  August  1,  1914, 
and  the  world's  steam  ocean-going  tonnage  in  existence 
on  November  11,  191 8.  Tonnage  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  was  42,146,000.  Losses  amounted  to  18,286,- 
000.  Replacements,  including  interned  German  tonnage 
taken  over  by  the  Allies,  amounted  to  15,049,000  tons. 
The  net  loss  was  3,237,000  tons.  Great  Britain  was 
the  greatest  sufferer.  Her  gross  loss  was  8,785,000  and 
her  net  loss  3,885,000.  The  United  States  made  a  net 
gain  in  tonnage  of  3,400,000. 

The  former  German  cruiser  Breslau,  under  the  Turk- 
ish flag,  was  sunk  by  a  mine,  at  the  entrance  to  the 
Dardanelles,  on  January  20th.  The  former  German 
battle  cruiser  Goeben  was  beached  on  the  same  day, 
after  an  engagement  with  British  warships.     On  May 


38°  The  Great  War  [1918] 

14th  Italian  submarines  entered  Pola  harbour  and 
sank  an  Austro-Hungarian  super-dreadnaught  of  the 
Viribus  Unitis  class.  The  Austro-Hungarian  dread- 
naught  Szent  Istvan  was  destroyed  by  Italian  torpedo 
boats  off  the  Dalmatian  coast  on  June  10th.  The 
Viribus  Unitis  was  sunk  by  an  Italian  monitor  on 
November  1st. 

The  American  armoured  cruiser  San  Diego  struck  a 
mine  off  Fire  Island  on  July  19th  and  sank.  There 
was  no  loss  of  life.  Between  May  and  October,  German 
submarines  operated  off  the  Atlantic  coast  of  the 
United  States,  sinking  sailing  vessels,  fishing  boats,  and 
some  passenger  steamers.  Submarines  sank  three 
British  transports  carrying  American  troops  to  Europe 
— the  Tuscania,  the  Moldavia,  and  the  Persic.  Only 
215  soldiers  were  lost.  The  American  auxiliaries 
Tampa  and  Ticonderoga  were  torpedoed  in  September. 
All  the  men  on  the  Tampa  were  drowned.  On  the 
Ticonderoga  102  enlisted  men  were  lost. 

German  naval  losses  were  fairly  well  concealed  during 
the  war.  A  statement  published  in  the  Berlin  Vossische 
Zeitung  in  July,  19 19,  disclosed  their  extent.  One 
hundred  and  seventy-eight  U-boats  were  destroyed, 
eighty-two  in  the  North  Sea  and  the  Atlantic,  seventy- 
two  off  the  coast  of  Flanders,  sixteen  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, five  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  three  in  the  Baltic 
Sea.  In  addition  fourteen  were  blown  up  by  their 
crews  and  seven  were  interned  in  neutral  harbours. 
Altogether  199  were  put  out  of  service. 

The  destroyers  lost  numbered  forty-nine.  One 
battleship,  the  Pommern,  and  one  battle  cruiser,  the 
Liitzow,  were  sunk  in  the  battle  of  Jutland.  Other 
losses  included  six  armoured  cruisers,  eight  modern 
and  ten  older  cruisers,  nine  auxiliary  cruisers,  and  sixty- 


[19x8]  German  Naval  Losses  381 

one  torpedo  boats.     The  number  of  war  vessels  of  all 
sorts  destroyed  was  490. 

The  German  naval  casualties  totalled  29,685,  in- 
cluding 10,625  marines.  Probably  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  marine  losses  occurred  in  the  military 
service. 


CHAPTER  XLII 

America's  part  in  the  war 

The  United  States  entered  the  war  lamentably  un- 
prepared. In  his  address  to  Congress  when  it  assembled 
on  December  8,  1914,  President  Wilson  said: 

More  than  this  [a  suggestion  of  voluntary  militia 
training],  proposed  at  this  time,  permit  me  to  say, 
would  mean  merely  that  we  had  lost  our  self-posses- 
sion, that  we  had  been  thrown  off  our  balance  by  a 
war  with  which  we  have  nothing  to  do,  whose  causes 
cannot  touch  us,  whose  very  existence  affords  us 
opportunities  of  friendship  and  disinterested  service 
which  should  make  us  ashamed  of  any  thought  of 
hostility  or  fearful  preparation  for  trouble. 

This  was  an  extraordinary  misjudgment.  The  Ger- 
man Admiralty's  "war  zone"  proclamation,  issued  on 
February  4,  191 5,  soon  proved  that  the  causes  of  the 
war  could  touch  us  and  that  we  could  not  hope  to  avoid 
entanglement  in  the  European  conflict,  if  we  intended 
to  uphold  our  rights  and  interests  as  a  neutral.  The 
sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  on  May  7,  191 5,  was  a  clear 
notice  to  the  United  States  to  prepare  for  the  contin- 
gency— not  to  say  the  certainty — of  war.  But,  unfor- 
tunately, the  theory  of  the  address  of  December  8, 
1 9 14,  was  lived  up  to  by  the  administration  for  nearly 
two  years  longer,  except  for  a  brief  series  of  preparedness 

382 


America's  Part  in  the  War        383 

speeches  made  by  the  President  in  the  winter  of 
1916. 

In  April,  191 7,  there  were  only  200,000  men  in  the 
military  establishment.  Of  these  133,000  were  regu- 
lars and  67,000  national  guardsmen,  called  into  the 
Federal  service  in  191 6  because  of  troubles  on  the 
Mexican  border.  Congress  had  passed  the  farcical 
Hay  army  reorganization  act  in  1 91 6.  It  was  reluctant 
in  191 7  to  resort  to  conscription.  But  the  country 
knew  that  the  war  could  not  be  won  without  conscrip- 
tion, and  demanded  an  immediate  trial  of  the  principle 
of  selective  compulsory  service. 

The  enthusiasm  with  which  the  public  supported 
and  executed  the  draft  system  was  one  of  the  revela- 
tions of  the  war.  Under  the  Selective  Service  law  of 
May  19,  19 1 7 — broadened  in  scope  in  19 18  to  include 
all  able-bodied  men  between  eighteen  and  forty-five — 
24,234,021  conscripts  were  registered  and  more  than 
3,091,000  became  members  of  the  new  National  Army. 
When  the  war  ended  4,000,000  men  had  served.  The 
Regular  Army  was  expanded  to  527,000  and  the  Na- 
tional Guard  to  382,000.  But  the  National  Army  con- 
stituted seventy-seven  per  cent,  of  our  military  forces. 

The  enlisted  strength  of  the  navy  on  April  6,  191 7, 
was  65,777.  By  November  II,  1918,  it  had  risen 
to  497,030.  The  Marine  Corps  was  enlarged  from 
15,627  to  78,017.  The  total  number  of  men  serving 
in  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  was  4,800,000 
— 4,000,000  in  the  army  and  800,000  in  other  branches. 
The  army  had  less  than  9000  officers  in  April,  191 7. 
By  the  end  of  the  war  the  strength  of  the  officers' 
corps  had  been  increased  to  200,000. 

What  America  could  contribute  to  winning  the  war 
in  the  field  was  man  power.     We  could  not  have  car- 


384  The  Great  War 

ried  a  sufficient  reinforcement  to  Europe  in  our  own 
ships.  Nor  could  we  have  supplied  our  forces  there 
adequately  with  guns,  machine  guns,  tanks,  or  airplanes. 
The  Entente  Powers  were  able  to  furnish  aid  in  trans- 
portation and  to  lend  artillery  and  other  equipment. 
American  man  power  did  arrive  on  the  battle  line  in 
time,  and  guaranteed  Foch  his  strategical  reserve  for 
the  Victory  Offensive  of  191 8. 

Two  million  and  eighty-four  thousand  American 
soldiers  were  carried  to  Europe.  American  vessels — 
chiefly  the  interned  German  liners  taken  over  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war — transported  927,000.  British 
and  British-controlled  vessels  transported  1,047,000. 
French  ships  carried  47,000,  and  Italian  ships  65,000. 
Only  half  a  million  soldiers  were  delivered  from  April, 
191 7,  to  May,  191 8.  In  the  last  six  months  of  the 
war  1,500,000  were  delivered.  On  November  II,  1918, 
the  United  States  was  represented  on  the  Western 
Front  by  1,950,000  men.  France  had  2,559,000  and 
Great  Britain  1,718,000.  Up  to  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  1,390,000  American  troops  had  appeared  on 
the  firing  line. 

The  transportation  of  troops  naturally  outran  the 
capacity  of  the  United  States  to  supply  them  with 
field  and  heavy  guns.  The  American  forces  in  France 
had,  in  round  numbers,  3500  pieces  of  artillery,  of 
which  nearly  500  were  made  in  this  country.  They 
used  on  the  firing  line  2250  pieces,  of  which  over  100 
were  made  here.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  United 
States  manufactured  large  quantities  of  smokeless 
powder  and  high  explosives  which  were  sold  to  the 
French  and  British. 

For  tanks  the  American  armies  had  to  depend  almost 
entirely  on  the  French  and  British,  the  former  con- 


America's  Part  in  the  War        385 

tributing  227  of  the  light  variety  and  the  latter  64  of 
the  heavier  model. 

The  war  also  ended  too  soon  for  American  airplane 
production  to  show  results.  Of  the  2698  planes  sent 
to  the  advance  zone  for  the  use  of  American  aviators 
667  were  of  American  manufacture. 

The  American  Expeditionary  Force  did  not  get  into 
active  front  line  service  until  April  25,  191 8.  But 
thereafter  it  saw  much  hard  service  and  greatly  dis- 
tinguished itself.  The  infantry  was  composed  of 
forty-two  divisions,  twenty-nine  of  which  were  combat 
units.  In  the  last  week  of  October,  191 8,  when  these 
twenty-nine  were  in  action,  they  held  10 1  miles  of 
front,  or  twenty-three  per  cent,  of  the  Allied  line. 
They  advanced  in  battle  485  miles,  and  captured 
63,079  prisoners  and  1378  guns. 

The  part  taken  by  the  American  Expeditionary  Force 
in  the  fighting  on  the  Western  Front  has  been  noted 
in  preceding  chapters,  dealing  with  LudendorfTs  five 
offensives  and  Foch's  Victory  Offensive  (Chapters 
XXXV,  XXXVI,  and  XXXVII).  A  brief  recapitula- 
tion may  be  appropriate  here. 

The  First  Division  captured  Cantigny,  in  the  Amiens 
sector,  on  May  28th.  The  Second  Division,  with 
elements  of  the  Third  and  the  Twenty-eighth,  helped 
to  stop  the  German  advance  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Chateau-Thierry.  The  Second  Division  (June  5th-i  ith) 
took  Bouresches,  Torcy,  and  Belleau  Wood — a  brilliant 
operation.  Eighty -five  thousand  American  troops  co- 
operated in  the  repulse  of  LudendorfTs  Fifth  Offensive — 
the  Forty-second  Division  fighting  with  Gouraud, 
in  Champagne,  east  of  Rheims,  and  the  Third  and 
Twenty-eighth  fighting  with  de  Mitry  south  of  the 
Marne. 

as 


386  The  Great  War 

Eight  divisions — the  First,  Second,  Third,  Fourth 
Twenty-sixth,  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty-second,  and 
Forty-second — were  employed  in  Foch's  attack  against 
the  Aisne-Marne  salient,  beginning  July  18th.  Ele- 
ments of  the  Thirty-third  Division  took  part  in  Haig's 
offensive  against  the  Montdidier  salient,  beginning 
August  8th.  They  helped  the  Australians  to  storm 
Chipilly  Ridge,  on  the  north  side  of  the  Somme.  The 
Twenty-seventh  and  Thirtieth  divisions  were  used  in 
conjunction  with  the  Australians  to  break  the  Hinden- 
burg  Line  about  Le  Catelet  and  in  the  subsequent 
advance  toward  Maubeuge. 

The  Twenty-eighth,  Thirty-second,  and  Seventy- 
seventh  divisions  participated  in  the  first  stages  of 
General  Mangin's  Oise-Aisne  offensive,  beginning 
August  1 8th.  The  Twenty-seventh  and  Thirtieth 
divisions,  before  storming  the  Hindenburg  Line,  had 
helped  to  recapture  Mount  Kemmel.  On  October  31st 
two  other  American  divisions — the  Thirty-seventh  and 
Ninety-first — were  sent  to  Flanders  from  the  Meuse. 
They  took  part  in  the  last  stages  of  the  Ypres-Lys 
offensive,  reaching  the  line  of  the  Scheldt. 

The  First  American  Army  was  organized  on  August 
10th.  In  co-operation  with  a  small  French  force  it 
squeezed  out  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  (September  12th- 
16th).  Then  it  fought  the  great  battle  of  the  Meuse- 
Argonne  (September  26th-November  nth).  About 
550,000  American  soldiers  were  engaged  in  the  battle 
of  St.  Mihiel.  One  million  two  hundred  thousand 
fought  in  the  Meuse- Argonne  campaign.  The  strategi- 
cal effect  of  the  successful  American  drive  for  Sedan  was 
to  break  into  two  groups  the  German  armies  operating 
in  France  and  Belgium  and  to  precipitate  Ludendorff's 
request  for  an  armistice.     Two  American  divisions — 


America's  Part  in  the  War        387 

the  Second  and  the  Thirty-sixth — also  assisted  the 
French  in  their  advance  in  October  east  of  Rheims. 

The  American  armies  were  often  handicapped  by 
the  lack  of  field  and  heavy  guns  of  their  own.  They 
were  also  inexperienced  in  warfare  and  may  not  have 
been  used  as  economically  as  the  French  armies  were 
used  in  the  later  periods  of  the  war.  But  they  fought 
surprisingly  well.  The  twenty-nine  combat  divisions 
had  46,739  men  killed  in  battle.  But  they  took  63,079 
prisoners,  and  lost  only  4434  prisoners.  An  army 
with  a  record  like  that  shows  military  quality  of  the 
highest  type.  The  American  casualties  are  given  in 
detail  in  Appendix  II. 

The  United  States  fought  a  successful  war  in  spite 
of  the  enormous  disabilities  imposed  by  the  failure  of 
our  government  to  prepare  for  war.  It  also,  through 
President  Wilson's  activities,  played  a  leading  r61e  in 
formulating  the  conditions  on  which  peace  was  nego- 
tiated. During  19 18  Mr.  Wilson  laid  down  various 
formulae  of  settlement  to  be  applied  in  concluding 
peace.  The  most  definite  of  these  were  the  ' '  Fourteen 
Points,"  incorporated  in  his  address  to  Congress  on 
January  8th.     They  read  as  follows: 

1.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at, 
after  which  there  shall  be  no  private  international 
understandings  of  any  kind,  but  diplomacy  shall 
proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

2.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas, 
outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war, 
except  as  the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part 
by  international  action  for  the  enforcement  of  inter- 
national covenants. 

3.  The  removal,  so  tar  as  possible,  of  all  economic 


388  The  Great  War 

barriers  and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of 
trade  conditions  among  all  the  nations  consenting  to 
the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its  main- 
tenance. 

4.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that 
national  armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest 
points  consistent  with  domestic  safety. 

5.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial 
adjustment  of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict 
observance  of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all 
such  questions  of  sovereignty  the  interests  of  the 
populations  concerned  must  have  equal  weight  with 
the  equitable  claims  of  the  government  whose  title 
is  to  be  determined. 

6.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and 
such  a  settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as 
will  secure  the  best  and  freest  co-operation  of  the 
other  nations  of  the  world  in  obtaining  for  her  an 
unhampered  and  unembarrassed  opportunity  for  the 
independent  determination  of  her  own  political  de- 
velopment and  national  policy  and  assure  her  of  a 
sincere  welcome  into  the  society  of  free  nations  under 
institutions  of  her  own  choosing;  and,  more  than  a 
welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  she  may  need 
and  may  herself  desire.  The  treatment  accorded 
Russia  by  her  sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come 
will  be  the  acid  test  of  their  good  will,  of  their  com- 
prehension of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from  their 
own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish 
sympathy. 

7.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be 
evacuated  and  restored  without  any  attempt  to 
limit  the  sovereignty  which  she  enjoys  in  common 
with  all  other  free  nations.     No  other  single  act  will 


America's  Part  in  the  War        389 

serve  as  this  will  serve  to  restore  confidence  among 
the  nations  in  the  laws  which  they  have  themselves 
set  and  determined  for  the  government  of  their  rela- 
tions with  one  another.  Without  this  healing  act 
the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  international  law 
is  forever  impaired. 

8.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the 
invaded  portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to 
France  by  Prussia  in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  which  has  unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world 
for  nearly  fifty  years,  should  be  righted,  in  order  that 
peace  may  once  more  be  made  secure  in  the  interest 
of  all. 

9.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy 
should  be  effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines 
of  nationality. 

10.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose 
place  among  the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded 
and  assured,  should  be  accorded  the  freest  oppor- 
tunity of  autonomous  development. 

1 1 .  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be 
evacuated,  occupied  territories  restored,  Serbia  ac- 
corded free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea;  and  the 
relations  of  the  several  Balkan  States  to  one  another 
determined  by  friendly  counsel  along  historically 
established  lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality;  and 
international  guarantees  of  the  political  and  economic 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  several 
Balkan  States  should  be  entered  into. 

12.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman 
Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but 
the  other  nationalities  which  are  now  under  Turkish 
rule  should  be  assured  an  undoubted  security  of  life 
and  an  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of  au- 


39o  The  Great  War 

I  tonomous  development,  and  the  Dardanelles  should 
be  permanently  opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships 
and  commerce  of  all  nations  under  international 
guarantees. 

/  13.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected 
which  should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by 
indisputably  Polish  populations,  which  should  be  as- 

1  sured  a  free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  whose 

i  political  and  economic  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  should  be  guaranteed  by  international 
covenant. 

1  14.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be 
formed  under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of 
affording  mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike. 

The  "Fourteen  Points"  were  supplemented,  on 
February  nth,  by  four  principles;  on  July  4th,  by 
four  more  principles;  on  September  27th,  by  five  addi- 
tional principles.  All  the  principles  were  abstract  in 
character  and  envisaged  a  peace  of  renunciation  and 
conciliation,  rather  than  a  peace  of  surrender.  The 
most  striking  of  the  thirteen  principles  was  the  first  one 
of  the  third  set,  which  read: 

f  The  impartial  justice  meted  out  must  involve  no 
discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we  wish  to 
be  just  and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be 
just.  It  must  be  a  justice  which  plays  no  favourites 
and  knows  no  standard  but  the  equal  rights  of  the 
peoples  concerned. 

When,  in  September,  191 8,  the  Central  Powers  lost 
all  hope  of  victory,  Austria-Hungary  made  an  appeal 


America's  Part  in  the  War        391 

for  a  conference  with  the  Allies.  This  was  rejected. 
In  October  Hertling  resigned  as  the  German  Imperial 
Chancellor  and  was  replaced  by  Prince  Max  of  Baden. 
The  latter  made  a  pretence  of  acting  as  the  mouthpiece 
of  the  Reichstag,  rather  than  of  the  Emperor.  In  his 
newly  acquired  representative  capacity  he  began  sound- 
ing out  the  government  of  the  United  States.  He 
announced  that  Germany  was  ready  to  accept  the 
peace  terms  laid  down  by  President  Wilson  in  the 
"Fourteen  Points"  and  in  the  later  principles,  particu- 
larly in  the  principles  enunciated  on  September  27th. 

Secretary  Lansing  demanded  assurances  that  the 
new  government  represented  the  people  of  Germany, 
not  the  old  autocracy.  These  were  formally  given. 
President  Wilson  then  transmitted  the  correspondence 
to  the  Allied  governments  and  asked  them  if  they  were 
disposed  to  accept  peace  on  the  terms  and  principles 
indicated  by  Germany.  They  assented,  reserving  the 
question  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  stipulating 
that  Germany  should  make  compensation  "for  all 
damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allied 
states  and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of  Germany 
by  land,  by  sea,  and  from  the  air." 

The  German  Government  was  informed  on  Novem- 
ber 5th  of  these  reservations,  and  also  that  Marshal 
Foch  had  been  authorized  to  receive  German  armistice 
commissioners.  While  armistice  negotiations  were  in 
progress  the  Kaiser  abdicated  and  fled  to  Holland. 
The  Reichstag  organized  a  government,  which  later 
became  a  mildly  socialist  republic. 

Peace  with  Germany  was  made,  at  least  in  form,  on 
the  basis  of  the  ' '  Fourteen  Points. "  Clause  X,  regard- 
ing Austria-Hungary,  had  been  nullified  by  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  belligerent  status  of  Czecho-Slovakia  and 


392  The  Great  War 

Jugo-Slavia.  Clause  II  had  been  annulled  by  the 
Allied  reservations  as  to  the  freedom  of  the  seas. 
Clause  VI,  regarding  Russia,  became  inapplicable, 
because  of  the  continuance  of  war  between  the  Lenine 
government  and  the  Allies.  Clause  I  was  more  hon- 
oured in  the  breach  than  in  the  observance  in  the 
proceedings  at  Paris.  Clauses  XI  and  XII  applied  to 
conditions  of  peace,  not  with  Germany,  but  with 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey. 

To  what  extent  the  other  clauses  (except  VII  and 
VIII,  about  which  there  was  no  dispute)  served  as 
the  framework  of  the  peace  will  probably  be  disputed 
for  generations.  No  compact  was  ever  made  to  observe 
them  in  the  arrangement  of  peace  terms  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  Bulgaria,  or  Turkey.  But  they  will  remain 
of  permanent  historical  significance  as  the  criteria  of 
the  German  settlement. 


The  peace  conference  met  in  Paris  in  January,  1919. 
A  treaty  with  Germany  was  signed,  at  Versailles,  on 
June  28,  1919.  It  went  into  effect  on  January  10, 
1920,  for  the  various  powers  which  had  ratified  it  prior 
to  that  date.  Ratification  by  the  United  States  was 
held  up  by  a  dispute  between  President  Wilson  and  the 
Senate  over  the  question  of  reservations. 

A  treaty  with  German  Austria  was  signed,  at  St. 
Germain,  on  September  10,  191 9.  One  with  Bulgaria 
was  signed,  at  Neuilly,  on  November  27,  19 19.  These 
treaties,  and  America's  part  in  them,  form  an  episode 
of  extraordinary  historical  interest,  with  which  the 
author  hopes  to  deal  in  a  separate  volume. 


APPENDIX  I 

DECLARATIONS    OF    WAR    AND    SEVERANCES   OF    DIPLOMATIC 

RELATIONS 

Declarations  of  War 

Austria  against  Belgium,  August  28,  1914. 
Austria  against  Japan,  August  27,  1914. 
Austria  against  Montenegro,  August  9,  1914. 
Austria  against  Russia,  August  6,  19 14. 
Austria  against  Serbia,  July  28,  1914. 
Brazil  against  Germany,  October  26,  191 7. 
Bulgaria  against  Serbia,  October  14,  1915. 
China  against  Austria,  August  14,  191 7. 
China  against  Germany,  August  14,  191 7. 
Costa  Rica  against  Germany,  May  23,  191 8. 
Cuba  against  Germany,  April  7,  191 7. 
France  against  Austria,  August  13,  191 4. 
France  against  Bulgaria,  October  16,  1915. 
France  against  Germany,  August  3,  1914. 
France  against  Turkey,  November  5,  1914. 
Germany  against  Belgium,  August  4,  1914. 
Germany  against  France,  August  3,  19 14. 
Germany  against  Portugal,  March  9,  1916. 
Germany  against  Rumania,  September  14,  19 16. 
Germany  against  Russia,  August  I,  1914. 
Great  Britain  against  Austria,  August  13,  1914. 
Great  Britain  against  Bulgaria,  October  15,  1915. 
Great  Britain  against  Germany,  August  4,  1914. 
Great  Britain  against  Turkey,  November  5,  1914. 

393 


394  Appendix  I 

Greece  against  Bulgaria,  November  28,  191 6  (Provisional 
Government). 

Greece  against  Bulgaria,  July  2,  191 7  (Government  of 
Alexander). 

Greece  against  Germany,  November  28,  1916  (Provi- 
sional Government). 

Greece  against  Germany,  July  2,  191 7  (Government  of 
Alexander). 

Guatemala  against  Germany,  April  21,  191 8. 

Haiti  against  Germany,  July  12,  1918. 

Honduras  against  Germany,  July  19,  1918. 

Italy  against  Austria,  May  24,  191 5. 

Italy  against  Bulgaria,  October  19,  1915. 

Italy  against  Germany,  August  28,  1916. 

Italy  against  Turkey,  August  21,  191 5. 

Japan  against  Germany,  August  23,  1914. 

Liberia  against  Germany,  August  4,  191 7. 

Montenegro  against  Austria,  August  8,  19 14. 

Montenegro  against  Germany,  August  9,  1914. 

Nicaragua  against  Germany,  May  6,  1918. 

Panama  against  Germany,  April  7,  191 7. 

Panama  against  Austria,  December  10,  1917. 

Portugal  against  Germany,  November  23,  1914  (resolu- 
tions passed  authorizing  military  intervention  as  ally  of 
England). 

Portugal  against  Germany,  May  19,  1915  (military  aid 
granted). 

Rumania  against  Austria,  August  27,  191 6  (allies  of 
Austria  also  consider  it  a  declaration). 

Russia  against  Bulgaria,  October  19,  1915. 

Russia  against  Turkey,  November  3,  19 14. 

San  Marino  against  Austria,  May  24,  191 5. 

Serbia  against  Bulgaria,  October  16,  191 5. 

Serbia  against  Germany,  August  6,  1914. 

Serbia  against  Turkey,  December  2,  19 14. 

Siam  against  Austria,  July  22,  191 7. 

Siam  against  Germany,  July  22,  191 7. 


Appendix  I  395 

Turkey  against  Allies,  November  23,  1914. 
Turkey  against  Rumania,  August  29,  191 6. 
United  States  against  Germany,  April  6,  191 7. 
United  States   against  Austria-Hungary,   December   7, 
1917. 

Severances  of  Diplomatic  Relations 

Austria  against  Japan,  August  26,  1914. 

Austria  against  Portugal,  March  16,  1916. 

Austria  against  Serbia,  July  26,  19 14. 

Austria  against  United  States,  April  8,  191 7. 

Bolivia  against  Germany,  April  14,  191 7. 

Brazil  against  Germany,  April  II,  191 7. 

China  against  Germany,  March  14,  191 7. 

Costa  Rica  against  Germany,  September  31,  1917. 

Ecuador  against  Germany,  December  7,  191 7. 

Egypt  against  Germany,  August  13,  1914. 

France  against  Austria,  August  10,  1914. 

Greece  against  Turkey,  July  2,  191 7  (Government  of 
Alexander) . 

Greece  against  Austria,  July  2,  191 7  (Government  of 
Alexander). 

Guatemala  against  Germany,  April  27,  1917. 

Haiti  against  Germany,  June  17,  191 7. 

Honduras  against  Germany,  May  17,  191 7. 

Nicaragua  against  Germany,  May  18,  191 7. 

Peru  against  Germany,  October  6,  191 7. 

Turkey  against  United  States,  April  20,  191 7. 

United  States  against  Germany,  February  3,  191 7. 

Uruguay  against  Germany,  October  7,  191 7. 


APPENDIX  II 

MILITARY   LOSSES   OF   THE   PRINCIPAL   POWERS 

Tabulations  of  the  military  losses  of  the  war  are  in- 
complete and  often  confusing,  because  of  the  inclusion  or 
exclusion  of  soldiers  dying  of  disease  or  other  causes  than 
wounds. 

The  Statistical  Branch  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  United 
States  Army  has  furnished  this  statement,  corrected  to 
May  31,  1 9 19,  of  the  battle  deaths  in  the  armies  of  the 
various  belligerents: 

The  Allies  and  the  United  States 

Russia 1,700,000 

France 1,385,300 

Great  Britain. 900,000 

Italy 330,000 

Serbia  and  Montenegro 125,000 

Belgium 102,000 

Rumania 100,000 

United  States 48,900 

Greece 7,000 

Portugal 2,000 

Total 4,700,000 

The  Teutonic  Allies 

Germany 1,600,000 

Austria-Hungary 800,000 

Turkey.. .  ■ 250,000 

Bulgaria 100,000 

Total 2,750,000 

396 


Appendix  II  397 

The  losses  figures,  as  given  out,  officially  or  non-officially, 
for  the  various  belligerents  are : 

France — Army:  1,089,700  killed;  265,800  missing;  total 
Ii 355.500 — 16.2  per  cent,  of  mobilization  of  8,410,000. 
Navy:  5,521  killed;  5,214  missing;  total,  10,735—4.19 
per  cent,  of  forces  mobilized.  The  French  High  Commis- 
sion in  Washington  on  January  8,  19 19,  estimated  the 
French  wounded  at  3,000,000  and  the  prisoners  at  435,000. 
It  put  the  total  French  losses,  excluding  native  Colonials, 
at  4,762,800.  Colonial  killed  and  missing  are  included  in 
the  figures  for  killed  and  missing  given  above.  Colonial 
wounded  numbered  44,000  and  prisoners  3500. 

Great  Britain — Army:  killed,  706,726;  missing  or  prison- 
ers, 359.145;  wounded  2,032,142;  total,  3.098,113.  Navy: 
killed,  33,361;  missing,  prisoners,  and  wounded,  6,405; 
total,  39,766. 

Australia  (included  in  British) — Killed,  58,035 ;  wounded 
166,606;  missing,  193;  prisoners,  438. 

Canada  (included  in  British) — Killed,  in  action  or  died 
of  wounds,  48,121;  died  of  disease,  4057 ;  wounded,  155,839; 
missing,  5080;  prisoners,  3049;  deaths  in  Canada,  2287; 
total  218,433. 

Italy — Killed  or  died  of  wounds,  460,000;  wounded, 
947,000;  prisoners  or  missing,  500,000. 

Russia — (estimated)  Killed,  1,700,000;  wounded,  5,000,- 
000;  prisoners,  2,500,000. 

Serbia — Killed,  or  died  of  wounds  or  disease,  292,342. 

United  States — Army  (final  revision);  killed  in  action, 
34,248;  died  of  wounas,  13,700;  died  of  disease,  23,430;  died 
of  other  causes,  5740;  wounded,  221,050;  missing  and  pris- 
oners, 4435;  total,  302,612.  Marine  Corps  (up  to  July  5, 
1919):  killed  or  died  from  wounds  and  other  causes,  2716; 
wounded,  3252;  missing,  143;  total,  61 11.  Navy:  deaths 
from  war  causes,  1233. 

Germany — Killed  or  died  of  wounds  and  other  causes, 
2,050,460;  wounded,  4,207,028;  prisoners  and  missing, 
615,922;  total,  6,873,410. 


398  Appendix  II 

Austria-Hungary — (estimated),  Killed  800,000;  other 
casualties,  3,200,000;  total,  4,000,000. 

Bulgaria — (estimated)  Killed  and  missing,  101,224; 
wounded,  1,152,399  (?) 

Turkey — (estimated)  Killed  and  died  of  wounds  and 
disease,  436,974;  wounded  407,772;  prisoners  and  missing, 
103,731;  total,  948,477. 


APPENDIX  III 

WHAT   GERMANY    DOES    UNDER   THE    PEACE   TREATY 

(Summary  prepared  by  the  author  and  published  in  the 
New  York  Tribune  of  June  II,  1919.) 

Restores  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France. 

Accepts  the  internationalization  of  the  Saar  Basin  for 
fifteen  years  and  of  Danzig  permanently.  The  people  of 
the  Saar  Basin  are  to  decide  by  a  plebiscite,  taken  by 
districts,  whether  they  wish  to  be  annexed  to  Germany  or 
to  France  or  to  accept  control  by  the  League  of  Nations. 

Recognizes  the  full  sovereignty  of  Belgium  over  neutral 
Moresnet  and  cedes  to  Belgium  Prussian  Moresnet  and  the 
districts  of  Eupen  and  Malm^dy. 

Cedes  a  small  strip  of  upper  Silesia  to  Czecho-Slovakia. 
Cedes  the  rest  of  upper  Silesia  to  Poland,  but,  except  in 
certain  districts  in  the  north-eastern  corner,  ceded  uncondi- 
tionally to  Poland,  a  plebiscite  to  determine  nationality 
is  to  be  held  between  the  sixth  and  eighteenth  month 
after  the  signing  of  the  treaty. 

Cedes  to  the  principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  the 
district  of  Memel. 

Cedes  to  Poland  without  plebiscite  most  of  Posen  and 
portions  of  West  Prussia  and  Pomerania  west  of  the  Vistula 
and  of  West  Prussia  east  of  the  Vistula.  Parts  of  East 
Prussia  are  to  decide  by  vote  whether  they  wish  to  belong 
to  Prussia  01  Poland. 

Agrees  to  the  creation  of  three  zones  in  Schleswig  in 
which  the  inhabitants  are  to  decide,  by  districts,  whether 
they  are  to  belong  to  Prussia  or  Denmark. 

399 


400  Appendix  III 

Recognizes  the  independence  of  Austria  and  agrees  that 
this  independence  shall  be  inalienable  except  with  the 
consent  of  the  council  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Renounces  all  territorial  and  political  rights  outside 
Europe  as  to  her  own  or  her  allies'  territories,  and  especially 
to  Morocco,  Egypt,  Siam,  Liberia  and  Shantung. 

Reduces  her  army  within  three  months  to  200,000  men, 
with  reductions,  determined  by  the  Allies,  every  three 
months  thereafter,  reaching  a  minimum  of  100,000  by  March 
31,  1920. 

Abolishes  conscription  within  her  territories. 

Agrees  to  dismantle  all  forts  fifty  kilometres  east  of  the 
Rhine  within  six  months. 

Must  stop  all  importation,  exportation,  and  nearly  all 
production  of  war  material. 

Agrees  to  Allied  occupation  of  parts  of  Germany  for  fifteen 
years,  or  until  reparation  is  made,  with  the  understanding 
that  the  army  of  occupation  will  be  reduced  at  the  end  of 
each  of  three  five-year  periods,  if  Germany  is  fulfilling  her 
obligations. 

Agrees  that  any  violation  by  her  of  the  conditions  as  to 
the  zone  fifty  kilometres  east  of  the  Rhine  shall  be  regarded 
as  an  act  of  war. 

Reduces  her  navy  to  six  battleships,  six  light  cruisers, 
twelve  destroyers  and  twelve  torpedo  boats,  without  sub- 
marines, and  a  personnel  of  not  over  15,000. 

Must  surrender  or  destroy  all  other  war  vessels. 

Is  forbidden  to  build  forts  controlling  the  Baltic. 

Must  demolish  the  fortifications  of  Heligoland.  The 
fishing  harbour  is  not  to  be  destroyed. 

Must  open  the  Kiel  Canal  to  merchant  and  war  vessels 
of  all  nations  at  peace  with  her  and  surrender  her  fourteen 
submarine  cables. 

May  have  no  military  or  naval  air  forces,  except  100 
unarmed  seaplanes  until  October  1st  to  detect  mines,  and 
may  not  manufacture  or  import  aviation  material  for  six 
months. 


Appendix  III  401 

Accepts  full  responsibility  for  all  damages  caused  to  the 
Allied  and  Associated  governments  and  nationals. 

Agrees  specifically  to  reimburse  all  civilian  damages, 
beginning  with  an  initial  payment  of  the  equivalent  of 
20,000,000,000  marks,  subsequent  payments  to  be  secured 
by  bonds  to  be  issued  at  the  discretion  of  the  reparation 
commission.  Within  four  months  Germany  may  make 
proposals  regarding  the  manner  of  the  payment  of  her 
reparation  obligations.  Within  two  months  threafter 
the  Allied  Reparation  Commission  will  answer  such  pro- 
posals. The  commission  is  directed  to  make  a  final  deter- 
mination of  the  total  due  from  Germany  before  May  i ,  1 92 1 . 


INDEX 


Aerenthal,  2 

Aisne,   battle  of  the,    1914,    39; 

battle  of,  19 1 7, 268, 269 
Aisne- Marne  offensives,  1918, 327- 

341 
Albanian  campaign,  191 8,  368 
Albert  of  Belgium,  20,  22,  41,  350 
Albrecht  of  Wurttemberg,  23,  34, 

135.  137,  138,  I39,3H 
Alexander  of  Greece,  291 
Alexieff,  81,  84,  183,  257,  260 
Allenby,  41,  43/44,  141,  192,  278, 

293,  294,  372,  373,  374,  375,  377 
Alsace,  French  invasion  of,  19 14, 

*  24  . 

American  Expeditionary   Forces, 

384-387 
American  losses,  397 
America's  part  in  the  war,  382-392 
Ancona  case,  166,  237 
Antoine,  275,  276,  312 
Antwerp,  siege  of,  40,  41 
Anzacs  at  Gallipoli,  96-99 
Aosta,  Duke  of,  284 
Arabic  case,  165,  166,  237,  238 
Archduke  Joseph,  361 
Archer,  243 
Ardahan,  battle  of,  67 
Ardennes,   battle  of,    19 14,    26- 

28 
Argonne  offensive,  American,  19 18, 
,    352,353,356,357,386 

Armed    neutrality,"    American 

policy  of,  248 
Armenia,     campaigns     in.       See 

Asiatic  campaigns 
Armistice  preliminaries,  387-392 
Arnim,  324,  325,  326 
Arras,  battle  of,  1917,  266-268 
Artois,  battle  of,  1915,  139,  140, 

142 


Asiatic  campaigns  of  1914,  66-67; 
of  1915,  145-150;  of  1916,  220- 
224;  of  1917,  291-294;  of  1918, 

372-377 
Asquith,  234 
Auffenberg,  54,  55 
Australian  losses,  397 
Austro- Hungarian  losses,  397 
Austro- Hungarian   ultimatum   to 

Serbia,  2-8 
Avarescu,  216 


B 


Bagdad  expedition,  148-150,  291- 
293 

Baldwin,  98 

Balfour,  252 

Balkan  campaigns  of  1914,  60-62; 
of  1915,  121-132;  of  1916,  207- 
219;  of  1917,  290-291;  of  1918, 

367-371 
Baltic   Provinces,   relations  with 

Germany,  no,  245,  301,  302, 

303,  309 
Bapaume,  battle  of,  19 18, 346 
Beatty,  74, 152, 153, 154, 227, 228, 

229,  230,  231,  234 
Beginnings  of  the  war,  1-12 
Belgium,  invasion  of,  19-22;  Ger- 
man policy  in,  48,  49 
Belleau-Bouresches,     battle     of, 

1918,  330,  331 
Belligerents,  strength  of,   13-16; 

losses,  396,  397 
Below,  81,  82,  104,  107,  109,  261, 

284,  285,  286,  314,  345 
Berchtold,  5 
Bernhardi,  324,  325 
Bernstorff,  247,  248 
Berthelot,  337,  340,  352,  356 
Bethmann-Hollweg,    13,    17,    I9> 

246 


403 


404 


Index 


Bird  wood,  98,  350 

Bismarck,  207 

Bissing,  48 

Blockade,    Allied,    of     Germany, 

156-158 
Boehm-Ermolli,  84,  104 
Boehn,  337,  338,  339,  340,  345 
Bojadeff,  128 
Bolo  Pasha,  272 
Boroevic,  81,  104,  105,  205,  360, 

361,365 
Botha,  71,  150 
Bothmer,  186,  188,  189 
Brazil  enters  the  war,  251,  252 
Brest-Litovsk,  treaty  of,  299-302, 

304 

Brialmont,  21 

Briand,  271 

British  losses,  396,  397 

Bruchmuller,  326 

Brusati,  202 

Brusiloff,  54,  81,   105,   181,   183, 

184, 185,  187,  189,  203,  209,  259, 

260 
Bryan,  158,  163 
Bulfin,  374 

Bulgaria  enters  the  war,  124,  125 
Bulgarian  losses,  397 
Bullard,  356 
Bulow,  General,  22,  23,  29,    31, 

33,  35,  36,  39.  40,  135 
Bulow,  Prince,  113,  116,  117 
Byers,  71 
Byng,  140,  278,  279,  280,  281,  312, 

316,  318,  320,  345,  351 


Cadorna,  118,  119,  201,  202,  203, 
204,  205,  282,  283,  285,  287,  289 

Caillaux,  7,  272 

Cambrai,  battle  of,  277-281 

Cameron,  348 

Canadian  losses,  397 

Cantigny,  battle  of,  335,  385 

Capello,  283,  284,  285 

Caporetto,  battle  of,  284-287 

Carden,  88,  91 

Carey,  320,  321 

Carol  of  Rumania,  208 

Carpathians,  battle  of  the,  84,  85, 
86 

Castelnau,  de,  23,  25,  37,  40,  134, 
142,  170,  174,  312 


Casualties    of    belligerents,    396- 

398 
Caucasus  operations,  1914,  66,  67; 

1915,  147,  148;  1916,  220-222; 

1917,  293 

Cavan,  Earl  of,  363 

Caviglia,  364 

Chamberlain,  224 

Champagne,  French  offensive  in, 

1915,  135,  136,  141,  142;  1918, 

352,  356 
Channel  ports  offensive,   Luden- 

dorff's,  1918,  309-326 
Charleroi,  battle  of,  29 
Chateau-Thierry,  battle  of,  330, 

331 
Chauvel,  374 
China  enters  the  war,  393 
Churchill,  41 
Clemenceau,  271,  272 
Cobbe,  292 
Colonial  campaigns  of  19 14,  68- 

71;  of  1915,  150,  151;  of  1916, 

224,  225;  of  1917,294 
Conneau,  43 
Constantine  of  Greece,  122,  123, 

125,  126,  218,  219,  291 
Coronel^ battle  of,  75,  76 
Costa  Rica  enters  the  war,  252 
Cox,  97 

Craddock,  75,  76 
Crimea,  301 
Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  23,  24, 

34,  I35,3H 
Ctesiphon,  battle  of,  149-150 
Cuba  enters  the  war,  252 
Cushing  and  Gulflight  cases,  160, 

161,  162 
Czarina  of  Russia,  182,  253,  254 
Czecho-Slovakia,   recognition   of, 

305,  391 
Czecho-Slovaks  in   Siberia,   304- 

306 
Czernin,  299 


D'Amade,  26,  32,  91 
Dankl,  54,  55,  81,  104,  107 
Dardanelles-Gallipoli     campaign, 

87-102 
Debeney,  319,  322,  342,  351,  356 
Declarations   of   War,    dates   of, 

249,  251,  252,  393-395 


Index 


405 


Defeatist  intrigues  in  France,  271 , 

272 
Degoutte,  338,  340,  350,  354 
Deimling,  24 
Delcasse\  127 
De  Lisle,  1 01,  280 
Demange,  171 
De  Mitry,  44,  324,  325,  336,  339, 

340,385 
Deprez,  171 
D'Esperey,  34,  36,  131,  134,  Ifl. 

312,367,368,370,371 
Deutschland,  submarine,  241,  242 
De  Wet,  70,  71 

Diaz,  287,  359,  360,  362,  363,  364 
Dickman,  348 

Dimitrieff,  81,  104,  105,  168 
Djemal  Pasha,  145,  146, 147,  377 
Dogger  Bank,  battle  of,  152-154 
D'Oissel,  170 

Dubail,  23,  25,  37,  134,  171 
Dunajec,  battle  of  the,  104,  105 
D'Urbal,  134 
Duval,  272 


B 


Egypt,  British  protectorate  de- 
clared, 65,  147;  Turkish  in- 
vasion of,  145-147 

Eichhorn,  81,  82,  83,  303 

Einem,  135 

Emden,  exploits  of,  78 

Entente  Alliance,  strength  of,  13- 

17 

Enver  Pasha,  63,  64,  66,  67,  377 
Erzerum,     Russian    capture    of, 

220,  221 
Erzingan,  Russian  capture  of,  221 
Eugene  of  Austria,  81,  84,   104, 

285,  286 
Evert,  183,  184 


Falaba,  sinking  of,  160,  163 
Falkenhausen,  48,  135 
Falkenhayn,  109,   168,   169,   170, 

171, 172, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 

199,  202,  214,  215,  216,  217, 

242,  262 
Falkland  Islands,  battle  of,  77,  78 
Fayolle,  170,  195,  196,  197,  198, 

288,  312,  322 


Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  122,  123, 

124,  370 
Festubert,  battle  of,  1915,  140 
Finland,  261,  300,  301,  302,  303, 

307,  309 
Fisher,  88,  234 
Fitz-Clarence,  46 
Flanders,  battle  of,  19 14,  43-48; 

19 1 7,  274-277;  Allied  offensive 

in,  1918,350,354 
Foch,  29,  34,  36,  41,  46,  47,  139. 

170, 266,  269,  289, 309,  320, 321, 

327,  328,  329,  330,  332,  333,  334, 

335,  337,  338,  341. 342,  344,  345. 

347,  349,  353,  385,  $86,  391 
Foch's  victory  offensive,  337-358 
"Fourteen     Points,"     President 

Wilson's,  358,  387-392 
Francis  Ferdinand,  1,  2 
Francis  Joseph,  1 
Frederick,  of  Austria,  1 10 
French  casualties,  396,  397 
French,  Viscount,  30,  41,  45,  46, 

134,  136,  140,  143 


Gaede,  135 

Gallipoli  campaign,  93-102 

Gallwitz,  128,  129,  311 

Garrison,  241 

Gerard,  164 

Gerard,  171 

German  casualties,  396,  397 

German  colonies,  loss  of,  68-71, 

150-151 

German  East  Africa,  conquest  of, 
151,  224,  225,  294 

German  peace  offer,  1916,246 

German  Southwest  Africa,  con- 
quest of ,  70-71,  150 

German  strategy,  development  of, 
17,  18 

Giardino,  364 

Giesl,  8 

Giolitti,  117 

Godley,  97 

Goeben  and  Brcslau,  64,  73,  74 

Golz,  92 

Gore  resolution,  241 

Goringe,  149 

Gorizia,  fight  for,  118,  204-206 

Gorky,  302 

Goschen,  Sir  Edward,  13 


406 


Index 


Gough,  192,  275,  312,  316,  317, 

318,  320,  321 
Gouraud,  171, 336, 352, 356, 385 
Gourko,  85,  103,  183,  258,  259 
Grand  Duke  Michael,  254 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  56,  83,  85, 

109,  181,  220,  222 
Grand  Duke  of  Wurttemberg,  23, 

34,  135,  137,  138,  I39,3H 
Grant,  320 
Graziani,  363 
Great   Britain's   casualties,    396, 

397 
Greece,  Entente  relations   with, 
1915,  125-127;  1916,  218-219; 

191 7,  291;  losses,  396 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  9,  11 
Grodek  Lakes,  battle  of,  106 
Guatemala  enters  the  war,  252 
Gueprette,  91 

Guillaumat,  174,  290,  356,  366 
Gulflight  and  Cashing  cases,  160, 

161,   162 
Gumbinnen,  battle  of,  52 

H 

Haig,  31,  41,  42,  43,  44,  45,  47, 

134,  143,  194,  195,  199,  263, 
268,  274,  277,  278,  279,  281, 
310,  311,  312,  317,  3i8,  319, 
324,  325,  335,  342,  345,  350, 
353,  354,  355,  386 

Haiti  enters  the  war,  252 

Hamilton,  90,  91,  92,  93,  94,  95, 
96,  98,  100,  101,  102 

Hardinge,  224 

Hausen,  23,  29,  34,  35,  36 

Havrincourt-Ep£hy,     battle     of, 

1918,  347 
Hay,  241 

Hedjaz,    Arabian    kingdom    pro- 
claimed, 147 
Heeringen,  24,  135 
Heligoland,     naval     engagement 

off,  74 

Heir,  171,  172 

Hertling,  391 

Hindenburg,  53,  56,  57,  58,  81, 
82,  83,  107,  109,  no,  180,  183, 
188,  189,  192,  199,  214,  245, 
262,  263,  264,  265,  269,  310,  344 

Hindenburg  Line,  200,  263,  265, 
268,  278,  280,  281,  344,  346, 
347,  350,  351,  386 


Hindenburg  retreat,    19 17,   262- 

266 
Hipper,  153,  154,  227 
Hirschauer,  347 
Hoetzendorff,    56,   57,    119,   202, 

203,  204,  284,  286,  288,  289, 

360,  361 
Hoffmann,  108,  299,  300,  301 
Holy  War,  declared  by  Sheik-ul- 

Islam,  65 
Honduras  enters  the  war,  252 
Hood,  229,  230 
Home,  312,  319,  323 
Hoyos,  5 
Humbert,   French   General,    135, 

141,   171,   191,  318,   319,   320, 

344,  345 
Humbert,  French  Senator,  272 
Hunding  Line,  356 
Hutier,  314,  320,  322,  332,  333, 

336,  342 


I 


Isonzo,  battles  of  the,  282-284 
Italian  campaign  of   19 15,    118- 
120;  of  1916,  201-206;  of  1917, 
282-289;  of  1918, 359-366 
Italian  casualties,  396,  397 
Italy  enters  the  war,  112-118 
Ivanoff,  54,  55 


Jadar,  battle  of  the,  19 14,  61 
Jagow,  6,  163,  164,  238, 239 
Japanese  campaign  in  Kiao-chau, 

68,69 
Jellicoe,  228,  229,  230,  231,  233, 

234 
Jerusalem,  fall  of,  294 
Joffre,  24,  26,  27,  29,  30,  32,  34, 

36, 37, 39, 40, 134, 135, 139, 143, 

191,  192,  252 
Johnston,  97 
Jonnart,  291 
Joseph  Ferdinand,  of  Austria,  81, 

104,  105,  107,  183,  185,  186 
Jugo-Slavia,  recognition  of,  392 
Jutland,  battle  of,  226-234 


K 


Kabil  Bey,  147 

Kaledin,  185,  186,  188,  261,  304 


Index 


407 


Kamerun,  conquest  of,  70,   150, 

151 

Kara-Ourgan,  battle  of,  67 
Karl,  of  Austria,  202,  360,  365 
Kerensky,  255,  256,  257,  258,  259, 

260,261,291,304 
Kitchener,  89,  91,  102,  235 
Kluck,  22, 23, 29, 31 ,  32, 33, 34, 35, 

36,  37,  39,  40,  135 
Koevess,  128 

Korniloff,  105,  257,  259,  260 
Krasnik,  battle  of,  54 
Krasnotow,  battle  of,  107 
Kriemhilde  Line,  356 
Krithia,  battle  of,  95,  96 
Krobatin,  285,  286,  288 
Kuchbach,  361,  362 
Kuhlmann,  300 
Kuprikeui,  battle  of,  221 
Kuropatkin,  183,  184,  258 
Kusmanek,  81,  85 
Kut-el-Amara,    capture     of,    by 

British,  149;  siege  of,  by  Turks, 

150;  recapture  of,  by   British, 

222-224,  292 


Lake,  222,  223,  224 

Lambros,  218 

Langle  de  Cary,  de,  23,  34,  134, 

170,  173,  177 
Lanrezac,  23,  26,  28,  29 
Lansing,  239,  243,  244,  391 
Lassigny  drive,  191 8,  332,  333 
Le  Cateau,  battle  of,  1914,  30,  31 ; 

battle  of,  1918,  353 
Lechitsky,  183,  185,  186,  187,  189, 

260 
Leelanaw  case,  164 
Leman,  21 

Lemberg,  battle  of,  54,  55 ;  recap- 
ture by  Mackensen,  106 
Lenine,  256,  257,  261,  300,  301, 

304,  307 
Leopold  of  Bavaria,  107,  108,  no, 

183 
Lerchenfeld,  5 
Lesh,  184,  185,  188 
Ley  marie,  272 
Liberia  enters  the  war,  252 
Lichnowsky,  4,  5,  9 
Liege,  siege  of,  20-22 
Liggett,  348 
Linsingen,  84,  104,  105,  107,  no 


Lithuania,  300,  301,  302,  303,  309 

Lodz,  battle  of,  57 

Long, 253 

Loos,  battle  of ,  1915,  142,  143 

Lorraine,  French  invasion  of, 
19 1 4,  24,  25 

Ludendorff,  108,  118,  170,  245, 
246,  257,  260,  261,  262,  266, 
273,  277,  280,  295,  299,  302, 
309,  310,  3",  313,  314,  3'6, 
320, 32 1 ,  322, 325, 326,  327, 329, 
331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 338, 339, 
340, 341,  343, 344, 345, 34$,  347, 
354.  355,  356,  358,  36o,  385,  386 

Ludendorff 's  West  Front  offen- 
sives, 1918,  for  the  Channel 
ports,  309-326;  for  Paris,  327- 

337 
Lusitania  case,  161-166,  237,  382 
Lvoff,  254,  255,  256,  258,  259,  304 
Lyautey,  271 
Lys  Valley  offensive,  Ludendorff 's, 

1918,  322-326 


M 


Mackensen,  57,  81,  82,  103,  104, 
105,  106,  107,  108,  no,  124, 
127, 128, 129, 213,  214,  215, 216, 
217,  242 

McLemore  resolution,  241 

Maitre,  273 

Mallterre,  133 

Malvy,  271,  272 

Mangin,  179,  332,  337,  338,  340, 
345,  352,  356,  386 

Maritz,  70,  71 

Marne,  battle  of  the,  1914,  33-37 

Marshall,  292,  293,  377 

Marwitz,  35,37,  104,  314 

Maubeuge,  siege  of,  30 

Maude,  224,  291,  292,  293 

Maud'huy,  40,  41,  134,  141 

Maunoury,  27,  29,  33,  34,  35,  39, 

Maurice,  31,  324 

Max  of  Baden,  358,  391 

Mazurian  Lakes,  battle  of,  82 

Mertens,  93 

Mesopotamian  campaigns,  1914, 
67;  1915,  148-150;  1916,  222- 
224;  1917,  291-293;  1918,  377 

Meuse-Argonne  campaign,  Amer- 
ican, 1918,  352,  353,  356,  357 

Micheler,  170,  191,  196,  197 


408 


Index 


Michitch,  129,  369 

Military    losses    of    belligerents, 

396-398 
Milne,  369,  370 
Milyukoff,  255 
Mirbach,  307 
Mittel-Europa,  no,  in,  132,  302, 

303,  307,  308 
Moltke,  the  Elder,  19 
Moltke,  the  Younger,  6,  30,  33, 

38,  41,  44,  47,  170 
Monro,  102 
Mons,  battle  of,  29 
Morgenthau,  5,  93,  145 
Morhange,  battle  of,  25 
Mount  Kemmel,  battles  of,  324, 

325.  386 
Muhlon,  5,  7 


N 


Namur,  siege  of,  22,  29 
Naval  losses,  German,  380,  381 
Naval   operations,    19 14,    72-79; 

1915,  152-155;  1916,  226-236; 

1917,  295-298;  1918,  378-381 
Naval    "war    zone"    correspon- 
dence  between  Germany   and 

United  States,  157-160 
Nebraskan  case,  162,  164 
Neutral  rights  at  sea,    156-167, 

237-244 
Neuve  Chapelle,  battle  of,  1915, 

136,  137 
Nevinson,  98 
"Nibbling,"    Joffre's    policy    of, 

133-144 
Nicaragua  enters  the  war,  252 
Nicholas  II,  50,  109,  182,  183,254 
Nivelle,  177,  178,  179,  268,  269, 

270 
Nixon,  223 
Numbers  in  the  war,  13-17 


O 


Oppy  Line,  267,  268 
Orduna  case,  164 


Painlev6,  269,  271 

Palestine  campaign  of  191 7,  294; 

of  1918,  372-377 
Panama  enters  the  war,  252 


Pau,  24 

Peace  treaty  with  Germany,  ab- 
stract of,  399-401 

Pecori-Giraldi,  202 

Pelte,  318 

Pershing,  347,  353,  357 

Persius,  233 

P6tain,  139,  140,  141,  171,  174, 
176,  177,  269,  270,  273,  312,  318 

Pflanzer,  104,  107 

Piave,  first  battle  of  the,  191 7, 
287-289;  second  battle  of  the, 
1918,  361-363 

Plumer,  274,  275,  276,  312,  319, 

Poincard,  7 

Poland,  relations  with  Germany, 

no,  1 11, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 

308,  309 
Pollen,  229 
Portugal's  entry  into  the  war,  225; 

losses,  396 
Pou,  240 
Pourtales,  9 
Prasnyz,  battle  of,  83 
Protopopoff,  182,  253,  254 
Przemysl,  siege  of,  55,  56,  57,  84, 

85;  recapture  of,  105 
Pulteney,  43 
Putnik,  61,  62 
Putz,  135 


Qu£ant-Drocourt  Line,  267 

R 

"Race  for  the  Sea, "  1914,  38-49 

Radoslavov,  124 

Rasputin,  182,  253 

Rawa  River,  battle  of,  82 

Rawa-Russka,  battle  of,  1914,  55 

Rawlinson,  41,  42,  44,  192,  342 

Read,  351 

Rennenkampf,  52,  53 

Ribot,  271 

Riga,  capture  of,  260,  261;  naval 

battle  of,  154 
Robeck,  de,  91,  92,  93 
Roques,  135 
Ruffey,  23 
Rumania,  enters  the  war,  207-210; 

conquest   of,    210-217;    treaty 

with  Entente,  209,  210;  with  the 

Teuton  powers,  303 


Index 


409 


Rumanian  casualties,  396 
Rupprecht  of  Bavaria,  24, 40,  135, 

3" 
Russia,  dismemberment  of,  299- 

308 
Russian  casualties,  306,  397 
Russian  offensive  of  10 14,  50-59; 

of  1916,  181-190;  of  1917,  259, 

260 
Russian  retreat  of  1 9 1 5 , 1 03- 1 1 1 
Russian  Revolution,  253-261 
Russian  winter  campaign,   1915, 

80-86 
Russky,  54,  55,  81,  82 


St.  Mihiel,  German  capture  of, 
1914,  39;  battle  of,  1918,  347- 

_,  349,  386 

St.  Quentin,  battle  of,  1918,  311- 
321 

Sakharoff,  185,  186,  188,  215,  216 

Salandra,  115,  117 

Salonica  expedition,  126 

Sambre,  battle  of  the,  19 18,  355, 

0356      - 

Samsonoff,  52,  53 

Sanders,  373,  375 

San  Giuliano,  115 

Sari-Bahr,  battle  of,  97-99 

Sarrail,  33,  34,  102,  130,  131,  134, 
141,  212,  217,  290 

Sarrebourg,  battle  of,  25 

Sarykamitch,  battle  of,  67 

Sazonoff,  8,  9 

Scarpe,  battle  of  the,  346,  347 

Scherbatcheff,  185,  186,  188,  189 

Scherr,  226,  228,  229,  231 

Scheuchenstuel,  360 

Schlieffen,  22,  36,  37,  106 

Scholz,  81,  83 

Schreiner,  93 

Selective  Service  Act,  United 
States,  251,  383 

Selivanoff,  81 

Selle  River,  battle  of  the,  354,  355 

Serajevo,  assassinations  at,  1-4 

Serbia,  Austro-Hungarian  inva- 
sion of,  1914,  60-62;  conquest 
of,  1915,  121-132;  losses,  396 

Severances  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, 395 

Shipping  losses  through  sub- 
marines, 236,  295-297,  379 


Siberia,  Allied  occupation  of,  305, 

306 
Sievers,  82 
Sims,  298 
Skouloudis,  218 

Smith- Dorrien,  30, 31, 43, 134, 224 
Smuts,  224 

Soissons,  battle  of,  1915,  135 
Somme,  battle  of  the,  1916,  191- 

200;supplementary  battle  of  the, 

19 1 7,  263-265 
Sonnino,  115 
Sordet,  32 

South  African  rebellion,  70, 71 
Spee,  75,  76 
Stegemann,  38 
Stopford,  99,  100,  101 
Stranz,  135 
Strategy  of  Entente  Powers,  18; 

of  Teuton  Powers,  17,  18 
Strauss,  379 
Sturdee,  77 
Stunner,  182 
Submarine   operations,    79,    236, 

295-297,  379 
Submarine  policy,  German,  156- 

167,  237-243,  245-251 
Suez  Canal,  Turkish  attack  on, 

146-147 
Sussex  case,   237-239,   242,   246, 

247,  295 
Suvla  Bay,  battle  of,  97,  99-101 

Szapary,  8 


Taalat  Pasha,  63,  64,  377 
Tannenberg,  battle  of,  53 
Teuton  Alliance,  strength  of,  13, 

17 

Theodoroff,  128,  129 
Thomas,  229 
Tirpitz,  72,  295 
Togo,  capture  of,  70 
Townshend,  148,  149,    150,   222, 

223,  293 
Treaty  of  London,  116,  117 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  summary  of, 

399-401 
Trench  warfare,  cycle  of,  143-144 
Triple  Alliance  treaty,  3,  1 12,  1 14, 

115 
Trotzky,  257,  300,  301,  304 
Tsingtau,  siege  of,  69 


4io 


Index 


Turkey,  entry  into  the  war,  63-67 ; 

losses,  396 
Turkish    campaigns.     See     Dar- 

danelles-Gallipoli    and    Asiatic 

Campaigns 


U 


Ukraine,  the,  261,  300,  301,  302, 

303.309  ,    , 

United  States,  declares  war  on 
Germany,  249-252;  military 
and  naval  losses,  397;  part  in 
the  war,  382-392;  relations 
with  Germany,  191 5,  156-167; 
1916,  237-244;  1917,  235-252; 
strength  of  military  and  naval 
forces,  383 


Venizelos,  122,  123,  125,  126,  218, 

291 
Verdun,  battle  of,  1916,  168-180; 

1917.  273 

Victor  Emmanuel,  117,  205 
Villaret,  171 
Vincent,  280 
Virton,  battle  of,  27 
Vittorio-Veneto,   battle  of,   364- 

366 
Viviani,  7,  127,  252 


W 


Wangenheim,  5 ,  63,  73,  92 

Warsaw,  fall  of,  108 

Weddigen,  79 

Western  Front  operations,  1915, 
133-144;  1916,  168-180,  191- 
200;  1917,  262-281;  1918,  309- 
358 

William  P.  Frye  case,  165 

William  II,  5,  6,  50,  72,  122,  173, 
245,246,310,391 

Wilson,  General,  289 

Wilson,  President,  240,  241,  242, 
243,  244,  246,  247,  248,  249, 
250,  358,  382,  383,  387,  391 

Woyrsch,  104,  107 

Wurm,  361 


Ypres,    battle   of,    19 14.    45~47; 

battle  of,  1915.  137-139 
Yser,  battle  of  the,  44,  45 
Yudenitch,  220,  221 


Zaimis,  125,  126,  218 
Zurlinden,  212,  270,  312 


A  Selection  from  the 
Catalogue  of 

C.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


Complete   Catalogues   sent 
on  application 


The  World  War 

And  Its  Consequences 

By 

William  Herbert  Hobbs 

With  an  Introduction  by 

Theodore  Roosevelt 


Theodore  Roosevelt  said,  after  a 
careful  reading  of  the  Manuscript:  "It 
is  the  literal  truth,  that  if  I  could  choose 
only  one  book  to  be  put  in  the  hand  of 
every  man  and  woman  in  the  United 
States,  I  would  choose  the  book  of 
Professor  Hobbs." 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


The  Yankee  in  the 
British  Zone 

By 

Captain  Ewen  G.  MacVeagh 

and 

Lieutenant  Lee  D.  Brown 

How  aid  Tommy  Atkins  and  the  Yank 
get  on?  How  did  they  impress  each 
other?  What  did  they  learn  about  each 
other? 

That  is  what  this  book  answers.  It  is 
not  a  war  book ;  it  is  rather  a  study  in 
the  psychology  of  the  average  man,  Brit- 
ish and  American;  and  it  is  the  first 
intimate  story  of  the  Anglo-American 
relations. 

Written  by  two  trained  observers  it 
sets  forth  a  wealth  of  anecdotes,  many 
grotesquely  funny,  and  illustrative  "hu- 
man interest "  stories  and  incidents. 


"Wade  in,  Sanitary!" 

The  Story  of  a  Division  Surgeon 
in    France 


*y 
Richard  Derby 

Lt.-Col.  M.  C,  U.  S.  A.,  Division  Surgeon,  Second  Division 

This  is  a  surgeon's  story  of  the  war— 
of  that  life  and  death  humanly  dramatic 
portion  of  the  war  in  which  the  doctors 
in  khaki  played  their  great  part. 

The  book  is  far  more  than  a  mere  ac- 
count of  war  experiences.  It  is  the  first 
complete  and  authoritative  picture  of  the 
struggle  from  the  surgeon's  side.  Though 
non-technical  in  style  and  thoroughly 
popular,  it  points  out  many  of  the  lessons 
of  the  war  from  the  medical  standpoint 
of  interest  to  every  physician  and  every 
thinking  citizen. 

To  after  the  war  literature  the  book  is 
a  highly  valuable  addition  of  absorbing 
interest. 


Average  Americans 

Theodore  Roosevelt 

Lieutenant  Colonel,  U.  S.  A. 

12°  Photogravure  Fronds,     10  Other  Illustrations 

Colonel  Roosevelt  was  with  the  first  di- 
vision abroad,  fought  in  the  first  battle  after 
America's  entry,  was  wounded,  promoted, 
and  was  with  the  first  troops  across  the 
bridgehead.  He  saw  "  the  big  show  M  from 
first  to  last,  and  he  pictures  it  with  clear-cut, 
graphic  force. 

At  the  outset  is  given  an  intimate  picture 
of  the  Roosevelt  home  life.  "My  Father 
and  Mother  believed  in  robust  righteous- 
ness," says  the  present  Colonel,  and  the 
meaning  and  need  of  it  was  inbred  in  all  the 
family.  The  part  played  by  the  elder  Colonel 
Roosevelt  in  awakening  the  country  to  the 
need  of  preparedness  and  the  reactions  of 
the  war  upon  him,  as  expressed  in  letters  to 
his  sons,  is  developed. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  paints  a  vivid  picture, 
and  not  a  pleasant  one,  of  the  needless  cost 
to  America  of  unpreparedness  and  incom- 
petency— a  cost  chiefly  paid  by  the  men  who 
fought  in  France. 

The  lessons  of  the  war,  the  author  treats 
with  refreshingly  robust  candor.  His  views 
are  those  of  a  clear  thinking  patriot — views 
of  vital  interest  to  every  real  -American. 


& 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


